THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF PHILIP THE THIRD, KING OF SPAIN.

THE FIRST FOUR BOOKS.

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THE TWO LAST

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THE firſt four books of this volume, which contain the progreſs of the war in the Netherlands, the eſtabliſhment of the truce with the Dutch, and the expulſion of the Moreſcoes from Spain, are printed literally from the manuſcript of Dr. Watſon: nor has the ſmalleſt alteration been made, either in the arrangement of his matter, or in his ſtyle. It is, however, but juſtice to the memory of that author, as well as to the public, to acknowledge, that, in the two laſt, he had not the leaſt participation. Theſe were written by the editor of Dr. Watſon's manuſcript, at the deſire of the guardians of his children. This was deemed an attention due to the curioſity of the reader; a curioſity which, in the preſent important era, may be ſuppoſed to be ſomewhat enlivened by the great events which have lately happened in the world.

It is evident that Dr. Watſon has exerted in this work all that care to diſcover the truth, which diſtinguiſhes his Hiſtory of Philip II. He has conſulted the moſt approved writers on this ſubject: and by that reſpectable friend to literature, the Earl of HARDWICKE, he was favored with manuſcripts of equal authority and importance.

The continuator of Dr. Watſon's narrative has

not thought it proper to give a detail of thoſe hoſtile operations at ſea, which were continued, beyond the line, even after the pacification of Antwerp. Theſe operations, in his opinion enter into the Spaniſh Hiſtory, by the moſt natural connexion, at the expiration of the truce; when the Spaniſh miniſters compared the advantages and diſadvantages that had reſulted from that engagement, and deliberatedw hether they ſhould prolong the peace, or renew the war.

The conferences now firſt publiſhed, between the Spaniſh and Engliſh commiſſioners, for effecting a peace between their reſpective nations, at London, in 1604, were carried on with extraordinary ability, decorum, and dignity, on both ſides: and they ſerve not only to gratify a curioſity relative to their particular ſubject, but alſo, to throw light on the intereſts and views of the courts of London and Madrid, at that time; on the ſtate of commerce; and the ſentiments, manners, and general character of the age.

THE

THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF PHILIP THE THIRD, KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK I.

PHILIP the Third, King of Spain, ſon of Philip the Second, and of Anne of Auſtria, daughter of Maximilian II. Emperor of Germany, was in the 21ſt year of his age at his acceſſion to the throne. He was a prince of a character extremely oppoſite to that of the late king, although no pains had been ſpared to form him to a ſimilarity of manners. From the inſtructions delivered to thoſe who had the charge of his education, it appears [1] to have been a principal object of his father's attention, to inſpire him with the ſame bigoted attachment to the ſuperſtition of the church of Rome, by which he himſelf had been actuated; and the means which he employed for this end, were attended with the deſired ſucceſs. But he was not equally ſucceſsful

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[1] Hiſtoria de la vida y hechos, del inclito monarcha D. Felippe tercero. Por Gil Gon. Davila, Croniſta de los Sennores Reyes D. Felippe III. y IV. lib. i. cap. 6.

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in his endeavours to overcome that averſion which his ſon, from the natural indolence of his temper, early diſcovered to almoſt every ſpecies of manly exertion and activity [2].

With this part of the young prince's character, Philip was well acquainted; and foreſaw, with much anxiety, the unhappy conſequences which it was likely to produce in his future reign. In order to introduce and habituate him to the management of public affairs, he formed a council of his ableſt and moſt experienced miniſters, who, in the preſence of the prince, debated three times a week, concerning various important matters relating to the adminiſtration of the kingdom; and the prince was required to preſide in this council, and to report the opinion of the majority to the king [3]. But neither this, nor any other expedient which Loiſa, the prince's faithful preceptor, could deviſe, proved effectual for the purpoſe for which it was intended. Inactivity or indolence ſtill remained the moſt conſpicuous feature in his character; and it early excited in the king, a ſtrong and well grounded apprehenſion that his ſon, unable or unwilling himſelf to hold the reins of government, would ſurrender them into the hands of the marquis of Denia, or of ſome other favorite. Againſt this conduct, which is ſo commonly attended with the moſt pernicious conſequences, Philip had often put the young

[2] Addiciones à la Hiſtoria del Marques Virgilio Malvezzi. Yanez, Memorias, p. 136.

[3] Davila, lib. i. cap. x.

prince upon his guard; and it was his laſt advice to him, which he delivered with great earneſtneſs, a few hours before his death, that he ſhould govern his kingdom by himſelf. He had likewiſe requeſted of him to employ, as his principal counſellors, Don Chriſtopher de Moura, marquis of Caſtel Rodrigo, and Don John Idiaquez; from whoſe experience, fidelity, and great abilities, he might derive the higheſt advantages, eſpecially in the beginning of his reign [4].

The ſoft and gentle temper of the prince had hitherto rendered him extremely obſequious to his father's will [5]: but, conſcious of his incapa-

[4] Gon. Davila, lib. i. cap. 12. Porreno, Dichos y Hechos, paſſim. It was a ſaying of Philip's concerning his ſon, Que era mas para ſer mandado, que mandar. Addiciones de Malvezzi.

[5] The author of "Addiciones à la Hiſtoria del Marques Virgilio Malvezzi," gives the following ſingular inſtance of the truth of this aſſertion. Philip II. intending that his ſon ſhould marry one of the daughters of Charles, archduke of Auſtria, and having ſent for the pictures of theſe princeſſes, he one day, in preſence of his daughter Iſabella and ſeveral of his miniſters, deſired the young prince to examine the pictures, and make his choice of the princeſs, whom he would prefer for his wife. Philip, with his uſual deference and humility, ſubmitted his choice to the king. The king remonſtrated with him on the impropriety of requeſting any other perſon to judge for him, in this matter, in which his own taſte alone ought to be conſulted, and deſired him to carry the pictures to his own apartment, where he might carefully examine them and fix his choice. I have no choice, replied the prince, but your majeſty's pleaſure, and I am certain that that princeſs will appear to me the beſt and the moſt beautiful whom your majeſty ſhall prefer. p. 137.

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city; and prompted by his indolence, he no ſooner mounted the throne, than, diſregarding the counſels which had been given him, he reſolved to avoid the perplexity which might attend his having recourſe, on any occaſion, to different counſellors, and therefore committed the whole adminiſtration of affairs to his favorite the marquis of Denia.

The marquis del Caſtel Rodrigo, in whom Philip II. had long repoſed the moſt perfect confidence, was honorably diſmiſſed from court, and appointed viceroy of Portugal [6]. Idiaquez had the preſidency of the military orders conferred upon him; and being of a leſs ambitious, and more complying temper than Caſtel Rodrigo, and willing to act in an inferior or ſubordinate capacity, he was ſuffered to remain, and occaſionally conſulted, on account of his long experience and the high character which he held for prudence and ſagacity [7]. But all power was lodged in the hands of the favorite, who, having been chief equerry to the king, before his acceſſion to the throne, and having in that ſtation had frequent acceſs to his perſon, had gained his affections, and acquired an entire aſcendant over him.

He was inſtantly created duke of Lerma, and admitted into the council of ſtate: after which, the king tranſmitted edicts to all the councils in the kingdom, requiring obedience to whatever orders ſhould be communicated to them in his name by the duke [8].

[6] Davila, p. 36. [7] Ibid. p. 37.
[8] Ibid. p. 41.

This determined partiality, which Philip was at no pains to conceal, occaſioned a general diſcontent. The grandees of the firſt rank were filled with indignation, when they beheld one whom they had been accuſtomed to regard as their inferior, inveſted with ſuch unlimited authority; and all ranks of men, judging from former inſtances of the ſame nature, dreaded an unproſperous and unquiet reign. Their complaints were the louder and the more generally diffuſed, as the duke of Lerma was utterly unpractiſed in the affairs of government, and had not yet given any proof of merit or abilities. It was a demonſtration, they thought, of extreme weakneſs in the character of the king, ſo avowedly, and in contradiction to the advice and example of his father, whoſe memory they revered, to declare his choice of a favorite; and they apprehended that, on trial, the character of this favorite would be found, in this reſpect, too nearly ſimilar to his own [9]. Their apprehenſions were not without foundation. By his courteouſneſs and affability, the duke impoſed on the penetration of many of thoſe who approached him; and, by diſcovering on all occaſions the moſt devoted attachment to the church, he conciliated the favor of the eccleſiaſtics, but it ſoon appeared that his views and abilities were extremely limited; and that he neither poſſeſſed the economy, the firmneſs, or the capacity requiſite for the difficult and important charge with which he was intruſted [10].

[9] Vide Addiciones to Malvezzi, p. 144.

[10] Mayerne Turquet, p. 1295.

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It was peculiarly unfortunate for the Spaniſh monarchy to have the helm of government committed to ſuch weak hands at the preſent period. The late king indeed had foreſeen, and, in ſome meaſure, provided for this event, by the peace which he had concluded with France, and the reſignation of his ſovereignty in the Netherlands; which he hoped would put an end to the war in that country, and prove the means of recovering the revolted provinces. He had likewiſe left all his other dominions, not only in Spain, but in Italy, and in the new world, in the enjoyment of peace; and Portugal, now accuſtomed to the yoke, yielded a ready obedience to his authority.

But although Philip II. through the vigilance and vigor of his adminiſtration, had left his dominions every where, except the Netherlands, in the enjoyment of internal tranquillity, he had not left them in a flouriſhing condition. On the contrary, Spain, his place of reſidence, and his ſeat of empire, was greatly exhauſted, and ſome of the principal ſources of her opulence and proſperity were dried up.

By the war in which he had made ſo many great exertions, both by ſea and land, and, ſtill more, perhaps, by the migration of the people to the new world, the inhabitants of Spain were greatly reduced in number. All emoluments and honors which the ſovereign could beſtow, had, for ages paſt, been divided between the military and the eccleſiaſtical profeſſions. By this means, the mechanic arts and agriculture, having come

to be regarded as comparatively mean and deſpicable, were alike abandoned by the indolent or inactive, and by thoſe who were endued with a ſpirit of ambition and enterpriſe. This contempt, and the conſequent neglect of the more uſeful arts, the profits ariſing from which, though ſure, are always moderate, was heightened by the frequent inſtances of enormous fortunes, ſuddenly acquired by the adventurers in America. That proportion of the riches ariſing from the American mines, which the ſovereign received, was ſpent either in thoſe countries in which his wars were carried on, or in purchaſing naval and military ſtores from other nations. The greater part of what was imported by merchants and other individuals was laid out in England, Italy, and the Netherlands, for manufactures, which the colonies required, but which Spain was become unable to ſupply; and the remainder was drained off by taxes which the king had, from time to time, been neceſſitated to impoſe. From this ſcarcity of money; from the want of manufactures; from the neglect of agriculture, joined to the numberleſs loſſes ſuſtained at ſea, where Philip had been almoſt always foiled by his enemies, trade of every kind was reduced to the loweſt ebb; and ſo great was the conſequent diſorder in the finances, that, beſides a debt of 140 millions of ducats which he left upon the crown, he had been obliged to have recourſe to the diſgraceful expedient of employing eccleſiaſtics to go from houſe to houſe, to receive from his ſubjects in

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Spain ſuch aſſiſtance, as they were willing to afford; a meaſure which was not attended with the advantage which he had expected to derive from it, while it contributed to ſink his reputation in Spain, as his refuſal to pay the intereſt of his foreign debt, before related, had already done in the reſt of Europe [11].

The danger to which the Spaniſh monarchy was expoſed, from that debility to which it was reduced at the preſent period, was the more to be dreaded, becauſe many parts of this widely extended empire were removed to ſo great a diſtance from the ſeat of government; and nothing, there was ground to believe, could avert the impending ruin, but a vigorous exertion of the higheſt abilities, joined to the moſt rigid and judicious economy. It was likewiſe obviouſly neceſſary that peace ſhould inſtantly have been eſtabliſhed with the maritime powers; who, having for ſeveral years paſt, held the ſovereignty of the ſeas, ſeemed to poſſeſs ſufficient naval force entirely to deſtroy the Spaniſh trade, and to cut off all communication between the mother country and her colonies.

But the duke of Lerma was equally incapable of diſcerning this danger, and of providing againſt it. As he had ſeen the difficulties in which the late king was involved, through the diſorder of his finances, and could not be ignorant of the exhauſted condition of the kingdom, it might have been expected, that one of the firſt objects

[11] Gon. Davila, p. 25.

of his attention would have been to retrench the unneceſſary expenſes of the court, by attempting, if practicable, to reduce the number of ſuperfluous offices, to which, in times of greater proſperity, the vanity of former kings had given birth. But inſtead of this, he greatly multiplied ſuch ſort of offices [12]; and, in the very infancy of his adminiſtration, gave other ſignal proofs of the degree of profuſion which would have been unjuſtifiable, had the kingdom been in the moſt flouriſhing condition.

One of the firſt events of this reign was the marriage of the king with Margaret of Auſtria [13], whom the archduke Albert had conducted into Spain. He had gone, for this purpoſe, from the Netherlands to Germany, about the time of the late king's death; and had ſoon afterwards ſet out with her from Gratz, by the way of Italy: but ſo great were the preparations made for her reception in Spain, and, agreeably to the character of the nation, ſo ſlowly were they carried on, that the fleet ſent to bring her thither did not arrive at Genoa till ſeveral months after. In the marriage ſolemnity, in the city of Valencia, above a million of ducats were expended, beſides a great number of rich preſents, which were made to foreign princes and to the church [14]. By the eccleſiaſtics, who on this, as on many other occaſions, ſhared amply of the duke of Lerma's munificence, his conduct was extolled as highly

[12] Gon. Davila, p. 45. [13] Daughter of Charles, archduke of Auſtria. [14] Gon. Davila, lib. ii.

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April. 1599. About the ſame time with the royal nuptials, thoſe of the archduke with the infanta were ſo-

End of May. lemnized [16]; but not long after, they ſet out together for the Netherlands, having received full aſſurance from the king and his miniſter, that no aſſiſtance in money or in troops, which Spain could afford, ſhould be wanting to ſupport them in their new ſovereignty, and to enable them to accompliſh the reduction of the revolted provinces.

In forming this reſolution, there was no room for heſitation. From the conditions upon which the late king had transferred the ſovereignty of the Netherlands to his daughter, joined to the age of that princeſs, there was little ground to doubt that it would ere long revert to the Spaniſh monarchy. It could not be conſidered, even during the life of the infanta, in any other light, but as a fief of Spain: for ſhe and her ſucceſſors were expreſly required to take an oath of fidelity to the kings of Spain, and, in order to inſure the faithful obſervance of this oath, the liberty was reſerved of putting garriſons of Spaniſh troops into Antwerp, Ghent, Cambray, and other places;

[15] Addiciones à la Hiſtoria de Malvezzi, p. 152.

[16] Albert had before-hand reſigned his dignity of cardinal into the hands of the pope.

beſides which, both parties had ſolemnly engaged to regard the ſame powers as enemies, or as friends, and promiſed mutually to aſſiſt and defend each other againſt all the world beſides [17].

It would probably have ſaved the Spaniſh monarchy from the extreme debility into which it fell in the preſent and in the following reign, and would have highly contributed to leſſen thoſe difficulties which, in his future adminiſtration, the duke of Lerma was about to encounter, had the ſovereignty yielded been enjoyed, free and independent, by the infanta, and Spain been delivered from the burden of the war with the United Provinces. But Iſabella could not, in this caſe, have accepted of the ſovereignty conferred on her. Without the aſſiſtance of Spain, ſhe muſt have ſunk under her unequal conteſt with the Dutch, ſupported by the queen of England; or ſhe muſt inſtantly have made peace with theſe powers, on whatever terms they ſhould be pleaſed to preſcribe. The ſovereignty of the United Provinces would thus have been eſtabliſhed, and both their religious and civil liberty have been recogniſed.

To embrace a meaſure which would be attended with ſo diſagreeable a conſequence, Philip was hardly leſs averſe than his father had ever been. With a temper gentle and obſequious to exceſs, he was devoted with the moſt bigoted attachment to the popiſh faith; and being entirely governed by his miniſter, who, on all occaſions, aſſiduouſly courted the favor of the Spaniſh eccleſiaſtics, and

[17] Thuanus, lib. cxxi. cap. 2.

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the ſovereign pontiff, he would have believed himſelf highly criminal in the ſight of God, had he not reſolved to employ his utmoſt power to reduce the revolted provinces under obedience to the holy ſee. He had beſides, before his father's death, formally given his conſent to the deed of transference, with all the conditions that were annexed to it; and, as he could not, conſiſtently with honor, ſo, from his affection to the infanta, he was not, inclined to retract.

Prompted by theſe motives, which were not likely ever to loſe their force, he reſolved to conſider his ſiſter's and her huſband's intereſt as his own, and to take the ſame concern in all the affairs of the Netherlands, as if the ſovereignty of that country had never been transferred. Conformably to this reſolution, both the money and the troops of Spain continued to be employed in the Low Countries, as in the preceding reign. All the affairs of theſe provinces were directed as formerly by Spaniſh councils. The intereſt of the Spaniſh monarch was affected as much as ever by what happened there; and, for theſe reaſons, almoſt all the important tranſactions which paſſed in the provinces, for ſeveral years after the preſent period, make an eſſential part of the Spaniſh hiſtory.

The archduke having, during his abſence, committed the government of the Netherlands to his couſin, cardinal Andrew of Auſtria, biſhop of Conſtance, and the command of the forces to Mendoza, marquis of Gaudalette, and admiral

of Arragon, had inſtructed the latter to ſecure ſome convenient paſſage over the Rhine, which might open an entrance into the northern provinces, and enable him either to ſupport the army at the expenſe of the enemy, or, if that ſhould be found impracticable, to quarter them in the country of Cleves, and the other neutral adjoining ſtates. Albert gave Mendoza inſtructions, at the ſame time, to avoid expoſing the army to any unneceſſary riſk, before his return; and therefore there is little room for doubt that his principal intention, in ordering him to croſs the Rhine, was to furniſh the troops with free quarters, in compenſation for their pay. To form this extraordinary reſolution, it is ſaid, he was determined by neceſſity; the ſouthern provinces of the Netherlands having been greatly exhauſted by the depredations of the Spaniſh troops, which had ſo often mutinied, and his exchequer drained, partly by the ſums lately advanced in payment of their arrears, and partly by the preparations for his journey to Spain, which, in honor of the young queen, had been performed with unuſual magnificence [18].

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But whatever were Albert's motives for having recourſe to ſo unjuſtifiable an expedient, it ſhould ſeem that he could not have made choice of a perſon better qualified by the native temper of his mind for carrying his plan into execution. Immediately after the archduke's departure, Mendoza, having collected together all the

September.

[18] Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. v. p. 473.

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troops which could be ſpared from the neceſſary defence of the country, paſſed over the Maeſe near Ruremonde, and directed his march, at the head of twenty thouſand foot, and two thouſand five hundred horſe [19] towards Orſoy, a town on the weſt ſide of the Rhine, belonging to the dutchy of Cleves. The garriſon of this place, being utterly unprepared for defence, were eaſily induced by promiſes mingled with threats, to open their gates and receive him. He then applied himſelf to ſtrengthen the fortifications of the town and citadel, and at the ſame time employed a great part of his forces for ſeveral weeks in fortifying Waſſum, a ſmall town on the eaſt ſide of the river, directly oppoſite to Orſoy.

Although his communication with the country beyond the Rhine was thus ſecured, he judged it to be of great importance to get poſſeſſion of ſome other town upon the Rhine, at a ſmaller diſtance from the enemy, and therefore he marched down the river, with all his forces, and laid ſiege to Rhinberg. This place, belonging to the biſhopric of Cologne, was, as above related, in the hands of the United Provinces. It was deemed a place of conſiderable ſtrength, and was defended by a ſufficient garriſon. The Spaniards, after battering the walls, attempted to take the town by ſtorm, and were repulſed with great ſlaughter.

[19] This army conſiſted of ſeven thouſand Spaniards, three thouſand Italians, two thouſand Burgundians, a thouſand Iriſh, and ſeven thouſand Germans and Walloons, beſides the cavalry.

But the ſiege was much ſooner brought to a concluſion than the beſiegers had reaſon to expect, through one of thoſe fatal accidents which have often happened ſince the invention of gun-powder, when the utmoſt precaution is not employed in preſerving it. Having caught fire, from a ſpark occaſioned by the ſtroke of a cannon-ball againſt the tower where the magazine was kept, and which the ball had entered by a window, not only the tower, but a great part of the wall of the town was thrown down. Several veſſels in the river were, by the violent agitation of the water, overwhelmed and ſunk, and the governor, his wife and family, with a conſiderable number of the inhabitants, were buried in the ruins. The garriſon ſtood aghaſt at this unforeſeen diſaſter; and, dreading that the town muſt now be taken by aſſault, they reſolved, without further reſiſtance, to capitulate on terms, to which Mendoza, in order to ſave time, immediately agreed [20]. 1599.

By the ſucceſs which had attended the Spaniſh arms in the reduction of Orſoy and Rhinberg, all the other towns in that quarter were filled with anxiety and terror. Burick, a town on the weſt-ſide of the Rhine, in the dutchy of Cleves, having, without heſitation, admitted a Spaniſh garriſon, Mendoza began to make preparations for employing force againſt Weſel, one of the moſt flouriſhing places in the circle of Weſtphalia, and which had lately received a conſiderable October 15.

[20] Thuanus, lib. cxxi. cap. 9. Grotius, lib. vii. Bentivoglio, p. 474.

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augmentation of Proteſtant inhabitants from the neighbouring provinces. Having aboliſhed the exerciſe of the Catholic religion, and eſtabliſhed the Reformed, as taught by Calvin, in its ſtead, they knew how guilty they muſt appear in the eyes of a Spaniard, and were at the ſame time conſcious of being unable to defend themſelves againſt ſo great a force. They attempted, by ſending the general an embaſſy with preſents for himſelf, to divert him from his purpoſe. But Mendoza, laying hold of this opportunity to color his preſent expedition with the pretext of zeal for the popiſh faith, peremptorily required they ſhould immediately reſtore the exerciſe of the Catholic religion. With this condition the inhabitants, in order to avoid a ſiege, were obliged, though extremely reluctant, to comply [21]. After which, though he had before rejected their preſents, he demanded a large ſupply of proviſions, and of money for his troops; and having obtained his demands, he continued his march down the river, and took poſſeſſion of the towns of Rees and Emmerick.

The inhabitants of the latter of theſe places, having been long diſtinguiſhed by their attachment to popery, had, from ſome intereſted motive, invited the Spaniſh army to come into that quarter, and had received a promiſe in writing from Mendoza, that neither their town nor territory ſhould ſuffer any inconvenience from the

[21] The Spaniſh army had no ſooner left Germany than the prieſts were again expelled, and Calviniſm re-eſtabliſhed.

neighbourhood

neighbourhood of his troops. He inſiſted however upon their admitting a Spaniſh garriſon; and when they reminded him of his promiſe, by one of their principal eccleſiaſtics, he replied, that the ſervice of the king and the intereſt of religion made it neceſſary for him to change his views and meaſures. The prieſt aſked him if, after ſuch a declaration, it was ſurpriſing that the revolted provinces ſhould refuſe to put truſt in the faith of the king of Spain, or of his generals; and warned him of the vengeance threatened by heaven againſt deceit and falſhood. But Mendoza, unmoved by this remonſtrance, gave orders for the immediate admiſſion of his troops [22]. In order, however, to appeaſe the people of Emmerick, he readily promiſed that only four hundred ſhould be ſent, and he even required the German officer who commanded them to ſwear that he would not admit a greater number. Notwithſtanding which, ſo little regard did he pay either to his character or his faith, that he afterwards attempted to introduce another cohort, under Barlotta, an Italian; to whom the German refuſed admittance, ſaying openly, that though the general had ſet the example, he would not violate his faith.

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After getting poſſeſſion of Emmerick, the Spaniſh army was at the diſtance only of a few miles from the fort of Schenck, and other places belonging to the United Provinces; nor had the ſtates been inattentive to the danger which ſo nearly threatened them. Having, from the commence-

[22] Grotius, lib. vii. p. 351.

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ment of Mendoza's expedition, ſuſpected that his deſign muſt be to make an attack upon their eaſtern frontier, prince Maurice had haſtily aſſembled together at Arnheim a body of troops, amounting to ſix thouſand foot, and fifteen hundred horſe, and had ventured to croſs the Iſſel, and advanced towards the enemy as far as Zevenaer, which lies at little more than a day's march from Emmerick.

With ſuch unequal forces he could not pretend to cope with the enemy in the open field; but on no occaſion had he ever exhibited greater military ſkill and conduct. By making choice of the moſt proper ſtations, which the nature of the country could afford, and the prudence and vigilance which he diſplayed in ſtrengthening all the approaches to his camp, he rendered it impoſſible for the Spaniſh general to attack him with any probability of ſucceſs; while, at the ſame time, he prevented him from advancing any farther, or undertaking the ſiege of any of the frontier towns upon the Iſſel. The two armies, between which there was ſo great a diſparity of numbers, lay for a conſiderable time almoſt in ſight of each other; and, from the anxiety which Mendoza diſcovered on that occaſion, it ſhould ſeem he was deeply impreſſed with a ſenſe of his inferiority to prince Maurice, in reſpect of military knowledge and capacity. For ten days and nights, without intermiſſion, his whole army, horſe and foot, ſtood under their arms; and were permitted to take no other reſt, though it was the middle of

winter, but in their ranks in the open air. It was neceſſary, mean while, to ſend out his cavalry, and the retainers of his camp, in ſearch of forage and proviſions; and between them and detachments of the prince's army various rencounters happened, in which they were always worſted, and conſiderable numbers taken priſoners. BOOK I. 1599.

Both the Spaniſh infantry and cavalry had begun to ſuffer ſo much from the cold, joined to a ſcarcity of proviſions, and were at the ſame time ſo much diſheartened by that anxiety and dread of which their general's conduct was ſo expreſſive, that there was ground to believe, that if Maurice had thought himſelf at liberty to attack them, he would have acquired a cheap and eaſy victory.

Finding it at length impoſſible, on account of the want of proviſions, to remain any longer in their preſent ſituation, they directed their march towards Duyſburgh, which commands an important paſſage over the Iſſel, into the territory of Veluwe. But Maurice, who lay nearer to that place, eaſily reached it in time to be fully prepared for their approach. They ſtopt ſhort therefore at Dotechem, a town on their road to Duyſburgh; and there deliberated what courſe they ſhould next purſue. November.

To a general of ſuch mean capacity as Mendoza, and ſo little endued with the ſpirit of laudable ambition or enterpriſe, there appeared to be no room for heſitation. By the ſeverity of the ſeaſon, by the ſword of the enemy, and by deſertion, his army had ſuffered conſiderable diminution;

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and, having been long permitted to plunder the country through which they paſſed, and to live in the moſt licentious manner, they were become reluctant to ſubmit to the control of military diſcipline. He dreaded, beſides, the great abilities of Maurice, and thought it doubtful whether, in caſe he ſhould ſucceed in effecting his paſſage over the Iſſel, he would find it practicable to ſupport his army during the winter-ſeaſon in the territories of the ſtates, where almoſt all the towns were fortified, and prepared for their defence. Determined by theſe conſiderations, he reſolved to turn back, and to take up his winter quarters in the dutchy of Cleves, and other neutral ſtates in the territory of Weſtphalia. He accordingly retired with precipitation, leaving behind him many of his ſick and wounded, expoſed to the mercy of the inhabitants of the country, who were highly exaſperated by the injury and outrage they had received. Maurice purſued him for ſeveral miles, and cut off or took priſoners ſo great a number of his troops, that, including thoſe who had deſerted, and thoſe who had fallen or were taken priſoners in former rencounters, it was computed that he had loſt above ſeven thouſand men.

Bad conduct of Mendoza.

He fixed his head-quarters at Rees, having left a ſtrong garriſon in Emmerick, which lay nearer to the enemy, under the command of the count de Bouequoi, one of his ableſt officers. But the count, having ſoon after been taken priſoner in a ſkirmiſh with count Lewis of Naſſau, Maurice conceived the deſign of making himſelf maſter of

the town. For this purpoſe he ordered count Hohenloe to inveſt it; and, in order to prevent Mendoza from returning to its relief, he cut the dike of the Rhine, and laid all the country between Rees and Emmerick under water. By this device the garriſon, having no proſpect of aſſiſtance from their friends, were intimidated, and, after a feeble reſiſtance, laid down their arms. Maurice was equally ſucceſsful againſt the garriſon of Zevenaer: but being well pleaſed with an opportunity of ſhowing his condemnation of the conduct of the Spaniſh general, who, with ſo great a contempt of the eſtabliſhed laws of nations, had ſeized on the towns of neutral powers, he retained poſſeſſion of neither of theſe places, but delivered Emmerick to the citizens, and Zevenaer to the duke of Cleves [23]. After which he put his troops into winter-quarters, and went himſelf to the Hague, where he was employed during the remaining part of the winter in making preparations for the next campaign.

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Magnanimous policy of Maurice.

In the mean time Mendoza, equally inattentive to his character and to the laws of humanity, permitted his troops to exerciſe the moſt cruel oppreſſion over the people of Weſtphalia, from whom he could not pretend that either the king of Spain or the archduke had received the ſmalleſt injury. After plundering the inhabitants of the open country, and leaving them neither corn nor cattle for their ſupport, he allowed his ſoldiers to employ force againſt ſuch of the towns

The licentiouſneſs of the Spaniards.

[23] Grotius, p. 353, &c.

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as refuſed them admittance; and the towns being generally unprepared for defence, they got poſſeſſion of many of them, where they not only lived at free quarters on the citizens, but robbed them of their moſt valuable effects, which they ſold at Cologne, and, by the merchants there, tranſmitted the price, amounting to very great ſums, to Antwerp or other places in the Netherlands. Nor were they ſatisfied with pillage or plunder, but indulged themſelves in every ſpecies of licentiouſneſs; and treated the inhabitants, on innumerable occaſions, with a degree of barbarous cruelty and outrage, of which the troops under Frederic de Toledo had, in their treatment of the people of Zutphen and Naarden, furniſhed the only inſtance which occurs in the annals of Europe for many years [24].

Their barbarity.

In order to compel ſuch of the people as they ſuſpected of being rich, to reveal their treaſures, they wounded ſome, they mutilated others, and, under the pretext of their being heretics, they committed others to the flames. Count Falcoſtein, lord of Bruck, a Proteſtant, having refuſed them admittance into his caſtle, which for ſome time he defended againſt them with great reſolution, at length ſurrendered on condition that he and his domeſtics ſhould be allowed to depart in ſafety; but he was no ſooner in their power, than they firſt butchered his domeſtics before his eyes, and afterwards himſelf. Mendoza had the effrontery to avow and vindicate ſome inſtances of this kind,

[24] Grotius, lib. vii.

by alledging, that thoſe who had ſuffered were heretics; but it was not the Proteſtants only, but great numbers likewiſe of the Catholics, who experienced the barbarity of his troops; and even many of thoſe who had diſtinguiſhed themſelves by their attachment to the Spaniſh intereſt in the Netherlands; among whom were the ſubjects of the biſhops of Munſter, Paderborn, Liege, and Cologne, as well as the dutchies of Cleves and Juliers, who were all treated with the ſame violence and inhumanity[21].

By theſe enormities the German princes were affected in the manner which it was natural to expect. They were fired with indignation againſt their barbarous oppreſſors, and had early deliberated concerning the meaſures proper to be purſued. No European nation had been more diſtinguiſhed than the Germans by their warlike diſpoſition, and their military proweſs, as no nation had exerted greater intrepidity and vigor in the defence of their property and liberty when attacked. But, having enjoyed profound tranquillity for near half a century, and all of them, but a few who had entered into the ſervice of foreign ſtates, having been diſuſed to war, their tameneſs and timidity invited the injuries of the Spaniſh ſoldiers; who found not only the inhabitants of the open country, but thoſe likewiſe of moſt of the towns, utterly defenceleſs and unarmed. It was probably Albert's knowledge of this,

State of Germany.

[21] Grotius, lib. vii. Thuanus, lib. cxxi. Piaſecii Chronica, anno 1598. Geſtorum in Europa ſingularium.

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joined to the conſideration of the character of Rodolph, the preſent emperor, a prince of a tame and indolent diſpoſition, that had induced him to reſolve to ſupport his army at the expenſe of the Germans; and what they ſuffered affords a ſtriking proof how neceſſary it is that every people, expoſed by their ſituation to be invaded, ſhould, inſtead of truſting to their neutrality, or to the faith of treaties, ſtand, on all occaſions, in a poſture of defence.

The people who ſuffered moſt from the depredations of the Spaniards were the ſubjects of the duke of Cleves, and of Erneſt of Bavaria, who held, at the preſent period, the four biſhoprics of Munſter, Paderborn, Liege, and Cologne. Erneſt, who had formerly been much indebted to the court of Spain, and was extremely deſirous of avoiding a rupture with the archduke, in order to obtain redreſs, reſolved to content himſelf with making remonſtrances and complaints.

Confederacy of German princes againſt Mendoza.

The duke of Cleves was a weak prince, and, being at times diſordered in his judgment, was incapable of holding the reins of government. But his place was well ſupplied, on the preſent occaſion, by his ſiſter, Sibylla, a princeſs of a maſculine ſpirit, who exerted great activity in rouſing the indignation of the neighbouring ſtates and princes, and labored to convince them of the neceſſity of uniting together, in order to drive the Spaniards out of Germany. The elector Palatine, the landgrave of Heſſe, ſeveral imperial cities on the banks of the Rhine, and a great number of counts,

and other ſovereign princes in Weſtphalia, readily entered into Sibylla's views, and endeavoured to intereſt the reſt of the empire, or at leaſt the neighbouring circles, in their cauſe.

They began with remonſtrating to the archduke againſt the iniquity of his conduct; and they were ſeconded by an ambaſſador, ſent for that purpoſe by the emperor, who likewiſe publiſhed a reſcript, commanding Mendoza immediately to evacuate the towns and territories of which he had taken poſſeſſion. But, finding that no regard was paid by Mendoza to the emperor's reſcript; and that, inſtead of complying with their requeſts, Albert only lamented that the neceſſity of his ſituation had obliged him to adopt a meaſure which he ſaid was equally diſagreeable to himſelf as to them, they aſſembled together at Munſter, and reſolved all of them, but the biſhop, or elector of Cologne, to have recourſe to arms. It was agreed that a numerous army ſhould be raiſed with the utmoſt expedition. The proportion of money and troops which each prince or ſtate ſhould furniſh was aſcertained; and the count de La Lippe, lieutenant general of the circle of Weſtphalia, was appointed to be commander in chief. From the unanimity, alacrity, and ardor which appeared in this aſſembly, there was ground to hope for the utmoſt diſpatch and vigor in carrying the plan adopted into execution; yet from the ſlowneſs incident to the motions of a league, in which no one member poſſeſſes authority ſufficient to control the reſt, the ſeaſon, as will be ſeen in the

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ſequel, was far advanced before the count de la Lippe was in a condition to take the field [26].

The Spaniſh army, in the mean time, kept poſſeſſion of all the towns into which they had entered; and, without reſtraint from their general, continued to exerciſe over the people the ſame oppreſſion as before; till the ſeaſon arrived when the cardinal governor of the Netherlands judged it proper to begin the operations of a new campaign. They were then withdrawn from all the towns in which they were quartered, except Orſoy, Rhinberg, Rees, and Emmerick; the laſt of which places they had again obliged the inhabitants to ſurrender, after prince Maurice had retired.

Siege of Bommel.

The cardinal, having come to Rees, where he held a council of war, to deliberate concerning an expedition againſt ſome of the frontier-towns of the United Provinces, it was determined to undertake the ſiege of Bommel, the conqueſt of which would open an entrance into Holland: but, in order to conceal this intention from the ſtates, and to facilitate the landing of the troops on the iſle of Bommel; it was agreed to ſend a detachment of the army to make a feigned attack on the fort of Schenck, which, as formerly deſcribed, is ſituated on the upper extremity of the Betuwe. This detachment was ſent down along the right or north ſide of the Rhine, while Mendoza, with the main army, marched down on

[26] Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. v. ab. initio. Grotius, lib. vii, & viii. Thuanus, lib. cxxi, &c.

the other; and both diviſions began about the ſame time to play off their batteries againſt the fort; the former from the banks of the Rhine, and the latter from thoſe of the Waal. BOOK I. 1599.

Prince Maurice's head-quarters were at Arnheim, only a few leagues diſtant from Schenck. He had never before experienced ſo great anxiety or fatigue. Almoſt all the officers, on whom he chiefly depended for the execution of his orders, were abſent: count Hohenloe was in Germany, employed in exciting the princes of the league of Munſter to take the field againſt the Spaniards; colonel Vere was not returned from England, whither he had gone to haſten a body of freſh troops, which had been promiſed by Elizabeth; and the younger la Noue had not finiſhed ſome levies which, with the connivance of the king, he had been making among the Proteſtants in France. All the troops therefore which Maurice had been able to muſter, after leaving ſufficient garriſons in the fortified towns, amounted only at this time to four thouſand men. With this little army he croſſed over to the Betuwe; and having reinforced the garriſon of Schenck, and ſtrengthened the banks oppoſite to Mendoza, where only he had occaſion to ſuſpect that an attack might be deſigned, he lay prepared to oppoſe him in caſe he ſhould attempt to land on the iſland. April. Beginning of May.

The Spaniards, having the river between them and the fort, were at too great a diſtance to do execution with their artillery; and, as this attack was only a feint to amuſe prince Maurice, for

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this reaſon they had not taken time to employ the uſual precautions for their ſhelter from the enemy's fire, they loſt upward of four hundred men. This expenſe of blood, which the prince could eaſily obſerve from the ramparts, contributed to confirm his belief that their deſign againſt the fort was ſerious, and his attention was therefore wholly engroſſed with providing for its defence. In the mean time the count of Berg, with a body of troops, under the command of the colonels Stanley, Zapeau, and Barlotta, was ordered to march down along the left or ſouth ſide of the Waal; and, in order to cover his intention, a great number of boats had been tranſported to this river over land from the Maeſe, on board of which he embarked his troops, and ſeemed to intend paſſing over to the Betuwe. Prince Maurice could hardly doubt that this was his deſign; and, to prevent him from accompliſhing it, he carefully watched his motions with a part of his forces, which being put on board of boats collected together at Nimeguen, kept directly oppoſite to the Spaniards in their progreſs down the river. In this manner both parties continued to advance, ſometimes approaching within reach of each other's fire, and the Spaniards ſeemingly intending on ſome occaſions to effect a landing on the Betuwe, till they both arrived in the neighbourhood of the Voorn; when the count de Berg, having diſembarked his troops, drew all his boats on ſhore, and having put them into carriages which had been prepared for that purpoſe, he

marched with great expedition acroſs the country, from the Waal to the Maeſe, where having again launched his boats, he ſailed down the river till he arrived at Empel, and thus ſecured a paſſage into the iſle of Bommel.

The fortifications of the town of that name, which ſtands on the other ſide of the iſland, though, on account of its ſituation, deemed a place of great importance, had, amidſt the multiplicity of objects which required the attention of Maurice and the ſtates, been extremely neglected; the old fortifications were ruinous, and new ones, which had been begun, were yet unfiniſhed.

Had the troops therefore under the count de Berg been ſufficiently numerous, or had Mendoza advanced in time to his ſupport, he might without much difficulty have accompliſhed the object of his expedition. But the army having been detained longer than it ought to have been in the fictitious attack on the fort of Schenck, the count was obliged to reſt ſatisfied with ſecuring his ſtation at Empel, or with making ſhort excurſions into the country. Prince Maurice was, in the mean time, every day receiving freſh ſupplies of troops from France, England, and other places; and his army amounted now to ſo great a number, that he could afford to leave a part of it for the defence of the Betuwe, and lead the reſt to Bommel.

He accordingly no ſooner received information of the count of Berg's invaſion of that iſland than he ſet out with the greater part of his army, and

BOOK I. 1559. arrived there in time to prevent the inhabitants from abandoning the town, which they were preparing to do, from their deſpair of being able to defend it. Mendoza left his camp oppoſite to the Schenck about the ſame time, and, having in his march reduced the fort of Crevecœur, which would have interrupted his communication with Bois le Duc, he tranſported his forces into the iſle of Bommel, and began to lead them towards the town. He firſt attempted to make himſelf maſter of the dike of Waal, on which he intended to have erected batteries, in order to ſtraiten the navigation of the river, but was prevented by an inceſſant fire from a great number of armed veſſels, which Maurice had prepared for that purpoſe. From the delay occaſioned by this unneceſſary enterpriſe, and the reduction of Crevecœur, a general of ſo great activity as Maurice had leiſure to put the town of Bommel into a proper poſture of defence.

His army, at this time, was not inferior to that of the enemy, and amounted to eighteen thouſand foot and three thouſand horſe. Having pitched his camp on the right ſide of the Waal, oppoſite to Bommel, and conſtructed two bridges [27], formed of barks covered with planks, one above and the other below the town, he committed the defence of the place to a ſelect body of four thouſand foot and two thouſand horſe.

Bommel was too ſmall a place to admit of ſo numerous a garriſon; but, in order that he might

[27] Each four hundred and fifty paces in length.

avail himſelf of the great number of his troops, his firſt care had been to give the town an artificial magnitude, by drawing round it at a little diſtance from the walls, an intrenchment, ſtrengthened with a ditch, and with redoubts at proper diſtances; to which he added a covered way; a new ſpecies of fortification, of which he himſelf was the inventor, and which he firſt put in practice on the preſent occaſion.

Maurice invents a new ſpecies of fortification.

Mendoza was greatly diſconcerted by the celerity and diſpatch with which theſe works were executed: and as not only the cannon planted upon them, but a ſtrong battery which Maurice had raiſed on the dike of the river, was ready to be played off upon the Spaniards, as ſoon as they approached, they ſuffered a conſiderable loſs of men, before they could cover themſelves with their trenches. Mendoza might now have ſeen his error in not advancing ſooner to the ſiege: and, if he reflected on the ſtrength of the place, and the number of the garriſon, or on the neighbourhood of the prince's army, and the facility with which, as he was maſter of the river, he could, at all times, introduce ſupplies, or reinforcements into the town, it muſt appear ſurpriſing that he did not perceive the impoſſibility of ſucceeding in his attempt.

Prince Maurice, on the other hand, was blamed by many of his countrymen for reſting ſatisfied with defending a town againſt an enemy, whom it was alledged, as he was ſuperior to them in numbers, he might have ſucceſsfully encoun-

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tered in the open field. It began to be ſurmiſed that Maurice did not wiſh to bring the war to a concluſion; and the ſtates ſent deputies, to repreſent to him, that, as they could never expect to aſſemble a more flouriſhing army than was at preſent under his command, and the expenſe which their late preparations had coſt them was enormous [28], they could not help expreſſing their deſire that he would ſhorten the campaign as much as poſſible, and muſt therefore recommend to him, if he could do it with ſafety, to try the fortune of a general engagement.

Suſpicions concerning prince Maurice.

Maurice was the more ſurpriſed at this remonſtrance of the ſtates, as they had hitherto been extremely averſe to all adventurous meaſures; and, on many occaſions, had diſcovered a degree of caution bordering on timidity. He could not account for it, but on the ſuppoſition that they had liſtened to the inſinuations of his enemies, who accuſed him of protracting the war, with the view of perpetuating his own authority: and, in order to wipe off this groundleſs aſperſion, he would not have declined the riſk of a battle, in caſe a favorable opportunity had offered. "But, in the preſent ſituation of the Spaniſh army, in a country ſo narrow and confined, where his cavalry, in which only he was ſuperior, could be of little uſe, no ſuch opportunity could reaſonably be expected. Should he attempt to tranſport his army over the Maeſe into Brabant, Bommel muſt

[28] Twelve thouſand guilders. See Reidan. quoted by Le Clerc, p. 197.

thereby

thereby fall into the hands of the Spaniards; and, although, after the reduction of that place, they ſhould be induced to follow him, and to offer battle, yet, without the greateſt probability of ſucceſs, he ſhould doubt whether it would be expedient to accept; as the fate of battles often depended on accidents, which no human prudence could foreſee; and the king of Spain, with ſuch inexhauſtible reſources, could much more eaſily ſuſtain the loſs of an army than the ſtates. It was for theſe reaſons, not only his opinion, but that of his moſt experienced officers, that the enemy ſhould be permitted to ſpend their ſtrength in the ſiege of Bommel, which, ſhould they perſiſt in it, he was confident would prove their ruin." The ſtates, convinced by theſe conſiderations, entered without much difficulty into the prince's views, and left him at liberty to purſue the plan of operations which he had laid before them. The cardinal Andrew, in the mean time, having with great activity formed at Bois le Duc, the moſt ample magazines of every thing neceſſary for the ſiege, Mendoza was enabled to make his approaches to the town, with greater expedition than there was reaſon to expect. His troops were now, in a good meaſure, covered from the enemy's fire; and he had begun to play off his batteries. But it ſoon appeared how little reaſon he had to flatter himſelf with the hopes of ſucceſs in his enterpriſe. The garriſon, ſupported by freſh troops, ſent to their aſſiſtance by the prince, could not only prevent them from making farther progreſs

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in the ſiege, but ſallied out againſt them, ſometimes by day, and ſometimes by night, demoliſhing their works, and putting a conſiderable number to the ſword. The Spaniſh troops diſplayed, on every occaſion, the moſt determined intrepidity; and thereby fully juſtified the caution of prince Maurice, in declining to reduce them to the neceſſity of a general engagement. They gave the moſt ſtriking proofs likewiſe of the excellence of their military diſcipline, by recovering themſelves with a facility which aſtoniſhed the enemy, from the confuſion into which they were ſometimes thrown; and they were every where ſucceſsful in repreſſing the ſallies of the garriſon, although theſe ſallies were performed by numerous bodies, amounting to five or ſix thouſand men, of the beſt of the French and Engliſh forces, conducted by la Noue, colonel Vere, and other officers of the moſt unqueſtionable bravery. They ſuffered, however, conſiderable loſs. In the ſpace of three weeks, upwards of two thouſand periſhed; and the cardinal governor, being at laſt convinced of the abſurdity of perſiſting in his enterpriſe, ſent orders to Mendoza to raiſe the ſiege.

Invention of the hiſtorian Colonna.

He was determined, however, by the advice of Colonna, the hiſtorian, who was, at this time, an officer in the Spaniſh army, to attempt accompliſhing, in another way, the object of the preſent expedition, by erecting a fort in another part of the iſland, from which the ſame advantage might be derived as from the poſſeſſion of Bommel:

and, for this purpoſe, agreeably to the counſel that was given him, he made choice of a narrow neck of land which unites the upper with the lower part of the iſland, intending to occupy, with a fortification of the ſtrongeſt kind, the whole ſpace between the Maeſe and the Waal; and thus, not only to facilitate an invaſion of the United Provinces, but to check the enemy's navigation in both rivers.

The conſtruction of this fort was committed to Velaſco, general of the artillery. A thouſand ſoldiers, and two thouſand pioneers, were employed in the work; and the army was poſted about the neighbouring villages of Herwyn and Roſſem, to prevent the approach of the enemy. Beginning of June.

Maurice having penetrated this deſign, led up his troops along the north ſide of the Waal, and took his ſtation directly oppoſite to the Spaniards; where, having planted batteries of his largeſt cannon, he greatly annoyed the workmen, and, though not without ſome loſs, did conſiderable execution. Velaſco, however, perſevered, and was at length able to cover his men from the enemy's fire.

The prince finding then that all his efforts in this quarter muſt be ineffectual, tranſported his army into the adjoining iſle of Voorn; and, from thence, ſent over a detachment of three thouſand men, to the upper part of the iſle of Bommel; giving them inſtructions to intrench themſelves at the village of Hervorden, which lies at a little diſtance from the place where the Spaniards were

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Mendoza, ſenſible of the danger and inconveniencies to which he was expoſed, from having the enemy ſo near him, immediately diſpatched the count de Berg, to attack their lines, with a numerous body of choſen troops. The count was repulſed with the loſs of more than five hundred men, among whom were many officers of diſtinguiſhed merit: but having ſtationed the greater part of his army on that ſide of the fort which lay next to the enemy, he kept the prince at bay, and enabled Velaſco, without interruption, to carry on his operations in the conſtruction of the fort.

The Spaniſh cavalry, in the mean time, which could neither have proper accommodation, nor be ſupplied with forage in the iſle of Bommel, were quartered in Brabant, in the neighbourhood of Megen. Their communication with the main army was kept open by a bridge over the Maeſe; but as they lay at the diſtance of ſeveral miles, a fort, called Durango, from the name of the engineer employed in conſtructing it, and ſeveral redoubts, had been erected on that part of the dike of the river by which the enemy might approach. Notwithſtanding theſe prudent precautions, prince Maurice ſtill reſolved to attack the Spaniſh cavalry, and, with this view, having

thrown a bridge over the Maeſe from the iſle of Voorn, he kept his own cavalry in readineſs to march as ſoon as orders ſhould be given them. But judging it neceſſary before-hand to diſlodge the Spaniards from their fortifications on the dike of the river, he ſent the ſieur de la Noue, and colonel Vere, with a ſelect body of troops, chiefly Engliſh and French, to make an attack on fort Durango. Nothing could ſurpaſs the ſpirit and intrepidity which theſe troops, animated by the example of their leaders, diſplayed in the attack. Having thrown down their pikes and muſkets, they ſcaled the ramparts in ſeveral places, and attacked the garriſon, with extraordinary fury, ſword in hand. But this garriſon, conſiſting of Spaniards and Walloons, though amounting only to five hundred men, commanded by Ladeiano, an officer of diſtinguiſhed bravery, in their defence diſcovered a degree of intrepidity not inferior to that of the aſſailants. The ſmallneſs of their number was compenſated by the advantages of their ſituation; and the combat was thus prolonged for ſeveral hours, with mutual ſlaughter, till la Noue and Vere, being informed that Mendoza was approaching towards them with ſuperior forces, judged it prudent to retire. July.

No other memorable tranſactions happened between the contending parties during this campaign. Maurice could not venture now to attack the Spaniſh cavalry with ſafety; and, from the precautions which had been taken to cover the workmen employed in erecting the fort in Bommel,

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joined to the advantageous ſituation of the Spaniſh army, he found it impoſſible to prevent them from carrying that deſign into execution.

A fort erected in the iſle of Bommel.

The fort was accordingly finiſhed in the moſt regular manner: the ramparts, flanked with baſtions, and inſtantly planted with cannon, in a great meaſure commanded the navigation of the Maeſe, on the ſouth, and of the Waal, on the north. On the eaſt and weſt, they were ſecured with ditches of extraordinary breadth and depth, which being at all times filled with water from the rivers, ſerved as harbours for twelve armed veſſels, ſtationed in them to cruiſe againſt the enemy. And, in imitation of the example which Maurice had exhibited in the fortifications of Bommel, the whole was ſtrengthened with a covered way, which was ſtrongly fortified with redoubts.

The cardinal came himſelf to viſit this fort as ſoon as it was finiſhed; and having marked out a place for a church, of which he laid the firſt ſtone with his own hand, he gave both to the church, and to the fort, the name of Saint Andrew. He had been extremely deſirous to diſtinguiſh his adminiſtration by ſome remarkable achievement; and he was overjoyed to have been able to finiſh ſo great a work, which he hoped would be found of great importance towards the reduction of the revolted provinces.

Prince Maurice, on the other hand, notwithſtanding his ſucceſsful defence of Bommel, could not fail to be ſeverely mortified; although, as

will appear in the ſequel, this fort, the erecting of which he had exerted his utmoſt ſkill and vigor to prevent, ſerved only to furniſh him with one opportunity more than would otherwiſe have occurred to diſplay his wonted activity and enterpriſe. In the mean time, he built another fort directly oppoſite to Saint Andrew, on the right ſide of the Waal, which rendered the country of Betuwe ſecure againſt the excurſions of the enemy [29]. BOOK I. 1599.

During the courſe of theſe tranſactions in the Netherlands, the Germans in the circle of Weſtphalia had begun their operations againſt the Spaniſh garriſons in Rhinberg, and the other towns upon the Rhine. But as neither the emperor, nor the electors of Cologne, Mentz, and Treves, beſides ſeveral other popiſh princes, were willing to come to an open rupture with the court of Spain, their preparations for war had not been carried on with that alacrity which might have been expected from the ſtrong and juſt reſentment with which they were inflamed; and the ſeaſon of action was far ſpent before they were ready to open the campaign. The elector Palatine had withdrawn his contingent of troops, under the pretext that the league had been violated by the other electors; and the biſhop of Cologne, though his ſubjects had ſuffered greatly from the depredations of the Spaniards, had carried his complaiſance to them to ſo great a length, as to

[29] Grotius, lib. viii. Bentivoglio, part iii. lib. v. Thuanus, lib. cxxii.

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permit them to make levies in his dominions, and to furniſh them with proviſions and military ſtores. It was therefore with the utmoſt difficulty that the count de la Lippe could muſter twelve thouſand foot and two thouſand horſe [10], and the greateſt part of theſe were raw troops, entirely unaccuſtomed to military diſcipline.

With ſuch an army it is probable that no general could have fulfilled the expectations of thoſe by whom it had been aſſembled, and the count de la Lippe poſſeſſed neither experience nor capacity ſufficient to entitle him to the ſupreme command. The counts Hohenloe and Solmes had been ſent to his aſſiſtance by the United States; and theſe men were neither deficient in courage nor in activity and enterpriſe; but they diſcovered a jealouſy of each other, which proved pernicious to the cauſe in which they were engaged, and when they differed in their opinions, the general was incapable of determining aright to which of their counſels the preference was due.

The firſt enterpriſe in which he was engaged was the ſiege of Rhinberg; but having no part of the apparatus neceſſary for carrying it on, except what he received from Holland, and the inhabitants of the adjacent country, whoſe reſentment the governor of the Netherlands had found means to appeaſe, being unwilling to ſupply his troops with proviſions, he ſoon abandoned his attempt, and directed his march towards Rees, where he expected the Dutch could more eaſily convey to him ſuch aſſiſtance as his exigencies ſhould require.

[10] Grotius.

The garriſon of Rees was ill prepared for their defence, and if la Lippe had liſtened to the counſel of count Hohenloe, who adviſed him to ſtation a part of his army on the other ſide of the river, to prevent them from receiving any reinforcement or ſupplies, they would ſoon have found it neceſſary to lay down their arms: but he neglected this neceſſary precaution. The garriſon were ſeveral times reinforced by detachments from the army in Bommel; and at length, finding themſelves poſſeſſed of ſufficient ſtrength, and obſerving that the ſiege was carried on in the moſt remiſs and negligent manner, they made a vigorous attack upon his trenches, put a great number of his men to the ſword, nailed up ſeveral of his cannon, and even carried off ſome of them in triumph to the town.

September. Siege of Rees.

This diſaſter increaſed the diviſion which from the beginning had ſubſiſted among the leaders. The troops were diſheartened, and became more diſobedient and refractory than ever; and in two days after the count gave orders to raiſe the ſiege.

The retreat of this army was ſtill more diſgraceful than their conduct during the ſiege. Dreading that the garriſon would renew their attack upon the trenches, they fled in the moſt precipitate manner, leaving behind them a great part of their baggage and proviſions. The Spaniards hung in their rear for ſeveral miles, put many to the ſword, and threw the whole army into confuſion. Not long after, a party of them mutinied againſt their officers, left their ſtandards, and, in

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their way home, indulged themſelves in the ſame rapine and depredation againſt their countrymen, as had formerly been exerciſed by the Spaniſh troops.

The Dutch had, in the beginniug, entertained the hopes of finding uſeful allies in the Germans. With this view they had exerted all their influence in rouſing them to arms, and had ſeveral times ſupplied them with ſtores and proviſions. On the preſent occaſion they ſent William de Naſſau, a near relation of prince Maurice, an experienced officer, and a perſon of diſtinguiſhed prudence, to attempt to re-eſtabliſh diſcipline among the troops, and a good underſtanding among the leaders, but all his endeavours having proved ineffectual for theſe ends, and the winter-ſeaſon approaching, it was judged neceſſary to diſband the army, and put an end to this inglorious campaign.

November. German army diſbanded.

Such is frequently the fate of confederacies formed by the union of independent princes, even when there is one common intereſt to unite them, unleſs the ſupreme command be devolved on ſome perſon of extraordinary abilities, whoſe want of power may be ſupplied by the confidence inſpired by his ſuperior merit.

Notwithſtanding the feeble efforts of this confederacy, the archduke having only intended, by ſeizing the German towns, to accommodate his troops for a ſeaſon, ordered moſt of them to be evacuated. He likewiſe promiſed to indemnify the ſeveral ſtates for the injuries and damages which

they had ſuſtained; and two commiſſioners were appointed by the emperor to eſtimate their loſſes; but it does not appear that any thing effectual was ever done in conſequence of this appointment [11].

A fleet ſent to cruiſe againſt the Engliſh.

In Spain the duke of Lerma, deſirous to give ſome proof of vigor in the beginning of his adminiſtration, fitted out a fleet of fifty ſhips of war, which he put under the command of Don Martin de Padilla, and ſent to cruiſe againſt the Engliſh; but this enterpriſe proved equally unfortunate as moſt of the former ones which the Spaniards had undertaken againſt their northern enemies. Padilla had not been many days at ſea when a violent ſtorm aroſe, which obliged him, without having ſeen the Engliſh fleet, to return to Spain.

Lenity and moderation of the duke of Lerma.

The duke of Lerma was more ſucceſsful in the meaſure which at this time he ſuggeſted to the king, for conciliating the affections of his ſubjects in Arragon, who had been diſguſted by the treatment which they had received in the former reign. Philip and his young queen, accompanied by the duke and many other courtiers, having ſet out to viſit the city of Saragoſſa, notice was ſent to the inhabitants, by order of the king, that he could not enter their town with pleaſure till the heads of thoſe citizens, who had ſuffered in the unfortunate affair of Antonio Perez, were

[11] Grotius, lib. viii. Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. v. Piaſecii Chronica Geſtorum in Europa Singularium, an. 1599. Gon. Davila, lib. ii. cap. 4. Thuan. Hiſt. lib. cxxii. cap. 6. 8, etc.

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taken down from the gates, and that inſcription eraſed which recorded their pretended crime. This order, ſo agreeable to the people, and which was inſtantly obeyed, was accompanied with the royal pardon to all thoſe who had been concerned in the inſurrection, and a declaration, that the king could not be happy while any of his faithful ſubjects had cauſe of grief. He then made a magnificent entry into the town, amidſt the ſtrongeſt demonſtrations of affection and joy on the part of the inhabitants; and ſoon after he ſolemnly confirmed all their rights and privileges [32].

Among the entertainments which the people of Saragoſſa preſented to their king on this occaſion, there was one, which, at the preſent period, will appear ſomewhat extraordinary; a diſpute held at the univerſity, at the conferring the degree of doctor, the ſubject of which was, whether the emperor be the lord or ſovereign of the whole world [33].

September. During the courſe of the tranſactions that have been related, Albert and Iſabella arrived in the Netherlands [34]. They entered Bruſſels with a ſplendid court and retinue, and were received with extraordinary magnificence. There was conſiderable difficulty in adjuſting the form of the oath of allegiance which they adminiſtered to their new ſubjects; and the ſtates of Brabant

The archduke's arrival in the Netherlands.

[32] Gon. Davila, lib. ii. cap. 8. [33] Davila.

[34] He had tarried much longer than his new ſubjects had reaſon to expect, but no cotemporary hiſtorian has informed us of the reaſon of his delay.

demanded that, beforehand, certain forts and citadels ſhould be demoliſhed, and the ancient rights and privileges of the provinces ratified; but, finding that the archdukes, (this was the title which Albert and Iſabella now aſſumed) were utterly averſe to comply with their requeſts, they were perſuaded to deſiſt from their purpoſe, and agreed, though with much reluctance, to take the oath required. It was likewiſe a matter of great offence to the Flemings that Albert, beſides aſſuming the Spaniſh dreſs, and requiring to be ſerved upon the knee, had formed his court according to the model of that of Spain, and in every thing adopted the Spaniſh manners and cuſtoms, in preference to thoſe of the Netherlands. This conduct was probably intended to gratify the Spaniards, on whom Albert ſaw he muſt principally depend during the continuance of the war; but it contributed to alienate the affections of his Flemiſh ſubjects, and to prevent them from exerting themſelves with active zeal in his behalf [55].

He ſtood however much in need, at the preſent juncture, of all the aſſiſtance which they were able to afford. Although he had received a conſiderable ſupply from the duke of Lerma, before his departure from Spain, yet having, in conformity to the practice of the age, expended large ſums in idle pomp and ſhow in his marriage ſolemnity, and his magnificent entrance into Bruſſels, and other towns which he and Iſabella viſited on their

[55] Grotius, lib. viii. p. 379. Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. v.

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acceſſion, he found himſelf utterly unable to diſcharge the arrears due to his troops, who no ſooner entered their winter-quarters than they began to mutiny againſt their officers. The Spaniſh forces, to the number of two thouſand foot, and eight hundred horſe, having abandoned their commanders, took poſſeſſion of the town of Hamont, in the biſhopric of Liege, where, having firſt ſtrengthened the fortifications, they lived at free quarters on the inhabitants, and laid all the adjacent country under contribution. Their example was quickly followed by ſixteen hundred Italians, and ſoon afterwards the garriſons of Crevecœur and St. Andrew, conſiſting of Germans and Walloons, expelled their officers and elected others from their own number in their room [36].

1600. January. In March. Siege of St. Andrew.

Prince Maurice, having received information of theſe diſorders, did not ſuffer ſo favorable an opportunity of action to eſcape. After reducing the town of Wachtendonc, and the fort of Crevecœur, and making a ſucceſsful attack on the Spaniſh cavalry, in the neighbourhood of Bois le Duc, where he put near five hundred of them to the ſword, he laid ſiege to St. Andrew. This fort, the only fruit of the operations of a whole campaign, the archduke juſtly conſidered as a place of the firſt importance, both on account of the ſtrength of the fortifications, and the great advantage which it afforded him for invading the revolted provinces. He was therefore extremely ſolicitous to preſerve it, and for this purpoſe

[36] See Meteren, fol. 451.

assembled together at Bois le Duc such a body of troops as were deemed sufficient to raise the siege. Of these troops he gave the command to Velasco, by whom the fort had been erected; and on the part of this officer no time was unnecessarily lost. But all his attempts were rendered ineffectaul by the vigilance and foresight of Maurice, who, besides fortifying his camp and all the approaches to it, had cut the dike of the Maese, and laid all the low grounds betwixt it and Bois le Duc under water. The garrison consisted of twelve hundred men, who, although they had mutinied against their officers, yet regarding the fort as their only pledge for the payment of their arrears, strenuously exerted themselves in its defence. 1599.

But perceiving that, notwithstanding their most vigorous efforts, Maurice was making daily progress in the siege, and having no prospect of deliverance, they listened to a proposal which was made to them by the prince, in order to save time, and agreed to surrender the fort for a sum of money equal to their arrears [17]. Immediately after which, conscious that they had committed an unpardonable crime against the Spaniards, they inlisted in the army of the United States; and as they knew that they could not expect quarter in case they should fall into the hands of their former masters, they were on many occasions of singular use, by the desperate intrepidity which they displayed [18]. May.

[17] A hundred and twenty-five thousand guilders.

[18] Triumphs of Nassau, printed 1613. Grotius, Hist. lib. ix. and Bentivoglio.

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By theſe diſaſters the archdukes were afflicted in the moſt ſenſible manner. They received information at the ſame time that prince Maurice, having on no former occaſion exerted greater diligence in his military preparations, was reſolved to proſecute the approaching campaign with extraordinary vigor, in the hopes of making ſome important conqueſts before the mutineers were perſuaded to return to their duty. All their endeavours for this end had hitherto proved ineffectual. They had ſome ground to ſuſpect that the reſt of the troops were infected with the ſame mutinous ſpirit, and dreaded that many of them might be induced to imitate the treacherous example of the garriſon of St. Andrew.

Convention of the ſtates at Bruſſels

The ſtates of the provinces ſubject to their authority, having been lately convened at Bruſſels, Albert repreſented to that aſſembly that, as the ſource of all the diſorders which prevailed was his inability to diſcharge the arrears due to his troops, it was neceſſary they ſhould grant him an extraordinary ſupply. He had reaſon to expect that ere long he ſhould receive remittances from Spain; but the demands of the mutineers muſt be immediately ſatisfied, otherwiſe there was ground to dread that the moſt pernicious conſequences would enſue.

The ſtates replied, by expreſſing their apprehenſion of theſe conſequences, and by giving him the ſtrongeſt aſſurances of their attachment and fidelity; but inſinuated that, conſidering the exhauſted ſtate of the provinces, and the difficulty which

which the court of Spain had ever found in supporting so great a number of forces, no other effectual remedy could be applied to the present disorders but an accommodation with the revolted states.

Advise an accommodation with the revolted states.

They had conceived hopes at this time that an accommodation might be brought about by the mediation of ambassadors, whom the emperor had sent into the Netherlands, in order to procure a restitution of some towns on the German frontier, of which the contending parties still retained the possession. The ambassadors found no difficulty in accomplishing the object of their commission; and having passed over into Holland, they prevailed on the United States to send deputies to Bergen op Zoom, to negociate a treaty with deputies sent thither by the archdukes. But the Dutch being unalterably determined to maintain their independence, and discovering the same distrust of the archdukes, with which they had long been actuated towards the Spaniards, the conferences were no sooner begun than they were broken off, and both parties retired, extremely diffatisfied with each other.

A negociation for peace between Spain and England.

While a reconciliation was thus, in vain, attempted between the archdukes and the United Provinces, a negociation was begun for restoring peace between the queen of England and the king of Spain. Some advances had been made for this purpose to the English ministers by the cardinal Andrew, while he was governor of the Netherlands, and neither of the courts at variance seemed

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at this time to have been inclined to prolong the war. It was agreed that a congreſs ſhould be held at Boulogne; and miniſters were ſent thither by the contending powers. But this negociation likewiſe proved abortive, as the plenipotentiaries found it impoſſible to adjuſt the ceremonial among them to the ſatisfaction of their reſpective courts. The precedence had, from time immemorial, been yielded to the crown of England, by the kings of Caſtile and Arragon; and Elizabeth maintained that it ſtill belonged to her, notwithſtanding the union of theſe crowns, and the conqueſt of Granada, ſince Spain, conſidered as one kingdom, was greatly inferior to England in reſpect of antiquity, which was the only ground on which a point of this nature could properly be decided. But the Spaniſh miniſters could not perceive the force of this reaſoning. They claimed the precedence on account of the ſuperior extent and power of the Spaniſh monarchy; and, even when Elizabeth, in order to prove the ſincerity of her pacific diſpoſition, offered to agree to an equality, they rejected this offer, and inſiſted that the ſuperior dignity of the catholic king ſhould be recogniſed. To this the queen as peremptorily refuſed her conſent; and, ſoon afterwards, the plenipotentiaries left Boulogne.

abortive.

United States reſolve to in-

This unexpected iſſue of the congreſs was matter of great joy to the United States. They had ſuffered much anxiety from the apprehenſion of loſing ſo powerful an ally as queen Elizabeth; and now, when they were delivered from this

apprehenſion, they reſolved to improve to the utmoſt the advantages which they derived from her alliance, by employing the Engliſh forces, and as many of their own, as could be ſpared from the defence of the frontier-towns, in an invaſion of Flanders. To form this reſolution, they were encouraged by the mutiny of the Spaniſh troops; and they were, at the ſame time, earneſtly ſolicited to carry it into execution by the merchants of Zealand, who were extremely deſirous of diſpoſſeſſing the archduke of the ſea-ports in Flanders, which afforded ſhelter to ſome Spaniſh ſhips of war, by which their trade had lately received conſiderable interruption. In compliance with their requeſt, it was agreed to undertake the reduction of Nieuport; and about the middle of June, the army, amounting to fifteen thouſand foot, and two thouſand five hundred horſe, ſet ſail from Ramekins in Walcheren, the place of rendezvous, and landed in Flanders near Ghent. After reducing ſome ſmall forts, prince Maurice led them towards Bruges, and paſſed almoſt within reach of the cannon of that place, not without hopes, which proved fallacious, that by the ſight of ſo flouriſhing an army, and the late diſaſters which had befallen the archdukes, the inhabitants might have been induced to throw off the Spaniſh yoke, and return to their former connexion with the United Provinces.

Invade Flanders.

From Bruges he marched towards Nieuport, and, by the way thither, made himſelf maſter, with little difficulty, of certain forts called St. Albert,

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Snaerſeerck, Bredene, and Oudenburgh, in which he left garriſons, with the view of retarding the progreſs of the enemy, in caſe they ſhould venture to approach [39]. He then inveſted Nieuport by land, while his fleet blocked up the harbour; and, as the town was neither very ſtrong nor well prepared for a vigorous defence, he hoped in a few weeks to be able to compel the garriſon to ſurrender.

Siege of Nieuport.

The archduke, in the mean time, exerted himſelf with great activity in his preparations for an attempt to make him raiſe the ſiege; and, having had the good fortune to perſuade a conſiderable number of the Spaniſh mutineers to return to their duty, his army ſoon amounted to twelve thouſand foot, and twelve hundred horſe. Both he and Iſabella, upon the firſt news of the enemy's arrival in Flanders, had repaired to Ghent, in order to provide for the ſecurity of that important place, and the other towns of the province. The troops were ordered to aſſemble together at Bruges; and as in their march thither they paſſed near Ghent, Iſabella, mounted on horſeback, went out to meet them, and rode along the lines animating and exhorting them, giving them repeated aſſurances that, in future, they ſhould not have the ſame ground as hitherto to complain of the irregularity of their pay; and declaring that, rather than their demands ſhould not be ſatisfied, ſhe would expoſe to ſale her plate

[39] Maurice was attended by a number of the deputies of the ſtates.

and jewels, and deliver up to them the funds appropriated to the ſupport of her court and ſervants. This ſpeech, joined to her majeſtic air and manner, produced a powerful effect upon the minds of the ſoldiers, who received it with ſhouts of high applauſe, and called out to her that they were ready to expoſe their lives to every danger in her defence. Albert, on this occaſion, omitted nothing in his power to confirm them in their preſent diſpoſition, and acquainted them that he was determined to fight at their head, and to ſhare their fortune. BOOK I. 1600.

Agreeably to his reſolution, having joined his army at Bruges, he ſet out with it from thence about the end of June. His firſt object was the reduction of the forts above mentioned, in which his ſucceſs correſponded with his moſt ſanguine hopes. The garriſons which Maurice had left in theſe forts, were intimidated by the ſight of ſo great a force, and after a feeble reſiſtance ſurrendered them, on condition, that they ſhould be ſuffered to depart with their arms and baggage. The archduke himſelf ſubſcribed the capitulation; but, though his intention was ſincere, he could not protect the garriſon of Snaerfeerck, conſiſting of two companies of ſoldiers, from the fury of the Spaniſh mutineers, who fell upon them, notwithſtanding their officers prohibition, and put them all to the ſword.

Prince Maurice being at the ſame time informed of the ſurrender of the forts, which he had expected would have held out much longer,

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and of the near approach of the enemy, was thrown into great perplexity. From his confidence of bringing the ſiege to a ſpeedy concluſion, he had neglected to fortify his camp; the number of his troops was not ſufficient to enable him both to continue the ſiege, and to oppoſe the enemy in the open field; and he had even reaſon to dread, from the rapidity of their march, that he ſhould not have leiſure before their arrival, to put himſelf into a proper poſture of defence.

In order to retard their progreſs, and to gain as much time as poſſible, he immediately diſpatched his kinſman, count Erneſt of Naſſau, with two regiments of foot, conſiſting of Zealanders and Scots, and four troops of horſe, to ſeize on the bridge of Leffingen, by which the enemy muſt paſs in their way to Nieuport. But before count Erneſt could reach this place, they had advanced, and taken poſſeſſion of it. Erneſt however, knowing how neceſſary it was to afford time to Maurice to prepare for their reception, reſolved, how fatal ſoever the conſequences ſhould prove to himſelf and his detachment, that he would not retire without fighting: and this generous reſolution was happily attended with the deſired effect. Albert, believing that Maurice's whole army muſt ſurely be at hand, ſpent a conſiderable time in making the proper diſpoſitions for a general engagement. At length, being informed that Erneſt's troops had received no augmentation ſince their firſt appearance, and that no other part of the enemy's army was in ſight, he

gave orders for an attack. The troops under Erneſt kept their ground for ſome time; but, the horſe having quickly given way, they were overpowered by numbers, and obliged to retire. In this action, upwards of five hundred of the Scots were ſlain, with many officers of diſtinguiſhed reputation [11]. BOOK I. 1600. July 2.

The archduke's hopes were greatly heightened by this ſucceſs, and he wrote to Iſabella that having with ſo great facility diſcomfited the van-guard of the enemy's army, he expected ſoon to inform her of the defeat of the whole. He judged, however, that there was ground to heſitate with regard to the conduct which it was proper to purſue; and, in order to aſſiſt him in forming his reſolution, he called a council of his moſt experienced officers. Gaſpard Zapena, a Spaniard of great experience, was of opinion that it was altogether unneceſſary, and would therefore, in the preſent circumſtances, be extremely imprudent to riſk a battle. The enemy's general, through his confidence of being able to reduce Nieuport before an army could be aſſembled to oppoſe him, had brought himſelf into the moſt dangerous ſituation in which he had been ever placed. He durſt not, now, in the face of ſo powerful an army, continue his operations againſt the town. His communication with Oſtend was intercepted, ſince the archduke was fortunately ſituated between him and that place; and, ſhould he attempt to make his eſcape by ſea, when his highneſs was

[11] Piaſecius, p. 182.

BOOK I. 1600. ready to fall upon him, in the hurry of embarkation, the greateſt part of his troops muſt be cut to pieces. He therefore thought that the archduke ought not immediately to advance, with a deſign to attack the enemy; but ought rather to take the proper meaſures for reducing them, without expoſing himſelf to the chance of a battle; and if he did, he believed, that ere long he would be able to oblige the enemy to lay down their arms. But whether his opinion on this head ſhould be rejected or embraced, it was at leaſt neceſſary that, before he advanced any further, he ſhould procure information of the ſituation of the enemy, of which he was entirely ignorant; and, before adventuring to attack them, ſhould wait for the arrival of Velaſco, who in a few days would join him with a reinforcement of three thouſand troops.

This prudent council was warmly oppoſed by the ſieur la Barlotte, an old Flemiſh commander, of no leſs experience than Zapena, but whoſe courage, notwithſtanding his advanced age, ſtill bordered on temerity. He maintained that the preſent favorable opportunity of attacking the enemy ought not to be ſuffered to eſcape; that the archduke would find them entirely unprepared for their defence, intimidated by the rapidity of his approach, and diſheartened by the defeat which their troops, under Erneſt of Naſſau, had ſo recently ſuſtained; that, as the advantages he muſt derive from theſe circumſtances, were more than ſufficient to compenſate for the want of the

troops under Velaſco', ſo his inferiority in number to the enemy was more than counterbalanced, by the ſuperior diſcipline and bravery of his troops; that his troops were at preſent animated with the higheſt degree of ardor; and that the delaying to lead them forward, when they were ſo eager to engage, would only ſerve to damp their alacrity, while it would afford leiſure to the enemy, either to fortify their intrenchments, or to ſecure their retreat. BOOK I. 1600.

This reaſoning was received with high applauſe by a great majority of the council; and the ſoldiers, eſpecially the Spaniſh mutineers, impatient to advance, could hardly be reſtrained.

Albert, however, being ſtrongly impreſſed with a ſenſe of the ſolidity of Zapena's reaſons for delay, ſtill heſitated as to which of the councils given him, he ſhould embrace; when chance, which often directs the moſt important events, contributed to fix his reſolution. The army having a view from their preſent ſituation of the ſea-coaſt, a great number of ſhips were ſeen in their courſe from Nieuport to Oſtend. The Spaniards prepoſſeſſed with the idea that the enemy durſt not wait for their approach, concluded that they had already begun their flight, and that, at leaſt, a part of them were on board the ſhips which they obſerved. Albert himſelf too readily yielded to this deluſion; and inſtantly gave orders to his troops to begin their march. He was, at this time, only at the diſtance of a few miles from Nieuport, and, as he advanced with great rapidity,

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his cavalry arrived within ſight of the enemy about mid-day, and his whole army about four or five hours before ſun-ſet.

He ſoon diſcovered how greatly he and his officers had erred in their conjectures with regard to the conduct and ſituation of the enemy. Far from meditating flight, prince Maurice had ordered his fleet to quit the coaſt, and retire to Oſtend; by which prudent meaſure, he at once gave his army proof of the confidence which he repoſed in them, and reduced them to the alternative of death or victory. He had withdrawn all his troops from the ſiege, except a number which he judged ſufficient to reſtrain the ſallies of the garriſon. He had advanced to a little diſtance from the town, partly to encourage his troops, by ſhowing that it was not with reluctance that he had reſolved to accept of battle; and partly becauſe the ſituation of the ground was more convenient for drawing them up in the order which he moſt approved.

Beſides his Dutch forces, he had ſeveral regiments of Britiſh, French, and Swiſs, commanded by officers of diſtinguiſhed merit, who had acquired the moſt conſummate knowledge of the military art in the civil wars of France, and in the Netherlands; and theſe men, he well knew, from long experience, would execute his orders with equal ſkill and valor.

He thought it neceſſary, however, to encourage and animate the troops, and for this purpoſe, he rode from rank to rank, reminding them that

they were about to engage with an enemy who were not only inferior in numbers, and fatigued with their march; but, who, in the manner of their approach, had given proof of extreme temerity: that it entirely depended on themſelves whether they ſhould return to their country and their friends, crowned with glory and victory, or be cut to pieces by an enemy over whom they had often triumphed, and have their names for ever covered with infamy. From his confidence in their bravery, he had ordered the tranſports to leave the coaſt; and he now led them on to battle, under a conviction that they would follow the example which he would ſet before them, and reſolve either to die or conquer. Theſe exhortations were every where received with the moſt joyful acclamations; and the whole army ſeemed to be animated with that intrepid ſpirit which he wiſhed to inſpire. BOOK I. 1600.

He gave the command of his van-guard to ſir Francis Vere, that of his main body to the count of Solms, and of the rear-guard to Oliver Vander Tempel, lord of Corbeck. He diſtributed his cavalry, commanded by count Lewis of Naſſau, partly in the front, and partly on the flanks, and having taken no particular ſtation to himſelf, he was at liberty to go from place to place, whereſoever he found his preſence neceſſary. He was accompanied by his brother the celebrated prince Frederic Henry, who was only ſixteen years of age [41]; and by the duke of Holſtein, the prince of

[41] Maurice urged his brother to go by ſea to Oſtend, but

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Anhalt, the count of Coligni, lord Gray, and ſir Robert Drury, grandſon of the famous admiral of that name, and by ſeveral other noblemen of the firſt rank, in the different proteſtant ſtates in Europe, who had lately come into the Netherlands to improve themſelves, by his leſſons and example, in the art of war.

Having drawn up his army upon the downs by the ſea-ſhore, and planted his artillery on ſome of the higheſt of the little hills of ſand of which the downs are formed, he reſolved, in that poſture, to wait for the enemy's approach. Albert was greatly diſappointed, when he found him ſo well prepared for his defence; and he was ſomewhat diſcouraged when he obſerved, that from the poſition he had made choice of, the Spaniſh army would have both the ſun and the wind in their face: the latter of which circumſtances he dreaded would prove particularly inconvenient, from the light ſandy ſoil on which they were about to engage. It was now, however, too late to entertain the thoughts of a retreat; and his troops were as confident and as eager and impatient for the combat as before. They had long cheriſhed a contempt of the enemy; and they were now heard in all the ranks uttering threats, that they would give no quarter to any of the heretics, except prince Maurice and his brother, whom they would reſerve to adorn the triumph of their general.

Henry inſiſted that he ſhould be permitted to remain and to ſhare his brother's fate.

Battle of Nieuport.

The battle was begun by the Spaniſh cavalry, under Mendoza, admiral of Arragon, who endeavoured to gain the flank of the Dutch army, by advancing along the ſands between the ſea and the downs; but Maurice, having foreſeen that this might be attempted, had made proviſion againſt it, by planting cannon on the ſands, and ordering ſome of his ſhips of war to approach the ſhore as near as poſſible. Mendoza was therefore unable to effectuate his purpoſe, and was obliged to retire, after having ſuſtained conſiderable ſlaughter.

In the mean time, the two armies, after a diſcharge of their artillery, having advanced within muſket-ſhot of each other, the Engliſh forces in the van, under ſir Francis Vere, were attacked by the Spaniſh mutineers, who, in order to retrieve their honor, diſplayed on this occaſion the moſt deſperate intrepidity. The Britiſh troops received their aſſault undaunted, and for ſome time withſtood their fury; their general had his horſe ſhot under him, and was twice wounded. Still, however, he maintained his ground, refuſing to give any attention to his wounds, till his brother, ſir Horatio Vere, arrived with freſh troops to his relief. Theſe troops, while engaged in combat, with the mutineers, having been vigorouſly attacked in flank by the Spaniſh cavalry, were thrown into diſorder, and many of them began to fly towards the ſhore.

But the battle was inſtantly reſtored. Prince Maurice, having divided his army into battalions, ordered two of thoſe which compoſed his main

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body to advance; and by them, the Spaniards were in their turn compelled to retreat, and time afforded to the Britiſh troops to rally. In ſupport of the Spaniards, the archduke brought forward his Walloons and the Iriſh, and with their aſſiſtance, the mutineers would once more have regained their ſuperiority, had not Maurice, without delay, led on another freſh battalion, conſiſting of Swiſs, and of thoſe Walloons who had ſurrendered to him the fort of Saint Andrew. The Britiſh forces likewiſe returned to the charge; and ſoon after, the whole of both armies, horſe and foot, were engaged from one wing to the other.

The Dutch cavalry, commanded by count Lewis of Naſſau, who, in this battle highly diſtinguiſhed himſelf by his activity and valor, proved in every rencounter an overmatch for that of the enemy, and having broken their ranks, drove them with great ſlaughter from the field of battle.

The combat was better ſupported by the Spaniſh infantry; where Albert himſelf was preſent, expoſing himſelf to every danger, and ſometimes mingling with the foremoſt combatants. His troops, in every quarter, gave proof of the moſt determined bravery. The battle had laſted for more than three hours; during which time, notwithſtanding the fatigue of their rapid march from Leſſingen, they had fought without intermiſſion, and often repulſed the freſh battalions of the enemy. From the beginning, they had been extremely incommoded with the ſun and wind in their face, and ſtill more with the duſt or ſand.

The Dutch artillery too had kept up a conſtant fire upon them during the whole engagement, and having been not only planted on higher and firmer ground with planks under it to prevent it from ſinking in the ſand, but better ſerved and more ſkilfully directed, it had made great havoc among the Spaniſh troops. Still, however, they preſerved their ranks, and ſeemed determined ſooner to lay down their lives, than yield to an enemy, whom they had been ſo much accuſtomed to deſpiſe. Albert had made ſeveral attempts to get to the windward of the enemy, but had been as often prevented by the prudent precautions and vigilance of prince Maurice. At length, having thrown off his helmet, that he might be the more eaſily diſtinguiſhed by his men, he received a wound in the ear with a pike, and was obliged to retire. Through ſome accident, his horſe, which was conſpicuous, fell into the hands of the enemy. His troops obſerved this, and believing that he himſelf had been taken priſoner, or killed, were greatly diſheartened. They ſtill kept their ranks; but in the languor of their exertions, they gave manifeſt ſymptoms that both their ſtrength and courage had begun to fail.

This abatement of their vigor did not eſcape the vigilant eye of Maurice, who inſtantly reſolved to improve the advantage which it afforded him; and for this purpoſe, having collected his whole force, he renewed the aſſault upon the enemy in front, with his infantry, and with his cavalry in flank. It happened, at the ſame time, that the

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Spaniſh magazine of gun-powder, deſigned for the uſe of the artillery, took fire. The Dutch cavalry availed themſelves of the confuſion which this accident occaſioned, and puſhed forward with irreſiſtible force, crying out, Victory, victory! This cry being inſtantly communicated to the reſt of the army, animated them with redoubled ardor. The Spaniards, unable any longer to reſiſt their fury, gave way on every ſide, and falling ſoon after into confuſion, betook themſelves to flight. The victors purſued for ſome time, and put great numbers to the ſword; but the night coming on, the prince gave orders for ſounding a retreat. His troops, he knew, muſt be exceedingly exhauſted and fatigued, as they had taken no food ſince the morning, and, almoſt the whole day, had either ſtood under arms, or been engaged in battle: beſides that, he was well acquainted with the intrepid ſpirit of the enemy, who might rally and return when he was unprepared for reſiſtance, and moſt of his troops employed in the purſuit. For this reaſon, he ſelected ſuch of them as had ſuffered leaſt from the fatigue which they had undergone, and ſtationed them as a guard to the reſt of the army, who remained all night on the field of battle.

The cotemporary hiſtorians differ widely in their accounts of the number of the ſlain. On the part of the Spaniards, Reidan, an hiſtorian who is generally well informed, ſays that it amounted to five thouſand, but Grotius makes it only three thouſand; while the loſs on the ſide of the

the victors did not exceed one thouſand: and the greateſt part of theſe, he ſays, were of the Engliſh troops, who diſtinguiſhed themſelves by their intrepidity in this engagement, and had eight of their captains killed, and all the reſt wounded, except two.

The Britiſh officers were almoſt the only perſons of diſtinction who fell in the army of the ſtates; but in that of the army of the archduke, beſides ſo great a number of his beſt troops, Zapena, and colonels Baſtock, de Laſſo, d'Avalos, and many other officers of great merit, were either killed in the field of battle, or died afterwards of their wounds. The admiral of Arragon and de Vigliar were taken priſoners; and the count de Bucquoi, Barlotta, and many others wounded, and rendered long unfit for ſervice. All the Spaniſh artillery, baggage, and proviſions, with more than a hundred ſtandards, fell into the hands of the victorious army [11]. Such was the battle of Nieuport, or, as it is ſometimes called, the battle of the Downs, the event of which proved ſo extremely different from what the confidence of the Spaniards and their generals had prompted them to expect. Their defeat was, no doubt, partly owing to the diſadvantages under which they fought; although it was acknowledged by all parties that nothing could ſurpaſs the prudence,

[11] Among the Italians who fell in this battle the cardinal Bentivoglio mentions his brother and his nephew, two young noblemen, about twenty years of age, who had lately entered into the ſervice of Spain, and were much regretted on account of their youth and bravery.

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vigor, and intrepidity, which prince Maurice diſplayed from the beginning to the end of the engagement. His ſkill in the ſiege of fortified towns had long been highly celebrated; but it now appeared that he was equally poſſeſſed of all the other talents which form a conſummate general, and all Europe at this time reſounded with his praiſe [43].

Albert, having left the field of battle immediately after ſeeing his troops give way, arrived on the ſame night at Bruges, where he ſoon after ſet out for Ghent, and was there received by Iſabella, with the ſame firm and maſculine ſpirit which ſhe had diſcovered upon the various reports that had reached her, firſt of his being killed, and afterwards of his being wounded and taken priſoner. He returned next day to Bruges, and there employed himſelf in collecting his ſcattered troops.

Prince Maurice, in the mean time had retired on the next day after the battle to Oſtend, to recruit his army in a place of ſafety, and to conſult with the deputies whom the ſtates general had ſent thither to aſſiſt him with their advice. His enterpriſe againſt Nieuport was a meaſure which the ſtates themſelves had firſt ſuggeſted, and which Maurice had undertaken at their deſire. It does not appear that he himſelf had approved of this meaſure; and it was ſtrongly condemned by his kinſman, count William of Naſſau, whom the Dutch hiſtorians celebrate as a perſon of the moſt conſummate prudence.

To lead the army ſo far into the enemy's coun-

[43] Grotius, lib. ix. Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. vi. The

try as Nieuport, truſting to an event ſo extremely uncertain as the continuance of the mutinous ſpirit of the Spaniſh troops, William had repreſented as a raſh and dangerous enterpriſe, by which the exiſtence of the commonwealth would be expoſed to imminent danger for the ſake of acquiring a ſingle town. That, even although they ſhould conquer Nieuport, yet the great expenſe of defending a place at ſo great a diſtance from them would more than counterbalance all the advantages they could derive from the poſſeſſion of it; and that, if the archduke ſhould be able to appeaſe the mutineers, the army of the ſtates might ſuffer a defeat, or, they might be reduced by famine, as the ſupplying them with proviſions would entirely depend on the winds and waves.

Theſe apprehenſions had hitherto been happily diſappointed; but from the events which had fallen out, it manifeſtly appeared how much reaſon there had been for entertaining them. The mutineers had eaſily been perſuaded to return to their duty. The archduke had in due time collected a ſufficient force; and if he had liſtened to the counſel that was given him by Zapena, and waited for the arrival of Velaſco, without precipitating an engagement, the army of the ſtates would probably have either been obliged to lay down their arms without fighting, or in the hurry of attempting to get on board their ſhips, the greater part of them would have been deſtroyed.

heroic Acts of Prince Maurice, printed in the year 1613. Piaſecii Chronica Geſt. in Europa ſingularium, an. 1600.

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The deputies, after the defeat of their troops at Leffingen, had come to be, in ſome meaſure, ſenſible of the error into which the ſtates had been betrayed; and, from that time till the victory was fully decided, they had been diſquieted with the moſt dreadful apprehenſions. From theſe apprehenſions they were now happily delivered; but being ſtill impreſſed with a ſenſe of the danger which they had ſo narrowly eſcaped, they thought that, notwithſtanding the great advantage they had obtained, there was ground for heſitating whether it was expedient to perſevere in the plan of operations that had been begun.

They gave proof on this occaſion, by the ſlowneſs of their deliberations, how much wiſer it had been on the part of the ſtates to have left prince Maurice at perfect liberty with regard to the conduct of the war, than to require him, as they had done, to follow the opinion of men who, from their ignorance of military affairs, were ſo extremely ill qualified to adviſe. They differed widely in their opinions from each other; and while ſome thought that the army ought immediately to return to Nieuport, others were of opinion that it ought rather to penetrate into the interior parts of Flanders. The former of theſe opinions at length prevailed; and on the fourth or fifth day after the battle, the ſiege of Nieuport was reſumed.

Siege of Nieuport reſumed.

This meaſure ought either not to have been adopted, or carried ſooner into execution. The archduke, having exerted great activity in

repairing the faults which he had committed, had ſent Velaſco [44], with a reinforcement to the garriſon of Nieuport of two thouſand five hundred men, who having marched with great expedition, had entered the town before prince Maurice had inveſted it. The operations however of the ſiege were renewed; but the garriſon, after making ſome vigorous ſallies on the beſiegers, ſoon convinced prince Maurice that he could not juſtly expect to reduce them before the archduke would arrive with another army, which he was collecting together for their relief.

Moved by this conſideration, and dreading that he might ſoon be again involved in the ſame danger, from which he had ſo recently eſcaped, he raiſed the ſiege, and having led back his troops to Oſtend, he put them on board the tranſports which the ſtates had provided for that purpoſe, and returned to Holland; judging it impracticable, on account of the difficulty of his ſituation, in the heart of the enemy's country, to derive any advantage whatever from the deciſive victory he had obtained [45]. July 18.

[44] Bentivoglio, Grotius. Thuanus ſays it was Barlotta and not Velaſco.

[45] Bentivoglio. Thuanus, lib. cxxiv, &c.

Before he embarked, Maurice made an attempt to reduce a Spaniſh fort in the neighbourhood of Oſtend, called St. Catherine: but in this too he was diſappointed by the vigor and activity of Barlotta, who by forced marches arrived with a conſiderable body of forces before the prince had time to make any progreſs in the ſiege. Barlotta himſelf however loſt his life on this occaſion. He was a native of Luxemburgh, and had

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The greateſt part of the ſeaſon fit for action ſtill remained; but both parties were greatly exhauſted with the exertions which they had already made, and no other memorable tranſactions paſſed during the courſe of the preſent year [66].

Decline of agriculture and manufactures.

In Spain, the operation of the ſeveral cauſes of decline, above-mentioned, was at this time ſenſibly felt in every department of the ſtate. Complaints were heard all over the kingdom of the neglect of agriculture and the decay of manufactures; and great numbers of the people, being without employment, were reduced to a ſtate of indigence, which rendered it poſſible for them to contribute their proportion of the taxes and ſupplies.

Several councils were held to conſider of the proper remedies for thoſe evils; but the duke of Lerma, and the other Spaniſh miniſters, appear to have been extremely ignorant of the cauſes from which they proceeded. They ſuppoſed them to have riſen principally from the ſcarcity of

practiſed ſurgery in Paris, where, having been employed in his profeſſion by count Charles of Mansfeldt, when he commanded the Spaniſh troops in France, the count took an attachment to him, and gave him a commiſſion among his troops. He ſoon diſtinguiſhed himſelf by his activity and enterpriſe, obtained the higheſt military honors, and was conſidered as one of the ableſt officers in the ſervice of Spain. His low birth, joined to his native arrogance and preſumption procured him many enemies among his inferiors and equals: but the archduke was ſincerely ſorry for his death.

[66] Davila, &c. p. 77. ch. ix.

money: and this they aſcribed partly to the great quantities of plate that were employed in the churches, and in the houſes of the rich, and partly to the exportation of gold and ſilver for the purchaſe of foreign manufactures.

Expedients for remedying thoſe evils.

But as no expedient occurred at preſent to prevent the latter of theſe practices, while the manufactures of Spain were at ſo low an ebb, they reſolved immediately, if poſſible, to put a ſtop to the progreſs of the former; and, with this view, a royal edict was publiſhed, requiring all churches, corporations, and individuals of whatever rank within the kingdom, to deliver upon oath, to certain magiſtrates who were named, an exact inventory of all the plate, whether gold or ſilver, in their poſſeſſion. In the body of the edict this reaſon for the publication was aſſigned, that from the information which his majeſty had received, there was ground to believe the quantity of the precious metals in plate and in church utenſils to be ſo enormous, that, if it were converted into coin, and circulated throughout the kingdom, it would be found ſufficient to reſtore the nation to that happy ſtate of wealth and proſperity which it had formerly enjoyed; and that, for this reaſon, the king had, with the advice of his preſent counſellors, reſolved, not only to prevent the farther increaſe of plate, but afterwards, under the ſevereſt penalties, to prohibit the exportation of it to foreign ſtates.

But it was ſoon found impracticable to carry this edict, which would not probably have been in

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any degree productive of the advantages propoſed by it, into execution. The clergy were highly incenſed becauſe the ſacred utenſils were comprehended in it; and, both in writings and harangues from the pulpit, they repreſented the edict as an attack upon the privileges of the church. Neither Philip, nor his miniſter, the duke of Lerma, had reſolution to contend againſt an order of men whom they dreaded, and whoſe favor they had been above all things ſolicitous to conciliate. Their deſign was therefore ſuddenly relinquiſhed, and no other attempt made, on the preſent occaſion, to remedy the diſorders which prevailed.

It was not probable that any effectual remedy could be applied to them, till peace ſhould be eſtabliſhed with England and the United Provinces. Notwithſtanding which it was judged neceſſary, for the reaſons formerly mentioned, to continue the proſecution of the war againſt both theſe powers, without regard to the prejudice which from thence the monarchy was likely to ſuſtain [47]. Orders were given for the equipment of a fleet to ſupport the Catholics of Ireland in their rebellion againſt Elizabeth, and both money and a reinforcement of Italian and Spaniſh troops were ſent into the Netherlands.

The archduke had at the ſame time prevailed upon the ſtates aſſembled at Bruſſels to grant him much greater ſupplies than formerly; and theſe he employed in making numerous levies in Germany, and the Walloon or ſouthern provinces. The

[47] Gon. Davila, lib. ii. cap. 9.

enemy however was ſooner prepared to take the field. Prince Maurice, having drawn his army out of winter-quarters, early in the ſpring, and ordered them to rendezvous in the neighbourhood of the fort of Schenck, ſeemed for ſome time to intend an attack on Bois le Duc; but it ſoon appeared that his real deſign was to attempt the reduction of Rhinberg; the poſſeſſion of this important place being neceſſary in order to facilitate the expulſion of the Spaniards from Guelderland, a part of which was ſtill ſubject to their authority. 1601.

The archduke no ſooner received intelligence of his deſign, than he ordered count Herman of Berg to ſet out with a body of troops to reinforce the garriſon; but before the count had time to execute his commiſſion, Maurice had drawn lines of circumvallation round the place, and fortified the approaches to his camp in ſuch a manner, as rendered all acceſs impracticable. Albert had therefore no other expedient for ſaving Rhinberg left, but to make a diverſion, by attacking ſome important place belonging to the United States, in the hopes that Maurice might be thus induced to abandon his preſent enterpriſe.

At the earneſt requeſt of the people of Flanders, he reſolved to lay ſiege to Oſtend; the garriſon of which place, though ſomewhat checked by adjacent forts, had been able to make incurſions into the heart of the province, and often laid the inhabitants of the open country under the moſt burdenſome contributions.

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The ſtates of this province, notwithſtanding the peculiar hardſhips under which they labored, had diſcovered great alacrity in raiſing their proportion of the ſupplies lately granted to the archduke; and they now promiſed ſtrenuouſly to exert themſelves in furniſhing him with every thing neceſſary for carrying on the ſiege with vigor.

Such were the motives by which Albert was influenced in forming his reſolution to undertake the ſiege of Oſtend; the moſt hazardous enterpriſe in which he had ever been engaged, and which was attended with more important conſequences, than any other which occurs in the hiſtory of the Netherlands.

Deſcription of Oſtend.

Oſtend ſtands on the ſea-coaſt, in a marſhy ſoil, and almoſt ſurrounded with canals; two of which being much larger than the reſt, and communicating with the ſea, receive ſmaller veſſels at all times, and at high-water, admit of ſhips of a conſiderable magnitude. It was an open fiſhing-town, till the year 1572, when it was firſt fortified with a paliſade by the duke of Alva. At the pacification of Ghent, the inhabitants having thrown off the Spaniſh yoke, the fortifications were ſo much ſtrengthened and augmented by the United States, that the duke of Parma, who inveſted it in the year 1583, deſpairing of ſucceſs, abandoned his enterpriſe, and could never afterwards be perſuaded to reſume the ſiege.

Oſtend is divided into two parts, called the Old and the New Town. The former of theſe is

waſhed by the ſea, againſt the ravages of which it was ſecured by a ſtrong fortification, formed of huge and well compacted beams or paliſades; and the latter was defended by a wall flanked with baſtions, and the canals already mentioned, to which there had lately been added a covered way, fortified with numerous redoubts. As, from the ſituation of Oſtend, on the coaſt of Flanders, it afforded a convenient ſhelter to the ſhips of the United Provinces, the ſtates had ever been extremely ſolicitous for its preſervation. They had ſpared no expenſe in rendering the fortifications as complete as poſſible, and beſides a numerous garriſon under the command of an experienced officer, they had always kept it richly furniſhed with proviſions and military ſtores. Nor were theſe the only circumſtances which had deterred the duke of Parma from renewing his attempt againſt it. He conſidered, what was of much greater importance than even the ſtrength of the place, that while the Dutch preſerved their ſuperiority at ſea, the garriſon might continue to receive whatever ſupplies and reinforcements they ſhould ſtand in need of, till his ſtrength and reſources being exhauſted, he ſhould be compelled to raiſe the ſiege. To this conſideration, the archduke ſeems not to have paid that attention which it merited. He did not poſſeſs the ſame military ſkill as the duke of Parma, and could not therefore ſo clearly perceive the difficulties he muſt encounter in his intended enterpriſe. He was not by nature bold or raſh; yet, from the

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facility of his temper, he was apt too readily to adopt the rash imprudent measures that were recommended by his counsellors [**].

Having set out with his numerous army about the end of June, he began his operations against Ostend on the 4th or 5th of July. Prince Maurice, in the mean time, who secretly rejoiced to observe his enemy engage in so dangerous an undertaking, persisted in the siege of Rhinberg; and in a few weeks, notwithstanding the most vigorous defence on the part of the garrison, he compelled them to capitulate.

Rhinberg capitulates

But the attention of both parties was now almost totally engrossed by the siege of Ostend; where Charles Vander Noot the governor, before the besiegers had time to complete their intrenchments, had sallied out upon them, and killed upwards of five hundred men. This unfortunate beginning, however, did not deter the archduke from the prosecution of his enterprise.

Siege of Ostend.

Having taken the necessary precautions to prevent the future sallies of the garrison, and stationed one part of his troops in the downs to the westward of the town, and the rest of them on the south and east, he soon opened his batteries, and began a furious cannonade in every quarter. But his distance from the body of the place, occasioned by the canals, ditches, and other outworks, which the industry of the besiegers had greatly

[**] Vide Bentivoglio, Le Clerc, and Grotius. Thuanus, lib. vi. p. 76, etc.

multiplied, rendered his fire of ſmall effect; and ſhowed him that it muſt long remain impoſſible to compel the garriſon to ſurrender, unleſs he could prevent them from receiving reinforcements and ſupplies by ſea. BOOK I. 1601.

In this opinion he might have been confirmed by the proof which the United States had lately given, how much they were determined to exert themſelves with vigor in the defence of the place. Though Vander Noot was an officer whom they highly eſteemed, yet they had taken from him the chief command, and given it to ſir Francis Vere, who, next to prince Maurice, was the moſt renowned of all their generals, for his military prudence and capacity; and to engage Vere to accept of this command, they had conſented to his ſelecting the flower of the Engliſh forces, for a reinforcement to the garriſon. They had, at the ſame time, ſent to Oſtend a copious ſupply of military ſtores and proviſions; and were unanimous in reſolving that whatever it ſhould coſt them, they would defend the town to the laſt extremity.

This reſolution, and the vigor which the ſtates had begun to diſplay, drew the attention of all Europe to the operations of this important ſiege; and with the permiſſion of the ſtates, the town was viſited by many illuſtrious foreigners, from Germany, Denmarc, France, and England **, who were led there by curioſity to view ſo intereſting a ſcene of action, and the

** As the duke of Holſace, the king of Denmark's brother, the earl of Northumberland, and others.

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desire of being thereby enabled more clearly to comprehend the relations of those military achievements which they expected to be performed by the contending parties.

The archduke had ground for much solicitude with regard to the final issue of his enterprise; but he could not now desist, without exposing himself to reproach and ridicule; and therefore he applied himself with redoubled ardor to the prosecution of the siege.

It might be brought to a period, he imagined, either by carrying it on in the ordinary form, by mines, batteries, and assaults, or by rendering himself master of the entrance of the canals, and thereby intercepting the communication of the garrison by sea, with the United Provinces. He ought naturely to have considered which of these two methods of procedure was the most likely to prove effectual, and to have confined his attention to one of them, without suffering it to be diverted by the other. But, instead of this, he employed his forces, sometimes in carrying on attacks upon the enemy's intrenchments, and sometimes in attempting to block up the canals; and, by this division of his strength, as the siege was protracted to an enormous length, so it was attended with an immense expense of blood and treasure.

For several weeks his principal object was to approach still nearer than where his batteries were first opened to the fortifications of the town. The garrison, on the other hand, omitted

nothing in their power that could obſtruct his approach. They adventured, on ſome occaſions, to ſally out, and to attack the beſiegers ſword in hand: and in the mean time, they labored indefatigably in caſting trenches, and raiſing new redoubts, wherever they apprehended there was danger of the enemy's attempting an aſſault. An inceſſant fire was all the while kept up from the Spaniſh batteries, on the one hand, and the fortifications on the other; and great numbers were killed on either ſide.

At length, the archduke, perceiving that his operations were not attended with the ſucceſs which he expected, had recourſe to the other expedient above-mentioned, and employed a great part of his forces in attempting to obſtruct the entrance of the canals. One of them was the entrance of the harbour, and here he began his operations. But, as all the ground to a conſiderable diſtance from the ſhore was ſand, no mound which he formed of it, could ſuſtain a battery, or reſiſt the violence of the waves. He was therefore obliged to collect together from the neighbouring towns, a great quantity of huge beams, of which and bricks he reſolved to form a dike at the mouth of the canal. The beams were driven deep into the ground, then bound together, and the intermediate ſpaces filled with bricks. Of this ſort of building, one was piled upon another, till the whole was raiſed to a ſufficient height; after which, being planted with a numerous battery of cannon, the enemy's ſhips

BOOK I. found all acceſs to the harbour utterly impracticable.

1601. But the hopes which Albert had from thence conceived, of being able ro reduce the town by famine, were quickly fruſtrated by the ingenuity and great exertion of the governor and garriſon. They inſtantly applied themſelves to enlarge the mouth of the other canal, which paſſed through the heart of the town, and ſoon rendered it capable of receiving the largeſt ſhips.

The archduke, however, did not deſpair of being able to deprive them of this reſource; and he immediately began the ſame ſort of operations at the entrance on this canal, as thoſe by which he had made himſelf maſter of the other. At firſt, his troops and pioneers proceeded with great alacrity, as they were ſheltered from the fire of the beſiegers, by a dike which had been raiſed to defend the town againſt the encroachments of the ſea. But the garriſon reſolved to forego the advantage which they derived from this defence; and having ſtrengthened their fortifications, as well as they could, by ſtakes, huge ſtones, and other materials fitted to repel the fury of the waves, they demoliſhed the dike, and, as by this expedient, the Spaniſh works were expoſed to the artillery of the town, and a great part of the adjacent country laid under water, the archduke was obliged to draw off his troops to a greater diſtance, and to have recourſe to other meaſures which required greater experience and time to carry into execution.

In

In the mean time, the ſtates general of the United Provinces held frequent conferences to conſider how they might beſt improve the leiſure which they enjoyed, while the Spaniſh army was detained before Oſtend. They wiſhed to have made an attack on the iſland of Cadſant, and afterwards to have undertaken the reduction of Sluys. But, at the preſent juncture, they had neither the money nor the troops which prince Maurice thought neceſſary for ſo difficult an enterpriſe. The flower of their army had, after the taking of Rhinberg, been ſent to Oſtend; and the great expenſe which attended the defence of that place, had almoſt exhauſted their finances. Much time was ſpent in deliberating, and various expeditions were propoſed. At length, towards the end of October, when the ſeaſon of action was nearly elapſed, they formed the reſolution of undertaking the ſiege of Bois le Duc, the garriſon of which important place, they underſtood, amounted only to three hundred men. 1601.

Siege of Bois le Duc.

In obedience to their commands, though extremely diffident of ſucceſs, prince Maurice immediately began his march, and having arrived before the place on the firſt of November, he judged, that, conſidering the great extent of the fortifications, the garriſon muſt ſoon find it neceſſary to capitulate, provided he could prevent the entrance of more troops. With this view, he inſtantly began to draw lines of circumvallation round the town, and at firſt, this work was carried on with great rapidity. But ſoon after-

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wards, it was retarded by a violent froſt, which happened, this year, much ſooner than uſual: and the archduke had time to ſend a large detachment of his army, above a thouſand of which forced their way into the town, before the intrenchments were complete; while the reſt lay at a little diſtance from the prince's camp, with the deſign of embracing any opportunity that might offer of annoying him. Still, however, he perſiſted in his deſign: but as the froſt continued daily increaſing in violence, and put an entire ſtop to his operations, he complied with the deſire of the deputies of the ſtates, who as uſual, attended him in the camp, and raiſed the ſiege [59].

End of November.

Maurice had no ſooner retired from Bois le Duc, than Albert, having recalled his troops, reſumed his operations, which had been ſuſpended during their abſence, againſt Oſtend: and in a few days after, he had ground to entertain the hope of being able to terminate the ſiege. The fortifications of the town next the ſea, had lately ſuffered conſiderable prejudice from the fury of the waves; and the garriſon, through ſickneſs and deſertion, and the great numbers killed by fatigue and the inceſſant fire of the beſiegers, was reduced from eight thouſand to between two and three thouſand men. Sir Francis Vere had given repeated notice of his diſtreſsful ſituation to the United States: but, till the raiſing of the ſiege of Bois le Duc, they had no troops which they could ſpare; and after troops were procured, and

[59] Meteren, lib. xxii. Grotius, lib. x. Bentivoglio, &c.

put on board the tranſports, they were prevented from ſailing by contrary winds. About the ſame time, the archduke had ordered a ſelect body of forces to paſs over the harbour at low-water, in the middle of the night, who ſet fire to a temporary defence, compoſed of huge piles of faggots and other combuſtible materials, which had been placed at the foot of the rampart, on the north ſide of the town, to prevent the further encroachments of the ſea. The fire burnt furiouſly for three days and nights, baffling all the attempts of the garriſon to extinguiſh it. The rampart was thus much weakened, and a greater number of men were neceſſary for its defence. In the midſt of this diſtreſs, the governor received notice that the archduke had been aſſiduouſly employed in preparing for a general aſſault, and would certainly carry his deſign into execution on the next day, or, at fartheſt, on the day immediately following. Vere, though poſſeſſed of the moſt unqueſtionable courage, was too ſenſible of the preſent weakneſs of his garriſon and fortifications, and too well acquainted with the perſevering and intrepid ſpirit of the Spaniſh troops, not to be alarmed with the danger which threatened him; and, in order to avert it, he made uſe of an expedient to which a brave man will hardly, even when neceſſity requires it, have recourſe. Without any ſerious intention of capitulating, he ſecretly ſent over to the archduke an officer, to ſignify that he was ready to treat with him for the ſurrender of the town. Albert,

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ſuſpecting no diſſimulation, gladly liſtened to this propoſal, and hoſtages were inſtantly exchanged. He came ſoon, however, to entertain ſome doubt of the governor's ſincerity, and urged him, without delay, to propoſe his terms. This, the governor, by employing different pretexts, found means to defer from day to day, till a reinforcement of troops which he had expected, arrived from Zealand. This reinforcement conſiſted only of five companies, amounting to four hundred men. But finding that the archduke could not be any longer deceived, and having already gained ſufficient time to repair the breaches in the rampart, he ſent him word, that ſince his maſters the ſtates had augmented his garriſon, he could not now, conſiſtently with his honor, conſent to give up the town.

As Vere had begun this tranſaction without communicating it to his officers, ſome ſuſpicions were at firſt entertained of his fidelity by all ſuch perſons as were averſe to a ſurrender; and the ſtates general were not entirely ſatisfied, either with the duplicity he had employed, or the example which he had given of entering into a treaty with the enemy, without the knowledge of his council of war. But no perſon had ſo much reaſon to be offended as the archduke, who though he did not heſitate to ſend back the hoſtages, was both incenſed and mortified when he conſidered how he had been deceived by an enemy, whom he might probably have compelled to lay down his arms [11].

[11] If he had improved the opportunity which he had loſt.

The fortifications of the place were now more ſecure than formerly, and the garriſon had been reinforced. Still, however, being moved by paſſion, more than the probability of ſucceſs, he reſolved to execute the deſign which the hopes of a capitulation had induced him to lay aſide, and gave orders for a general aſſault. He intended to make his principal attack on the weſt, near the harbour, which had been for ſome time in his poſſeſſion; but, in order to divert the enemies attention and divide their forces, he reſolved at the ſame time to make attacks in other quarters, and gave the command of a body of troops, deſtined to act on the eaſt ſide, to the celebrated count de Bucquoi; having committed the execution of his principal deſign to Auguſtin Meſcia, an experienced officer, and governor of the citadel of Antwerp.

Early in the morning he began to play off his batteries, and kept up a furious cannonading in every quarter till midnight, when, the tide having gone back, Meſcia led forward the Spaniſh troops. They were drawn up in a compact body, forty men in front, and the foremoſt ranks clothed in complete armour, followed by the muſketeers and by others, who were provided with ſcaling ladders, and whatever elſe was judged neceſſary, either for acquiring or ſecuring poſſeſſion of the rampart. They advanced acroſs the old harbour, in which there was between three and four feet water, with great ardor and the moſt determined intrepidity; but the garriſon were well prepared for their defence. The governor had beforehand

January 7th, 1602.

BOOK I. 1602.

ordered the cannon to be removed from that part of the fortifications where he expected their principal attack, and in their place had planted ſeven large mortars, which were loaded with ſtones, flints, bullets, and other inſtruments of miſchief. He had likewiſe inſtructed thoſe to whom he had committed the charge of theſe mortars to keep up their fire till the enemy ſhould approach. This order was well obeyed, and the Spaniards had almoſt reached the foot of the rampart, when the mortars were diſcharged, and made dreadful havoc among the foremoſt ranks: a great number was killed and wounded, and the ranks were thrown into confuſion. Still, however, they continued to advance, thoſe who were behind puſhing forward thoſe who were before, till the greater part of them were ſo near that every ſtroke and ſhot of the beſiegers did certain execution. The night came on, yet the Spaniards ſeemed ſtill determined to perſiſt. To prevent a ſurpriſe, the governor ordered a great number of fires to be lighted up within the rampart, and the battle continued to be as bloody and deſperate as before.

The Spaniſh troops at the ſame time crowded together in the harbour, ready to advance to fill up the places of thoſe who fell; when the governor had recourſe to an expedient which he had meditated from the beginning. There were two ſluices within the fortification, one of which ſerved in the time of ebb to keep the water in that part of the canal which lay within the town, and the other to reſtrain it in that part which ran up into

the country. Having ordered both these sluices to be opened, so great a quantity of water was poured into the harbour, that many of the Spaniards were carried down by the violence of the stream, and drowned; while many others, attempting to save themselves by laying hold of the palisades on the rampart, were slaughtered by the enemy. The archduke had commanded his cavalry to keep close in the rear of the infantry to prevent them from having recourse to flight. It was thus rendered impossible for the latter to make their retreat so soon as necessity required; and by this means they were obliged to stand exposed to the fire of the besiegers, long after it was manifest that their most vigorous efforts could be of no avail. A part of the cavalry having entered the water, with a design to obstruct the violence of the current, several horses with their riders were likewise drowned, and Mescia at length found it necessary to give the signal of retreat. The assailants having been equally unsuccessful in every other quarter, were obliged to abandon the assault. In this rash and desperate enterprise about fourteen hundred of the Spaniards and Italians were either killed or drowned, among whom were several persons of the first rank, while the loss of the besiegers amounted only to forty killed, and a small number wounded [52].

[52] Meteren, liv. xxiii. Grotius, lib. xi. ab initio. Bentivoglio, part iii. lib. vi.

BOOK I. 1602.

The archduke would have renewed the assault on the second day after his repulse, but was prevented by a mutiny of his Italian and Spanish troops, who were highly exasperated at the barbarous, and what they deemed disgraceful manner in which they had been used. They bitterly complained that they had been treated like slaves or brutes, and not like soldiers of unquestionable bravery, when they were compelled by the cavalry to stand exposed to the enemy's fire, after the sluices being opened, it was rendered impossible for them to advance. They complained that this measure, which had been adopted without consent of the council of general officers, was contrary to every rule of war, and they declared, that since they had not been treated as soldiers, they would no longer act as such. Albert, soured with his ill success, was equally alarmed and provoked at this behaviour, and in order to prevent the infection of their example from spreading through the rest of his army, he instantly caused between forty and fifty of the most seditious to be executed, and sent a hundred and fifty to the gallies. By this prompt severity he quelled the mutiny, but, finding it necessary to relinquish his design of renewing the assault, he now bent his whole attention to the blocking up of the canal.

Spanish levies in Italy excite jealousies.

During the course of these transactions the court of Spain, notwithstanding their inability to furnish the archduke either with the troops or money necessary to insure success in his contest

with the United States, was engaged in other expenſive enterpriſes. By their order the count de Fuentes, governor of Milan, had ſome time before made ſuch numerous levies of troops, as excited in the minds of the Italian ſtates and princes an apprehenſion, which at the preſent period ſeems to have been without foundation, that ſome ambitious deſign had been conceived of reducing Italy under the Spaniſh yoke. Of theſe troops a part was ſent to the archduke Ferdinand, to aſſiſt him in his operations at Caniſſa againſt the Turks; another part of them to the Netherlands; and the reſt were intended for an expedition againſt Algiers, which was ſtill the principal ſeat of thoſe numerous pirates, by whom the coaſt and the ſhips of Spain continued to be no leſs moleſted than in the former reign. About ten thouſand troops were employed in ſeventy gallies, partly Genoeſe and partly Spaniſh, commanded by the celebrated Doria, and they had a proſperous voyage till they were within a few days ſailing of the deſtined port. Had they immediately landed, it is probable they would have ſucceeded in their enterpriſe, as the greater part of the pirates, agreeably to information which Doria had received, were abſent, and ſuch of them as had been left behind, were unprepared for their defence: but, unfortunately, one of the capital ſhips had been ſeparated from the reſt of the fleet, on which account the debarcation was delayed till next day; and in the intervening night a dreadful ſtorm aroſe, which not only rendered all attempts to land impracticable, but

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obliged the fleet to leave the coaſt and return to Sicily [51].

Invaſion of Ireland.

The court of Spain was not diſcouraged by the failure of their attempt againſt Algiers, from engaging in another enterpriſe, which was ſtill more difficult to be carried into execution. The war with England had not for ſeveral years been vigorouſly proſecuted by either of the two contending powers; and no event had happened which deſerves to be recorded: but Philip, or more properly the duke of Lerma, had, about this time, conceived the hopes of being able to give a mortal wound to the power of Elizabeth, by an invaſion of Ireland, where a great number of the natives were in open rebellion againſt her, under the earl of Tyrone.

Philip the Second, by various intrigues carried on by eccleſiaſtics, had fomented the diſcontents of the Iriſh, and on different occaſions had ſent them ſupplies of arms and military ſtores. Many of them had been engaged, by the kind treatment which he ordered to be given them, to enter into his ſervice in the Netherlands: and of theſe, many having returned to their native country, had, through the knowledge which they had acquired, in ſome meaſure contributed to teach their countrymen the rules of military diſcipline, thereby rendering them a much more formidable enemy than they had hitherto been to the Engliſh troops.

[51] Thuanus, lib. cxxvi. Piaſecii Chronica, an. 1601.

Tyrone, whoſe affections Elizabeth had in vain endeavoured to conciliate, though noted for his treachery and cruelty, vices which generally attend on barbarous manners, yet, being brave and active, had perſuaded many of his countrymen to inliſt themſelves under his banners, by flatteringly inſpiring them with the hopes of deliverance from the Engliſh yoke. He had applied for aſſiſtance to the court of Spain, and being ſeconded in his application by ſeveral ſeminaries of Engliſh prieſts and Jeſuits, ſolicitors the moſt likely to ſucceed with Philip and his miniſter, he had obtained a promiſe both of arms and troops.

A bull of excommunication having been publiſhed by three ſucceeding popes [14] againſt Elizabeth, abſolving her ſubjects from their allegiance, and inviting all catholic princes to take poſſeſſion of her dominions, the ſuperſtitious mind of Philip was eaſily impreſſed with a perſuaſion that, by ſupporting the rebels, and aboliſhing Elizabeth's authority in Ireland, he would act the meritorious part of a faithful ſon of the church, and ſerve the cauſe of God and of the catholic religion. And, although he had too much indolence to be capable of being principally actuated by ambition, yet he could not but deſire to add Ireland to his dominions, as, beſides the great extent and fertility of that iſland, its commodious harbours would occaſionally afford a retreat and ſhelter to his ſhips, and better enable him to diſpute the empire of the ſea with England and the United Provinces.

[14] Pius V. Gregory XIII. Clement VIII. the preſent pope.

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Determined by theſe conſiderations, he gave orders for the equipment of a fleet of tranſports and ſhips of war, ſufficient for carrying ſix thouſand troops, and ſo confident was he and his miniſter of the ſucceſs of their intended enterpriſe, that, beſides the troops, a great number of families, including women and children, were put on board, with the deſign of eſtabliſhing a Spaniſh colony in the kingdom which they expected to ſubdue. They had lent too eaſy faith to the exaggerated accounts which Tyrone had given them of his ſtrength: and they were not ſufficiently acquainted with the character and abilities of lord Mountjoy, whom Elizabeth had appointed viceroy and commander in chief of the Engliſh forces.

The command of the Spaniſh troops, and the conduct of the expedition, were committed to Don John d'Aguilar, who had learnt the rudiments of war under the duke of Alva, and had afterwards acquired ſome military reputation from a ſucceſsful enterpriſe, in which he had the chief command, againſt the town of Blavet in Bretagne.

He ſet ſail from Spain in the end of Auguſt, accompanied by ſome ſhips of war, under Don John Guevara, and arrived at Kinſale, in the ſouth of Ireland, on the 8th of October: but a part of his tranſports having been ſeparated from the reſt of the fleet, he found, on his arrival at Kinſale, that he could muſter only four thouſand men. With this little army, he applied

himſelf to ſtrengthen the fortifications of the place, reſolving to remain there, till he ſhould be joined by Tyrone, or till the reſt of his forces ſhould arrive. The ſhips of war under Guevara returned immediately after the troops were landed; and, ſoon after, the harbour of Kinſale was blocked up by a ſquadron of Engliſh men of war, commanded by ſir Richard Leviſon. Agreeably to his inſtructions from the court of Spain, d'Aguilar diſperſed a manifeſto, over the adjacent country, in which he aſſumed the title of general in the holy war, undertaken for the preſervation of the catholic faith in Ireland; and whilſt he invited people to come unto his aſſiſtance, he declared, that he was ſent by his maſter the king of Spain, with no other intention but to deliver them from the dominion of the devil and the heretical queen of England.

The Iriſh had formerly, on different occaſions, received the juſteſt grounds of complaint againſt the Engliſh government; and at this time they were highly incenſed on account of the introduction of what the Engliſh, with good reaſon, regard as one of their moſt valuable privileges, the inſtitution of trials by jury; they were therefore generally animated with a ſpirit of diſcontent againſt their ancient maſters. The greater part of them were likewiſe ſtrongly attached to the popiſh faith; and their prieſts, who were wholly in the intereſt of Spain, poſſeſſed an entire aſcendant over them, having perſuaded them that their anceſtors had originally ſprung from Spain, and thereby

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created in their minds a ſtrong predilection in favor of the Spaniards.

They were diſcouraged, however, from complying with d'Aguilar's invitation to have recourſe to arms, by conſidering the ſmall number of troops which he had brought to their aſſiſtance; and they reſolved to remain quiet till the arrival of the reſt, which he had aſſured them would quickly follow.

The viceroy was, at this time, engaged in the proſecution of the war againſt Tyrone, in the northern parts of the iſland. His arms had been attended with great ſucceſs; he had defeated ſeveral parties of the rebels, and had made priſoners of many of their leaders, ſome of whom he had ſent to England. Tyrone himſelf, with his adherents, had fled before him, and taken ſhelter in thoſe faſtneſſes in the northern provinces, where the marſhy ground rendered it difficult for the Engliſh general to advance. Here, however, the rebel chief was in a manner beſieged, and as the country was but little cultivated, he muſt ere long have been obliged, through the want of ſubſiſtence, to ſubmit to the conqueror. In this critical ſituation were the affairs of the inſurgents when the Spaniſh troops arrived. Upon receiving information of their arrival, the viceroy, juſtly dreading that the inſurrection would ſoon become more general, reſolved, without delay, to exert his utmoſt vigor againſt the invaders. With this intention, having left a part of his cavalry to watch the motions of Tyrone, he ſet out for

Kinſale, and having marched with great rapidity, he ſoon arrived before the place, and began the ſiege with between eight and nine thouſand men. But before he had time to make any conſiderable progreſs, he received notice that the Spaniſh tranſports above mentioned, which had been ſeparated from the reſt of the fleet, had arrived at Baltimore, with two thouſand ſoldiers on board, under the command of an officer named Ocampo; and ſoon after he was informed, that the froſt having ſet in with great violence in the marſhy country where he had left Tyrone, that leader and his followers had made their eſcape over the ice, had joined Ocampo with upwards of four thouſand men, who together with the Spaniards, were on their march to raiſe the ſiege of Kinſale. This alarming intelligence he procured by intercepted letters from Ocampo and Tyrone to Aguilar; and from theſe letters too he underſtood their plan of operations, the time of their approach, and the route which they intended to purſue. He therefore prepared himſelf for his defence; and, having drawn off the greater part of his army to an advantageous ſituation, at ſome diſtance from the town, he left no more forces than were ſufficient to reſtrain the eruption of the Spaniards under Aguilar.

When Tyrone ſaw the Engliſh army ſo advantageouſly poſted, and prepared for his attack, his courage failed; and notwithſtanding the remonſtrances of Ocampo, who reproached him with cowardice, he gave orders to his men to change

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the direction of their march, hoping to reach a marſh which lay near, and thus to avoid the neceſſity of fighting. But the viceroy, perceiving his intention, haſtened forward with all his forces, and attacked him in the rear. Finding then that an engagement was unavoidable, he reſumed his courage, and faced about to the enemy. But the rebels were no match in the open field for the Engliſh forces. They were quickly thrown into confuſion, and put to flight. The Spaniards, who fought deſperately for ſome time, being forſaken by their daſtardly aſſociates, were overpowered by numbers, and Ocampo himſelf with ſeveral officers, made priſoners. In this battle, above twelve hundred men were killed upon the ſpot; a great proportion of whom were Spaniards. The reſt of that nation fled to Baltimore and other places on the coaſt, in which they had left garriſons. Such of the Iriſh as were taken, were hanged as rebels; the greater part of them, among whom was Tyrone, eſcaped through their knowledge of the country; but were totally diſperſed.

It was eaſy for d'Aguilar, when he received intelligence of this defeat, and the cowardly behaviour of the Iriſh, to perceive how much the court of Spain had been miſtaken in their judgement of the facility of eſtabliſhing their authority in Ireland. There could be no ſecure dependence, he ſaw, on aſſiſtance from the natives; and no army, which in the preſent ſtate of the finances could be ſent from Spain, could be able to contend alone with the Engliſh forces. He reſolved, therefore,

therefore, to employ all his influence to diſſuade the king from perſiſting in ſo deſperate an attempt: and, being at the ſame time conſcious, that with ſo ſmall a number of troops as were under his command in Kinſale, he could not juſtly expect to be able, above a few weeks, to defend the town againſt a general of ſo much ſkill and vigor as the viceroy, he reſolved to ſave the lives of his ſoldiers, and to deliver the place into the hands of the Engliſh, provided he could obtain from them ſuch terms as his honor would permit him to accept.

In a few days after the battle, he gave the viceroy notice of his intention, and explained to him the motives of his conduct, and the ſentiments which he had come to entertain of the Iriſh rebels, and of the folly of the enterpriſe, into which the court of Spain, through miſinformation, had been betrayed.

But he accompanied his offer with a declaration expreſſed in the ſtrongeſt terms, that, in caſe the viceroy ſhould refuſe to grant him the conditions which he required, the honors of war to his troops, with a promiſe of tranſporting them and their cannon and ammunition to Spain, in Engliſh ſhips; and an act of indemnity to the inhabitants of Kinſale, by whom he had been ſo kindly received and entertained, he and his ſoldiers were unalterably determined to defend the town to the laſt extremity.

Lord Mountjoy could not but reſpect the ſpirit by which this declaration was dictated. He was

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prompted by the native generoſity of his diſpoſition to comply with the terms propoſed, and he thought himſelf juſtifiable in point of prudence for complying with them, when he conſidered how much his army was likely to ſuffer in the operations of a ſiege, carried on in the middle of winter, againſt ſo brave and ſo determined an enemy.

Without heſitation, therefore, he agreed to d'Aguilar's demands. Kinſale, Baltimore, and ſome other forts, in the poſſeſſion of the Spaniards, were delivered into the hands of the viceroy; and d'Aguilar with his troops, cannon, and ammunition, were ſoon after tranſported to Spain in an Engliſh fleet.

Philip, after hearing of the iſſue of the battle, having deſpaired of their preſervation, greatly rejoiced at their arrival. He highly approved of the capitulation, and, with the advice of his counſellors, reſolved, in conſequence of the information which he received from d'Aguilar, to abandon the Iriſh rebels to their fate; and henceforth to apply himſelf with more undivided attention to his affairs in the Netherlands [*].

[*] Van Meteren, lib. xxiii. Carte's Hiſt. of England, book xix. Thuanus, &c.

THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF PHILIP THE THIRD, KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK II.

THE archduke, after the repulse of his army, as above related, by the garrison of Ostend, was advised by some of his principal officers to raise the siege. He was himself extremely reluctant to comply with this advice, but thought it necessary, before rejecting it, to know the sentiments of the court of Spain. Philip's ministers could judge of the propriety of his persisting in his enterprise, only by the information which he transmitted to them; and there is ground to believe that, having conceived an opinion that it would be inconsistent with his honor to relinquish it, his representation was calculated to make them think too lightly of the obstacles which it was necessary to surmount, and too highly of the importance of the place. They believed it to be impossible for the garrison to defend it much longer against so great a force, and they imagined that by the reduction of it

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they might ruin the trade of the United Provinces, and thus insure success in the future operations of the war. It was therefore determined that the archduke should continue the siege, and that no assistance should be with-held which could enable him to bring it to the desired conclusion.

Siege of Ostend continued.

Their assistance on the present occasion was the more necessary, as his own finances were almost entirely exhausted, and he had little prospect of receiving any considerable support from the assembly of the states. He convened this assembly, however, and urged them, on account of the necessity of his affairs, to grant him an immediate supply. The deputies were liberal in their professions of loyalty; but, in return to his application, they represented that, in their present circumstances, it was impossible for them to comply with his request, as the province of Brabant had, almost every season, been obliged to pay the most exorbitant contributions to the enemy, and not only that province but several others had long been cruelly robbed and plundered by the mutineers.

Conscious of the truth of this representation, he could not persist in his demand, but was obliged to rest satisfied with what he received from the states of Flanders, who, being more deeply interested than the rest in the conquest of Ostend, contributed to the utmost of their power to assist him in carrying on the siege.

Having, since the failure of his late attempt, despaired of being able to reduce the garrison by

ſtorm, his principal object now was to intercept the communication with the United Provinces, by blocking up the entrance of the canal. For this purpoſe he brought engineers from Italy and other places, and, by their direction, various works were undertaken at an immenſe expenſe. But at the mouth of the canal their labor was rendered fruitleſs by the fury of the waves; and when they attempted to raiſe a dike and batteries on the banks of the canal, ſomewhat nearer to the town, they were not only expoſed to the enemy's artillery, but were often interrupted by the garriſon, who on different occaſions ſallied out upon them, deſtroyed their works, and put great numbers to the ſword. In order to avoid the farther repetition of theſe diſaſters, they began at a diſtance from the canal, and out of the reach of the beſieged, to conſtruct huge machines, formed of beams ſtrongly bound together, which, when finiſhed, they intended to puſh forward to the banks of the canal, and on theſe, after covering them with turf, ſtraw, and other materials, to erect their batteries. But the finiſhing of this, and other works which they attempted, required a conſiderable length of time; a great part of the preſent year was ſpent in preparing them, all the other operations of the ſiege were thus relaxed. In the mean time abundant ſupplies of ſtores and proviſions were introduced into the town. The garriſon, many of whom were ſickly and wounded, was entirely changed. By the new garriſon, conſiſting of ſelect troops, partly Britiſh and partly

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French and Dutch, all the damages which the fortifications had ſuſtained were repaired; and ſo little dread was entertained of the ſucceſs of the beſiegers, that general Vere, with the conſent of the ſtates, went over to England, devolving the command, during his abſence, upon the ſieur Frederic de Dorp.

The defence of Oſtend had coſt the United Provinces about a hundred thouſand florins each month, beſides the pay of between ſix and eight thouſand troops; yet, from the great increaſe of their commerce, joined to the frugality of their manners, they were not only able to bear the burden of this expenſe, but to maintain a conſiderable fleet, and at the ſame time to make ſo great an augmentation of their land-forces, that prince Maurice began his operations this campaign with twenty-four thouſand foot and ſix thouſand horſe, a more powerful army than any former one which he had commanded ſince the commencement of the war.

The United States aſſiſted by Henry IV. of France, and the queen of England.

In raiſing this army they were ſecretly favored by Henry IV. who permitted the ſieur de Bethune, of the houſe of Melun, to levy troops for them in France; and in Germany, where they were befriended by ſome princes of the Proteſtant religion, they raiſed a body of two thouſand four hundred horſe. But their moſt uſeful ally was the queen of England, who furniſhed them with three thouſand men to fill up the vacancies in the Engliſh regiments already in their ſervice, and ſoon after ſent them three thouſand more. The

obtaining of this reinforcement had been Sir F. Vere's principal object in going over to England, and he now returned from thence, and was appointed to the command of all the Engliſh forces.

The Spaniſh army, on the other hand, had not for many years been ſo much reduced in number as at the preſent period. Many had been killed, or had died of a peſtilential diſeaſe, and of the hardſhips which they had undergone before Oſtend; and the Italian and Spaniſh mutineers amounted to a conſiderable number; notwithſtanding which, the court of Spain and the archduke were as obſtinately as ever reſolved to proſecute the ſiege. The United States rejoiced at their obſtinacy, and hoped it might ere long prove fatal to their power in the Netherlands. They conſidered the preſent juncture as the moſt favorable for action which could occur, and therefore had reſolved ſtrenuouſly to exert themſelves in attempting to make ſome important conqueſt in the ſouthern provinces, which, in caſe the garriſon of Oſtend ſhould be obliged to capitulate, might fully compenſate for the loſs.

They had conceived an expectation at this time that the people in the ſouthern provinces, who had lately ſuffered great oppreſſion from the rapacity of the mutineers, might be induced to ſhake off the Spaniſh yoke; and in this expectation they publiſhed a memorial addreſſed to the ſtates of theſe provinces, enumerating the grievances which they muſt be conſcious of having ſo long ſuffered; repreſenting how much they had been

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abuſed in the late king's transference of the ſovereignty over them to the archdukes, notwithſtanding which they were ſtill as much as ever ſubject to the tyranny of Spain; and calling upon them, in remembrance of their firſt engagements, to return into their former connexion and alliance with their kinſmen in the United Provinces. In order to procure attention to this memorial, they reſolved that their army ſhould march into the heart of Brabant, to be ready to afford ſupport to ſuch of the inhabitants as ſhould be willing to vindicate their liberty: and this meaſure, it is ſaid, received the approbation both of the French monarch and the queen of England.

But prince Maurice could not be ſatisfied that it was either expedient or practicable. The people, he thought, were too much inured to the Spaniſh government, and too much overawed by citadels and garriſons, to liſten to the invitation of the ſtates; and he dreaded the difficulty of being able to ſupport ſo numerous an army in an enemy's country for ſo long a time as would be neceſſary for the end in view. The Spaniſh army, indeed, could not at preſent contend with him in the open field; but they could harraſs him in his march, and intercept his convoys of proviſions; beſides, that the archduke was in daily expectation of receiving a reinforcement of troops from Spain and Italy [1].

[1] Siri ſays that Maurice intended marching through Brabant to lay ſiege to Nieuport, or ſome other ſea-coaſt town. Vide vol. i. p. 126. Mem. recondite.

Moved by theſe conſiderations, the ſtates conſented that, till it ſhould appear whether their memorial was likely to produce the deſired effect, he ſhould lead his army along the eaſt ſide of Brabant; that, by keeping it near the Maeſe, he might more eaſily receive ſupplies from the neutral powers in that neighbourhood. Having aſſembled his army at Nimeguen, he paſſed the Maeſe near Mark, and towards the end of June he had advanced as far as Maſeyk, when he was obliged to ſtop for ſeveral days, through an unjuſtifiable action of his Engliſh troops, who having on their march ſold a great part of the bread with which he had furniſhed them, could not procure any in the country where they now were, and were obliged to bring it from a conſiderable diſtance. This delay was, in the iſſue, attended with important conſequences.

The archduke, having heard with much anxiety that Maurice had begun his march, had diſpatched Mendoza, admiral of Arragon, who had lately been ſet at liberty, with ſix thouſand foot and four thouſand horſe, to watch his motions, and, if poſſible, to obſtruct his progreſs. Mendoza was come as far as Tienen, a fortified town in the centre of Brabant, and was there employed in caſting up intrenchments to ſecure his troops. Could prince Maurice have immediately advanced, he might have attacked him with the higheſt probability of ſucceſs. But through the delay occaſioned by the improvident conduct of the Engliſh troops, Mendoza had not only full leiſure to

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complete his intrenchments, but received a reinforcement of eight thouſand men, under the marquis of Spinola, who at this time arrived from Italy, and, if the prince could have haſtened forward, might eaſily have been intercepted before he reached the Spaniſh camp. Maurice ſtill however continued to advance, till he arrived within a little diſtance of the enemy, and once and again offered battle; but, finding that Mendoza was unalterably reſolved to decline it, and was now too ſtrong to be compelled, and conſidering how dangerous it muſt be, in the face of ſo great a force, to remain much longer in a country where it was ſo difficult to procure proviſions, he returned haſtily towards the Maeſe; and, about the middle of July, began to put in execution the only part of the general plan of his operations which he himſelf had judged practicable, by laying ſiege to the town of Grave.

Siege of Grave.

This place, one of the ſtrongeſt in the Netherlands, and deemed of great importance, on account of its ſituation on the banks of the Maeſe, and its neighbourhood to the dominions of the ſtates, had remained in the hands of the Spaniards, ſince the year 1586, when, as above related, the young baron de Harmont, involved himſelf in ruin and infamy, by ſurrendering it, without neceſſity, to the duke of Parma. It was defended, at this time, by Antonio Gonſalez, a Spaniſh officer of diſtinguiſhed merit; and, as the archduke had before-hand dreaded the danger which impended over this important place, he had ſent

a body of ſelect troops to reinforce the garriſon, which, after their arrival, amounted to fifteen hundred men. From ſuch a governor and garriſon Prince Maurice expected to meet with the moſt vigorous reſiſtance; and he could not doubt that Mendoza would quickly follow him, and attempt to compel him to raiſe the ſiege. But he did not deſpair of bringing his enterpriſe to a happy iſſue before the approach of winter, provided he could prevent the entrance into the town of any farther reinforcement and ſupply. With this view, he drew lines of circumvallation round his camp, extending from that part of the river which is above the town to that other part of it which is below. Theſe lines were more than half a German league in length, of an extraordinary height and depth, and ſtrengthened by a great number of redoubts planted with cannon. While this laborious work was going on, he reduced a fort belonging to the garriſon, on the other ſide of the river, directly oppoſite to the town, and having ſtationed a part of his troops there, he next threw two temporary bridges over the Maeſe, one above, and the other below the town. When theſe works were finiſhed, the town was completely inveſted on every ſide, and the garriſon muſt, ere long, have found it neceſſary to capitulate: but, as he knew not what quantity of ſtores they poſſeſſed, and conſequently was ignorant how long they might be able to ſuſtain the blockade, he reſolved, in order to ſave time, to carry on the ſiege in the uſual form, and im-

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mediately began by opening trenches in different quarters, to make regular approaches to the town.

A cotemporary hiſtorian [2], who upon the ſpot examined the various works which prince Maurice executed on this occaſion, ſpeaks of them as the moſt maſterly which had ever been exhibited in any ſiege. In order the more effectually to ſave his men from the enemy's fire, the trenches were made of a greater depth than uſual; both the workmen and ſoldiers were, at every approach, ſecured againſt the ſallies of the garriſon, by mounds and batteries; and when the trenches were advanced within a certain diſtance of the fortifications, ſpacious covered ways, of ſufficient breadth to admit of carriages, were formed, which led from the trenches to the ditch. The garriſon made frequent ſallies, in which they diſplayed the moſt unqueſtionable bravery; but, through the precautions mentioned, they were as often repulſed with loſs, while few of the beſiegers were killed either in theſe ſallies, or by the artillery of the place.

Mendoza had, in the mean time, advanced from Tienen as far as Venlo, which ſtands on the banks of the Maeſe, about twelve German miles higher than Grave, and there deliberated with his council of war, whether it was practicable to compel prince Maurice to raiſe the ſiege. But he quickly perceived how vain and ruinous it muſt prove to attack a numerous enemy in ſuch ſtrong intrenchments, for whom he was not an equal

[2] Van Meteren.

match in the open field; and therefore he reſolved to reſt ſatisfied with introducing a reinforcement of ſelect troops into the place. Had this meaſure been attended with ſucceſs, it muſt have rather ſerved to haſten than to retard the ſurrender, as the ſtock of proviſions in the town muſt thereby have been ſooner conſumed. It was adopted, however, by Mendoza, who was probably more influenced by the dread of the reproach which he would incur, if he made no attempt, than by the proſpect of any advantage that could accrue from it.

The execution of this enterpriſe was committed to an Italian general of the name of Spina; who was ordered, with a thouſand choſen troops, to attack the enemy's intrenchments in the night, at a place where they appeared to be the weakeſt, and to attempt to force his way acroſs their camp into the town.

Another party, equal in number, was appointed to ſupport him, and, in caſe of a repulſe, to ſecure his retreat; while a third detachment was ſent to make a feigned attack in another quarter, in the hopes of dividing the attention of the beſiegers, and thereby rendering it eaſier for Spina to execute his deſign. But prince Maurice was every where upon his guard. The Spaniards were repulſed; and, leaving behind them their carriages, with their ſcaling ladders, and other apparatus, they fled precipitately to their camp.

Mendoza, now deſpairing of ſucceſs, retired with his whole army towards Maeſtricht, and, a Sept. 20.

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few days after, the garriſon capitulated upon honorable terms [1].

Naval affairs.

During the courſe of theſe tranſactions the contending parties exerted themſelves at ſea, with ſomewhat greater vigor, than for ſeveral years preceding. The court of Spain had, before the preſent period, ſent a ſquadron of gallies to cruiſe on the coaſt of Flanders, under the command of Frederic Spinola, a Genoeſe nobleman, who had ſerved under the duke of Parma, and given ſome diſtinguiſhed proofs of vigor and abilities. From this ſquadron the Dutch trade had ſuſtained conſiderable prejudice: and Spinola, encouraged by his ſucceſs, having gone himſelf to Madrid to ſolicit an augmentation of his fleet, had obtained ſix gallies more, which he had conducted in ſafety into the harbour of Sluys. This harbour afforded him the moſt commodious ſhelter and retreat. His gallies lying at anchor in the canal which leads to it, iſſued forth againſt the enemy when they were leaſt prepared to oppoſe them, and either took or ſunk a great number of their trading veſſels. With a more numerous ſquadron, and a greater number of ſoldiers on board, he would have ventured to a greater diſtance from the coaſt, and thus have in ſome meaſure intercepted the communication of Oſtend with Holland and Zealand. He could likewiſe have ſometimes ventured to make a deſcent upon their coaſts; or have entered their harbours and canals, and ſeized or burnt their ſhipping.

[1] Van Meteren, l. xxiv. Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. vii. Grotius, lib. undecimo, Heroic Acts of Prince Maurice, &c.

Impreſſed with a conviction that from ſuch ſpirited naval enterpriſes the enemy muſt ſuffer more eſſentially than from the ſiege of their towns, or the operations of the Spaniſh army in the field, he this year made a ſecond journey into Spain, after having communicated his intention to his elder brother Ambroſe, the celebrated marquis of Spinola. This nobleman, ſo juſtly renowned on account of the military talents which he afterwards diſplayed, had not yet entered into public life, though he was at this time about thirty years of age. But his ambition was now rouſed by his brother's ſucceſs, and being conſcious of great abilities, he reſolved henceforth to avail himſelf of his fortune, which was one of the greateſt in Genoa, in order to render himſelf illuſtrious. BOOK II. 1602.

Having, from the information communicated to him by his brother, conceived an opinion that the war in the Netherlands might be ſucceſsfully carried on at ſea, he empowered his brother to propoſe to the court of Spain that, in caſe they would grant an augmentation of the number of their gallies at Sluys, he would raiſe at his own expenſe a body of eight thouſand troops, to be commanded by himſelf, and to ſerve occaſionally on board his brother's fleet.

The Spaniſh miniſter readily conſented to this propoſal, and gave the marquis a commiſſion for levying the troops, while orders were at the ſame time iſſued for the equipment of the gallies. The marquis, with the aſſiſtance of his numerous friends, and of the count de Fuentes, governor

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of Milan, punctually fulfilled his part of the agreement, and, as above related, arrived with his troops in the Netherlands at a fortunate juncture, when, without his aid, the admiral of Arragon muſt have abandoned the province of Brabant to the army of the United Provinces.

His brother was not ſo fortunate in conducting from Spain the gallies with which the king had furniſhed him. They were eight in number, with above a thouſand ſoldiers on board, and fifteen hundred ſlaves, who ſerved as rowers. But two of theſe gallies were, before their departure, burnt by ſome Engliſh ſhips of war on the coaſt of Portugal; and other three, having been intercepted by an Engliſh and Dutch ſquadron, which lay in wait for them in the narrow ſeas, and either taken or deſtroyed, Frederic arrived in Flanders only with the remaining three.

He was deeply affected by this diſaſter. His force, which he had been at ſo great pains in ſoliciting, was ſtill too ſmall for carrying the deſigns which he had formed into execution, and for ſeveral months he could not engage in any memorable enterpriſe. But, having become impatient under this inactivity which neceſſity impoſed on him, he ventured with eight gallies, having a great number of ſoldiers on board, and ſome frigates, to attack a ſquadron of Dutch ſhips of war, which had for ſome time been ſtationed on the coaſt. The conteſt was bloody and obſtinate on both ſides; but as the Dutch were favored by the wind, and could navigate their ſhips with greater dexterity, they were enabled

enabled to avoid grappling with the Spaniards, and had thus a much ſmaller number killed. At length Frederic himſelf received a mortal wound, of which he died ſoon after, and his fleet, diſheartened by this calamity, and perceiving that their utmoſt efforts to come to cloſe fight were ineffectual, retired into the canal of Sluys *. May, 1603.

The marquis of Spinola was at this time employed in raiſing troops in Italy, and ſtill entertained the hopes of being able to carry his firſt deſign into execution; but his brother's death, joined to the weakneſs of the Spaniſh fleet at Sluys, obliging him to abandon it, he now reſolved to turn his attention from the ſea to the land-ſervice, and with this intention he returned to the Netherlands, where the archduke was diſpoſed to give him every mark of eſteem and confidence.

This prince had never before ſtood ſo much in need of the counſel and aſſiſtance of his friends. The promiſes of money made him by the court of Spain had been only in part fulfilled, and the mutinous ſpirit of his troops, occaſioned by his inability to pay their arrears, had riſen to the greateſt height.

Mutiny and deſertion.

They had no ſooner retreated after their repulſe in attempting to raiſe the ſiege of Grave, than almoſt all the Italians, except thoſe who were commanded by the marquis of Spinola, refuſed to obey the order which the admiral of Arragon had iſſued for their marching towards Maeſtricht, and withdrew themſelves in a body from the

* Meteren, Bentvoglio, &c.

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camp. They were accompanied by ſeveral officers of experience and abilities, and by theſe men conducted towards Hochſtrate, a fortified town in Brabant, of which, as they came upon the garriſon by ſurpriſe, they eaſily acquired poſſeſſion. Their number having been augmented by other mutineers, who flocked to them from every quarter, ſoon amounted to three thouſand foot and two thouſand horſe, and almoſt the whole of them were veteran ſoldiers, diſtinguiſhed for their knowledge of military diſcipline. Having choſen an elect, or leader, and filled up from among themſelves the places of all ſuch officers as had not joined in the mutiny, they eſtabliſhed, with general conſent, a ſyſtem of regulations which they judged neceſſary for their ſafety and preſervation, after which they applied themſelves to ſtrengthen the fortifications of the town, and then ſent out parties to lay the inhabitants of the adjacent country under contributions. Emboldened by their numbers, they made incurſions into the interior and more diſtant parts of the province, and when the people refuſed to comply with their exorbitant demands, they laid waſte the country, and indulged themſelves in every ſpecies of injury and outrage. This populous and fertile province had long been expoſed to the inroads of the troops of the United States; but they had never been treated with ſo great cruelty by the enemy as on this occaſion, by the troops which had been hired for their defence.

The archduke having convened the ſtates to deliberate concerning a proper remedy for theſe diſorders, he was urged by that aſſembly to employ whatever money could be raiſed to give the ſoldiers immediate ſatisfaction with regard to their arrears, becauſe without this they repreſented the country muſt be involved in utter ruin.

But Albert, conſcious that he had not funds ſufficient at once to ſatisfy the mutineers, and to pay the arrears due to his other troops; and judging, from paſt experience, that unleſs he could ſatisfy them all, the example of thoſe who had mutinied would be quickly followed by their companions, for this reaſon he entertained ſome doubt of the prudence of the advice which the ſtates had given him, and declined complying with it, till he ſhould know the ſentiments of the court of Spain.

Miſconduct of the Spaniſh court.

That court ought to have been ſenſible of the folly of expecting that diſcipline could be maintained among troops, eſpecially foreign troops, unintereſted in the iſſue of the war, when their pay was with-held from them. They ought, long before this time, to have perceived the abſurdity of keeping an army on foot, which they were unable to ſupport. They ought, on the preſent occaſion, to have reſolved to reduce the number of their troops, and to reſt ſatisfied with a defenſive war, or, by greater economy at home, to enable themſelves to make more liberal remittances to the archduke, or to have put an end to the war, by empowering him to grant to the United

BOOK II. 1603. States ſuch terms of peace as they were willing to accept. But, inſtead of adopting any of theſe meaſures, which prudence and neceſſity required, they reſolved that, for an example to the reſt of the army, the mutineers ought to be reduced to obedience by force, and for this end they gave orders for levying ſeveral new regiments with the utmoſt poſſible expedition. It does not appear that the archduke was diſſatisfied with this reſolution of the Spaniſh council, and he inſtantly applied himſelf to carry it into execution. More than half a year was ſpent in raiſing the troops, and making the other neceſſary preparations; and during all that time, the people of Brabant were expoſed to the violence and depredations of the mutineers. In order to intimidate them Albert publiſhed an edict of proſcription, in which he declared, if they did not return to their duty in three days after receiving the copy of the edict which he ſent them, they ſhould be conſidered as rebels to his government, and be all put to the ſword without mercy. To this edict the mutineers publiſhed an anſwer, expreſſed in the moſt contemptuous terms. They were more than ever exaſperated, and they reſolved that, rather than ſubmit to a prince, by whom they thought their ſervices were ſo ungratefully requited, they would enter into the ſervice of the United States, and make him feel the weight of their reſentment.

January 2. 1604. Agreeably to this reſolution they ſent a deputation of their number to prince Maurice, to inquire whether, in caſe they were attacked by the

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archduke's forces, he would afford them his protection. Maurice, conformably to his conduct on a former occaſion, gave them the moſt gracious reception, and agreed that, in caſe they ſhould be obliged to abandon Hochſtrate, they might retire with ſafety under the walls of Breda, Bergen op Zoom, or Swenberg. He likewiſe permitted them to purchaſe proviſions in theſe towns, and left them ground to hope that, if Albert ſhould not be induced to treat them with greater lenity, he would exert himſelf to the utmoſt in their behalf.

Spaniſh mutineers protected by Maurice.

The United States conſidered this mutiny as the moſt fortunate event that could have happened, becauſe it would greatly retard the archduke's operations in the ſiege of Oſtend, and prevent him from engaging in any new enterpriſe during the preſent campaign. They highly approved therefore of the prince's conduct with regard to the mutineers, and empowered him to enter into a formal treaty with them, of which the following were the principal conditions; that, in return for his aſſiſtance againſt the Spaniards, they would ſerve in his army for the reſt of the campaign; and farther, that in the caſe of an accommodation with the archduke, they would not carry arms for four months againſt the United Provinces. The ſtates believed that this treaty could not expoſe them to the imputation of acting ungenerouſly towards an enemy, whoſe whole conduct in the war they regarded as tyrannical and unjuſt; and they thought themſelves juſtified for fomenting the mutiny, by the practice of moſt nations,

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and particularly of the Spaniards themſelves, who on all occaſions encouraged deſertion from the arms of their enemy.

The archduke was greatly alarmed when he received intelligence of this tranſaction, and, being at the ſame time more than ever incenſed againſt the mutineers, he collected his troops with the greateſt expedition which the ſtate of his affairs would permit, and ſent them, under the command of Frederic, count of Berg, to lay ſiege to Hochſtrate. Theſe troops amounted to ſeven thouſand foot, and three thouſand horſe; and, as Hochſtrate was but indifferently fortified, he muſt have ſoon compelled the mutineers to lay down their arms; but prince Maurice, already prepared to fulfil his agreement with the mutineers, advanced towards him with a ſuperior army, which he had aſſembled at Gertrudenburgh, and before the count had time to make any progreſs in the ſiege, obliged him to retire into the interior parts of the province.

July 10.

Maurice followed him for ſome time, but finding it impoſſible to overtake him, without entering too far into the enemy's country, he ſuddenly returned and laid ſiege to Bois le Duc. He had lately given the mutineers a proof of the truſt which he repoſed in them, by entering their camp with only ſeven or eight of his attendants; and, on the preſent occaſion, he gave them a farther proof of confidence, by employing them equally with his own troops in the operations of the ſiege.

Bois le Duc beſieged by prince Maurice.

The archduke, extremely anxious for the preſervation of Bois le Duc, which he conſidered as one of the moſt important frontier towns, ſent a reinforcement of troops to the count of Berg, and ordered him to march without delay to its relief. The count's army was now nearly equal to that of the enemy, and he arrived in time ſo ſeize an important ſtation adjacent to the town, which prince Maurice had not found leiſure to ſecure. From this ſtation he could eaſily introduce whatever reinforcements or ſupplies were neceſſary. But the inhabitants, having hitherto ſucceſsfully defended the place without the aſſiſtance of the Spaniards, were utterly averſe to the admiſſion of regular forces. The count labored to perſuade them that their preſervation entirely depended on admitting them, but they refuſed to liſten to his requeſt; and prince Maurice ſtill entertained the hopes of being able to bring the ſiege to the deſired concluſion.

At length the archduke, having come himſelf to Bois le Duc, endeavoured, but in vain, to overcome the obſtinacy of the citizens, till having obtained their permiſſion to ſuffer a body of Walloons to paſs through the town, under the pretext of their being neceſſary to oppoſe the enemy on the other ſide, he called them together, while the Walloons were within the walls, and once more repreſented to them the neceſſity of yielding to his deſire, if they meant to preſerve their religion and their liberty. They remained ſtill as averſe as ever to his propoſal; but believing that, while

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ſo great a number of his troops were within the town, it would be in vain to refuſe their conſent, they agreed with much reluctance to admit a garriſon of three thouſand regular forces; and at the ſame time a large ſupply of ſtores and proviſions were introduced.

The two armies continued for ſome time longer in ſight of each other, and ſeveral ſkirmiſhes paſt between them with various ſucceſs. At length prince Maurice deſpairing, on account of the approach of winter, to bring the ſiege to the deſired iſſue, abandoned his intrenchments, and retired in good order to ſome diſtance from the town. There he remained a whole day, in expectation that the enemy might now be induced to riſk a battle; but being informed, that ſo far from intending this, they had, as ſoon as he left his intrenchments, directed their march towards the interior parts of the province, he broke up his camp, and put his troops into winter-quarters.

To the mutineers, who repreſented to him that Hochſtrate was too ſmall for their accommodation, he aſſigned the town of Grave, of which he himſelf was lord paramount, retaining the citadel in his own hands, and requiring that Hochſtrate ſhould be put into his poſſeſſion. He likewiſe entered on this occaſion into a new agreement with them; the conditions of which they continued religiouſly to fulfil till the following year, when the archduke, ſtanding much in need of their aſſiſtance, and dreading that many of his other troops were about to join them, found it

neceſſary to grant them an act of indemnity for all paſt offences, together with full and immediate payment of their arrears [s].

Death and character of Elizabeth, queen of England.

In the courſe of the tranſactions related in this book an important event happened, in which both the contending powers were equally intereſted, the death of Elizabeth, queen of England. This great princeſs, whoſe reign was ſo long and proſperous, had through her whole life enjoyed uninterrupted health, which ſhe had been careful to preſerve by regular exerciſe, and the ſtricteſt temperance. But towards the end of the preceding year, having been ſeized with a cold, which confined her for ſeveral days, ſhe found her ſtrength conſiderably impaired; and, in the hopes of deriving benefit from a change of air, ſhe removed from Weſtminſter to Richmond; but there ſhe grew daily worſe, could neither ſleep nor eat as uſual, and though her pulſe was regular, ſhe complained of a burning heat in her ſtomach, and a perpetual thirſt. Both her looks and ſpirits had from the beginning been greatly affected; buſineſs of every kind had become an intolerable burden to her; and at length ſhe ſunk into a deep melancholy, expreſſing the anguiſh of her mind by tears and groans, and obſtinately refuſing nouriſhment, as well as all the medicines which the phyſicians preſcribed for her recovery. This melancholy might have entirely proceeded from her bodily indiſpoſition, although, from ſome late diſcoveries, there

[s] Van Meteren, lib. xxv. xxvi. Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. vii. Piaſecii Chronica an. 1603.

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is ground to believe that it was greatly heightened, if not principally occaſioned, by remorſe and grief conceived on account of her having ordered the execution of her favorite, the earl of Eſſex. But to whatever cauſe her dejection of mind was owing, it preyed upon her exhauſted frame, and in a few weeks put a period to her life, in the ſeventieth year of her age, and the forty-fifth of her reign.

It is not ſurpriſing that we meet with ſuch contradictory deſcriptions of the character of this princeſs in the cotemporary hiſtorians, whoſe paſſions were too much inflamed to ſuffer them to judge impartially of her character: but it ſhould ſeem impoſſible for any perſon, who is not blinded by prejudice, to refuſe her a place among the moſt illuſtrious princes of whom we read either in ancient or in modern times.

She was not indeed exempt from the imperfections that are incident to humanity, and ſhe was ſubject to ſeveral of thoſe weakneſſes which characterize her ſex. She cannot be vindicated from the imputation of female vanity, and the love of admiration on account of her exterior accompliſhments. We ſhould have loved her more if ſhe had been more gentle and indulgent, leſs imperious and violent, or more candid and ſincere. From natural temper, her paſſions of every kind were ſtrong and vehement, and, among her courtiers, they ſometimes betrayed her into improprieties; but they were almoſt never permitted to influence her public conduct, which was

uniformly regulated by the principles of prudence, and a regard for the public good; even her ambition was controlled and governed by theſe principles, of which ſhe gave a rare and ſignal proof, when ſhe refuſed to accept of the ſovereignty of the United Provinces. Her penetration and ſagacity, her prudence and foreſight, her intrepidity in the midſt of danger, her activity and vigor, her ſteadineſs and perſeverance, and her wiſe economy, which prompted her to ſave every unneceſſary expenſe, however ſmall, while it permitted and enabled her to undergo the greateſt, when neceſſity required; theſe qualities in her character, which are acknowledged by her enemies, as well as her admirers, no prince, of whom we read in hiſtory, appears to have poſſeſſed in a more eminent degree.

Few princes have been placed in ſo difficult circumſtances, or have had ſo many, and ſuch formidable enemies to oppoſe; yet almoſt no prince ever enjoyed a reign ſo long and proſperous. While the neighbouring nations were almoſt continually involved in the calamities of war, ſhe was able, notwithſtanding the unremitted attempts of her foreign enemies, and her popiſh ſubjects, to preſerve her dominions in almoſt uninterrupted peace. Nor did her own ſubjects only reap the fruits of her great abilities, but her friends were every where ſupported and protected by her power; while her enemies, though poſſeſſed of much greater reſources, were either checked and reſtrained, or humbled and overcome: without her judicious

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interpoſition, the reformation in Scotland muſt have been extinguiſhed; a race of popiſh princes muſt have inherited the crown of that kingdom; and the difference of religion there, and in England, joined to the hereditary right of the Scottiſh princes to the Engliſh throne, whilſt it muſt have proved a copious ſource of diſcord, would long have prevented the union of two nations, which muſt have often been unhappy while they remained, divided and were, by nature, deſtined to be one. Nor were the benefits which mankind derived from her wiſe and active reign confined to Britain; but it is likewiſe probable, that without her aid and her exertions, the proteſtants in France muſt have been extirpated; the beſt and greateſt of the French monarchs muſt have been excluded from the throne; France itſelf muſt have ſunk under the Spaniſh yoke; the republic of the United Provinces muſt have been cruſhed in its infancy; and an overgrown and enormous power eſtabliſhed, which muſt have overwhelmed the liberties of Europe, and prolonged the reign of ignorance, bigotry, and ſuperſtition.

Her death gave equal ſorrow to the Dutch as it afforded joy to the archdukes and the court of Spain. The former were thereby deprived of a powerful friend, who had often ſupported them in the time of their diſtreſs; whereas the latter were delivered from a determined enemy, by whom they had been long controlled in all their enterpriſes.

The affliction of the former was the more ſincere, becauſe they had ground to ſuſpect that Elizabeth's ſucceſſor had not the ſame favorable ſentiments of their cauſe, nor the ſame affection for their republic, as the queen had entertained. James, though of a gentle and indulgent temper, averſe to the exerciſe of deſpotic power, had conceived the moſt extravagant notions of the meaſure of obedience due from ſubjects to their prince; and, being naturally open and unreſerved, had, on ſome occaſions, condemned the conduct of the United States, and given them the name of rebels to their rightful ſovereign. The court of Spain, deſirous to conciliate his favor, had before the death of Elizabeth, made him an offer of their aſſiſtance to vindicate his right to the Engliſh crown, in caſe he ſhould meet with oppoſition. Intelligence of the queen's death had no ſooner reached the Netherlands than the archduke, conſidering the war with England as at an end, had iſſued a proclamation, forbidding all hoſtilities againſt the ſubjects of the king of England, and ordering all the Scotch and Engliſh priſoners to be ſet at liberty[e]. The like orders were iſſued by the court of Spain. And, in return to theſe advances, James, by proclamation, recalled the letters of marque which had been granted againſt the Spaniards by Elizabeth.

James I. King of England.

From theſe concurring circumſtances, the ſtates perceived how little ground they had to hope for the friendſhip of the Engliſh monarch. They

[e] See Gonſalez Davila.

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reſolved, however, that nothing ſhould be wanting on their part, which might induce him to change his ſentiments, and, for this end, they ſent a ſolemn embaſſy, at the head of which were the celebrated Barnevelt, Lord of Temple, and prince Henry Frederic, brother to prince Maurice, to congratulate him on his acceſſion, and to ſolicit his renewing the alliance which had ſubſiſted between them and Elizabeth.

Ambaſſadors from Holland, France, and Spain, to the king of Great Britain.

Theſe ambaſſadors, on their arrival in London, found that the ſuſpicions which the ſtates had entertained of the king's prejudice againſt them, were but too well founded. James ſtill continued to employ the ſame diſreſpectful language, when he ſpoke of their republic as formerly; nor could they at firſt obtain an audience. After ſome delay, they were at length admitted into his preſence, through the perſuaſion of his Engliſh counſellors. But though Barnevelt exerted all his eloquence, which he poſſeſſed in ſo eminent a degree, to make him ſenſible of the danger to which Britain would be expoſed, if, by with-holding his aſſiſtance, he ſhould ſuffer the United Provinces to fall back again under the dominion of Spain, he could only draw from him a general and vague reply: "That he had not, at preſent, leiſure to conſider fully of the ſubject which had been propoſed to his conſideration, and would not, therefore, now declare what reſolution he ſhould form; but he was himſelf deſirous to live at peace with them, and all his neighbours; and, in caſe they would imitate

his example, he would chearfully employ his good offices to procure them peace with Spain, upon reaſonable terms." BOOK II. 1603.

It ſufficiently appeared from this reply, that the plan of conduct which the king had formed, was extremely different from that which had been purſued by his predeceſſor; and the ambaſſadors would have immediately returned home, in deſpair of being able to intereſt him in their behalf, had not they been in daily expectation of the arrival of the French ambaſſador; through whoſe interceſſion they hoped that James might be induced to lend a more favorable ear to their requeſt.

Henry had appointed for his ambaſſador to England, on this occaſion, the marquis of Roſni[7], whom, on account of his ſuperior talents and fidelity, he eſteemed the moſt of all his miniſters. No ſubject had ever performed more important ſervices to his prince; and Henry could not, without great inconvenience, ſpare a miniſter ſo neceſſary to him in the adminiſtration of his kingdom. But from various reports, which were propagated at this time, he had conceived a ſuſpicion that James might be perſuaded to enter into an alliance with the court of Spain, and no perſon he believed was more likely to engage him to alter his intention than Roſni, whom he highly reſpected on account of his inviolable attachment to the proteſtant religion, and uſed to celebrate as the greateſt ſtateſman in Europe.

[7] Afterwards duke of Sully.

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James was highly pleaſed with Henry's choice of his ambaſſador, and received him with more than ordinary marks of diſtinction and regard. It had been reported to him by ſome of the partiſans of Spain, that Henry, and even Roſni himſelf, had ſpoken diſreſpectfully of his character*; and James ſo far deſcended from his dignity as to mention what he had heard to the marquis; but the impreſſion which it had made upon him was eaſily effaced; and Roſni, from his firſt audience, conceived the hopes of being able to accompliſh the object of his embaſſy.

A party among the Engliſh miniſters were, not without reaſon, ſuſpected to be attached to the intereſts of Spain, and others, dreading the difficulties which they muſt encounter in providing funds for carrying on the war, were averſe to all engagements either to France or the ſtates general. From theſe men, the propoſals of the French monarch met with conſiderable oppoſition. But the ambaſſador, having been admitted by the king to a private audience, and having explained to him at full length his maſter's views, which he ſhowed were all calculated to promote the general intereſt of Europe, and the ſecurity of the proteſtant religion, whereas the court of Spain were daily giving freſh proofs of the moſt inordinate and turbulent ambition; he had the addreſs to convince him, that a regard to the ſafety of his dominions, as well as the intereſt of his religion, required

* It was reported to him, that Henry had called him captain of arts, and clerk of arms.

required that he ſhould join himſelf with France, and reſolve to ſupport the United Provinces. A treaty of alliance to this purpoſe, was accordingly drawn up, and ſoon after ſigned and ratified; of which the following were the principal articles.

That the two kings ſhould mutually contribute their aſſiſtance to prevent the Dutch from being overpowered by the Spaniards; that, for this purpoſe, a ſufficient number of troops ſhould be levied within the dominions of the king of England, and ſent from thence to the Netherlands as ſoon as poſſible; that the whole expenſe of theſe troops ſhould be defrayed by the king of France, but that the half [9] of what he advanced, ſhould be deducted from the debt which he owed to Elizabeth. It was reſolved, that in order to avoid an open rupture with the court of Spain the utmoſt ſecrecy ſhould be obſerved in levying the troops, and in tranſporting them to the continent; but it was agreed, that in caſe theſe tranſactions could not be concealed, and the Spaniards, in revenge for the aſſiſtance afforded to the Dutch, ſhould attack either, or both of the contracting princes, they ſhould mutually aſſiſt each other, and furniſh ſuch a number of troops, to be employed by ſea or land, as ſhould be judged ſufficient for their mutual defence, and the preſervation of the United Provinces [10].

[9] Grotius ſays two thirds.

[10] Sully's Memoirs, book xvi. Carte's Hiſtory of England.

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James immediately fulfilled his part of this agreement, by giving ſecret orders to the lord Buccleugh to raiſe a body of two thouſand men in Scotland; who, ſome months after, were ſent over to join the army of the ſtates [11].

The archdukes and the court of Spain were greatly alarmed, when they heard of the kind reception which the king had given to the French ambaſſador, and they ſuſpected that ſome treaty had been concluded between them. It does not, however, appear that they received particular intelligence of the purport of it; and they ſtill entertained the hopes of being able to fix James in their intereſt.

The archdukes had early ſent over the count d'Aremberg, as their ambaſſador, to congratulate him on his acceſſion; and ſoon after Don John de Taxis, count of Villa Mediana, arrived in the ſame capacity from Spain. It was commonly believed that the former of theſe noblemen, who was eſteemed as a ſoldier, but was extremely ill qualified for his preſent employment, had, ſoon after his arrival in England, given his countenance to a conſpiracy, formed by the lords Grey, Cobham, Sir Walter Raleigh, and others, for ſubverting the preſent government, and raiſing Arabella Stuart to the throne. It ſhould ſeem that he had, at leaſt, lent an ear to the conſpirators, without thinking it incumbent on him to

[11] Carte and Meteren, Vittorio Siri, tom. i. p. 148. For the preciſe ſum due to Elizabeth, vide Sully, book xxi. near the beginning.

communicate their intention to the king's miniſ- BOOK
ters; and by this imprudent conduct he rendered II.
himſelf ſo obnoxious to James, that, in his hands, 1604.
no treaty of agreement with his maſter could have ſucceeded. But James was ſtill as much as ever bent on peace with Spain, nor had he meant to preclude himſelf from concluding it by his treaty of alliance with the French monarch.

Taxis left no art untried to confirm him in this pacific diſpoſition; and, at the ſame time, labored to remove thoſe prejudices againſt the Spaniards which he had long entertained, and had been lately awakened by count d'Aremberg's concern in the conſpiracy. He was warmly ſeconded by the queen, who, being attached to the Spaniſh intereſt, had conceived the deſire of having the young prince, her ſon, married to the infanta; and, by bribes and promiſes, it was believed, he had gained over a conſiderable party of the Engliſh counſellors.

The French king and the ſtates general, thought they had much reaſon to dread the influence of ſuch powerful agents, and they employed all their intereſt to counteract them, and to divert the king from his intention. James gave them repeated aſſurances that Henry ſhould have no ground to complain of him for any breach of the alliance into which he had ſo lately entered, nor the ſtates for being inattentive to their intereſt; but the preſent ſituation of his affairs, he told them, rendered it neceſſary for him to put an end to the Spaniſh war.

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He accordingly gave orders to his miniſters for holding conferences for this purpoſe, with the Spaniſh and Flemiſh ambaſſadors, and in the mean time cauſed an entire ſtop to be put to all hoſtilities.

Thoſe appointed by the archdukes were d'Aremberg, and Richard of Verreicken; and Rouida, a ſenator of Milan, had come over to the aſſiſtance of Taxis.

The letter which Taxis brought to James from the king of Spain was addreſſed to him not in the uſual ſtyle, To our Brother, but to our Couſin; and, in enumerating James's titles, though France was mentioned, Ireland was omitted. James laughed at the latter of theſe abſurdities, into which he ſuppoſed the Spaniſh court had been led, by their complaiſance to the pope, who had publiſhed a bull, declaring Ireland to be a fief of the holy-ſee; but he ſharply expreſſed his reſentment at the term Couſin.

It ſoon appeared that the claims of the two nations on each other, were but few in number. No conqueſts had been made by either of the two parties, which the other could inſiſt to have reſtored; and neither of them claimed an indemnification for the expenſes of the war; but there were two points which were difficult to be adjuſted, and occaſioned the holding of many conferences. The Spaniards, on the one hand, inſiſted that James ſhould engage to prevent his ſubjects from entering for the future into the ſervice of the United States; and he, on the other, required

that they ſhould enjoy the liberty of trade to the Indies.

The Spaniſh ambaſſador repreſented, that his maſter had expected to find in his Britannic majeſty, a good and faithful ally; and hoped to have formed an offenſive and defenſive alliance with him, but if he was ſtill determined, in imitation of his predeceſſor, to give aſſiſtance to the rebels in the Netherlands, it was impoſſible but the catholic king muſt conſider him rather as an enemy than a friend. The Engliſh commiſſioners replied, that their maſter could not now regard the Dutch in the light of rebels; their ſovereignty had been aknowledged by ſome of the greateſt princes in Europe, and the king had, on his acceſſion, found ſo cloſe a connexion ſubſiſting between them and his Engliſh ſubjects as could not be diſſolved without conſiderable prejudice to his kingdom: he was therefore reſolved to permit them to make levies within his dominions as formerly; but as he intended to obſerve a ſtrict neutrality, he was ready to grant the ſame permiſſion to the archdukes and the king of Spain, and farther to engage that he ſhould not ſend any of his own troops to the aſſiſtance of the ſtates, nor furniſh them either with money or with military ſtores. The Spaniſh commiſſioners finding, after ſeveral conferences, that all their remonſtrances on this head proved ineffectual, were obliged to acquieſce in the king's propoſal.

Peace between Spain and England.

The other article above mentioned, which related to the India trade, was the ſubject of ſeveral

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conferences, and of great altercation between the commiſſioners. The Spaniards maintained that, as they were the firſt diſcoverers of the Indies, and their right to theſe countries had been confirmed by the ſovereign pontiff, no other nation was entitled to trade there without their permiſſion; that for weighty reaſons they had refuſed to grant this permiſſion; not only to the king of France in the treaty of Vervins, but likewiſe to the emperor, and to the archdukes; that theſe reaſons ſtill ſubſiſted, and therefore they muſt not only decline granting it to the Engliſh, but inſiſt that the king of England ſhall, by proclamation, prohibit all his ſubjects from continuing to trade in India, as they had done for ſome years paſt.

This chimerical pretenſion was treated by the Engliſh commiſſioners with the contempt which it merited; the Spaniards themſelves had traded to many parts of India, beſides thoſe where they had eſtabliſhed their dominion; and no reaſon could be given why the Engliſh ſhould not enjoy the ſame liberty. James peremptorily refuſed to publiſh the prohibition which was requeſted of him. His ſubjects had for many years been in poſſeſſion of the India trade, and he reſolved that they ſhould not be deprived of it by any article in the preſent treaty.

The diſputes on this ſubject roſe to ſo great a height as to give ground to apprehend that the conferences would have proved abortive; but, as both parties were eagerly bent on peace, it was at length propoſed that no mention whatever ſhould

be made of the Indies in the treaty, and to this propoſal they both yielded their conſent.

All the other articles were eaſily adjuſted; but as Taxis had not plenipotentiary powers, the ſigning of it was delayed for ſome time longer. This, however, had been reſerved for Don John de Velaſco, duke of Frias, and conſtable of Caſtile, who, ſeveral months before had come to Bruſſels, in his way to England: but had remained till now in Flanders, either on account of his health, which was the excuſe he offered for his delay, or, as was ſuſpected by the Engliſh, becauſe he judged it to be incompatible with his dignity to come over to England till he knew that peace would certainly be concluded. He had requeſted the Engliſh monarch to ſend his commiſſioners to treat with him in the Netherlands; but James declined complying with this requeſt, becauſe the catholic king, he ſaid, had firſt offered to ſend his ambaſſador to England, and he choſe to have the treaty carried on under his own eye [10].

1604.

Velaſco arrived at Dover on the 5th of Auguſt, and was from thence conducted by ſome Engliſh noblemen ſent to receive him, with great pomp to London. The treaty was ſigned on the 19th of Auguſt, and next day was ratified by the king [11]. The publication of it gave general ſatis-

[10] Carte, Sully, Beaumont, Meteren, and Siri, Mem. recondite, tom. i. p. 200, &c.

[11] It was not till the following year that the earl of Nottingham, lord high admiral, was ſent to Madrid to witneſs the notification of this treaty, by the king of Spain.

BOOK II. 1604. faction both to the Spaniſh and Engliſh nations; but was unacceptable to the Engliſh ſailors, becauſe they alone, by the numerous captures they had made, had derived any advantage from the war [14].

During the courſe of theſe negociations, the war in the Netherlands was carried on with more than ordinary vigor. The ſiege of Oſtend had laſted for more than two years and a half, and the beſiegers, during all that time, had exerted their utmoſt ſtrength and ſkill, yet ſo vigorous was the oppoſition which they received from the garriſon, that they had not been able to make any conſiderable impreſſion on the place. Thoſe huge machines, above-mentioned, which were intended for blocking up the canal, were no ſooner brought within reach of the artillery of the town, than, by the well-directed ſhot of the beſiegers, they were either demoliſhed or ſet on fire. The beſieged too made innumerable ſallies, in which they diſplayed the moſt determined intrepidity, and completed the deſtruction of ſuch parts of the Spaniſh works as could not be reached by the artillery.

The principal engineer employed in conſtructing theſe works was Pompeo Targone, an Italian, who poſſeſſed an inventive genius, but had never till now enjoyed an opportunity of reducing his theories to practice. Of this man's ingenuity the archduke unfortunately entertained too favorable

[14] For farther particulars relating to this treaty ſee, Appendix, A.

an opinion, and was thus too eaſily induced to approve of projects, which, on trial, were found impracticable, but were attended in the execution with immenſe expenſe. His machines were all conſtructed at ſome diſtance from the town, but when they were brought forward to the places where they were to be uſed, they were expoſed, either to the violence of the tide, or to the fire of the beſiegers; and it often happened that works were in a few hours deſtroyed, or rendered uſeleſs, on which the labor of many weeks had been employed.

The archduke came at length to be undeceived in the expectations which he had formed of the ſucceſs of theſe works. His patience was now greatly exhauſted; and he began to ſuſpect that the repeated diſappointments which he had met with muſt be in a great meaſure owing to the want of ſkill or vigor on the part of thoſe to whom he had committed the conduct of the ſiege.

The marquis of Spinola had been only a few months in the Netherlands, and, till his arrival there, had never witneſſed any military operations; yet Albert, with the conſent of the court of Spain, reſolved to devolve on him the command of the army, and the proſecution of this ſiege, in which the ſtrenuous efforts of his moſt experienced commanders had been of ſo little avail. In forming this reſolution it was generally believed that, in the iſſue, he would find he had been betrayed into ſtill greater imprudence than when he repoſed ſuch undeſerved confidence in the abilities

The command of the Spaniſh army given to the marquis of Spinola.

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of Targone, and many of his officers were greatly incenſed at a choice ſo expreſſive of his diſtruſt in their abilities; but having conceived a high admiration of Spinola, partly on account of his ſpirited conduct in ſome enterpriſes of ſmall importance in which he had been engaged, and partly from the prudence and ſagacity, of which he had given proof as often as he had conſulted him on the conduct of the war, Albert perſiſted in his reſolution, and was juſtified by the event.

Spinola was highly pleaſed, with ſo flattering a diſtinction, but could not avoid feeling much anxiety when the archduke communicated to him his intention. He heſitated for ſome time whether to accept, at ſo critical a juncture, of ſo important a command, in which, inſtead of acquiring fame, he might, at his very entrance upon the military life, expoſe himſelf to ſo great a riſk of incurring cenſure and reproach: and therefore, before he agreed to the archduke's propoſal, he convened together ſuch of the officers as he confided in, and deſired them deliberately to conſider whether it was practicable to bring the ſiege of Oſtend to the deſired concluſion.

Theſe men differed widely from each other in their ſentiments on the ſubject, and only contributed to increaſe his perplexity. But, being conſcious of reſources within himſelf, of which thoſe who attempted to diſſuade him could form no conception, his hopes and his ambition at length prevailed over his doubts and fears, and determined him to accept of the command.

The failure of many enterprises, he believed, had been greatly owing to the mutinous spirit of the troops, occasioned by the irregularity of their pay; and to remedy this evil was the first object to which he applied his attention. Upon inquiry, he found that large sums of money had been misapplied, or embezzled by those who had the care of the military chest. These persons he dismissed from their employments, and substituted others, upon a plan of greater economy, in their room. But he still perceived that the military funds were too small to enable him to keep the troops in good humor, and at the same time to carry on successfully all the expensive operations of the siege. Of the truth of this he spared no pains to convince the archduke and the Spanish ministers; and, in the mean time, till they should devise expedients for furnishing him with more ample supplies, he pledged his private fortune for such considerable sums, as put it in his power to give instant satisfaction to the troops.

In conducting the operations of the siege, his deference for the judgment of the archduke determined him to persist for some time longer in the attempt, which had cost so much expense of blood and labor, to intercept the navigation of the canal; and, in order to form the intended dike, and batteries on the banks of it, great quantities of stones and earth and other materials were brought from a distance, on floats or rafts constructed by Targone. But this work, being exposed both to the fire and the sallies of the besieged, advanced

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ſlowly. It could not be finiſhed, he perceived, for many months; and, even when it ſhould be finiſhed, though it would render the navigation of the canal more difficult to the Dutch ſhips, yet many of them, he foreſaw, by taking advantage of the night, and winds and tides, might elude his batteries, and the garriſon ſtill continue to receive ſupplies. In order to prevent this, Targone had, with the archduke's approbation, begun to erect, on large boats ſtrongly bound together, a huge floating caſtle, which he propoſed to ſtation in the mouth of the canal, and to plant it with cannon. But Spinola conſidered this project as chimerical. A pile ſo huge and unwieldy could not, he ſuſpected, be brought from the place where the engineer was employed in building it to the mouth of the canal; although it ſhould be found practicable to do this, yet the machine would not long reſiſt the violence of the tide; and, unleſs a dike of an extraordinary height and ſtrength could be raiſed to ſhelter it, it would ſoon be demoliſhed by the artillery of the town.

Determined by theſe motives, Spinola abandoned the deſign of blocking up the canal, and reſolved, henceforth, to employ his whole ſtrength in carrying on the ſiege by mines, batteries, and aſſaults. The archduke, notwithſtanding the repulſe which he had met with in the aſſault above-related, would, on the ſecond day after, have reſumed his attempt, if the troops, diſcontented with his treatment of them on that occaſion, had not refuſed to obey. But the whole army was now

under the moſt perfect diſcipline, and having no longer any ground to complain of their want of pay, they were ready to give every proof of their attachment to their general, from whom they had received ſo much greater attention than had formerly been ſhown them. Encouraged by this diſpoſition of his army, Spinola iſſued his orders for a general aſſault, in the ſame quarter where the former one had failed, at the ſmall canal which encompaſſed the fortifications on the weſt. In order to inſpire his troops with emulation, he divided them into four battalions, one of which was entirely compoſed of Germans, the ſecond of Spaniards, the third of Italians, and the fourth of Walloons, and other ſoldiers raiſed in the county of Burgundy. Great quantities of materials had been provided for forming dikes accroſs the canal, at thoſe parts where he intended the troops ſhould paſs; and the foremoſt ranks were ordered to carry before them a ſort of rampart formed of twigs and faggots, to ſcreen them from the fire of the enemy's ſmall arms in their approach. BOOK II. 1604.

The garriſon, having received intelligence of his deſign, were well prepared for their defence; and the aſſailants had no ſooner entered the canal than they began a dreadful fire upon them, both with their ſmall arms and their artillery. Great numbers fell, notwithſtanding the precautions which had been taken: ſtill, however, they continued to advance. The Walloons having been ſtationed fartheſt from the ſea, where the canal was of the ſmalleſt depth, were the firſt who arrived

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on the other ſide, and the reſt of the army quickly followed. The garriſon ſtill maintained their ground, and kept up an inceſſant fire, by which the braveſt of the aſſailants fell in heaps above one another. Spinola was in the midſt of his troops, giving orders, and exhorting them to perſevere. They were animated by his example, as well as his exhortations, and it being now become more dangerous to retreat than to advance, they haſtened forward with the moſt deſperate intrepidity, and attacked the ravelins and halfmoons which defended the counterſcarp. The garriſon withſtood their fury for ſome time; but at length, after great numbers had fallen on both ſides, they were compelled to abandon their outworks, and retire within the ditch.

Spinola could not at this time attempt with ſafety to proceed any farther in the attack; but, having covered his men from the enemy's fire, he immediately began, by working trenches, to make ſtill nearer approaches to the place [15].

The ſtates general were in the mean time deliberating whether to attempt to raiſe the ſiege, by marching the army to Oſtend; or to undertake ſome new conqueſt on the coaſt of Flanders, by which the loſs of Oſtend, which they had now more reaſon to dread than ever, might be compenſated. After mature deliberation, the latter of theſe meaſures was adopted, as the eaſieſt to be carried into execution; and it was agreed to undertake the reduction of Sluys [16], which, as it

[15] Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. vii.

[16] See volume iii. p. 78. of Philip II.

lay nearer to the United Provinces, would prove in every reſpect a more valuable poſſeſſion than Oſtend. BOOK II. 1604.

The troops were ordered to rendezvous at Williamſtadt, where prince Maurice, attended by the deputies of the ſtates, arrived on the 24th of April, and next day he ſet ſail with upwards of twelve thouſand men for the iſle of Cadſant, which is ſeparated from Sluys by the great canal. Having diſembarked without oppoſition, he ſoon reduced all the forts upon the iſland. From Cadſant he paſſed over into that part of Flanders which lies to the eaſtward of Sluys, and laid ſiege to a ſtrong fort called St. Catherine. The garriſon of this fort, having made a more vigorous reſiſtance than he expected, he reſolved, rather than be detained before it any longer, to leave it behind him in the enemy's poſſeſſion, and gave orders for having his artillery drawn off in the middle of the night; but one of his cannon having ſunk in a marſh, a great number of ſailors were employed in raiſing it, who made ſo great a buſtle and noiſe, that the garriſon, believing the whole Dutch army to be at hand, and that they were removing their artillery to a more advantageous ſituation, in order to renew the attack, were ſeized with a panic, and fled precipitately towards Iſendyck. Of this unexpected event the prince received intelligence next morning, when he took poſſeſſion of the fort: and from thence he proceeded to Iſendyck, Ardenburgh, and other places, all of which he eaſily compelled to ſurrender.

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In the mean time Spinola, having been informed by Serrano, the governor of Sluys, of the danger which threatened him, ſent him a reinforcement of three hundred men. With this reinforcement, joined to as great a number of the garriſon as could be ſpared, Serrano, who was an officer diſtinguiſhed for his activity and enterpriſe, reſolved to embrace the opportunity which the preſent diſtance of prince Maurice's army afforded him, to make an attack on the iſle of Cadſant.

Had his deſign ſucceeded, he muſt have got poſſeſſion of all the Dutch tranſports, together with their military ſtores, and thus have rendered it impracticable for Maurice to proceed in his intended enterpriſe againſt Sluys. Some companies of Scots troops, which had been ſtationed in Cadſant, having no apprehenſion of danger, were off their guard, and Serrano had time to land ſix hundred of his men without oppoſition; but the Scots, having ſoon received intelligence of their landing, ſet out inſtantly to oppoſe them, and having come upon them, before they were completely formed, attacked them with uncommon fury, and drove them back in great confuſion to their boats.

The prince had now ſubdued all the fortified places which lay to the eaſt of Sluys, and was advancing weſtward, when he was met by Velaſco, general of the archduke's cavalry, who had been ſent to obſtruct his progreſs. Velaſco had poſted his troops in a ſtrong ſituation, near Dam, which ſtands on the canal of Bruges. He had the good fortune in the beginning to repulſe a party of the Dutch

Dutch horſe, who were ſent before the reſt of the army to attack his intrenchments; but the infantry coming up, he was overpowered by numbers. About eight hundred of his men were killed and taken priſoners, and he himſelf with the reſt was obliged to retire precipitately towards Dam.

After this ſucceſs Maurice, judging it unneceſſary to loſe time in laying ſiege to this fort, proceeded in his march, and, with little difficulty, made himſelf maſter of all the forts on the great canal, by which Sluys communicates with the ſea; immediately after which he aſſigned their ſeveral ſtations to his troops in the neighbourhood of the town; and began to form a line of circumvallation round the place, by working deep intrenchments, where the ſoil permitted, caſting bridges over the numberleſs little canals and rivulets, by which the ground is almoſt every where interſected, and fortifying the whole at certain diſtances with redoubts [17].

In theſe laborious operations, ſeveral weeks were employed, and before the works were finiſhed, the archduke found means, at different times, to reinforce the garriſon with fifteen hundred men. Prince Maurice was not ſorry for the introduction of theſe troops into the town. He had received certain intelligence that the ſtock of proviſions in

Siege of Sluys.

[17] In order more deeply to impreſs the minds of his ſoldiers with a ſenſe of the importance of their preſent enterpriſe, Maurice appointed the 21ſt of May to be obſerved as a day of faſting and of prayer to the Almighty, for his bleſſing upon their arms.

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the place, was not ſufficient long to ſupport ſo great a number; he had no intention to carry on the ſiege by batteries or aſſaults, and he hoped ſoon to be able to render the blockade ſo complete, as to prevent the entrance of ſupplies.

The archduke, on the other hand, expected ere long to be able to raiſe the ſiege, and dreaded no danger but from the weakneſs of the garriſon. He was deeply ſenſible of the great importance of Sluys, which, beſides affording the moſt commodious retreat to the Spaniſh gallies, was conveniently ſituated for an invaſion of the United Provinces, and enabled him to give great annoyance to their trade. He could not, however, perſuade himſelf to forego the fruits of his long continued labors before Oſtend, by raiſing the ſiege of that place; but he reſolved, for ſome time, to ſuſpend his operations there, and ſignified to Spinola, his deſire that he ſhould immediately march to the relief of Sluys, leaving no more troops behind him, than were ſufficient to reſtrain the ſallies of the garriſon.

Spinola, who was well acquainted with the character of prince Maurice, had a juſt ſenſe of the difficulty of carrying the archduke's deſign into execution, and remonſtrated againſt it as impracticable; but finding that Albert could not be prevailed on to alter his reſolution, he agreed to accept of the command, upon condition that the officers of greateſt experience ſhould accompany him in the expedition. He could hardly flatter himſelf with the hopes of ſucceſs, and he wiſhed

that others ſhould partake in the cenſure which he was likely to incur. The archduke readily conſented to this propoſal; and, being joined on this occaſion by a great number of the mutineers, who had been perſuaded to return to their duty, he began his march with ſix thouſand foot, and two thouſand horſe, beſides a train of artillery, and a large convoy of proviſions. BOOK II. 1604.

The garriſon of Sluys had already begun to ſuffer greatly from the want of wholeſome food; and Serrano had repeatedly ſent notice, that without a ſupply, he could not poſſibly hold out for many days longer. Spinola therefore advanced towards Sluys with the utmoſt expedition; and, having received intelligence that the weakeſt part of the enemy's lines was at a village called Tervarde, he made an attack upon them in that quarter, in the middle of the night. But the Dutch troops were prepared for his reception; and though he had taken every precaution to inſure ſucceſs, he was obliged, after repeated attempts, to retire with conſiderable loſs.

He then fetched a compaſs round by Ardenburgh, and directed his march towards the iſle of Cadſant, in the hopes of making himſelf maſter of that iſland, from whence he might by water introduce proviſions into Sluys. He expected to have come upon the enemy in ſurpriſe, by fording the canal which ſeparates Cadſant from Flanders on the eaſt. But prince Maurice, having ſuſpected his deſign, had planted a half moon battery there, and ſtationed ſome ſelect troops to

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diſpute his paſſage, under count William of Naſſau. Over theſe troops, Spinola at firſt gained ſome advantage, and drew them from the battery: but Maurice himſelf, coming up with freſh troops to their aſſiſtance, Spinola was, at length, obliged to abandon his attempt, after an obſtinate conteſt, in which he ſuffered the loſs of five hundred killed, and as many wounded.

Auguſt.

Had not Spinola entered with reluctance on his preſent enterpriſe, his prudence might juſtly have been impeached; but as his diſapprobation of it, and his diffidence of ſucceſs were known to the enemy by intercepted letters, as it had been known from the beginning to his friends, and nothing had been wanting on his part to carry it into ſucceſsful execution; it ſerved, notwithſtanding his repulſe, to heighten his character for military ſkill, and confirmed the archduke in the high opinion which he entertained of his abilities.

Auguſt 19.

He returned without delay to Oſtend; and, on the ſecond day after his retreat, Serrano, the gogernor of Sluys, capitulated upon honorable terms. His garriſon amounted to four thouſand men, beſides a great number of ſlaves, who had formerly been employed on board the gallies; but his ſtock of proviſions had, ſeveral days before, been entirely conſumed, and the ſtrength of the ſoldiers was ſo much impaired, that more than ſixty of them died on the road to Dam, which is only two hours march from Sluys.

Capitulation of Sluys.

By one article of the capitulation, all the artillery and military ſtores, and by another, all the

ſhips and ten Spaniſh gallies, which had ſo long infeſted the Dutch trade, were delivered into the hands of the conqueror.

Fourteen hundred ſlaves, the greater part of whom were Turks, were ſet at liberty; and as many of them choſe to return to their native country, the United States, in order to conciliate the friendſhip of the Corſairs, treated them with great humanity while they remained in Holland, and afterwards ſent them in Dutch ſhips to Barbary [18].

The glory which prince Maurice acquired from ſo important a conqueſt, was greatly heightened by the compariſon which men generally inſtituted between the rapidity of his progreſs, and the ſlowneſs of that of the Spaniards before Oſtend. Judicious obſervers thought there was hardly room for this compariſon, the two caſes being extremely different in the moſt important reſpects from each other; but it was univerſally acknowledged that Maurice had, on no former occaſion, diſcovered greater vigor and vigilance, or greater military ſkill.

The archduke, on the other hand, was ſeverely mortified; nor was he entirely free from apprehenſion of being ere long ſubjected to a ſtill greater mortification, as a conſiderable part of the ſeaſon fit for action ſtill remained, and he expected that Maurice, whoſe army had ſuffered almoſt no diminution, would next attempt to compel

[18] Grotius, lib. xiii. Meteren, and the triumphs of Naſſau. Bentivoglio, p. 3. cap. vii.

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him to raiſe the ſiege of Oſtend. In order to prevent this, which he would have conſidered as the greateſt calamity that could befal him, he gave immediate orders for ſtrengthening the fortifications of Dam, Blackenberg, and other places, by which the prince's army could approach.

But Maurice had no intention of entering ſo far into an enemy's country, whoſe forces were ſuperior in number to his own; and the ſtates general, highly ſatisfied with the ſucceſs which had already attended their arms, reſolved to employ the remainder of the ſeaſon in ſecuring their new conqueſts. No expenſe was ſpared to render Sluys impregnable, and Cadſant, Iſendyck, and ſeveral other places in the neighbourhood of Sluys, were ſtrongly fortified.

The marquis of Spinola had, in the mean time, reſumed his operations before Oſtend, and was daily making nearer approaches to the town. He had already croſſed the ditch, and compelled the garriſon to retire from all that part of the place called the old town, but one redoubt [n], from which, as it was conſiderably elevated above the other fortifications, the beſieged made dreadful havoc among his troops. He reſolved, whatever it ſhould coſt him, to make himſelf maſter of this redoubt. His Spaniſh and Italian troops, having been again and again repulſed with great ſlaughter, could not be perſuaded to renew the attack: and this arduous undertaking was therefore committed to two regiments of Germans, who

[n] Called the ſand-hill.

allured by promiſes, and puſhed on by emulation to execute what the Italians and Spaniards had abandoned in deſpair, advanced towards the fort with the moſt determined intrepidity. The garriſon ſprung a mine upon the foremoſt of theſe regiments, and blew up a great number of them in the air. The reſt, however, ſupported by the ſecond regiment, ſtill continued to advance, and having attacked the garriſon ſword in hand, they drove them with irreſiſtible fury from the place. BOOK II. 1604.

The garriſon, by the advice of a Scotch engineer of the name of Dixter, had provided againſt this diſaſter, by drawing a ſtrong intrenchment flanked with baſtions, and fortified with artillery betwixt the old and the new part of the town; and behind this, they had likewiſe drawn another intrenchment of the ſame kind, acroſs the middle of the new town; being determined to diſpute every inch of ground, and to maintain their defence till the laſt extremity.

From the progreſs, however, which Spinola had already made, and the ſkill and vigor with which his operations were conducted, it could not be doubted, that he muſt ere long get poſſeſſion of the place. The garriſon ſtill continued to make the moſt vigorous ſallies upon his miners and his troops; but ſince they had loſt the fort of Sandhill, theſe ſallies were made at a much greater expenſe of blood, on their part, than formerly: their new works had not yet acquired the ſame ſolidity and ſtrength as thoſe from which they had been expelled; and, being now confined within

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such narrow limits as could not admit of any considerable reinforcement of fresh troops, they were exposed to much greater danger than before, of being overpowered in every assault, by the superior numbers of the enemy.

The states general, influenced by these considerations, and thinking it extremely doubtful whether the preservation of Ostend, since the conquest of Sluys, was an object worthy of the expense and attention it must cost, resolved to persist no longer in the defence, and sent instructions to the sieur de Marquette, the governor, to prepare himself for capitulating upon honorable terms.

On receiving these instructions, Marquette immediately conveyed to Flushing, by the ships which were then lying in the harbour, all deserters, and other persons, who had any particular reasons for dreading the enemy's resentment, together with a part of the artillery and stores; after which he sent two of his principal officers to treat with Spinola of the surrender of the place.

Ostend capitulates.

This general, whether from admiration of that intrepid bravery which the garrison had displayed, or because he was still diffident of success, and desirous to avoid the further effusion of blood, readily agreed that the garrison should march out with all the honors of war, and be safely conducted by land to Sluys; that waggons should be furnished to the sick and wounded; that the inhabitants should be at liberty to quit the town

without moleſtation; and that all priſoners on both ſides ſhould be releaſed. This agreement was made on the 20th of September, in the beginning of the fourth year ſince the commencement of the ſiege; and on the ſecond day after, Spinola was put in poſſeſſion of the town. He religiouſly fulfilled all the articles of the capitulation, and while the garriſon were preparing to ſet out, he gave proof of a generoſity of ſpirit, of which no other inſtance has occurred in the hiſtory of the preſent war, by inviting the governor, and all colonels and captains in the place, to a magnificent entertainment, where he treated them with every mark of diſtinction and reſpect.

From Oſtend, the governor marched at the head of his garriſon, amounting to near four thouſand men, with a ſmall train of artillery, along the ſea-coaſt, till they arrived in the neighbourhood of Sluys, where they were met by prince Maurice, who received them in the moſt gracious manner, and gave them every teſtimony of applauſe and gratitude. They were ſoon after followed by almoſt the whole body of inhabitants, who choſe rather to reſide at Sluys than Oſtend; and the chief magiſtrate of Oſtend was appointed chief magiſtrate of Sluys.

Such was the termination of this celebrated ſiege, which, beſides an enormous expenſe of labor and military ſtores, had coſt the contending parties the lives of near a hundred thouſand men. Oſtend could not, on any account, be deemed worthy of this expenſe; yet the Dutch

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ſeemed to have acted wiſely in defending it with ſo great obſtinacy. They could, no where elſe, have encountered the enemy on more advantageous terms: and, while the ſiege continued, they not only enjoyed profound tranquillity at home, but were at liberty to ſecure and extend their frontier, by the acquiſition of Rhinberg, Grave, Cadſant, Iſendyck and Sluys.

The conduct of the archduke does not admit of any ſuch apology. Hardly any of the places which he had loſt was of leſs importance than Oſtend; and Sluys, from its excellent harbour, and its neighbourhood to Zealand, was of much greater importance. His arms, at a juncture, when his finances were low, and his troops mutinous, ought rather to have been employed in defending his own dominions, than in attacking thoſe of the enemy: and if he had found leiſure for acting offenſively, he ought to have made his attack on ſome place of eaſier conqueſt, in the preſervation of which the United Provinces were more deeply intereſted.

But if he ever came to be ſenſible of his error, it was not till he thought that it could not be retrieved with honor; and he was encouraged to perſiſt in it by the Spaniſh miniſters, who were at too great a diſtance from the ſcene of action to judge of the conduct which it was proper to purſue.

But there was reaſon now to expect that neither the archduke, nor the court of Spain, would for the future be guilty of the ſame ſort of

imprudent conduct, as that into which, on different occaſions, they had been hitherto betrayed; as both he and they were impreſſed with a juſt eſteem of the prudence and great abilities of the marquis of Spinola, and had reſolved to devolve on him the entire direction of the war. He had already given ſtriking proofs of ſuperior capacity; and no perſon doubted that he would ſtill be found deſerving of that extraordinary confidence that was repoſed in him.

A chief ſource, Spinola knew, of thoſe diſappointments and loſſes which Albert had ſuſtained, was his irregularity in the pay of his troops, and in order to remedy this evil, the marquis reſolved either to reduce their number, or to be well aſſured of procuring more ample funds for their ſupport. But no ſufficient funds could be procured, unleſs they were furniſhed by the court of Spain, and therefore, as ſoon as he put his army into winter-quarters, he ſet out for Madrid, in the hopes of being able to convince the Spaniſh miniſters of the neceſſity of either making greater exertions, and furniſhing more liberal ſupplies, or of reſolving as ſoon as poſſible to put a period to the war.

Scarcity of the precious metals in Spain.

The Spaniſh finances were in no better order at this time than at any former period. From that decay of induſtry, of which the cauſes have been already mentioned, Spain was no longer able to furniſh either her colonies or herſelf with manufactures of her own production. The gold and ſilver which ſhe imported from America no

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sooner arrived, than it was transmitted, for the purchase of manufactures, to other nations that were more industrious; and the scarcity of the precious metals in Spain, had risen to so great a height, that the duke of Lerma had, last year, raised the nominal value of the copper-coin, which by a royal edict was made nearly equal to that of silver. But this absurd expedient served only to increase the evil which it was intended to prevent or remedy [20].

Counterfeit copper-money, of equal intrinsic value to the current coin in Spain, was poured into that kingdom by the neighbouring nations; these nations, at the same time, received gold and silver in return; they still continued likewise to receive the price of their manufactures in gold and silver. And thus was Spain more than ever drained of these precious metals. The distress arising from thence was sensibly felt from one end of the kingdom to the other, and the ministers often found it difficult to procure money sufficient for the necessary purposes of government. But, being now delivered from the burden of the war with England, and hoping that henceforth the returns of treasure from America would be greater and more certain than they had hitherto been, they resolved, in conformity to the king's inclination, to spare no expense to enable the archduke to carry on the war in the Netherlands with vigor.

The court of Madrid resolves to carry on the war.

[20] Gonsalez Davila, lib. ii. cap. xiv.

Agreeably to this reſolution, the marquis of Spinola, to whom Philip, on this occaſion, gave every proof of eſteem and confidence, was immediately furniſhed with a conſiderable ſum of money. The ſtrongeſt aſſurances were likewiſe given him, by the miniſters of greater punctuality in their future remittances; and there was at the ſame time conferred upon him, full power to employ all the money which he received, or was afterwards to receive, in the manner which he ſhould judge to be moſt expedient. The conduct of the archduke, it ſeems, and that of thoſe to whom he had committed the adminiſtration of his finances, had rendered this precaution neceſſary; he had never obſerved that ſtrict economy which the exigencies of his affairs required; and it would appear, that being ſenſible of this defect in his character, and conſcious of his inability to correct it, he was well pleaſed to have the diſpoſal of the money ſent from Spain, devolved upon Spinola.

The marquis having thus accompliſhed the deſign of his journey to Madrid, and obtained from Philip and his miniſters their approbation of his plan of operations for the next campaign, returned without delay to Bruſſels. The firſt object of his attention was to remove every ground of diſcontent among his troops, by applying a part of the money which he had brought along with him to the diſcharge of their arrears; immediately after which, he gave orders for making numerous levies in Germany and in the Southern Provinces

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of the Netherlands. The Spaniſh miniſters had promiſed to ſend him a veteran regiment from Spain by ſea; and they had given inſtructions to the governors of Naples and Milan, to provide for him a ſtrong reinforcement of Italians [21].

The United Provinces on the other hand, being already well acquainted with the activity and enterpriſe of Spinola, had ſtrenuouſly exerted themſelves in their military preparations, and were ſooner ready to take the field. They had formed the deſign of laying ſiege to Antwerp, where they had learnt that the number of the garriſon was neither adequate to the extent of the fortifications, or the great importance of the place. Prince Maurice did not approve of this expedition, but engaged in it at the requeſt of the ſtates. Having put a part of his army on board tranſports, under count Erneſt of Naſſau, he himſelf marched over land with the reſt from Bergen op Zoom, and joined Erneſt, at the fort of Lillo, which ſtands on the north ſide of the Scheld, about two leagues diſtant from Antwerp, and was ſtill in poſſeſſion of the Dutch.

His intention was to lay all the low grounds between Lillo and Antwerp under water, by cutting the dike of the Scheld, together with the counter-dike at Couveſtein, and then to croſs over the inundation, and to pitch his camp on the higher

[21] Some officers were ſent over to recruit in Britain, but James diſcouraged his ſubjects from entering into the Spaniſh ſervice. Vidé Carte. Yet ſoldiers were raiſed among the catholics, as appears from the ſequel.

grounds which lie near the town. He would thus have had a much ſmaller ſpace to incloſe with his intrenchments, while his army would have been entirely ſecure on one ſide againſt the approach of the enemy. His deſign had been carefully concealed, and if his tranſports had not been detained by contrary winds, his enterpriſe would probably have been attended with ſucceſs. But Spinola, conjecturing from the embarkation of a part of his forces, and his choice of Bergen for the rendezvous of the reſt, that he could not have any other object in view but the ſiege of Antwerp, had time to take every precaution to prevent him from carrying his plan into execution. He had greatly augmented the garriſons of the town and of the forts upon the counterdike; and at the ſame time had lined the banks of the Scheld on both ſides with a ſufficient number of troops to oppoſe his landing [22].

Maurice attempted, however, to make a deſcent on the Flanders ſide near Caloo, but finding his utmoſt efforts ineffectual, and that Spinola was every where upon his guard, he abandoned his firſt attempt; and after reducing the caſtle of Woude, a ſtrong fort in the neighbourhood of Bergen, he embarked his army, and made a deſcent in Flanders, near Iſendyck, with an

[22] He had likewiſe come himſelf to Antwerp, with all the forces which he could collect together, and having thrown a bridge over the Scheld, a little above the town, he ſtood prepared to march whenever the enemy ſhould venture to begin their attack.

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intention of laying ſiege either to the Sas of Ghent or Hulſt.

Maurice himſelf had diſapproved of this expedition, as well as of his attempt on Antwerp, and had adviſed to employ the army on the banks of the Rhine, where he thought there was reaſon to dread an irruption of the enemy; but he had yielded to the judgment of the ſtates, who being anxious for the preſervation of Sluys, were deſirous of getting poſſeſſion of as many fortified towns as poſſible, in the neighbourhood of that important place. They had formerly had repeated proofs, how ill qualified they were to judge of the proper conduct of the war; and from the ſequel, it will appear, how much wiſer it had been, if, on the preſent occaſion, they had liſtened to the opinion of their general.

Maurice had not time to begin his operations, either againſt the Sas of Ghent or Hulſt, when Spinola, who on this occaſion derived great advantage from his bridge over the Scheld, arrived in ſight with all his forces: but, as neither of the two generals were inclined to try the fortune of a battle, they immediately applied themſelves to fortify their reſpective camps; reſolving, each of them, to await till ſome favorable opportunity ſhould offer of annoying his enemy, without expoſing himſelf to danger. Several ſkirmiſhes were fought by foraging parties, with various ſucceſs, but neither party was able to gain any conſiderable advantage over the other.

At

At length, Spinola having effectually provided for the ſafety of the two places which Maurice had intended to attack, left a part of the army under the count of Berg, to watch his motions, and ordered the reſt to direct their march towards Maeſtricht.

About this time he expected the arrival of the troops which had been raiſed for the archduke's ſervice in Germany and Italy, and he had appointed Maeſtricht for the place of rendezvous. Agreeably to the promiſe given him by the court of Spain, a regiment, conſiſting of twelve hundred men, had been embarked at Liſbon, in eight ſhips, which, in order to elude the vigilance of the enemy, had been hired from Hamburgh of the Engliſh and Daniſh merchants. But, notwithſtanding their precaution, they were intercepted by the Dutch admiral Hautain, whom the ſtates had ordered to lie in wait for them in the Engliſh channel. Four of them were either taken or deſtroyed, and the remaining four obliged to take ſhelter in Dover, where they were ſhut up by the Dutch till the following winter, when the long nights afforded them an opportunity to eſcape to Flanders[23].

[23] The ſtates diſgraced themſelves, and ſullied the victory which they obtained on this occaſion, by ordering all the priſoners to be tied, two and two together, and thrown into the ſea. Yet neither Grotius nor Van Meteren, the two moſt reſpectable of the Dutch hiſtorians, have ſpoken of their conduct as reprehenſible. Their pretext for this barbarity, was to damp the courage of the Spaniards, but it rather ſerved to inſpire them in all their rencounters with deſperate rage and fury; and as no better reaſon could be given for treating with

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The marquis of Spinola lamented the loſs of the Spaniſh troops the more, as they were all veteran ſoldiers, commanded by officers of great experience. But all the German and Italian forces which he expected, having arrived in ſafety, he reſolved without further delay, to enter upon the execution of the plan of operations, which, in concert with the archduke, he had formed for the remainder of this campaign. It had been his intention, ever ſince the ſurrender of Oſtend, to eſtabliſh the theatre of the war beyond the Rhine, in that part of the dominions of the ſtates, where the ſuperiority of their naval force could be of no avail. His army would thus, he thought, be in ſome meaſure ſupported at the enemy's expenſe; it would be eaſier for him to ſuppreſs the mutinous ſpirit of his troops, in caſe it ſhould again appear; and as the ſtates had no dread of an attack in that quarter, he expected to find ſome of their principal towns unprepared for a defence. His deſign had been carefully concealed even from the general officers: councils of war had been held, in which the archduke, in order more effectually a prevent a diſcovery, had ſometimes propoſed to undertake the ſiege of Sluys, and ſometimes that of Bergen op Zoom, or of Grave, or of Breda; and the different opinions of the officers had, from time to

Spinola's plan for conducting the war.

ſo great inhumanity the priſoners whom they took at ſea, than thoſe who were taken in the ſiege of towns, or in the field of battle, it was an example calculated to revive that ſavage method of carrying on the war, which had excited ſuch general horror when it was practiſed by the duke of Alva and his ſon.

time, by ſecret agents, been communicated to the ſtates. BOOK II.

Prince Maurice, as already mentioned, was almoſt the only perſon upon whom theſe artifices did not produce the deſired effect. He could not be perſuaded that Spinola, who had given conſpicuous proof of ſuperior ſagacity, would undertake the reduction of any of theſe towns, where the army of the ſtates was at hand to interrupt his operations. He ſuſpected that his attack muſt rather be intended againſt ſome more diſtant place, which could not be ſo eaſily relieved; and had therefore propoſed to ſtation the troops on the banks of the Rhine, in order to prevent the enemy from entering the Dutch dominions on the eaſtern frontier [24]. But the ſtates having, in conſequence of the information they had received of the deliberations in the archduke's council of war, rejected this advice, Spinola was now at liberty to carry his deſign into execution. 1605.

Before he left Flanders, he had given orders to the count de Bucquoi, his general of artillery, to ſecure a convenient paſſage for his army over the Rhine; and this active officer, after planting batteries on the banks, and thereby clearing the river of ſome Dutch armed veſſels, which were ſtationed there, had begun to erect two ſtrong forts, one on each ſide of the Rhine at Keiſerwert, a ſmall town in the electorate of Cologn. As ſoon as theſe forts were finiſhed, Spinola ſet out from Maeſtricht, with all the troops which July

[24] Grotius. Meteren.

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he had assembled there; and having joined those which were under Bucquoi, and crossed the Rhine at the passage which had been secured for him, he called a council of war, and, for the first time, communicated to them his design.

The enemy, he told them, had been first led to expect an attack in Flanders, and they now believed that he had formed a design on Rhinberg. But his intention, from the beginning, had been to lay siege to Lingen; and by the reduction of that important place, to open an entrance into Friesland. He was sensible how much it was contrary to the common maxims of war, to leave behind him so strong a place as Rhinberg, but he did not from thence apprehend any danger or inconvenience, since, with the forts which had been erected, he could always command a safe passage over the river; besides that, the success of his enterprise against Lingen, must greatly depend on the celerity with which it should be executed, as prince Maurice would no sooner hear of the danger to which that place was exposed, than he would hasten to its relief. That although Lingen lay at a great distance, and the march must be performed in a neutral country[35], in which the troops would not be supported by plunder, yet there was no ground to dread a scarcity of provisions; he had brought a considerable quantity along with him; he had money sufficient to purchase whatever more should be necessary; and, as he was determined to enforce the strictest military discipline, he had

[35] Westphalia and the dutchy of Cleves.

received assurances from the towns of Westphalia, that, on that condition, they would chearfully furnish him with supplies. But attention to discipline was indispensibly necessary, and for this reason, he was resolved that every violation of the rules of it should be punished with the utmost severity and rigor.

What he declared on this occasion to his officers, he afterwards carried into execution. Some of the soldiers having ventured, notwithstanding the peremptory orders which he had issued, to leave their standards, they were instantly seized and put to death. The rest were intimidated by this example, and although a great part of them had long been accustomed to rapine and disobedience under former generals; yet so great is the power of discipline over troops which regularly receive their pay, that almost no army ever marched through a neutral country against which the inhabitants had so little reason to complain. His camp, in consequence of this prudent conduct, was at all times abundantly supplied, and no time was lost in sending out detachments to procure provisions. The inhabitants still retained a bitter remembrance of their sufferings from the Spanish army, under the admiral of Arragon, and were in some measure animated with gratitude to Spinola for the justice and humanity which he displayed.

After traversing a part of the dutchy of Cleves and Westphalia, he first directed his march to Oldenzeel, a fortified town in the province of

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Overyſſel, and ſoon compelled the garriſon to capitulate; immediately after which he advanced towards Lingen, which lies at the diſtance of only one day's march from Oldenzeel, and, without meeting with any oppoſition, aſſigned to his troops their ſeveral quarters round the town. Prince Maurice, on whon the ſtates general had, as formerly mentioned, beſtowed the property of Lingen and its territory, as a reward for his important ſervices, had, at his own expenſe, made great additions to the fortifications of it. But as the enemy's attention had, for ſeveral years, been turned to another quarter, it was defended, at this time, only by the ordinary garriſon, amounting to five or ſix hundred men.

Spinola lays ſiege to Lingen.

Even with ſo ſmall a garriſon, however, Prince Maurice had expected it might ſuſtain a ſiege of ſeveral weeks; and the governor, an officer of the name of Cobbe, ſeemed at firſt determined to defend it till the laſt extremity. Spinola was therefore obliged to begin the ſiege in form, and to make his approaches to the place as uſual, by working trenches. The garriſon had not ſufficient numbers to interrupt his operations, and he ſoon reached the ditch, which was of an extraordinary breadth and depth, and filled with water; nor could the water be drawn off, becauſe the ditch lay conſiderably lower than the adjacent ground. But at length, his troops got over it, though not without conſiderable ſlaughter, by filling it up with earth and faſcines, and then begun to work a mine under one of the principal baſtions of the

town; when the garriſon, importuned by the inhabitants, and deſpairing of being able to defend themſelves much longer, capitulated on honorable terms. BOOK II. 1595.

Prince Maurice, in the mean time, had advanced as far as Deventer, the capital of Overyſſel, and was employed in preparing for an attempt to raiſe the ſiege.

On the firſt intelligence which he received of the march of the enemy from Maeſtricht, he had diſpatched his brother, Henry Frederic, with four thouſand foot, and one thouſand horſe, to watch their motions; and a few days after, he had ſet out himſelf, at the head of another diviſion of his forces. But, having judged it neceſſary to leave a conſiderable proportion of them in Flanders to oppoſe any attempts which the enemy might make in that province, he was obliged to ſtop for ſome days at Deventer, till he had collected a ſufficient number of troops from the neighbouring towns, to enable him to undertake the relief of Lingen; and before his preparations were complete, a meſſenger arrived with the news of its ſurrender. He was highly incenſed againſt the governor and officers, for the feeble defence they had made of a place of ſo great importance, and threw them all into priſon, where they remained for near a twelvemonth, and though they were afterwards ſet at liberty, they were all of them degraded from their rank.

He had juſt cauſe for the reſentment which he felt on this occaſion, as Spinola, who had thought

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it unneceſſary to ſecure his army by intrenchments, muſt have raiſed the ſiege as ſoon as the army of the ſtates had approached. He had ground likewiſe for great anxiety, when he conſidered the defenceleſs ſtate of moſt of the towns in the neighbourhood of Lingen; and particularly that of Bourtang and Coevorden, by the conqueſt of which the enemy would have a free courſe into the provinces of Groningen and Friesland. It was believed, that if Spinola had immediately attacked theſe places, he might, without great difficulty, have made himſelf maſter of them. But having ſpent ſome time in ſtrengthening the fortifications of Lingen, he thereby afforded leiſure to prince Maurice to provide for their ſecurity. He judged it to be of greater importance to preſerve what he had already acquired, than to multiply his conqueſts; and, as Maurice had collected an army in the neighbourhood, nearly equal to his own, he thought that he could not venture any farther into the enemy's country ſo late in the ſeaſon, without expoſing himſelf to the greateſt riſk. Having, therefore, taken every neceſſary precaution for the ſafety of Lingen and Oldenzeel, he returned, afterwards to Keyſerwert, and repaſſed the Rhine.

The forts which had been erected there, having given offence to the elector of Cologn, on whoſe territory they had been raiſed, the archduke, in order to appeaſe his reſentment, had ſent orders for demoliſhing them; which Spinola did accordingly, and then began to build other two, a little

farther down the river, at Rorerort in the county of Meurs, which was at that time ſubject to the Dutch.

While a part of his army was employed in building theſe forts, ſo neceſſary for preſerving his communication with his late conqueſts, he ſent the reſt, under the count de Bucquoi, to lay ſiege to Wachtendonc, a town in Guelderland, which ſtood in a marſhy ſoil, and was deemed one of the ſtrongeſt towns in that province, but was at this time rendered more acceſſible than uſual by a long continued drought. As the fortifications however were complete, and the garriſon numerous [25], he had reaſon to apprehend that the ſiege muſt laſt for ſeveral weeks, and that prince Maurice, who had left Overyſſel, and was encamped in the neighbourhood of Weſel, would certainly attempt to raiſe it. He therefore ordered the count de Bucquoi to fortify his camp with ſtrong intrenchments, and having lately received a ſtrong reinforcement of Italians, beſides a conſiderable number of Engliſh, Scotch, and Iriſh Catholics, whom James, agreeably to his treaty of peace with Spain, had permitted the archduke to inliſt in his dominions, he took his ſtation near Rorerort, with a reſolution to attack prince Maurice's army in the rear, in caſe he ſhould venture to approach to Wachtendonc.

In diſtributing their quarters to his troops on he north ſide of the Rhine, next to the enemy, he committed an error which was likely to have

[25] Twelve hundred men.

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been attended with fatal conſequences, by ſtationing his cavalry at the village of Mulleim, on the banks of the Roer, where they were at too great a diſtance from the infantry to receive immediate ſupport; no intrenchments had been thrown up to ſecure them againſt an attack, nor was there any place of ſhelter near but a fort on the other ſide of the Roer, oppoſite to Mulleim, called the caſtle of Broeck, which was neither ſtrongly fortified nor furniſhed with a ſufficient garriſon. Prince Maurice, having got intelligence of their poſition, reſolved to avail himſelf of the advantage which it afforded him, and inſtantly ſet out from his camp at Weſel, with all his cavalry, and a ſelect body of infantry, amounting to two thouſand four hundred men. That no time might be unneceſſarily loſt on the march, the foot ſoldiers were put into carriages: the cavalry was ordered to haſten forward before the foot, one half of them commanded by Marcellus Baex, an officer of diſtinguiſhed ſpirit and intrepidity, and the other half by prince Henry Frederic, who was at that time only twenty years of age, but who had already given conſpicuous proofs of ſuperior prudence and capacity. Prince Maurice himſelf followed as quickly as poſſible with the infantry, colonel Baex was ordered to croſs the Roer, and to endeavour to get poſſeſſion of the caſtle of Broeck, in order to intercept the enemy's communication with their camp, while Henry, ſupported by prince Maurice, was to attack them at Mulleim.

Baex was ſucceſsful beyond what could juſtly have been expected in his firſt aſſault upon the

fort, having expelled the garriſon from every part of it but one, which was defended by a ſmall number of men; but he was interrupted in his progreſs by the accidental arrival of a party of foragers, who attacked him with great vigor, and obliged him to abandon his attempt upon the fort.

Engagement near the village of Mulleim.

In the mean time prince Henry had paſſed a narrow defile, which the enemy had left unguarded, and was about to begin the attack at Mulleim. It was unfortunately judged proper to defer it for a little time till the infantry ſhould arrive ſomewhat nearer. At length he gave orders for his troops to advance, and they obeyed at firſt with great alacrity; but finding that, through the delay in making the attack, the enemy had taken the alarm, and were in a better poſture of defence than they had expected, they were ſeized, though greatly ſuperior in number, with a ſudden panic, and, after an irreſolute and feeble effort, they turned their backs and fled, till they were met by prince Maurice at the head of the infantry.

Aſhamed of their daſtardly behaviour, and being ſeverely reproached by the prince, they were perſuaded to return. The Spaniſh cavalry, from whom they had ſo precipitately fled, far from venturing to purſue, were in great confuſion retreating acroſs the Roer, before a ſmall number of the Dutch cavalry that had remained with their commander. Henry was now rejoined by the reſt, and being likewiſe ſupported by the Engliſh and Scotch infantry, under colonel Vere and lord

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Buccleugh, he purſued the enemy to the other ſide of the river; but there the Spaniards, commanded by Trivulcio, in the abſence of Velaſco; general of the cavalry, having recovered their ranks, returned with great reſolution to the charge; and the Dutch, being again unaccountably ſtruck with terror, gave way before an inferior enemy, and left prince Henry almoſt alone in the field of battle. He muſt have been cut to pieces or taken priſoner, but for the ſeaſonable interpoſition of the Britiſh troops, who, being armed with pikes, attacked the Spaniſh cavalry, and kept them long at bay.

Henry, perceiving himſelf abandoned by almoſt all his men, went over with the few that remained with him, and joined the troops under colonel Baex, who had been long engaged in combat with the enemy in another part of the field. Soon after this the Spaniards, having received a reinforcement under Velaſco, this part of the Dutch cavalry too was intimidated, and the two commanders, with a ſmall number of adherents, were left, ſurrounded by the enemy; but in the mean time prince Maurice arrived with his vanguard, and having planted ſome field-pieces on a riſing ground, he played them off ſo ſucceſsfully upon the Spaniards, that he ſoon threw them into confuſion, and put them to flight with conſiderable ſlaughter. He was preparing to purſue them into a wood, where they had taken ſhelter, when he received intelligence that Spinola himſelf was approaching with all his forces.

This general had got early information of the attack, and had inſtantly ſet out at the head of ſix hundred men, leaving orders for two thouſand more to follow as quickly as poſſible. In order to intimidate the enemy, by making them believe that his whole army was at hand, he ſent forward a great number of drummers on horſeback, and as the ground was favorable to this ſtratagem, it produced the deſired effect. Prince Maurice gave immediate orders for ſounding a retreat. Spinola purſued, and made conſiderable ſlaughter; but his troops were ſtopt ſhort in their career by colonel Vere, who being ſupported by the count de Chatillon, with a ſelect body of French infantry, placed his men in an advantageous ſituation, behind a hedge, and kept up ſo hot a fire upon the Spaniards, as obliged them to deſiſt from the purſuit.

The loſs of men in this action, which laſted for upwards of eight hours, was conſiderable; and probably not leſs than five hundred men on either ſide. Had the Dutch cavalry arrived at Mulleim a little earlier, or acquitted themſelves after their arrival as they had done on all former occaſions, the Spaniards muſt have been compelled to lay down their arms [27]. Prince Maurice therefore, who had never before conceived more ſanguine

[27] Grotius, in ſpeaking of this action, makes the following obſervation, "tum id ſi eveniſſet, reliqua exercitus invadere ſtatuit, laudabili conſilio, & magnam illo die victoriam elaturus, ni Deo viſum, longa Batavorum proſpera & belli gloriam adverſis retundere: namque haud alii rectius cauſæ tam fatalem pavorem adſcripſerim.

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hopes of victory, was highly incenſed againſt them for their puſillanimous behaviour, and reproached them in the ſevereſt terms. He could no longer confide in their courage for the execution of any important enterpriſe, and found it neceſſary to act with the utmoſt circumſpection through the reſt of the campaign [28].

In order, however, if poſſible, to extinguiſh the memory of this repulſe, he ſoon after made an attack in the middle of the night on the town of Guelders, and he ſo far ſucceeded as to demoliſh one of the outer gates of that place, by fixing a petard in it; but the garriſon having taken the alarm, by the burſting of another petard which happened to fall into the ditch, he was repulſed with loſs, and obliged to abandon his attempt. His ill ſucceſs in this, and in his enterpriſe at Mulleim, made a ſtrong impreſſion on the minds of the garriſon of Wachtendonc. They had from the beginning expected that he would come to their relief, and, in the hopes of his being able to raiſe the ſiege, they had given him the ſtrongeſt aſſurances of their reſolution to defend the town to the laſt extremity; but when they found that, notwithſtanding his moſt vigorous exertions, the enemy ſtill maintained their ſuperiority, their courage failed, their defence became more feeble and irreſolute, and, on the twentieth day after the commencement of the ſiege,

[28] Grotius, lib. xiv. p. 469. &c. Van Met. lib. xxvii. Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. vii.

they offered to capitulate, though their number still amounted to more than a thouſand men. 1605.

From Wachtendonc Spinola ordered the count de Bucquoi to lead his troops againſt the caſtle of Cracao, of which the count made himſelf maſter in a few days, and obliged the garriſon to ſurrender at diſcretion.

Had not the ſeaſon been ſo far advanced, it is probable, from the great diſparity between the contending parties during this campaign, the ſtates muſt have ſuffered ſtill greater loſſes; but it was now the end of November, the rains had begun to fall, and the troops were greatly exhauſted with the fatigues which they had undergone. Spinola therefore, after carefully providing for the ſecurity of his new conqueſts, ſent his army into winter-quarters, and his example was ſoon after followed by prince Maurice. This general had at no former period ſuffered the enemy to gain ſo great advantages with impunity; yet, on his part, neither prudence and vigilance, nor vigor and activity, were wanting in oppoſing their deſigns. Had the ſtates permitted him to follow his own judgment in the conduct of the war, a different plan of operations would have been adopted; Spinola would probably have been prevented from paſſing the Rhine, and the lapces loſt have been preſerved. His army was from the beginning much inferior in number to the enemy, yet, if his well concerted attack at Mulleim had not proved abortive, through that unaccountable panic with which his troops were

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seized, the Spaniſh cavalry would have been cut off, and Spinola obliged to act on the defenſive through the reſt of the campaign.

But while for theſe reaſons it would ſeem that no blame can juſtly be imputed to prince Maurice, Spinola was ſurely well entitled to the applauſe which he received from his cotemporaries; by whom he was henceforth regarded as one of the greateſt generals of the age.

Sanguine hopes of the Spaniards.

The Spaniſh miniſters had no reaſon to repent of the confidence they had repoſed in him, when they reflected on the vigor and great abilities he had exerted during this campaign; and their hopes of being able to compel the revolted provinces to lay down their arms were at this time raiſed to the greateſt height. The archduke likewiſe had conceived the moſt ſanguine expectations of ſucceſs, and was aſſiduouſly employed throughout the winter, in preparing for a vigorous proſecution of the war.

Having removed the ſeat of it into the enemy's country, his ſubjects in Brabant and Flanders could, with greater eaſe than formerly, afford their annual ſupplies; but theſe were not alone ſufficient to enable him to carry the plan concerted with the general for the next campaign into execution; and, in order to procure from Spain the aſſiſtance which was requiſite, he judged it neceſſary that Spinola himſelf ſhould undertake another journey to Madrid. The Spaniſh miniſters had acquainted him that they were at preſent involved

involved in the greateſt difficulties, occaſioned by the loſs of ſome of their ſhips loaded with treaſure, which had foundered in a ſtorm, in their paſſage from America; but he hoped that, through Spinola's perſonal influence with the king, which was ſo great as even to excite the jealouſy of his miniſters, they might be induced to have recourſe to ſome extraordinary expedient for his relief.

The marquis, who left Bruſſels about the middle of winter, found, on his arrival at Madrid, that the account tranſmitted to the archduke, of the exhauſted ſtate of Philip's finances, had not been exaggerated. There was hardly money in the exchequer ſufficient to defray the neceſſary expenſes of government, and the miniſters had no proſpect of being able to procure the ſums requiſite for carrying on the war with vigor, before the ſeaſon fit for action would be elapſed. Philip could not reſolve, in the midſt of victory, to abandon a cauſe in which he was ſo deeply intereſted: and Spinola was determined to decline accepting of the command of the forces, unleſs an adequate fund ſhould be provided for their pay. Many weeks were ſpent in fruitleſs endeavours to raiſe the money which he demanded [a]. At length the miniſters offered to mortgage the treaſure which was expected to arrive towards the end of the year from America. And the merchants of Cadiz and other places, upon receiving an obligation for their reimburſement from that

Expedient of the Spaniſh miniſtry for raiſing ſupplies.

[a] It amounted to three hundred thouſand crowns a month.

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fund, agreed to advance the money that was wanted: upon a condition, which marks their diffidence either in the good faith or good economy of the miniſters, that the marquis of Spinola ſhould give an additional ſecurity for their payment on his eſtates in Italy.

The marquis did not heſitate in complying with this requeſt; and immediately after receiving bills of exchange for the money, he ſet out for the Netherlands, by the way of Italy. In that country he was ſeized with a fever which detained him for ſeveral weeks, and prevented him from reaching Bruſſels till the beginning of June.

Sickneſs of Spinola.

The ſtates general, on the other hand, having got early intelligence of the difficulty which he muſt encounter in raiſing money, had long flattered themſelves with the hopes that he would not be able to procure it. They were afterwards amuſed for a conſiderable time by a report which had been propagated of his death; an event which they were perſuaded would contribute more than any other that could happen to relax the archduke's exertions in the proſecution of the war. Influenced by theſe hopes, and this report, joined to their deſire of avoiding any unneceſſary expenſe, they had been uncommonly remiſs in their military preparations. They had not availed themſelves of Spinola's detention in Italy; and when they heard, not only that he had arrived in the Netherlands, but was daily receiving reinforcements of freſh troops from Germany and Italy, they were filled with the moſt diſquieting apprehenſions;

Strange remiſſneſs in the conduct of the United States.

but it was now too late to remedy their error. They had not ſufficient time to augment their army, by making new levies, as they uſed to do in Britain; and almoſt all the proteſtant ſoldiers, whom they might have inliſted in France and Germany, were, during the greateſt part of this ſummer, detained at home; thoſe in France, by a quarrel between the king and duke of Bouillon; and thoſe in Germany, by an inſurrection of the inhabitants of Brunſwic againſt their ſovereign.

Prince Maurice adopts defenſive operations.

When the campaign therefore was about to be opened, their forces, being greatly inferior in number to thoſe of the enemy, prince Maurice was obliged to adopt a plan of operations which was merely defenſive.

Having carefully provided for the ſecurity of ſuch of the frontier towns, as were moſt expoſed to danger, he next applied himſelf to fortify the banks of the Waal and the Iſſel, whereſoever he ſuſpected that the enemy might attempt to tranſport their forces.

Along the banks of all that part of the Waal, which extends from the fort of Schenck to the iſle of Bommel, redoubts, at ſmall diſtances from each other, were raiſed on the north dike of the river. The troops, to which the defence of theſe redoubts was committed, were ordered to keep themſelves in conſtant readineſs to march to each other's aſſiſtance, on the firſt notice of an attack. And a great number of armed barks and boats were ordered to cruiſe in the river, to watch the

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motions of the enemy, and to be ready to attack them, in caſe of their adventuring to embark.

The ſame care and pains were taken in fortifying the Iſſel; on the banks of which another line of redoubts was raiſed, extending from Arnheim to Hattem, which ſtands at the diſtance of only a few hours march from the Zuider Sea.

Theſe works, in which the Dutch were more expert than any other nation, and which had been carried on with ſurpriſing expedition, were far advanced before Spinola had fully prepared to take the field. His plan had, from the beginning, been what the ſtates and prince Maurice had ſuſpected, to penetrate into the provinces of Utrecht and Holland, through the Betuwe on one ſide, and the Veluwe on the other. He juſtly conſidered, that while the Dutch maintained their ſuperiority at ſea, it was only on their eaſtern frontier, he could expect to make any ſenſible impreſſion; and that, in caſe he ſhould ſo far ſucceed as to get poſſeſſion of Utrecht, which was a large town, but weakly fortified, not only the numerous fortified places which lie to the north and eaſt, would be eaſily compelled to ſubmit, becauſe their communication with Holland would be interrupted; but Holland itſelf, the chief ſeat of the wealth and ſtrength of the revolted provinces would be laid open in that quarter, where it would be moſt ſucceſsfully attacked.

Spinola determined to penetrate into Utrecht and Holland.

He was ſenſible, that ſince the ſtates had employed ſuch wiſe precautions for their defence, it muſt now be extremely difficult for him to carry

this plan into execution. But he ſtill reſolved to perſiſt in it, and hoped, on one ſide or other, either to find the enemy off their guard, or to overpower them by his ſuperior numbers. BOOK II. 1606.

Having divided his forces, he gave the command of one army, conſiſting of ten thouſand foot and twelve hundred horſe, to the count de Bucquoi, with inſtructions to attempt to tranſport it over the Waal into the country of Betuwe; and he himſelf conducted another, ſtill more numerous, into the province of Overyſſel, which had been the ſcene of his operations in the preceding year.

Bucquoi, having paſſed the Maeſe at Mooch, pitched his camp in the neighbourhood of that village, reſolving to attempt the paſſage of the Waal, between the fort of Schenck and Nimeguen, and, in caſe of his being able to effect it, to lay ſiege to the latter of theſe places. With this view, he tranſported a great number of boats in carriages from the Maeſe; and having launched them in the Waal, he put a ſelect body of troops on board, under the command of Juſtiniano, an Italian general of diſtinguiſhed abilities. But before Juſtiniano could approach the oppoſite bank, Dubois, a French general, in the ſervice of the ſtates, had drawn up ſome companies of French and Engliſh ſoldiers, brought haſtily from Nimeguen, and was prepared to diſpute his landing. Juſtiniano ſtill continued to advance, having firſt obliged all the Dutch armed veſſels to retire, by planting a battery at the place of his

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embarkment. An obſtinate engagement ſoon followed, in which he loſt about one hundred and twenty men.

The rowers were intimidated, and being furniſhed with a pretext, from the rapidity of the current, they ſuffered the boats to fall down the ſtream. Dubois followed along the dike of the river. Other attempts were made afterwards to approach the ſhore, but the enemy were every where prepared to make reſiſtance. At length the boats, which at firſt had proceeded in good order, being attacked by the Dutch armed veſſels, which were ſix abreaſt, were thrown into confuſion; and Juſtiniano, deſpairing of ſucceſs, abandoned his attempt.

Spinola in the mean time had paſſed the Rhine at Rorerort, and was advancing through the province of Overyſſel. But he was greatly retarded in his progreſs by an extraordinary quantity of rain which had begun to fall before he left Rorerort, and continued falling after he had ſet out upon his march. All the rivers were ſwelled to an unuſual height; and at thoſe places, where in ordinary ſeaſons they were fordable, much time was loſt in collecting boats, or in building temporary bridges. A great part of the country through which he marched being naturally wet and marſhy, the roads were every where ſo much broken, that the one-half of his army was commonly a whole day behind the other. The artillery-carts, and his waggons with proviſions, of which he had near three thouſand, were dragged along

with the utmoſt difficulty, and, as they often ſunk in the mud, they proved almoſt every hour the occaſion of confuſion and delay. Many of his men fell ſick from the unhealthineſs of the ſeaſon, and many were overpowered by the extraordinary fatigue which they underwent. BOOK 11. 1606.

It was paſt the middle of July before he arrived in the neighbourhood of the Iſſel; and he ſtill entertained the hopes of finding it practicable to bring his enterpriſe to the deſired iſſue: but, as the rains had not yet begun to abate, he found the river every where unfordable. It was, at the ſame time, crowded with armed veſſels, which muſt have rendered all attempts to caſt a temporary bridge over it impracticable: and prince Maurice, having had leiſure to fortify the oppoſite banks, had collected an army of ten thouſand foot, and two thouſand five hundred horſe, with which he ſtood prepared to oppoſe his paſſage.

After deliberating for ſome days what courſe he ſhould purſue, he would have undertaken the ſiege of Deventer or Zutphen. But, beſides that every precaution had been taken for their defence, prince Maurice had pitched his camp on the oppoſite ſide, at an equal diſtance from each of theſe places, and was ready, with forces nearly equal to his own, to march to their relief.

He had, in the mean time, ſent the count de Solre with a detachment of his army down the river, to attempt a paſſage in the neighbourhood of Swoll, where he hoped the enemy might not be ſo much upon their guard. But de Solre was

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vigorouſly repulſed by the garriſon of Swoll, ſupported by ſome armed veſſels, and obliged to return, without being able to execute his enterpriſe.

Spinola therefore found it neceſſary to relinquiſh his plan of penetrating through the country of Veluwe, and to reſt ſatisfied with employing his arms againſt ſome of the towns of the province of Zutphen, where Maurice could not attempt to interrupt his operations, without expoſing himſelf to the riſk of a general engagement. He firſt attacked the town of Lockem, and in a few days compelled the garriſon to ſurrender. Immediately after which he laid ſiege to Groll, a town much better fortified than Lockem, and defended by a garriſon of one thouſand three hundred men. He was the more deſirous to get poſſeſſion of the place, as it would greatly contribute to the ſecurity of his former conqueſts, Lingen and Oldenzeel. And for the ſame reaſon prince Maurice was equally ſolicitous to prevent it from falling into his hands.

Siege of Groll.

The prince, therefore, having augmented his army, by drawing the garriſons from Zutphen, Deventer, and other places, reſolved to attempt, without delay, to raiſe the ſiege. But Spinola being acquainted with his deſign, puſhed forward his operations with the moſt unremitted ardor, and, though not without conſiderable ſlaughter of his troops, he, in a few days, drove the garriſon from all the out-works of the place.

They might ſtill, however, have reſiſted till prince Maurice had arrived; but the governor, a young man of little experience, being either prevailed upon by the importunity of the inhabitants, or intimidated by the threats of Spinola, who ſent him notice that if he did not immediately ſurrender, he would put all his garriſon to the ſword, capitulated on the ninth day after the commencement of the ſiege. Auguſt 14.

Spinola had no ſooner got poſſeſſion of the town, and repaired ſome breaches in the fortifications, than he reſolved to remove his army from Overyſſel, where their health was greatly affected by the humidity of the ſoil, and to employ them in ſome other quarter, in which they would not be expoſed to the ſame inconveniencies. Having called a council of war to aſſiſt him in his deliberations on this occaſion, it was agreed, conformably to his own propoſal, that no enterpriſe could be undertaken at that time, with any probability of ſucceſs, of equal importance with the ſiege of Rhinberg.

Rhinberg beſieged.

This town, which commands one of the moſt convenient paſſages over the Rhine, had, ſeveral times, been taken and retaken, ſince the commencement of the war; and the Dutch, in whoſe poſſeſſion it had remained ſince the year 1601, when it was ſubdued by prince Maurice, had, at an immenſe expenſe, made great additions to the fortifications. Round the old fortifications, they had drawn a new rampart, ſtrengthened with halfmoons, redoubts, and ravelins, and had

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ſurrounded the whole with a ſecond ditch, of extraordinary breadth and depth; to which they had added a covered way. They had erected on the iſland, which is ſeparated by a narrow channel from the town, a ſtrong fort with regular baſtions, of nearly the ſame extent, as the iſland itſelf, and they had furniſhed another fortification of ſtill greater extent and ſtrength, defended by a deep intrenchment, on the oppoſite bank of the river.

Spinola was aware of the difficulty he muſt encounter in reducing a town ſo ſtrongly fortified, and which he knew likewiſe to be abundantly ſupplied with proviſions and military ſtores: but, having been greatly diſappointed by the failure of his enterpriſe againſt the interior provinces, and being deſirous of performing ſome achievement, that might juſtify the opinion which the archduke and the court of Spain had conceived of his abilities, even the difficulty of accompliſhing his deſign proved a motive for adopting it; while, at the ſame time, it determined him to exert his utmoſt vigor in the execution.

Having ſent orders to the count de Bucquoi to come to his aſſiſtance, the count immediately directed his march towards Rhinberg along the ſouth-ſide of the river, while he himſelf advanced towards it on the north. No delay was unneceſſarily admitted by either general; but before they could throw up their intrenchments, prince Maurice, having received intelligence of their deſign, had time to ſend his brother Henry Frederic with

a reinforcement to the garriſon of two thouſand men. Henry was accompanied on this occaſion by a large body of cavalry, and having executed his commiſſion without any loſs, he immediately returned with the cavalry to the camp, where his brother was preparing to march to the relief of the beſieged with all his forces.

In the mean time Spinola began the ſiege by attacking the fort above-mentioned, which had been raiſed on the ſide of the river oppoſite to the town. Of this fort, which communicated by temporary bridges with the iſland and with the town, and was deemed a poſt of the firſt importance, the defence was given to colonel Edmund, a Scotch officer of diſtinguiſhed merit, who had been advanced in the ſervice of the ſtates from the rank of a common ſoldier to that of colonel. Beſides a numerous garriſon, upwards of ſeventy French gentlemen, who had come into the Netherlands to learn the military art, ſerved under him as volunteers; and, that they might merit promotion on their return to their native country, were ready to expoſe themſelves to every danger. With this determined band, ſupported by his garriſon, both horſe and foot, he ſallied out againſt Spinola, as ſoon as he approached, threw a great part of his army into confuſion, and made conſiderable ſlaughter. Spinola himſelf narrowly eſcaped being taken priſoner: but freſh troops coming forward to his aſſiſtance, Edmund was at length repulſed, and obliged to retire into the fort.

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From the intrepid ſpirit which the garriſon diſplayed in this ſally, joined to the character of their commander, Spinola had reaſon to expect the moſt vigorous reſiſtance. But a few days after, Edmund was killed by a ſhot from the enemy's camp while he was viewing his intrenchments; and the garriſon, immoderately diſheartened by his death, evacuated the fort in the following night, and paſſed over into the iſland.

This precipitate meaſure, the effect of ſudden dejection, on account of the loſs of the commander, was quickly attended with the moſt important conſequences. The fortifications of the iſland were in a great meaſure commanded by the artillery of the fort which they had ſo haſtily abandoned, and Spinola, by keeping up an inceſſant fire on them, from which their ramparts did not long afford protection, compelled them to take ſhelter in the town.

He then applied himſelf to ſtrengthen the fortifications which he had gained on the banks of the river, in order to prevent prince Maurice from approaching on that ſide to the relief of the beſieged; and having brought his bridge of boats above-mentioned from Rorerort, he tranſported the greateſt part of his forces over the Rhine, to co-operate with the count de Bucquoi, who had begun his operations againſt the town.

Being already ſecured againſt an attack on the ſide towards the river, he now labored to render himſelf equally ſecure on the other ſide, by caſting a ſtrong intrenchment round his camp. And

as he was perpetually preſent himſelf, and no hands were permitted to be idle, the work was carried on with extraordinary expedition, while a great proportion of his troops were employed in making their approaches to the town.

There was nothing omitted on the part of the garriſon, which prudence and bravery could perform, to retard their progreſs. Animated by the example of the French volunteers, they ſpurned at danger, and made ſeveral vigorous ſallies on the enemy, in ſome of which they ſucceeded in their attempt to demoliſh their works, and in all of them put conſiderable numbers to the ſword.

But the exertions of the beſiegers were in proportion to the obſtacles which they found it neceſſary to ſurmount. Spinola had on no former occaſion given more conſpicuous proofs of vigor, ſkill, and bravery; he expoſed himſelf to every danger to which his troops were expoſed, and at the ſame time diſcovered the moſt perfect compoſure and tranquillity. The conduct of Bucquoi and Velaſco fully juſtified the opinion that was entertained of their abilities. The duke d'Oſſuna, one of the firſt grandees in Spain, the princes of Caſerta and Paleſtrina, and the marquiſſes of Eſt and Bentivoglio [10], were commonly mingled with the foremoſt combatants, and exhibited a bright example of the moſt heroic valor. The behaviour of the troops correſponded to this example of their general and officers. The Italians and Spaniards on the one hand, and the Walloons

[10] Nephew to the celebrated hiſtorian of that name.

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and Germans on the other, animated by their leaders, and ſtimulated by ambition to ſurpaſs their companions, diſplayed in every rencounter the moſt determined intrepidity.

The garriſon therefore, notwithſtanding the moſt obſtinate reſiſtance, were compelled to abandon one part of their fortifications after another; and it ſoon appeared, that in order to ſave themſelves from utter deſtruction, they muſt, ere long, deliver up the town, unleſs prince Maurice ſhould come ſpeedily to their relief.

This general had already croſſed the Rhine near Weſel, with an army amounting to fourteen or fifteen thouſand men; and had advanced as far as Alphen, which lies at the diſtance of only a few hours march from Rhinberg. From his approaching ſo near, and from the various movements of his troops, Spinola could not doubt that he intended to attack his intrenchments. He therefore immediately applied himſelf to fortify ſome hills adjoining to his camp; and having ordered ſuch of his forces as had been left for guarding the fort on the oppoſite ſide on the river, to come to his aſſiſtance, he ſtood prepared to accept of battle, in caſe it ſhould be offered by the enemy.

But prince Maurice was too prudent, and too well acquainted with the character of Spinola, as well as with the ſtrength of his preſent ſituation, to expoſe his army to ſo great a riſk. From the time when the garriſon had abandoned the fort on the oppoſite ſide of the river, he had deſpaired

of being able to raiſe the ſiege, as all communication with the town on that ſide was thereby intercepted, and the enemy enabled to effectuate a junction of their forces. They were now greatly ſuperior to his in number. No precaution had been omitted by their general to prevent a ſurpriſe. It was impoſſible to attack them without reſolving to try the fortune of a battle. And he conſidered that while the preſervation of Rhinberg would be the only fruit which he could reap from a victory, a defeat muſt be attended with the loſs of other towns of ſtill greater importance, and, at the ſame time, render it practicable for Spinola to execute his firſt plan of an invaſion of the country beyond the Waal; he thought it rather fortunate that this general, with ſo numerous an army, had engaged in an enterpriſe which could not greatly affect the proſperity of the United Provinces; and hoped that, by his perſiſting in it, he would exhauſt his ſtrength, and loſe what remained of the ſeaſon fit for action.

Many of prince Maurice's countrymen, however, were diſſatisfied with his inactivity on this occaſion, and the ſtates general ſent deputies to his camp to acquaint him they had expected he would have made an attempt to raiſe the ſiege. But having brought over the deputies to his opinion, he deſpiſed the general cenſure to which his conduct was expoſed, and ſtill adhered to his reſolution.

By the various movements which he made he prevented the garriſon from deſpairing of his

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Spinola had hitherto preſerved the moſt perfect diſcipline in his army, and had fully experienced the benefit ariſing from it, in the facility with which he procured ſupplies from the neutral countries adjoining to his camp. But, ſome time before the preſent period, a convoy with a part of his money, having been intercepted by the enemy, and the affairs of ſome merchants, who had accepted his bills, having fallen into diſorder, in conſequence of loſſes ſuſtained at ſea, he was no longer able to pay his troops with the ſame regularity as formerly, and conſiderable arrears had become due. They had begun to complain before the termination of the ſiege, and ſoon after the ſame mutinous ſpirit appeared among them, which had ſo often proved pernicious to

October 1.

[31] Grotius, lib. xv. Van Meteren, lib. xxviii. Bent. part iii. lib. vii.

the

the Spaniſh intereſt in the Netherlands. Spinola, in his treatment of the mutineers, mingled gentleneſs with ſeverity, and omitted nothing in his power to prevent the infection from becoming general; but his endeavours were in a great meaſure ineffectual. A conſiderable number deſerted, and went over to the enemy's camp; while a body of two thouſand horſe and foot, with ſeveral officers, directed their march towards Breda, and put themſelves under the protection of prince Maurice; who, agreeably to his uſual maxims, reſolved to encourage them in their revolt; and ſent orders to the governor of Breda to grant them permiſſion to fortify their quarters under the cannon of the town, and to purchaſe proviſions from the citizens.

Mutiny and deſertion of Spaniſh troops.

As ſoon as intelligence had reached him of the ſurrender of Rhinberg, Maurice had retired with his army into the province of Overyſſel, and he now reſolved to embrace the opportunity, which the mutiny of Spinola's troops afforded him, to recover ſome of the towns in that province which had been loſt. He firſt attacked Lockem, which he reduced in a few days, and immediately after he laid ſiege to Groll. Spinola, anxious for the preſervation of a place which he deemed of great importance, immediately conceived the deſign of attempting to relieve it, and called a council of war to deliberate on the ſubject. A great majority of his officers endeavoured to perſuade him to relinquiſh his deſign, by arguments drawn from the lateneſs of the ſeaſon, the humidity of the

Siege of Groll.

BOOK II. 1606.

country through which he must pass, joined to the weakness of his army, and the pernicious consequences which must accompany a defeat. He was deeply sensible of the force of these objections. But he considered that the loss of Groll would probably soon draw after it that of all his other conquests beyond the Rhine; that his late conquest of Rhinberg would thereby become in a great measure insignificant, as it derived its importance chiefly from the secure communication which it afforded with his other conquests; that the glory he had acquired would thus be quickly buried in oblivion; and the fruit of all those labors lost, which had been attended with so great an expense of blood and treasure.

Stimulated by these motives, he persisted in his design, though it could not perhaps be justified on the principles of prudence; and instantly selected from his whole army eight thousand foot, and twelve hundred horse, on whose obedience and bravery he could depend for the execution of any enterprise, however dangerous. These troops were highly pleased with the flattering distinction which they received, and began their march with every symptom of ardor and alacrity.

The success of his enterprise Spinola knew must entirely depend on his preventing the enemy from having time to complete their intrenchments, and with this view he advanced towards them with the utmost rapidity, and in a few days arrived within sight of the town. Prince Maurice, on the other hand, having from the beginning

believed that Spinola would not attempt to interrupt his operations, had neglected to employ such precautions as might have obstructed his approach. Being desirous to spare his men, he had not as usual drawn any lines of circumvallation round the place, and his camp itself had no other defence on one side but some marshy ground, which he had thought sufficient to prevent any sudden incursion of the enemy. BOOK II. 1606.

It was in this quarter that Spinola resolved to begin his attack; and having drawn up his army in four battalions, each of which had a small train of artillery attending them, and a part of the cavalry secured by a double row of carriages on their flanks, he first rode through the several ranks, encouraging and exhorting them, and at the same time declaring that he was determined either to die or conquer; immediately after which he gave the signal to advance.

But prince Maurice had from the first appearance of the enemy resolved to decline the combat, and had already begun to raise the siege. He first withdrew his troops in good order to an advantageous situation, near his camp, where he was free from danger, and soon after retired to a greater distance from the town. His army was greatly superior in number to that of the enemy; but many of his men were sickly, and worn out with the fatigues of a long campaign; and the event of battles he considered, depended less on the numbers than on the intrepidity and vigor of the combatants. To the ignorant his conduct

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was a matter of cenſure and ſurpriſe: but, as both his ſkill and courage were unqueſtionable, the conſtraint which he impoſed upon himſelf on this occaſion was, by the more prudent and judicious, deemed deſerving of admiration and applauſe.

Such was the concluſion of this campaign, through accidents againſt which no human prudence could provide. Spinola had been diſappointed in his hopes of reducing the interior parts of the United Provinces; but, from his conduct in the ſiege of Rhinberg, and the relief of Groll, all the world were ſatisfied that, on his part, neither abilities nor vigor would have been wanting to carry the plan which he had concerted into ſucceſsful execution [11].

[11] Piaſecii Chronica. Grotius, lib. xv. Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. vii. Meteren, lib. xxiii.

THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF PHILIP THE THIRD, KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK III.

BOOK III.

Negociation for a peace.

SOON after the tranſactions above related a negociation for peace was begun, in the courſe of which it appeared that neither of the two contending parties were intent on the farther proſecution of the war. But, in order fully to comprehend their views and motives, a more particular account of ſome of their operations at ſea, in the Eaſt-Indies, and in America, is neceſſary, than could have been conveniently given in the preceding books.

It may juſtly appear ſurpriſing, that a ſtate poſſeſſed of ſo ſmall a territory as the republic of the United Provinces ſhould have been able to ſupport the expenſe of a war at home againſt ſo potent an enemy. Yet, during the continuance of this war, their exertions were not confined to the Netherlands. They maintained at the ſame time a numerous fleet of ſhips of war, with which they generally proved victorious in all

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their naval rencounters with the enemy, while they ſucceſsfully attacked his dominions in the moſt diſtant quarters of the globe. They had been much indebted for their ſucceſs in the Low Countries to the aſſiſtance in money and troops which they received from Henry IV. and queen Elizabeth; but as the aid which theſe princes could afford them was never liberal, they muſt have ſunk under the power of their enemies, but for thoſe copious reſources which they opened by the extenſion of their trade.

Progreſs of arts in the low Countries.

The inhabitants of the Low Countries had for ſeveral centuries been diſtinguiſhed by their induſtry, and their ſkill in manufactures. Even in the time of the Roman republic, they had given proofs of their ſuperior ingenuity [1]. When by the irruptions of thoſe northern barbarians who overturned the Roman empire, all the uſeful arts of life, as well as letters and ſcience, had been well nigh extinguiſhed, they were firſt revived and ſucceſsfully cultivated by the Flemings, and other inhabitants of the Netherlands. About the middle of the tenth century, free marts, or fairs, were eſtabliſhed by Baldwin, earl of Flanders, to which great numbers of merchants from Germany, France, and other places reſorted, to purchaſe the manufactures in which the Flemings ſo much excelled. The example of Baldwin was imitated by his ſucceſſors for almoſt three centuries, during which period the induſtry and com-

[1] Eſt ſummæ genus ſolertiæ, atque ad omnia imitanda quæ a quoquo traduntur aptiſſimum. Vide Cæſar, lib. vii.

merce of the Flemings were carried to the greateſt height, and remained unrivalled by the other European nations. But the ſucceeding ſovereigns, finding it neceſſary for defraying the expenſe of the wars in which they were often engaged with the neighbouring princes, to impoſe various taxes on commodities, great numbers of the manufacturers and merchants, unaccuſtomed to ſuch impoſitions, withdrew into Holland, where they were at once free from taxes, and much leſs expoſed to thoſe calamities of war, which they had often experienced in the more open provinces of Flanders and Brabant. BOOK III.

The art of ſalting herrings having, in the fourteenth century, been diſcovered by William Bucrem, a native of Pierulem, in Flanders, the herring trade, which hath proved ſo copious a ſource of wealth and induſtry to the Netherlands, was firſt cultivated by the citizens of Sluys and Bruges; but it was ſoon afterwards communicated to the Dutch, who improved to the utmoſt the advantages which their ſituation afforded them for carrying it on with ſucceſs. They were, at the ſame time, in poſſeſſion of the cod and whale fiſhery; and, while they exported great quantities of fiſh, and of manufactures, they were every year extending their trade in the ſouthern parts of Europe, in the countries which lie round the Baltic, and in thoſe parts of Germany with which they communicated by the Rhine and other rivers which paſs through their territory, before they fall into the ſea.

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Before the middle of the ſixteenth century the provinces of Holland and Zealand underwent an important change by the great increaſe of the number of inhabitants, occaſioned by the perſecutions on account of religion in France and Germany. Charles the Fifth had reſolved to extirpate the Proteſtants from his dominions in the Netherlands, as well as from thoſe in Germany; but he had been in a great meaſure deterred from the proſecution of his deſign, partly by the partial affection which he bore towards his Dutch and Flemiſh ſubjects, and partly by his dread of the fatal conſequences, with which the rigorous execution of his edicts might be attended, with regard to their manufactures and their trade.

Both the French and German Proteſtants therefore found an aſylum in the Netherlands, and imported thither their families, their wealth, and their induſtry. Of the advantages reſulting from thence Brabant and Flanders participated in common with the more northern maritime provinces, but the intolerant and oppreſſive Spirit of the Spaniſh government prevented them from long enjoying theſe advantages. It was chiefly by the manufacturers and merchants that the opinions of the reformers were embraced; they were perſecuted with the moſt unrelenting fury, and they likewiſe moſt ſeverely felt the burden of thoſe oppreſſive taxes that were impoſed. By the cruel treatment which they received, ſeveral thouſands of them were compelled to withdraw into other countries. Many went over to England,

where Elizabeth was ready to afford them her protection. But when the maritime provinces had aſſerted their liberty, and Ghent, Bruges, and Antwerp, after an unſucceſsful ſtruggle, had again ſubmitted to the Spaniſh yoke, by much the greater part of the Flemiſh emigrants retired into Holland or Zealand, and took up their reſidence in Middleburgh, Haerlem, Leyden, and Amſterdam. In their new abode they enjoyed the free exerciſe of their religion, a privilege which they deemed a compenſation for every hardſhip they might find it neceſſary to undergo. The country which they had made choice of being of ſmall extent, could not afford ſuſtenance for one third part of its inhabitants. But being ſituated in the heart of Europe, at the mouth of ſeveral navigable rivers, and moſt of the towns communicating with each other by theſe rivers, or by canals, no country could be more commodious either for inland or foreign trade. While their ſituation therefore prompted them to apply themſelves to commerce, by the conveniencies which it afforded for carrying it on, they at the ſame time found it neceſſary to engage in it, as the only means of their ſubſiſtence and ſupport.

And commerce.

No branch of it, to which they could find acceſs, or from which any profit could be derived, was neglected; nor did they confine themſelves, like other nations, to the exporting of ſuch of their own commodities as they could ſpare, or the importing of ſuch commodities from other countries as their neceſſities required, but they

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likewiſe traded for other nations, and had many of their ſhips continually employed in carrying the merchandize of one nation to another. This ſpecies of commerce had been formerly poſſeſſed by the Anſeatic or maritime towns on the Baltic; but the ſituation of the Dutch, between the Northern and Southern European nations, was more commodious for carrying it on. The neceſſity which their circumſtances impoſed upon them, of continual action and employment, had prompted them to engage in it; and their extreme frugality and rigid economy, by rendering it practicable for them to trade for ſmaller profits, had enabled them to wreſt it from their competitors, and to engroſs it almoſt wholly to themſelves.

Among the various branches of commerce in which the Dutch diſplayed ſo much activity and enterpriſe, one of the moſt conſiderable conſiſted in carrying from the countries lying round the Baltic to the different ports in Spain and Portugal, great quantities of corn and naval ſtores; in return for which, beſides fruits, wine, and other productions of thoſe Southern Kingdoms, they received the gold and ſilver of America, and the ſpices and other commodities which the Portugueſe imported from India or Liſbon. The period when this branch of trade commenced, cannot be exactly aſcertained. Being of ſmall extent at firſt, it has eſcaped the notice of hiſtorians. But it had become conſiderable ſoon after the beginning of the ſixteenth century, and before the middle of that century, it was deemed a

ſpecies of commerce of the first importance. It was equally neceſſary to Spain and Portugal as to the United Provinces, and was for this reaſon connived at by the court of Spain for many years after the revolt in the Netherlands; being ſtill carried on by the Dutch themſelves, who found no other precaution neceſſary but to ſail under the flag of ſome neutral power at peace with Spain. But Philip's reſentment againſt his revolted ſubjects being on ſome occaſions too violent to be reſtrained by conſiderations of policy or prudence, the Dutch ſhips were ſometimes confiſcated, the commanders thrown into priſon, and the ſailors either ſent to the gallies, or compelled to ſerve on board the Spaniſh fleet. This monarch having come at length to ſuſpect that the commerce which he had hitherto in ſome meaſure permitted, was of infinitely greater advantage to the enemy than to himſelf, and being deſirous to deprive them of what he believed to be a principal ſource of their increaſing wealth and ſtrength, he reſolved to enforce an edict which he had formerly publiſhed, prohibiting his ſubjects in Spain and Portugal from holding intercourſe with the revolted provinces; the Dutch traders were, in conſequence of this reſolution, every year more harraſſed than the preceding, till the reſtraints and vexations which they ſuffered had become intolerable.

Finding themſelves therefore under the neceſſity of abandoning this gainful traffic, they began to conſider whether they might not, in another way, ſecure to themſelves the advantages which they had hitherto derived from it.

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Having ſo long acted as carriers for the Portugueſe, in diſtributing the rich productions of the Eaſt over the Northern nations, they well knew where to find the ſpeedieſt ſale for theſe productions, and they likewiſe knew that the demand for them was every year increaſing: nor, when they conſidered the great advantages of their ſituation, joined to their ſuperior naval power, could they doubt of being able to deprive the Portugueſe of this profitable trade, provided they could procure the commodities requiſite for carrying it on.

But, for this purpoſe, it was neceſſary they ſhould perform a voyage of ſeveral thouſand leagues, through ſeas with which they were unacquainted; that they ſhould viſit countries of which they were almoſt entirely ignorant; and after their arrival there, ſhould enter into a competition with a bold and enterpriſing nation, who, beſides being in poſſeſſion of the trade of theſe countries, had eſtabliſhed a formidable military force for its protection. The Dutch, though ſufficiently aware of theſe difficulties, were not thereby deterred from perſiſting in their deſign. In order to ſhorten their voyage, the great extent of which through unknown ſeas, was the principal cauſe of their dread, they made three different attempts to diſcover a paſſage to India, by the Northern Ocean; but theſe attempts, like all others of the ſame kind, proving fruitleſs, they reſolved to undertake the voyage to India by the cuſtomary route, provided they could procure

ſome perſon already acquainted with it to conduct them.

It happened opportunely when they were deliberating on the ſubject, that ſome merchants of Amſterdam received an application from Cornelius Houtman, a native of Flanders, who was in priſon for debt in Liſbon; repreſenting, that having made ſeveral voyages with the Portugueſe to India, he was not only well acquainted with the courſe of navigation thither, but likewiſe with the nature of the India trade; and that, in caſe they would furniſh him with a ſum of money to purchaſe his liberty, he would gladly communicate to them all neceſſary information, and undertake in perſon the conduct of their ſhips. His propoſal was inſtantly accepted, the money which he requeſted for his releaſe, was tranſmitted to him, and ſoon afterwards he arrived at Amſterdam. The merchants, highly ſatisfied with the information which they received from him, and perceiving him to be a man of uncommon penetration and abilities, immediately formed an aſſociation, to which they gave the name of the Company of Diſtant Countries, and equipped a ſquadron, conſiſting of four ſhips, which they put under his command. This little ſquadron had two hundred and fifty men on board, and a hundred pieces of cannon, which were furniſhed by the ſtates; beſides naval and military ſtores, and a variety of merchandize fitted to the taſte of the Indian nations [a].

[a] The two largeſt of theſe ſhips were of two hundred and thirty tons; the third, of one hundred und thirty; and the

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As the principal object of the voyage was to procure more particular information than they yet poſſeſſed concerning the country, and the different branches of trade which it afforded, Houtman was inſtructed, as much as poſſible, to avoid the ſettlements of the Portugueſe, and carefully to abſtain from all hoſtilities, when they were not neceſſary for his defence: nor was he inattentive to theſe inſtructions; he might, in his way to India, have ſeized a rich carac in which the archbiſhop of Goa was returning home; but though he went on board that veſſel, in order to procure intelligence, he ſuffered it to proceed on its voyage without moleſtation.

Operations in the Indies.

After viſiting the coaſts of Africa and Braſil, he doubled the Cape of Good Hope, and proceeded to the iſle of Madagaſcar, in which iſland and that of St. Mary he was detained for ſome time, in conſequence of a diſſenſion which happened between him and the other commanders, with regard to the route which it was proper to purſue. From St. Mary he at length proceeded to Sumatra, and from thence to Bantam, in the iſland of Java, where he began to purchaſe pepper and other ſpiceries. At firſt he was well received, and no averſion was diſcovered by the natives to enter into a commercial treaty with him; but the jealouſy of the Portugueſe merchants, a conſiderable number of whom reſided

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fourth, of fifty. The value of the whole equipment was eſtimated at four hundred thouſand florins.

at Bantam, being inſtantly alarmed, they reſolved to exert their influence to effectuate his ruin. For this end, carrying rich preſents in their hands, the only means of procuring acceſs to the princes of India, they repreſented the Dutch to the king or general of Bantam as pirates, and the common enemies of human kind, of whoſe rapine and violence his ſubjects would ſoon have fatal experience, if they did not embrace the preſent opportunity, when they were few in number, to cut them off, and to prevent their return. The governor, ignorant, and therefore credulous, was eaſily perſuaded of the truth of this repreſentation, and conſented to follow the counſel that was given him. But diſtruſting his ability to deſtroy them by open force, he reſolved to employ fraud and treachery. He pretended an inclination to have a commercial treaty, which had been propoſed by the Dutch, concluded, and deſired that Houtman and the other officers would come to his palace to adjuſt the terms. Suſpecting no deceit, Houtman, and one or two more, complied with his requeſt, and were immediately taken into cuſtody. The governor had abſurdly believed that all the officers would have accepted his invitation, and that the ſhips, having no perſons on board that were fit to command them, would then have become an eaſy prey. Being diſappointed in this expectation, he dreaded the conſequences of putting his priſoners to death, while their companions remained at liberty to take vengeance on him for his perfidy. Still, however,

BOOK III. he detained them in priſon, and refuſed to liſten to the repeated ſolicitations of their friends in their behalf; till the Dutch ſhips having begun to cannonade the town, laid part of it in ruins, he at length reſtored them to their liberty.

Soon after this, Houtman finding, on a review of his men, that by death, occaſioned chiefly by the climate, they had ſuffered a diminution of more than one third of their number, ordered one of his ſhips to be burnt, and ſet ſail for Europe with the reſt; carrying with him ſome of the natives of Madagaſcar and Sumatra, a Japaneſe, a Chineſe, and a pilot of the name of Abdul, diſtinguiſhed for his knowledge of the Indian ſeas. After a proſperous voyage of between five and ſix months, he arrived ſafe in the Texel in the beginning of Auguſt, 1597, having ſpent almoſt two years and a half in his expedition. He hardly brought home with him wealth ſufficient to defray the expenſe of his equipment; but both he and his companions were now able to give the moſt ſatisfactory information to their employers. The Indians too, whom he had induced to accompany him, were likely to be afterwards of the greateſt uſe; and the hopes which his countrymen conceived of greater ſucceſs in their future voyages, were raiſed to the greateſt height [s].

The Portugueſe, they knew, would give all the oppoſition in their power to every attempt which they

[s] Meteren, lib. xvii. & xviii. Antonii Thyſii Hiſtoria Navalis, Lugd. Batav. 4to. 1657, p. 117, &c.

they could make, either to eſtabliſh their trade, or to procure a ſettlement in India; but, from the accounts which they had received of the declining power of the Portugueſe, and of the manner in which the eaſtern nations were affected towards them, they hoped to be able, either to elude, or to counteract their malignity.

Portugueſe ſettlements in India.

A bolder and more enterpriſing ſpirit had never been diſplayed than the Portugueſe had manifeſted in their numerous conqueſts and diſcoveries; and no conqueſts, ſo extenſive and important, had been ever made with ſo ſmall a force, or by a nation poſſeſſed of ſuch ſcanty reſources. Animated at once by almoſt all the paſſions which moſt powerfully impel the human mind, by avarice, by bigotry, and by ambition, they had performed exploits, which ſeemed to be beyond the power of man, and were regarded by all thoſe barbarous nations, over whom they triumphed with ſo great facility, as more than men. They had made themſelves maſters of all the more important parts of the coaſt of Guinea. They had expelled the Arabians from that of Zanguebar, where they had formed ſettlements, which gave them the command of all the gold and ſilver mines in their country, from Sofala to Melinda. They had acquired a decided ſuperiority over the Egyptians; though aided by the Venetians, in the Red Sea; and had thus put an entire ſtop to that gainful trade which the Venetians had ſo long carried on with India, by the way of Suez and Alexandria. Their arms had been attended with

BOOK III. equal ſucceſs in the Perſian Gulf, and on the coaſt of Perſia, Malabar, and Malacca. They had acquired poſſeſſion of Ceylon, and the Molucca and Sunda iſlands; and, by their eſtabliſhment at Macao, they had ſecured to themſelves the trade of China and Japan.

Had the Portugueſe, at the preſent period, poſſeſſed the ſame vigor and intrepidity of which they had given ſuch conſpicuous proof on their firſt arrival in India, it is probable that any attempt to diſpoſſeſs them would have proved abortive: but they were no longer the ſame people as before. The firſt conquerors of India were all extinct; and their ſucceſſors, a few only excepted, were men defiled with the moſt odious vices, which rendered them a ſcourge to the people committed to their care. Removed to ſo great a diſtance from the ſeat of government, as gave them hopes of impunity for the moſt flagitious crimes; corrupted by proſperity, and enervated by the climate, while their religion, of the moſt illiberal kind, only ſerved to render them more ferocious, their conduct towards the natives was equally oppreſſive and perfidious. Attempts were made, by ſome virtuous viceroys, to reform the numberleſs abuſes which had been committed; but theſe great men, whoſe names are handed down to poſterity with juſt applauſe, were too few in number, and their government of too ſhort continuance, to produce any permanent effect. Corruption of every kind had ſtruck its roots too deep to be ſo eaſily extirpated; and the natives, who had been

long diſguſted, began to feel contempt, mixed with abhorrence of their oppreſſors, in the room of that reſpect and dread which they had formerly been accuſtomed to entertain. BOOK III.

After the ſubjection of Portugal to the crown of Spain, the affairs of the Portugueſe in India were more than ever neglected by the government at home, and diſorders of every kind were increaſed and multiplied. It was believed by ſome perſons, that Philip II. agreeably to the maxims of his malignant policy, was well pleaſed that the power of his new ſubjects ſhould ſuffer a diminution, as he would thereby find it eaſier to maintain his uſurped authority. But it is more reaſonable to ſuppoſe that his attention being wholly engroſſed by objects, which he judged to be of greater importance, he had not leiſure to attend to the affairs in India; and found it, therefore, in ſome meaſure neceſſary to leave the ſeveral governors at liberty to act without control. However this be, it is certain that they acted more like independent monarchs than the ſubjects of one common prince, to whom they were accountable for their conduct, and ſeemed to have forgotten the relation which they had bore, and the duties which they owed, both to their country and to one another; while each individual was ſolely attentive to his private intereſt, and ſeldom ſcrupled to promote it at the expenſe either of faith or of humanity. The natives had, on different occaſions, taken arms, and attempted to vindicate their rights againſt their lawleſs oppreſſors.

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Their efforts hitherto had not been vigorous, nor attended in the iſſue with ſucceſs; but they were become more than ever impatient under the injuries which they ſuffered, and longed for an opportunity to aſſert their liberty.

Such was the ſtate of the Portugueſe, and ſuch the diſpoſition of the natives with regard to them, when the Dutch made their firſt voyage to the Indies. They were thereby encouraged to perſiſt in their attempt to eſtabliſh trade in thoſe parts; and a ſpirit of enterpriſe and adventure was excited, which ſoon diffuſed itſelf over all the maritime provinces. The Spaniſh miniſters imprudently contributed to quicken this adventurous ſpirit, and to confirm the Dutch in the reſolution they had formed, by republiſhing, ſoon after the acceſſion of the preſent king, an edict, prohibiting the Spaniards and Portugueſe from all commercial intercourſe with them in the ſtricteſt manner, and under the ſevereſt penalties. They might have perceived the folly of this meaſure from the effects which their former reſtrictions on the Dutch trade had already produced; but they attended only to the immediate inconvenience which was occaſioned thereby to the enemy, without conſidering either the advantages which the Dutch might ultimately derive from their prohibition, or the prejudice which the Spaniards and Portugueſe were likely to ſuſtain.

By the advice of the count de Fuentes, a nobleman of great abilities, but naturally haughty and ſevere, and extremely ignorant of the

commercial intereſt of his country, the prohibitory edict was carried into the moſt rigorous execution. A ſtrict inquiry was made, at all the ſea-ports of Spain and Portugal, whether any of the Dutch had come thither under the colors of any neutral power; and as a conſiderable number were diſcovered to have been guilty of this temerity, their ſhips and goods were confiſcated, and they themſelves either caſt into priſon, or ſent to the gallies and condemned to work as ſlaves. BOOK III.

The ſtates general, in order to expreſs their contempt of this conduct of the Spaniſh court, publiſhed an edict, in which, beſides prohibiting all intercourſe between their ſubjects and thoſe of the king of Spain, they declared, that they would treat as enemies the ſubjects of all neutral powers, who ſhould carry commodities, of whatever kind, to the ports of Spain, Portugal, or Flanders.

To this manifeſto, copies of which were ſent to the courts of the ſeveral maritime powers, no anſwer was returned, nor any objection made, by the ſtates or princes who received it; and the French monarch gave, on this occaſion, a ſtriking proof of his favor for the Dutch, by publiſhing a declaration, that if any of his ſubjects ſhould, for the ſpace of ſix months, adventure to trade with Spain, they muſt do it at their private riſk, without the hopes of his protection.

While the Dutch in this manner ſhowed their contempt of the Spaniſh trade, and the prohibitory edict, being more than ever intent on proſecuting

BOOK III.

the trade which they had begun in India, ſeveral different aſſociations were formed by the merchants in Holland and Zealand, almoſt immediately after the return of their fleet under the command of Houtman; and before the end of the following year, more than eighty ſhips, completely equipped, and furniſhed with various articles of commerce, were ſent out; the greater part of them to the Eaſt-Indies, and ſome to the Weſt, and to the coaſts of Africa, while others were ordered to attempt the paſſage by the Straits of Magellan into the Pacific Ocean.

Dutch trade in both Indies and on the coaſt of Africa.

They were divided into ſmall fleets, conſiſting chiefly of four, ſix, or eight armed veſſels, from about one hundred and fifty to three or four hundred tons, ſome of which had regular troops on board, that were furniſhed by Prince Maurice and the ſtates. Their inſtructions were nearly the ſame as thoſe which had been given to the commanders employed in the firſt expedition, to avoid the ſettlements of the Portugueſe and, as much as poſſible, to abſtain from hoſtilities. But it was impoſſible for them ſtrictly to comply with theſe inſtructions. Their enemies were ſpread almoſt every where over the coaſts which they viſited; and being equally animated by jealouſy, and by reſentment, were reſolved to give them all the oppoſition, and to do them all the miſchief in their power. They had labored to inſpire the natives with the ſame malignity; and on the minds of ſome of them their miſrepreſentations had produced the deſired effect. It was not only the dangers,

therefore, of voyages, ſo long and difficult, through climates the moſt adverſe to the human conſtitution, which the Dutch encountered in the proſecution of their deſign; but, after their arrival on thoſe coaſts, where the trade, which they deſired to eſtabliſh, muſt be carried on, they found it neceſſary to fight, and to negociate by turns. They had the prejudices of the natives to overcome; and they were obliged to ſtand perpetually on their guard againſt the machinations of the Portugueſe, who practiſed every method which they could deviſe to accompliſh their deſtruction, whether by ſecret fraud, or open force and violence.

The Portugueſe had no ſuch formidable oppoſition to encounter, when they firſt arrived in India. The ſhips of their enemies were few in number, and much inferior to their's, both in reſpect of ſtrength and ſize; and the towns which they attacked were weakly fortified, and unſkilfully defended by a daſtardly, effeminate, and feeble race of men. Whereas the Dutch encountered fleets of ſhips of the ſame conſtruction as their own, and were obliged to contend with an enemy, who, beſides being accuſtomed to the climate, and familiarly acquainted with the Indian ſeas, were not leſs diſtinguiſhed than themſelves for their naval and military ſkill.

But their conduct was wiſely adapted to their circumſtances, being equally prudent whether it reſpected the natives or the Portugueſe. They ſoon convinced the former of the falſhood of

BOOK III.

thoſe injurious aſperſions which the latter had caſt upon their character; and by the moderation, juſtice, and humanity, which they diſplayed in all their dealings, proved that, in purity of manners, they were much ſuperior to their accuſers. They were ſoon allowed to trade in many places, from whence the Portugueſe had labored to exclude them; and as with indefatigable induſtry they improved to the utmoſt every advantage which they enjoyed, they came, ere long, to procure admiſſion to ſeveral of the moſt important branches of commerce.

As the extenſion of their trade, and not conqueſt, was the great object which they purſued, they avoided all unneceſſary rencounters with the Portugueſe; but they were generally well prepared to defend themſelves when attacked, gave many proofs of the moſt determined bravery, and ſometimes triumphed over the ſuperior force and numbers of the enemy. Still, however, they kept the great end of their voyages perpetually in view. The ſame time which they found it neceſſary to ſpend in repairing the damages ſuſtained in battle, was likewiſe employed in trading with the natives; and as ſoon as their cargoes were complete, and their damages repaired, they returned to Holland: thus enriching their employers, and enabling them not only to defray the expenſe of their equipment, but to exert themſelves with redoubled vigor in the proſecution of their deſigns.

Although ſome of the numberleſs voyages which they had undertaken, had, through

miſconduct or croſs accidents, proved unfortunate, they had been in general ſufficiently ſucceſsful to render it their intereſt to perſevere. The ſocieties, however, of merchants, by whom the Indian trade had been carried on, were not ſatisfied with the profits which it afforded. They complained that too great a number of adventurers had engaged in it; and that in conſequence thereof, as they muſt pay much higher prices for Indian goods than had been formerly given by the Portugueſe, ſo they found it neceſſary to ſell them much cheaper; and would either be ruined by their efforts to eſtabliſh this new branch of commerce, or obliged to abandon it altogether.

This evil, which could hardly have been apprehended in the beginning of a trade, attended with ſo great expenſe and danger, would probably have ſoon been remedied by a diminution of the number of competitors, the natural conſequence of ſmall profits in any branch of commerce; and if the evil complained of, had been the only reaſon for the interpoſition of the ſtates, it may be queſtioned whether they ought to have interpoſed. But, beſides this, there was another reaſon of greater weight. The Portugueſe in India, being under the direction of their governors or viceroys, could more eaſily act in concert, than the great number of independent Dutch ſocieties: and the ſmall fleets or ſingle ſhips, belonging to theſe ſocieties, were expoſed to the danger of being ſeparately attacked and deſtroyed one after another, by an enemy with whom if they too

BOOK III. 1602. Dutch East-India Company.

could act in concert, they might be able to contend. Determined by these considerations, the states general in the year 1602, united the several societies of traders into one body, under the name of the East-India company; on which, besides the exclusive privilege of trading beyond the Cape of Good Hope on the one hand, and the Straits of Magellan on the other; they conferred the power of administering justice, of building forts, of appointing governors and garrisons, of raising troops, and of making peace and war with the Indian princes. A fund, amounting to more than six millions of florins, was immediately subscribed for by the merchants in the principal maritime towns, and managers were appointed, under whose direction all the trade to India was henceforth to be carried on. This company being the first regular commercial society, of which we read in history, has served in some measure as a model to all the trading companies that have been created in modern times. It consisted chiefly of those who had been engaged as private adventurers in the Indian trade; and by these men, who had profited from their former errors, and were well acquainted with that trade in all its branches, the affairs of the company were, from the beginning, conducted with consummate skill; nor was their good fortune inferior to the prudence which they displayed. Having by their justice and moderation, extinguished those groundless prejudices against their national character, which the Portuguese had labored to instil into the minds of the

Indian princes, they were almoſt every where received with favor, and in ſeveral places obtained permiſſion to eſtabliſh factories, and to build forts for the protection of their trade. They were requeſted by ſome of theſe princes, to lend their aſſiſtance in expelling the Portugueſe, and in their rencounters with that nation they generally came off victorious. They made innumerable captures of their richeſt ſhips. Their trade was every year more widely extended, and the profits ariſing from it, were greater than they had been accuſtomed to derive from any former branch of commerce. The principal cauſes of their weakneſs have been already explained, and to theſe muſt be added this conſideration, that, on the other hand, the trade and power of the Portugueſe were quickly haſtening to decay. While their rivals were every ſeaſon receiving reinforcements both of ſhips and troops, they were left unſupported by their friends in Europe, to ſtruggle with the difficulties which ſurrounded them. The ſtrength of Portugal had long been exhauſted by the too numerous emigration of its inhabitants, and the Spaniſh miniſters, beſides that their attention was entirely occupied by other objects, found more than ſufficient employment at home for all the force and treaſure which they poſſeſſed.

It was this reaſon, and not, as has been ſuppoſed, the deſire of having Portugal reduced to a ſtate of weakneſs, and thereby rendered more tame and obſequious, that prevented the Court

BOOK III. 1602.

of Spain from affording that aſſiſtance to the Portugueſe in India, which their exigencies ſo much required at the preſent period. They were almoſt equally inattentive, or equally unable to afford ſupport to the Spaniſh traders and coloniſts as to the Portugueſe. Many captures were made of their ſhips loaded with the treaſures of America and the Indies. Their fleets were ſometimes blocked up in their harbours, till the ſeaſon fit for entering on their voyages had elapſed; and their ſettlements on the coaſts were often plundered, ſometimes, by the Dutch, and ſometimes by the Engliſh, with impunity.

Nor was it only in the Indies, and on the coaſts of America, that the ſubjects of the Spaniſh monarchy were expoſed to the depredations of their enemies. While the war with England ſubſiſted, the coaſts of Spain itſelf had been inſulted both by the Dutch and Engliſh, and many ſhips in the harbours either taken or deſtroyed. After the eſtabliſhment of peace with France and England, the Spaniſh miniſters had conceived the hopes of finding it eaſy, not only to reſiſt the moſt vigorous efforts of the Dutch, but ere long, to reduce them to obedience. But although they had now only a ſingle enemy to contend with, whom they had long been accuſtomed to deſpiſe, that enemy, through the great increaſe of their trade and navigation, were become more powerful, while they themſelves, from the decay of their trade and other cauſes, were much weaker than before. For ſome time paſt, therefore, the Spaniards

had found it equally difficult to defend themſelves againſt the Dutch alone, as they had done formerly againſt the Dutch, and Engliſh, and French united. BOOK III. 1607.

Philip's miniſters were not ignorant of the ſources from whence the Dutch had received ſo great an acceſſion of wealth and power; and of one of theſe we have ſeen, they had in vain endeavoured to deprive them, by the prohibition of their trade with Spain and Portugal. Another not leſs copious they knew, was their cod and herring fiſhery, on the coaſt of England and the Netherlands; and to deprive them of this, and at the ſame time, to intercept their navigation in the narrow ſeas, between the ſouthern and northern ſtates of Europe, had for ſome years been a principal object of their attention. It was with this view that all thoſe gallies had been equipped, which, as formerly related, had been intruſted to the command of Frederic de Spinola; and with the ſame view there had been fitted out at Nieuport and Dunkirk a great number of armed veſſels, from which the Dutch ſuffered conſiderable moleſtation in their coaſting trade and fiſhery. But all Spinola's gallies had either been deſtroyed or had fallen into the hands of the Dutch, when they got poſſeſſion of Sluys; and the States having provided ſome ſhips of war on purpoſe, had, on ſome occaſions, taken ſignal vengeance on the privateers of Nieuport and Dunkirk, the crews of which they always treated as pirates, and either hanged or drowned. Their fleets now rode triumphant

The Spaniards attempt to deſtroy the Dutch commerce.

BOOK III. 1607.

from the Baltic to the ſtraits of Gibraltar and their European as well as their African and Indian trade was at this time in a much more flouriſhing condition than ever *.

The courts of Spain and Bruſſels had long beheld this ſuperiority of the naval power of the Dutch, with much anxiety. They dreaded from it the utter extinction of their commerce; and perceived, that in order to prevent this effect, it would, ere long, be neceſſary to put a period to the war. Nor did peace appear to be leſs neceſſary, when they conſidered what had hitherto been the iſſue of their military operations at land, than when they reflected on the numberleſs loſſes which they had ſuſtained at ſea. Their moſt ſtrenuous endeavours to reduce the revolted provinces to obedience had ſerved only to render the people more expert, and more obſtinate in their defence: to ſtrengthen the bond of their internal union; and to confirm the neighbouring powers in their reſolution of affording them aſſiſtance and ſupport. The maritime provinces almoſt ſurrounded by the ſea, and every where interſected by the rivers and canals, had hitherto been found impregnable; and the ſouthern frontier had lately been ſtrengthened by the acquiſition of ſome

Cauſes which induced the Spaniſh miniſters to wiſh for peace.

* Recueil de Voyages, &c. Van Meteren paſſim; — Grotius. De Wit's Maxims. — Thyſii Hiſt. Navalis, paſſim. Huet on the Dutch Commerce. Janizon, Etat préſent des Prov. Un. Recueil des voyages qui ont ſervi à l'Etabliſſement & aux Progrès de la Compagnie des Indes Orientales formée dans les Provinces Unies des Païs-Bas, à Rouen, 1725.

of the ſtrongeſt places in Flanders and Brabant, Sluys and Breda. 1607.

The Marquis of Spinola had wiſely directed his attack againſt the confederates in that quarter, where they were the worſt prepared for reſiſtance. The army which he commanded, had been the moſt numerous which could poſſible be collected.

Through the united exertions which had been made by the archdukes, the court of Spain, and by the marquis himſelf, who had mortgaged his ample fortune in order to procure money, his troops having regularly received their pay, had been kept under the ſtricteſt diſcipline. All his operations had been conducted with conſummate ſkill; and nothing had been omitted on his part which might have enſured ſucceſs; yet he had been utterly unable to ſurmount the difficulties which he encountered. Inſtead of penetrating into the interior provinces, he had been obliged to reſt ſatisfied with conqueſts, from whence no ſolid advantage could be derived. From the fatigues which they had undergone, and the moiſture of the climate, the army had lately ſuffered conſiderable diminution. Thoſe funds from whence the marquis had defrayed the expenſes of the laſt campaign, had for ſeveral months been almoſt entirely exhauſted; and conſiderable arrears being now reſting to the ſoldiers, the ſame mutinous ſpirit by which they had formerly been actuated, had again begun to appear. A part of them as above-mentioned, had already abandoned their

BOOK III. 1697.

officers; and having chosen others from among themselves, had begun to indulge themselves in every species of licentiousness. To these disorders no adequate remedy could possibly be applied during the continuance of the war. All the money which could be raised in the Netherlands, or furnished by the court of Spain, would be hardly sufficient to defray the expense of the new levies which must be made before the next campaign. And in the mean time the licentious spirit of the mutineers must diffuse itself throughout the army; and both the army itself and the provinces, be thereby exposed an easy prey to a watchful enemy; who, being possessed of more certain resources for carrying on the war, had been always ready to avail themselves of every advantage that was afforded them [5].

Besides these considerations there were some others, which with Philip and his ministers, were supposed to have had still greater weight. A report at that time prevailed, that the Dutch, having entered into a correspondence with the Moors on the coast of Barbary, had agreed to furnish them with ships to transport an army into Spain. And another report was likewise propagated, that the French monarch having formed the design of annexing the Netherlands to France, was now prepared and resolved to carry it into execution. It does not appear, that there was any just foundation for either of these reports. But they seem to have made a strong impression on the minds of the

[5] Grotius lib. xv. Bentiv. part. xiii. lib. viii.

the Spaniſh miniſters; who, dreading that either an interruption of that domeſtic tranquillity which Spain had ſo long enjoyed, or the entire loſs of the Netherlands, muſt be the conſequence of the continuance of the war, were now more deſirous than ever to have it brought to a concluſion[*].

The Archduke Albert ſolicitous for peace, and why.

The archduke was ſtill more ſolicitous for peace than the Spaniſh miniſters. From the commencement of his ſovereignty he had lived in perpetual diſquietude. He had fully experienced the vanity of his hopes of ſucceſs from the ſupport of Spain, which he knew to be too much exhauſted, and removed at too great a diſtance from the ſcene of action, to afford him the aſſiſtance that was neceſſary. He had no heirs of his own body to whom he could tranſmit his dominions. And both he and the infanta, beſides being ſenſibly affected by the calamities in which their ſubjects were involved, were deſirous to paſs the remainder of their days in peace.

Peace recommended by Spinola.

They were confirmed in their reſolution by the marquis of Spinola, who did not heſitate in adviſing peace, notwithſtanding the renown which he had acquired from his conduct of the war. But his ambition being tempered with prudence and moderation, he wiſely judged it better to reſt ſatisfied with the glory which he had already gained, than to run the riſk of expoſing himſelf to reproach, by attempting what he knew to be impoſſible. He was better acquainted than any other perſon with the difficulties to be encountered

[*] Memorie recondite, Vol. i. p. 418.

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in the proſecution of the war, and therefore exerted all his influence to perſuade the archduke, and the Spaniſh miniſters, of the folly of perſiſting in their attempt. The time might come, he repreſented, when the confederates divided among themſelves, and no longer ſupported by ſo powerful an ally as the king of France, might be induced or compelled to return to their allegiance; but while, through their dread of Spain, their internal union was preſerved inviolate, and a prince ſo near them, poſſeſſed of ſuch inexhauſtible reſources, ever ready to lend them his aſſiſtance; as it was abſurd to expect to bring the war to the deſired iſſue, ſo the conſequences of perſiſting in it muſt prove equally ruinous to the dominions of the archdukes, and to the Spaniſh monarchy [7].

Albert offers peace to the confederacy.

Albert, who entertained the moſt profound reſpect for Spinola's judgment, being now more firmly than ever perſuaded, that peace was neceſſary, reſolved, whatever conſtruction might be put upon his conduct, to make the confederates an offer of it without delay. Having previouſly ſounded their inclinations, by two perſons of the names of Wittenhorſt and Gevart, he ſome time after ſent theſe men back to Holland, with inſtructions ſigned by himſelf and the infanta [8].

Prince Maurice oppoſes an overture for peace.

Theſe inſtructions they firſt communicated privately to ſeveral individuals, and afterwards requeſted to be permitted to lay them before the aſſembly of the ſtates. The members were of

[7] Bentivoglio, Grotius, Baudius, &c.

[8] Dated January 3, 1607.

different opinions with regard to the expediency of granting them this permiſſion: and prince Maurice endeavoured to diſſuade the ſtates from granting it, by expreſſing his apprehenſions that ſome inſidious deſign was covered under the preſent propoſal, and that as no treaty with Spain, or with the archdukes, while they were ſo entirely governed in all their conduct by the court of Spain, could be productive of any good effect, ſo the granting of a public audience to the commiſſioners would only ſerve to inſpire the people with fallacious hopes of peace, and ſo damp their zeal in the proſecution of the war.

But Maurice yielded *, on this occaſion, to the perſuaſions of the celebrated John Olden Barnevelt, penſioner of Holland; one of the greateſt ſtateſmen of the age, and equally eminent for his public ſpirit as his political abilities and integrity. By this venerable patriot it was urged, that while the king of Great Britain ſtood an idle ſpectator of the war, and the French monarch ſeemed to have ſome great object in view, which he deemed of more importance than the ſupport of the Dutch republic, both theſe princes were well pleaſed to obſerve the Spaniards exhauſt their ſtrength by an obſtinate perſeverance in the war with the Netherlands; and would probably be more liberal in their offers of aſſiſtance to the ſtates than they had hitherto been if there were a negociation begun for the eſtabliſhment of peace. A great majority of the

Peace ſtrenuously recommended by Barnevelt.

* It does not appear to have been candor or conviction. Vide Jeannin tom. iii. 106, 107.

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assembly, with Maurice himself, came readily into this opinion, and the commissioners were readily admitted to an audience. They represented that the archdukes, being desirous to put an end to the calamities of war, were ready to enter into treaty with them, either for establishing a perpetual peace, or a long truce, and would consent to such reasonable terms as they could not suppose would be rejected by the United Provinces. That the states could not be ignorant of the equity of the pretensions of the archdukes; that in all their conduct they had shown how averse they were to every severe and arbitrary measure in the government of their subjects; that they would claim nothing to which they had not the most unquestionable title; and that the states might assuredly depend on receiving from them every sort of satisfaction and security they could require for the full enjoyment of their rights and privileges.

To this proposal the states, after an interval of a few days, replied, that no regard could be paid to what the commissioners had delivered in the assembly, since the archdukes, it appeared, still persisted in supposing themselves possessed of a right to the sovereignty of the United Provinces. That in the solemn deed, entitled the Union of Utrecht, the states having, on the justest grounds, renounced the authority of the king of Spain, had asserted their liberty and independence; that this deed had been recognised by many of the European states and princes; that they had long maintained their liberty by force of arms; and were still

determined to maintain it to the laſt extremity; and to reject every propoſal for treating with the archduke or the king of Spain, either for a truce or a perpetual peace, unleſs they were acknowledged as a free ſtate, over which theſe princes could pretend to no authority.

The United States inſiſt on a recognition of their freedom.

With this anſwer the commiſſioners returned to Bruſſels, from whence they wrote a letter to the ſtates, acquainting them that, by the propoſal which had been made, the archduke did not mean to claim any authority over them, or to introduce any change into their form of government; but, leaving all their laws and inſtitutions on their preſent footing, to put a period to the miſeries attendant upon war, by a peace or truce; and, ſoon afterwards, another commiſſioner was ſent into Holland, in whom it ſhould ſeem, Albert could put greater confidence than in his firſt commiſſioners. This perſon was Ney, or Neyen, a native of Antwerp, who had been educated in the Proteſtant religion, but having afterwards embraced the Popiſh faith, had reſided for ſeveral years in Spain, and was at this time general of the order of Franciſcans; a man of conſiderable learning, and of great integrity and abilities, and highly diſtinguiſhed for his eloquence and addreſs. Having been upwards of twenty years of age before he left the Netherlands, he retained a warm affection for his native country; he was at the ſame time animated with zeal to ſignalize himſelf in the ſervice of the archdukes and the court of Spain, and undertook the taſk impoſed upon him with great alacrity.

BOOK III. 1607.

He had no ſooner, after his arrival in Holland had an interview with ſome of the principal perſons in the republic than he diſcovered that it would be vain to hope for ſucceſs in the execution of his embaſſy, unleſs the ſtates were in the treaty propoſed to be acknowledged free and independent, and for this reaſon he immediately returned to Bruſſels, in order to convince the archdukes of the neceſſity of making this conceſſion.

Theſe princes, conformably to the tenor of the abovementioned letter, written by Wittenhorſt and Gevart, at their deſire, were willing to agree that no mention ſhould be made in the treaty of their right of ſovereignty, but expreſsly to diſclaim this right, and formally to acknowledge the ſovereignty of the ſtates, they conſidered as equally dangerous and diſhonorable. It would be in words to acknowledge what in their hearts they muſt diſavow; it would be to give their ſanction to rebellion, and thereby to afford encouragement to their ſubjects to imitate the example of the revolted provinces.

Being conſcious, however, from the ſtate of their finances, that they were utterly unable to carry on the war, they reſolved, in conformity to the advice of their counſellors, to yield at leaſt ſo far as to empower their commiſſioners to declare, that they were willing to treat with the confederates as with a free people, over whom they pretended to no authority: a form of expreſſion which might be adopted they thought

conſiſtently with their honor, as it only denoted a matter of fact, but did not import either a renunciation of their own right to the ſovereignty, or an acknowledgment of a right inherent in the ſtates to independence.

A letter from the archdukes to the United States.

In the hopes however that it might ſatisfy the confederates, Ney was immediately ſent back to the Hague with a letter addreſſed to the ſtates, and ſigned both by Albert and Iſabella, of which the following were the principal contents: that being extremely ſolicitous to put a ſtop to the effuſion of human blood, they were ready to treat with the United States as with a free people, from whom they claimed no ſubmiſſion or obedience: that they were willing to treat either for the purpoſe of eſtabliſhing a perpetual peace, or a long truce, of twelve, fifteen, or twenty years, during the continuance of which the contending parties ſhould retain what they at preſent poſſeſſed; unleſs it ſhould be mutually agreed, for the common intereſt of both, to make an exchange of certain towns and territories: that, in order to prevent all ſuſpicion of fraud or ſiniſter intention, ambaſſadors, natives of the Netherlands, ſhould be nominated by the archdukes, and an equal number named by the United States: that the ſtates ſhould have their choice of the time and place of meeting; and that while the negociation was carrying on, there ſhould be an entire ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities for eight months, both by ſea and land.

From the ſequel it will appear that all the members of the ſtates were not equally diſpoſed to

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agree to theſe propoſals: but by a great majority they were thought a ſufficient ground for a negociation or treaty.

No objection was made to the words in which the declaration of the independence of the republic was expreſſed. The ſtates, conſcious of the ſuperiority of their naval force, refuſed to conſent to the ceſſation of hoſtilities at ſea; but they agreed that no hoſtile enterpriſe ſhould be undertaken againſt any of the towns or provinces of the Netherlands, and no new forts erected. It was declared that the truce of eight months ſhould commence on the fourth of May: and the archdukes engaged to procure a ratification of the preſent convention, including the declaratory clauſe, within three months, from the king of Spain [10].

This agreement having been firſt made with Ney, and a few days after confirmed in proper form by Albert and Iſabella, was immediately communicated by the ſtates general to the particular ſtates, and a day of thankſgiving to Heaven for the proſpect of peace appointed to be obſerved throughout the provinces.

The proſpect of peace matter of joy to the people of the United Provinces.

The people in general ſincerely rejoiced on this occaſion, and were greatly elated when they reflected on the proof which the propoſal and conceſſion of the archdukes afforded of the difficulties to which they were reduced.

[10] Grotius, lib. xvi. Baudius, lib. i. Bentivoglio, lib. viii. and Meteren, lib. xxviii.

The war had now ſubſiſted for almoſt forty years; and though, during a part of that time, only ſome of them had been much expoſed to the calamities which are commonly attendant upon war, in the immediate ſcenes of action, yet moſt of them had experienced theſe calamities in ſome degree. They had, on numberleſs occaſions, been diſquieted with the moſt dreadful apprehenſions; and they had long groaned under the weight of thoſe enormous taxes, which the ſupporting of ſo many fleets and armies made it neceſſary to impoſe.

There was a conſiderable proportion however of the people whoſe intereſt and proſperity depended on the continuance of the war, and particularly thoſe who held employments, which muſt either be ſuppreſſed, or rendered much leſs lucrative in the time of peace. By ſuch perſons peace was no leſs dreaded than it was deſired by the generality of their countrymen, and the archdukes propoſals were repreſented as deceitful and inſidious. Unhappily many of the clergy joined in repreſenting them in this light; and, by their inflammatory harangues from the pulpit, contributed to increaſe the difficulties which the ſtates afterwards encountered in carrying on the treaty.

A party in the United States repreſent the archdukes propoſals as inſidious.

This negociation was a matter of great ſurpriſe to the neighbouring ſtates and princes. They could not ſuppoſe that the archdukes would have ventured to make ſuch humiliating conceſſions, if they had not beforehand obtained the conſent of the court of Spain; and that court, they thought,

The negociation for peace matter of ſurpriſe to neighbouring ſtates and princes.

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would never have conſented to it, but in order to procure by artifice what they had been unable to accompliſh by force of arms. They were not wholly unacquainted with the diſorder that had taken place in the Spaniſh finances; but they could hardly believe that a prince poſſeſſed of ſuch copious reſources as thoſe of Philip, could be reduced ſo low as to find it neceſſary to treat with his rebellious ſubjects on equal terms. They were therefore ſuſpicious that the Spaniſh miniſters had ſecretly formed ſome deſign, by which their intereſt or the intereſt of Europe might be affected; and they were confirmed in their ſuſpicion, by reflecting on the ſecrecy with which the negociation had been carried on. At Bruſſels it had been communicated only to a very ſmall number of the archdukes miniſters. At the Hague, the ſtates general alone had been privy to it; and at both theſe places it had been carefully concealed from all the foreign reſidents, till it was made known by the ſtates general to the particular ſtates, when they appointed the day of public thankſgiving. Theſe precautions gave a myſterious appearance to the conduct of both parties; yet they had probably been uſed with no other view, but either to avoid the perplexity ariſing from too great a multitude of counſellors, or to prevent oppoſition to the treaty in its infancy, and before the reſolution was fully formed, whether it ſhould be rejected or embraced.

Likewiſe an object of jealouſy.

There were no princes ſo well entitled to be conſulted on this occaſion by the ſtates as the

kings of Great Britain and France, to whom the provinces had been ſo much indebted for their aſſiſtance in carrying on the war. The former of theſe princes, from the narrowneſs of his revenue, joined to his bad economy in the adminiſtration of it, had never been able to furniſh them with pecuniary ſupplies: but notwithſtanding the difficulties in which he was involved, he had conſented that the one half of the money with which the French king ſupplied them, ſhould be deducted from the debt which that prince owed to the crown of England, and had at all times afforded encouragement to their levies of troops in Britain; while he had ſecretly diſcountenanced thoſe which, in conſequence of the permiſſion granted in the treaty of peace above-mentioned, were attempted by the archduke or the king of Spain.

The obligations, however, of the ſtates were much greater to the French than to the Britiſh monarch; for Henry was not only more able, but more diſpoſed to contribute to their ſupport. Before the peace of Vervins, he had always conſidered their cauſe and intereſt as his own; and after that peace, had given them every proof of friendſhip that was conſiſtent with fidelity to thoſe engagements which he had come under to the king of Spain. His proteſtant ſubjects had been freely admitted to enter into their ſervice, and had, every campaign, formed a conſiderable proportion of their troops. When, in order to procure tranquillity to France, he found it neceſſary

Conduct of the French king towards the United States, after the peace of Vervins.

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to engage that he would not any longer afford aſſiſtance to the ſtates, he had ſolemnly declared to the Spaniſh ambaſſadors, that he did not thereby mean to preclude himſelf from repaying thoſe ſums to the ſtates, which they had lent him in the time of his diſtreſs. And, for ſome years, the repaying of theſe ſums [11] was the only aſſiſtance in money which he afforded them. But after diſcovering that, in violation of the peace of Vervins, the court of Spain had formed intrigues with the Mareſchal Biron, and his other diſſatisfied ſubjects, the object of which was the ſubverſion of his government, thinking himſelf then at liberty to retaliate upon them for ſo great an injury, he had been more open and liberal than formerly in lending his aſſiſtance to the United Provinces. He ſpared no pains to perſuade the king of England to enter into an alliance with him for their ſupport; and had, yearly, advanced them ſums of money for the payment of their forces.

It would be abſurd to ſuppoſe, that in the kindneſs which Henry had manifeſted to the ſtates, his conduct had entirely proceeded from motives of friendſhip and generoſity.

It can ſeldom happen that a prince, in his conduct towards foreign ſtates, could be juſtified for acting under the influence of ſuch motives. A regard to the intereſt of his ſubjects, was, as it ought to have been, the ruling principle of Henry's

[11] The amount of theſe ſums was ſeven millions three hundred and ſeventy-eight thouſand and eight hundred livres. Sully, liv. xxi.

conduct; and his liberality towards the United Provinces proceeded from his conviction, that on their proſperity, in ſome meaſure, depended the peace and tranquillity of his own dominions. 1607.

Having formerly ſuffered ſo much from the arms, and afterwards from the intrigues of the Spaniards, he was ſtill diſquieted with apprehenſions of the danger to which he was expoſed from their turbulent ambition. He had long beheld with pleaſure their fruitleſs conteſt in the Netherlands, which had contributed ſo much to exhauſt their ſtrength. But having, in concert with ſome of his wiſeſt miniſters, formed a plan for the humiliation both of the German and Spaniſh branches of the Auſtrian family, which required leiſure before he could bring it to maturity [12], he was not diſpleaſed to hear that the ſtates had agreed to the archdukes propoſals for entering into a treaty; but not having been previouſly conſulted upon the ſubject, and the archdukes having made greater conceſſions than he expected, he dreaded that the court of Spain muſt have formed ſome deep inſidious deſign, either againſt the ſtates themſelves or the princes in alliance with them; and therefore he reſolved to beſtow all that attention upon the preſent negociation in the Netherlands, which a tranſaction of the higheſt conſequence deſerved.

His affairs in that country had hitherto been managed with great prudence by his reſident, monſieur de Burerwall; but, being determined, if

[12] Sully's Memoirs, p. 324, &c.

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1607. The president Jeannin, sent ambaſſador to the Hague from France.

poſſible, to acquire a direction of the preſent negociation, and vigilantly to watch over the conduct of the contracting powers, he ſent to the Hague, in quality of ambaſſador extraordinary, the preſident Jeannin, a miniſter of great experience, who is equally celebrated in the annals of Henry's reign, and in thoſe of his ſucceſſor, for his fidelity, his eloquence, and his political abilities.

This able negociator had no ſooner arrived than he required admiſſion into the aſſembly of the ſtates; where, after reminding them of the zeal with which his maſter had for ſo many years exerted himſelf in their behalf, he inveighed, with much ſeverity, againſt thoſe who had falſely accuſed the king of aiming at the ſovereignty of the Provinces; and then gently reproaching the ſtates with giving a color to this aſperſion, by entering into a treaty with the enemy, without his knowledge or conſent. But as no prince, he added, could more eaſily forgive his enemies; ſo there was none more ready to overlook the omiſſions of his friends: and, to prove the ſincerity of his friendſhip for the ſtates, the king had now ſent him in the character of ambaſſador, with powers to aſſure them of the continuance of his aſſiſtance, in caſe a continuance of the war ſhould be found expedient; or if they choſe to put a period to it, to aſſiſt them in eſtabliſhing an honorable and laſting peace. He concluded with requeſting that a committee of the ſtates might be appointed, to whom he might more particularly communicate his inſtructions, and

with whom he might occaſionally deliberate concerning the meaſures which it might be proper to purſue.

The ſtates readily complied with this requeſt, and expreſſed how ſincerely they rejoiced to find ſo great a king diſpoſed to take ſo warm an intereſt in their affairs.

This interpoſition of Henry gave equal uneaſineſs to the court of Spain, as it afforded joy to the ſtates. They knew that all his influence would be employed, either to prevent an accommodation, or to render it derogatory to the honor and intereſt of Spain. And they were well acquainted with the ſuperior talents of Jeannin, who, while he would keep the ſtates perpetually on their guard, would encourage them to perſiſt in their moſt exorbitant demands.

The courts of Spain and Bruſſels had reaſon likewiſe to look for oppoſition from the Britiſh, as well as from the French monarch. For James had no ground, they thought to entertain any jealouſy of the Dutch; as their dependence on him for their Engliſh and Scotch troops, which formed ſo great a proportion of their army, his poſſeſſion of the cautionary towns, which were ſo many keys of the Netherlands, the ſituation of his dominions, and the coincidence between his ſubjects and thoſe of the ſtates in religious opinions, ſeemed to render him ſecure of their alliance. It could not therefore but be agreeable, they imagined, to this prince, to contribute his endeavours, in the treaty of peace, to promote the intereſt of

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the ſtates at the expenſe of Spain. They ſuppoſed it, however, to be more likely that he might exert his influence to render this treaty abortive, from an apprehenſion which they had given him ground to entertain, that if Spain were at peace with the United Provinces, ſhe might employ her leiſure in fomenting the diſcontents of his popiſh ſubjects in Ireland.

The king of England concurs with the French monarch in promoting peace.

But they afterwards found that they had erred in this conjecture. Indolence, and an averſion to war, were predominant principles in the character of James; and theſe on this occaſion determined him, in oppoſition to his political intereſt, to concur with the French monarch, in promoting the eſtabliſhment of peace; beſides that, he could not decently have attempted to diſſuade the Dutch from liſtening to the propoſals which had been made to them, without being more liberal than the narrow ſtate of his finances would permit, in contributing to their aſſiſtance. James had been no leſs alarmed than Henry, by the intelligence which he received of the negociation between the ſtates and the archdukes; and had expreſſed to Caron, the Dutch reſident at London, his ſurpriſe at the ſecrecy with which it had been carried on. But the ſtates, ſolicitous to preſerve his friendſhip, having ſent two of their number to explain to him the motives of their conduct, he readily admitted of their apology, and ſoon after ſent ſir Ralph Winwood and ſir Richard Spencer, in the character of ambaſſadors, to aſſiſt them in bringing the treaty to the deſired concluſion.

About

About the ſame time ambaſſadors arrived in Holland from the king of Denmarc, the elector Palatine, the elector of Brandenburgh, the landgrave of Heſſe, and ſeveral other proteſtant princes of Germany; who, having no intereſt of their own to adjuſt or ſecure, could have no other motive in ſending them, but to afford to the ſtates, on this important occaſion, a proof of the concern which they took in their proſperity [11].

In the mean time an event happened, which, by elevating the hopes of one of the contending parties, while it depreſſed thoſe of the other, contributed to haſten the treaty to a concluſion. The ſtates having, early in the ſpring of this year, equipped a fleet of twenty-ſix ſhips of war, beſides tranſports with ſtores and proviſions, they put it under the command of Heemſkirk, one of the braveſt officers, and moſt ſkilful navigators in the Netherlands, with inſtructions to ſail for the weſtern coaſts of Spain and Portugal, and by watching the motions of the enemy, to provide for the ſafe arrival of the Eaſt-India fleet. The preſervation of this fleet, which there was ground to believe the Spaniards were prepared to intercept, the ſtates informed him was to be conſidered as a principal object of his expedition; but they required beſides, that he ſhould give all poſſible annoyance to the enemy, and remember, that the archdukes having made propoſals for a treaty of peace, the iſſue of this treaty, and conſequently

Operations of the Dutch at ſea, under admiral Heemskirk.

[11] Baudius, lib. i. Bentivoglio, Grotius, and Winwood, vol. ii.

BOOK III. 1607. the future proſperity of the United Provinces, would greatly depend on the ſucceſs with which his arms in the preſent enterpriſe ſhould be attended.

Heemſkirk, flattered with the truſt repoſed in him at ſo critical a juncture, aſſured the ſtates, when he received his inſtructions, that whether he ſhould die or ſurvive, they ſhould not have reaſon to repent of the honor they had conferred on him; and, in order to expreſs his confidence of ſucceſs, he declared that he would not accept of any reward or pay, unleſs the booty ſhould amount to more than five hundred thouſand florins; in which caſe he would accept only of his ſhare of what ſhould remain after that ſum was deducted. He was already, ſays Grotius, poſſeſſed of a greater fortune than his manner of life required; and, being animated more by the love of glory than of riches, under the ſimple ſhow and moderate deportment of a citizen, he concealed all the qualities of a hero.

Having left the Texel on the 25th of March, he firſt directed his courſe towards Liſbon; but April 10. being informed on his arrival in the mouth of the Tagus, by ſome merchants whom he had ſent before him, under neutral colors, to procure intelligence, that the firſt diviſion of the Portugueſe and Spaniſh fleet intended for the Indies and America, had already ſailed, and that the ſhips belonging to the ſecond, were neither fully equipped nor had got their cargoes on board; but that a Spaniſh fleet of ſhips of war was then riding at anchor in the bay of Gibraltar, he immediately

ſet ſail for that place, and ſoon arrived within ſight of the enemy. BOOK III. 1607. April 24. or 25.

The Spaniards having, for ſeveral days, obſerved him ſteering his courſe along the coaſt of Andaluſia, had given notice to the admiral Don John Alvarez Davila of his approach; and Davila had full leiſure to put his fleet into a proper poſture of defence. It conſiſted of twenty-one ſhips, nine of which were greatly ſuperior in ſize to thoſe of the enemy, and was drawn up under the cannon of the fort, having the admiral's galleon, which was much larger than the reſt, in front. Heemſkirk was fully aware of the great advantage which the Spaniſh admiral muſt derive from his ſituation; but this conſideration rather ſerved to confirm him in his purpoſe than to deter him from carrying it into execution.

For the greater, ſaid he to his officers, in a council of war which he held before the engagement, the danger to which we ſhall be expoſed, and the more arduous our attempt, the greater will be the glory we ſhall acquire, and the more important the ſervice we ſhall perform to our country, if our arms ſhall be crowned with victory. Many illuſtrious exploits have our countrymen achieved in different quarters of the globe, but we are the firſt who ſhall adventure to attack the royal fleet in the ſtrongeſt port of Spain; and, by our ſucceſs, ſhall ſhow how little reaſon the Spaniſh monarch, with his long proud liſt of titles, has to boaſt that he is the ſovereign of the ſeas. Let us not be diſheartened by the enormous ſize

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of the enemy's ſhips, for this very circumſtance, by rendering them unwieldy in all their motions, will facilitate our conqueſt. I require you to do nothing, of which I ſhall not ſet you an example. But when the engagement ſhall be begun, we muſt remember it will be no longer poſſible to eſcape, we muſt either conquer or periſh. Nor is it only our own preſervation that depends on the fortitude we ſhall diſplay in our preſent enterpriſe, but the ſafety of the rich fleet that is in its way from India, the ſafety of all our countrymen, who are engaged in trade in this part of the world, and the terms likewiſe of peace which the ſtates ſhall obtain from the enemy. Let us only exert ourſelves as we have done on former occaſions, and diſcover that contempt of danger which is the ſureſt pledge of victory, and we ſhall enjoy the glory and felicity of putting a period to the war, and thereby ſecure to our countrymen that liberty for which they have fought for more than forty years.

Having delivered theſe exhortations with that natural military eloquence, which he poſſeſſed in an eminent degree, and received from all the officers preſent, the moſt ſolemn aſſurances, confirmed by oath, that, to the utmoſt of their power, they would imitate his example, and fulfil his commands, he communicated to them his plan of attack, and, as ſoon as they had returned to their reſpective ſhips, he gave the ſignal to advance.

When Davila perceived them approaching, he ordered the maſter of a Dutch merchantman, whom

he had a priſoner on board his ſhip, in chains, to be brought upon the deck, and inquired of him what he imagined might be his countrymen's deſign: to attack your fleet, anſwered the priſoner; to which Davila, ſmiling contemptuouſly replied, that he could not ſuppoſe it, ſince his ſingle ſhip, he thought, would prove an over-match for all the Dutch veſſels that were in ſight. That may be true, ſaid the other, but, either I know nothing of the character of my countrymen, or the battle will be inſtantly begun.

Heemskirk attacks a Spaniſh fleet riding at anchor in the bay of Gibraltar.

Heemſkirk himſelf led the van, and ſteered his courſe directly towards Davila, who, inſtead of that contempt which he had ſo recently expreſſed, being now overwhelmed with aſtoniſhment at the ſight of ſuch unprecedented intrepidity, gave orders to ſlip his anchors, and to retire behind his other ſhips, hoping that the enemy would thus be induced to exhauſt their fury upon them, and that afterwards he might come in for a ſhare of the victory.

But Heemſkirk, agreeably to his reſolution, which he had communicated to his officers, that he himſelf would attack the admiral's galleon, without heſitation entered within the line of the Spaniſh fleet, and ſtill continued to advance, keeping up his fire till he had come within muſket-ſhot of the enemy. Davila having, before his approach, given the firſt broadſide, it was now returned by Heemſkirk, whoſe fire being more ſkilfully directed, did greater execution. But ſoon after, while this gallant ſeaman ſtood giving orders, on the

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most conſpicuous part of the deck, his left leg was carried off by a cannon ball and his thigh being at the ſame time torn and ſhattered, he perceived, from the great effuſion of blood, that he could not have many minutes to ſurvive. Theſe he employed in exhorting thoſe about him to perſevere in the attack, and to remember the oath which they had taken, and the duty which they owed to themſelves and to their country; after which having recommended himſelf to the Divine Mercy, and appointed an officer of the name of Verhoeve to command the ſhip, he expired.

Death of Heemskirk.

So great a diſaſter was calculated to fill the minds of the ſpectators with diſmay and terror; but that intrepid ſpirit with which his example had inſpired them, far from being extinguiſhed by his death, was rather nouriſhed up into rage and fury, by their deſire of taking ſignal vengeance on the enemy. The battle, which had been ſuſpended for a little while, was inſtantly renewed with the ſame vigor as before; and another captain, called Lambert, coming up to ſupport Verhoeve, they united together in their aſſault on the Spaniſh admiral's ſhip, and battered her at once on both ſides with uncommon violence.

In the mean time the reſt of the Dutch fleet had begun their attack upon the other galleons, with the ſame alacrity and ardor; and the Spaniards long gave proof of equal bravery in their defence. But at length, two of their ſhips were ſet on fire and burnt by the enemy, a third was ſunk, a fourth, from ſome accidental cauſe, blew

up, and all the reſt, except the admiral's galleon, run aſhore.

The admiral himſelf had been killed about the ſame time with Heemſkirk, but the officer who ſucceeded him in the command, had maintained the combat with inflexible fury, and the iſſue for ſeveral hours remained doubtful. At length, a third Dutch ſhip arriving to the aſſiſtance of the other two, the Spaniſh commander hoiſted a white flag, as a ſignal that he was ready to ſurrender.

Vindictive fury of the Dutch.

But the Dutch, animated by the ſame implacable and vindictive ſpirit, with which their war againſt the Spaniards had generally been conducted, paid no regard to this ſignal, and ſtill continued firing till they had beaten down the flag. The hearts of the Spaniards then ſunk within them, and their efforts began to relax. The Dutch perceiving this, inſtantly boarded their veſſel, and attacked them with ſo much fury, that they were quickly overpowered. Moſt of them were put to the ſword, and the reſt compelled to jump over board into the ſea, where many of them were either ſhot or drowned. In this engagement the Spaniards loſt near two thouſand men; and, beſides the ſhips above-mentioned, which were burnt or ſunk, almoſt all the reſt were rendered unfit for future ſervice; whereas not a ſingle Dutch ſhip was either loſt or deſtroyed, and only about a hundred men were killed.

They obtain a ſignal victory.

So ſignal a victory, which excited the moſt dreadful apprehenſions in the minds of the people along the ſouthern coaſt of Spain, might have

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been attended with the moſt important conſequences, if Heemſkirk had lived to improve it; and either Cadiz or Gibraltar might have been reduced. But the officers, on whom the command had devolved, were ſatisfied with the glory they had acquired, and, in two days after the engagement, retired to Tetuan, on the African coaſt; from whence, after repairing their damages, and ſending home two of the tranſports with the ſick and wounded, and the body of the admiral, they ſailed in different ſquadrons to the coaſt of Portugal, Azores, and other places, where they expected to enrich themſelves by the capture of the merchant-ſhips.

But although this victory was not attended with any new conqueſt, it had conſiderable influence on the temper and conduct of the contending parties at the preſent criſis. It contributed to inſpire the Dutch with greater confidence of ſucceſs in the proſecution of the war, and to render them more intractable; while it tended, on the other hand, to produce a more complying temper on the part of the Spaniards, and to heighten their ſolicitude for the eſtabliſhment of peace.

Effects of this victory on the contending parties.

The archdukes had given the moſt convincing evidence how ſtrongly they were actuated with this ſolicitude. They had not only made the firſt advances to the ſtates, and readily agreed to preliminary terms, which, by all the powers of Europe, were thought humiliating; but no ſooner had a ceſſation of hoſtilities been agreed to, which extended only to hoſtilities at land, than they ſet

at liberty, without a ranſom, all the Dutch ſailors, who had been taken priſoners by their ſhips of war, and ſhowed themſelves determined, if poſſible, to put an end to every ſpecies of hoſtility. BOOK III. 1607.

Theſe princes had, from the beginning, taken too little pains to ſave appearances, and had ſuffered their eagerneſs for peace to betray them into an act of indiſcretion, which, by putting the ſtates more than ever upon their guard, tended to increaſe the difficulty of accompliſhing their deſign. Their agent having, agreeably to his inſtructions, requeſted a private interview with Aerſens, the Dutch ſecretary, after returning him thanks for his good offices with the ſtates, deſired him to accept of a diamond of conſiderable value for his wife, and acquainted him that the archdukes, deeply impreſſed with a ſenſe of his good intentions, had given orders for the reſtoration of his houſe in Bruſſels; while the marquis of Spinola had ſent him an obligation for fifty thouſand crowns, fifteen thouſand of which ſhould be paid upon demand, and the reſt as ſoon as either a peace or a long truce ſhould be concluded. Aerſens, having conjectured what might be Ney's intention in wiſhing for an interview, and having previouſly conſulted prince Maurice concerning the part which he ſhould act, accepted, though with ſeeming reluctance, both of the diamond and Spinola's obligation for the money; but, agreeably to his concert with Maurice, he delivered them up to the council of ſtate, to

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whom he gave a particular relation of the whole affair in a few days after [14].

Eagerness of the archdukes for peace encourages the Dutch to insist on high terms.

This transaction, therefore, served only to excite suspicion of the archdukes designs; while it afforded a striking proof how extremely averse they were to the continuance of the war, and thus contributed to confirm the states in their resolution of insisting upon the most advantageous and honorable terms.

The court of Spain was not in reality less anxious with regard to the issue of the present negociation than that of Brussels; but, whether from pride or policy, they better concealed their anxiety, and artfully acted for some time as if the treaty had been entirely the plan of the archdukes, to which the king found himself under no necessity, arising from the situation of his own affairs, of yielding his consent.

Of the truth of this, their conduct, with regard to the ratification of the late agreement between the states and the archdukes, affords sufficient evidence. In order to obtain that ratification, Ney, the Franciscan, had gone to Madrid, and, after a delay of several weeks, during which he had occasion for all his address and eloquence, he had now returned with it to Brussels. It was immediately after carried to the Hague by Verreiken, Albert's principal secretary; to whom the states, impatient to know particularly the contents of his instructions, granted an audience on the next

[14] Grotius, 520.

morning after his arrival. They had been beforehand informed, by a letter from Spinola, that their agreement with the archdukes had been ratified by the king, and that it was in order to communicate to them the deed of ratification that Verreiken was ſent into Holland. But they were extremely diſſatisfied when they examined this deed, both with the form and the contents.

The United States diſſatisfied with Philip's ratification of the preliminaries of peace.

It was conceived in vague and general terms, and not in the common form of a compact or convention. It did not comprehend the eſſential clauſe relative to the ſovereignty and independence of the United Provinces. Even in the copy of the archdukes agreement, which was prefixed to the deed, that clauſe was omitted; and, in contradiction to the ſpirit and meaning of it, the archdukes were ſtyled the ſovereigns of the Netherlands. It was ſubſcribed by Philip, "I, The King," (Yo el Rey) a form of ſubſcription which he uſed only where his ſubjects were addreſſed. It was ſealed with his ſmall ſeal, inſtead of the great one; and it was written on paper, and not on vellum, as was uſual in all tranſactions of importance.

Theſe omiſſions and informalities were inſtantly perceived by all the deputies; but, that their conduct might not appear precipitate, they appointed another meeting for the mature conſideration of them; after which they unanimouſly reſolved to reject the deed of ratification, as being neither ſuch as the archdukes had undertaken to procure, nor affording a ſufficient ground for proceeding in the intended treaty. Verreiken, to whom this

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reſolution was communicated, labored to perſuade the ſtates that the defects and informalities complained of muſt have been entirely owing to careleſſneſs on the part of the tranſcriber, it being impoſſible to doubt that the king would have entirely rejected the agreement, if he had not meant to grant his ratification of the whole.

But the ſtates remained inflexible in their purpoſe; for it was equally impoſſible, they thought, to ſuppoſe that a deed of ſo great importance, in the conſequences of which not only the archdukes, but the king himſelf, were ſo deeply intereſted, could have been left by his miniſters to be deviſed by an inferior clerk or ſecretary. It was impoſſible but his miniſters muſt have perceived the want of ſo eſſential a clauſe as that which related to the independence of the provinces; a clauſe which was obviouſly of ſuch a nature, that it was impoſſible to doubt of its having been purpoſely omitted, but without which they were unalterably reſolved to decline all farther negociation, either with the archdukes, or with the court of Spain.

Verreiken, perceiving that no arguments he could employ would prove effectual, requeſted liberty to remain at the Hague for ſix days longer, till he ſhould acquaint the archdukes with what had paſſed, and receive their inſtructions for his future conduct. With this requeſt the ſtates complied; and, before the expiration of the time ſpecified, a letter from the archdukes arrived, in which they engaged, that, though they could

not perceive the validity of theſe objections which the ſtates had made to the form of the king's ratification, who thought, that, as he had ratified a part of the convention without objections to the reſt, the deed ought to be conſidered as a ratification of the whole; yet, in order to remove every obſtacle to the treaty propoſed, and to ſhow how ſincerely they deſired the eſtabliſhment of peace, they would procure another ratification in the form required: but, in the mean time, they hoped, and requeſted, that the ſtates would give proof of ſincerity on their part, by recalling their fleet from the coaſts of Spain.

The treaty in danger of being broken off.

On this occaſion a violent conteſt aroſe among the deputies, and ſeveral of them diſcovered an inclination to break off the treaty without delay. It was now ſufficiently manifeſt, they alledged, that the Spaniards were not ſincere in their profeſſions. It was abſurd to expect that an enemy, ſo inveterate and implacable, would ever ſeriouſly think of peace on fair and equitable terms, till they were compelled by ſome dire neceſſity. It was evident that their object had, from the beginning, been to diſarm the confederates, and to procure a reſpite from the war, till their preparations for proſecuting it with greater vigor were complete. The fleet, therefore, ought not to be recalled, but to be reinforced, and the people rouſed from their preſent lethargy, by apprizing them of the ſnare which had been laid for their deſtruction.

Theſe were not, however, the ſentiments of the greater part of the deputies; for although the

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whole assembly were disposed to ascribe duplicity and artifice to the court of Spain, only some of them thought there was any ground for calling in question the sincerity of the archdukes, who, in the opinion of the generality, had, to the utmost of their power, fulfilled their engagements, and could not be justly blamed for the defects or informalities of the ratification.

The United States agree to recal their fleet from the coasts of Spain.

It was therefore resolved, partly from the respect due to these princes, and partly from dread of the imputation of insincerity in the professions which they had made of their desire of peace, that the fleet should be recalled. But they, at the same time, required that the ratification, executed in proper form, should be produced within a limited time specified; and, in order to prevent any future omission or error, they delivered to Verreiken three copies, precisely of the same import, one in Latin, another in French, and a third in Dutch declaring, that, without a faithful transcript of one or other of these, they would instantly break off the negociation, and apply themselves to the prosecution of the war.

It was Barnevelt who made this declaration, in the name of the other deputies; after which he reminded Verreiken of the attempt which had been made by the Franciscan to corrupt the secretary. "There," said he, "is the diamond, and here is the marquis of Spinola's obligation for fifteen thousand crowns. Let them both be restored to their proper owners: such presents are not necessary for the purpose of obtaining peace, if

your maſters wiſh for it, on equitable terms; and if they are not willing to agree to ſuch terms, their preſents will not be ſufficient to procure it. Were it poſſible that one or two perſons could be found in this aſſembly ſo baſe as to accept your bribes, and, for the ſake of them, to make a ſacrifice of the liberty of their country, yet a great majority will retain their integrity, and render your largeſſes, though they were much greater than your maſters can afford, of no avail [25]."

Verreiken, being unprepared for this attack, was thrown into ſome confuſion, and replied, that "Ney muſt certainly have done what he was accuſed of without any authority from the archdukes." It was impoſſible that the ſtates could give credit to this aſſertion; but, being ſatisfied with having ſo publicly expreſſed their reſentment, the meeting was immediately diſmiſſed, Verreiken permitted to return to Bruſſels, and ſoon after the fleet was recalled.

The archdukes, at the ſame time, renewed their applications at the court of Spain; and at length, though not without conſiderable difficulty, obtained ſuch a ratification of their convention from the king as they hoped the confederates would accept.

In this new deed all the ſame clauſes were inſerted, which the copies tranſmitted by the ſtates contained, and nearly the ſame form of

[25] Grotius and Baudius.

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expreſſion was obſerved; but to the declaration that the king and archdukes were willing to treat with the confederates as with a free people, over whom they pretended to no authority, a clauſe was annexed, declaring, that in caſe the negociation ſhould be broken off on account of religion, or any other diſputed point, the ratification ſhould be void, and all matters remain on their preſent footing. Beſides which, the deed was incorrectly written, ſome words being interlined, and others wholly omitted. It was written in Spaniſh, and not in Latin, French, or Dutch, as had been requeſted; upon paper, and not on parchment, and ſubſcribed like the former one, not with the name of the king, but with the words "I, The King," as if Philip had ſtill conſidered the confederates as his ſubjects.

Theſe latter circumſtances, though they afforded a proof of extreme careleſſneſs, or of the moſt childiſh obſtinacy, on the part of the Spaniſh miniſters, were deemed of ſmall importance; and it was proved that even the king of England; in his late treaty of peace with Spain had acquieſced in the ſame form of ſubſcription. But the deputies could not be ſo eaſily reconciled to the clauſe annexed to the declaration of their liberty; for although, as they repreſented to the archdukes commiſſioners, they were free, whether the king of Spain ſhould acknowledge it or not, yet the annexed clauſe ſeemed to imply that their freedom depended on the will of the king; and

to

to accept of the ratification with a clauſe of this import, might be interpreted as an acknowledgement, on their part, of the truth of the poſition which the clauſe implied. Beſides that, from the manner in which mention is made in this annexed clauſe, of religion, and other diſputed points, there was ground to ſuſpect, that, in the treaty propoſed, the king intended that the eſtabliſhment of religion, and other matters which reſpected the internal government of the provinces, ſhould be diſcuſſed. BOOK III. 1607.

To this the people of the United Provinces would never be perſuaded to conſent. To inſiſt upon it, would be to treat them as a dependent, and not as a free people; and, therefore, to the ſtates it appeared extremely doubtful, whether, in order to ſave a great deal of unneceſſary trouble, it were not expedient that the negociation ſhould be inſtantly broken off. But, as they ſhould be ſorry to give ground to ſuſpect that they were not deſirous to put a period to the calamities of war, they had reſolved to refer the whole matter to the ſtates of the particular towns and provinces, that the people might have an opportunity of judging for themſelves in a matter in which they were ſo deeply intereſted. With this anſwer the commiſſioners returned to Bruſſels, after receiving an aſſurance from the ſtates, that, in ſeven weeks from the preſent time, information would be tranſmitted to the archdukes whether the ratification was rejected or received [16].

[16] Baudius, Grotius, &c. Jeannin, tom. i. Lettre au Roy, Oct. 27. 1607.

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160. Diſputes and parties in the United Provinces.

At this juncture, both the people and their rulers differed widely in their ſentiments with regard to the queſtion that was now before them; while one party maintained that the ratification ought, without heſitation, to be rejected, and the other thought, that although it was not altogether ſuch as they wiſhed it to have been, yet it ought to be admitted as a ſufficient foundation for the treaty that was propoſed. Prince Maurice was at the head of the former of theſe parties, and Barnevelt of the latter; and each of theſe leaders exerted himſelf with great activity and zeal in gaining converts to his opinion [17]. There was

[17] The ſtates, on this occaſion, required that the original deed itſelf ſhould be left in their hands. The commiſſioners having no inſtructions on this head, the Franciſcan went himſelf to Bruſſels to receive them; and the archdukes agreed to the requeſt of the ſtates on theſe conditions, that they ſhould give an obligation in writing to reſtore the deed if required, and ſhould, at the ſame time, declare that the archdukes, in procuring it from the king, had fully performed the engagement which they had come under in their firſt agreement with the ſtates. The ſtates refuſed their conſent to theſe conditions, but ſtill inſiſted, that, as the deed was addreſſed to them, it ſhould be ſuffered to remain in their poſſeſſion. Ney returned to Bruſſels a ſecond time, and prevailed on the archdukes to yield to their demand. Though the ratification was not ſuch as the ſtates wiſhed it to have been, yet it ſhould ſeem to have been no ſmall gratification to them, that the king had granted a declaration, however qualified and expreſſed, of their being a free people, over whom he pretended to no authority. In return for the complaiſance of the archdukes on this occaſion, they would gladly have given the declaration required, that theſe princes had fully performed their engagement, but thought it was impoſſible to give it conſiſtently with truth.

ground to ſuſpect that the motives by which the prince was actuated, on this occaſion, were not perfectly pure and diſintereſted, but that he dreaded the diminution of his power, if peace were eſtabliſhed, and, partly on this account, was deſirous of the continuance of war. The reaſoning, however, which he employed, was ſpecious, and made a ſtrong impreſſion on the minds of many of his countrymen.

As the court of Spain, he ſaid, had on former occaſions given the moſt unqueſtionable evidence of their duplicity, ſo at preſent it was impoſſible to doubt of their being actuated by ſome ſiniſter deſign. In their firſt ratification, they had not only declined to acknowledge the independence of the ſtates, but had expreſsly affirmed, that they were ſubject to the dominion of the archdukes. To their ſecond, they had ſubjoined a clauſe which rendered their independence contingent and precarious, and wholly dependent on the will of the king. Whoever conſiders the vaſt dominions of Spain, and her inveterate habits of domination and pride, would not be eaſily convinced that ſhe intended to obſerve a truce, or peace, any longer than it might ſuit her views of tyranny and conqueſt. It was the deſign of that ambitious and politic nation, to break the ſpirit of the confederates by the habits of indolence and luxury. The martial ſpirit would leave the republic, and would not be eaſily revived. The citizens would become remiſs and inattentive to the defence of objects, which, when they knew them to be in danger, they conſidered as dearer than

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life. None are ſo eaſily ſubdued as thoſe who think they have nothing to fear. The fear of the enemy is a bond of unity, and produces both military diſcipline and civil obedience, while ſtates living in ſecurity, opulence, and eaſe, are ſubdued by habits of effeminacy, torn by inteſtine diſcords, and thus fall an eaſy prey to ſome ambitious and warlike neighbour. It was for this reaſon, that Scipio Naſica oppoſed with ſo much wiſdom, the falſe policy of Cato, who adviſed the deſtruction of Carthage.

When the minds of the confederates ſhould cool, and their patriotiſm begin to languiſh, the Spaniards hoped, by various arts of corruption, to bring them again under the yoke of their former ſovereigns. But whatever might be the effect of ſuch artifices, they would recruit their exhauſted ſtrength, and whenever a fit opportunity ſhould offer, violate the peace they now ſolicited.

Their army, at the preſent period, was univerſally diſcontented on account of their want of pay. Great numbers had already mutinied; and if the war continued, there was ground to expect, that the greateſt part would refuſe to ſubmit to the control of military diſcipline. With ſuch an army, no prudent general would venture to engage in any important enterpriſe. And the people, among whom they were quartered, being grievouſly oppreſſed, both by the government and the mutineers, were ready to ſhake off a yoke which had become intolerable.

The Spaniards were ſtill leſs formidable at ſea than at land. From the great decreaſe of their

trade, they found it impoſſible to procure ſailors ſufficient to man their ſhips of war; and their fleets, far from being able to contend with thoſe of the ſtates, were even unable to defend themſelves in their harbours, under the cannon of their forts. BOOK III. 1607.

Such was the preſent ſtate of the Spaniſh fleet and army; whereas thoſe of the confederates had never been in ſo flouriſhing a condition. Their army was at preſent, as it had always been, under the moſt perfect diſcipline; regularly paid, and abundantly ſupplied with every thing neceſſary to enable it to act with vigor: while their fleets, more numerous than ever, had in almoſt every quarter of the globe proved an overmatch for thoſe of the enemy; and had obtained over them ſeveral important victories, which had been attended with a great increaſe of trade, and wealth, and power. They had eſtabliſhed trade in many places, which, till lately, had been viſited only by the Spaniards and Portugueſe. They had got poſſeſſion of ſeveral of the moſt important branches of the Indian commerce; and if they did not ſuffer themſelves to be diverted from the proſecution of their naval enterpriſes, they would ere long make themſelves maſters of the whole. The war, therefore, which they had carried on againſt the enemy at ſea, had already proved, and would ſtill continue to prove, a mine of gold to the United Provinces; while their military operations at land, had neither exhauſted their riches nor their ſtrength. Their army in a great

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meaſure conſiſted of foreign troops, while the natives were permitted to apply themſelves to manufactures and trade, and all the money expended for the ſupport of the army, was ſpent at home, either in purchaſing the manufactures of the country, or thoſe commodities which merchants found it ſo beneficial to import from foreign parts. It had indeed been found neceſſary to impoſe taxes on ſeveral commodities; and many perſons complained of the burden of theſe taxes, yet both the riches and the number of the people had every year increaſed, ſince the taxes were impoſed; and no country abounded more in the neceſſaries and conveniencies of life.

Of the truth of theſe obſervations, the Spaniards were ſufficiently aware. They had come at length to perceive that the war had to the confederates proved a copious ſource of proſperity; while their own ſtrength had been exhauſted by it, and their commerce almoſt ruined; and they were for this reaſon deſirous of a temporary peace, hoping thereby to avert the danger to which they ſaw themſelves expoſed; to deprive the confederates of the advantages which they at preſent enjoyed; to ſow diſcord among the provinces, and to accompliſh, by fraud and artifice, what they had hitherto been unable to attain by force of arms. That ſuch was their intention, appeared from the diſingenuity of their conduct with regard to the deed of ratification.

But whether this was in reality a deſign or not, no doubt could be entertained that, as it was for

the intereſt of the Spaniards that peace ſhould be eſtabliſhed, it was no leſs for that of the ſtates that the war ſhould be proſecuted with vigor, till the enemy were reduced to the neceſſity of acting with greater ſincerity, and more equitable terms could be obtained, than they had ground to expect at the preſent period.

This reaſoning produced the deſired effect, chiefly in Holland and Zealand, where the people were conſcious, that their proſperity had been in ſome meaſure owing to the war; while their ſituation rendered them more ſecure againſt its attendant calamities, than the inhabitants of the inland provinces. But the reaſons on the other ſide, which were urged by Barnevelt, were generally thought to be more deſerving of attention and regard.

The reaſonings urged by Barnevelt for peace.

There was too much ground, he allowed, for the imputation which had been caſt upon the court of Spain, of inſincerity in their conduct, with regard to the deed of ratification. It was evident, from the manner in which they had acknowledged the independence of the States, how extremely reluctant they had been in granting that acknowledgment. The clauſe annexed to it, declaring that in caſe the negociation ſhould be broken off, the ratification ſhould be void, ought not to have been inſerted. It was even unneceſſary to inſert it for any purpoſe which the Spaniards could have in view, becauſe, in every treaty, the validity of any particular conceſſion, muſt depend on the event of the treaty, and if it prove

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abortive, all the claims of the contending parties, whether real or pretended, muſt remain as before its commencement. From the inſertion however of this clauſe, it could not be inferred that the court of Spain had formed any inſidious deſign. Their reluctance to acknowledge the independence of the ſtates, might juſtly have been expected; and the little pains which they had taken to conceal it, afforded a ſtrong preſumption that their intentions were ſincere.

But although they ſhould in reality intend to violate the peace which they now ſolicited, was this a ſufficient reaſon for refuſing to treat with them, or for declining to accept of a peace upon equitable terms? Ought peace to be rejected in every caſe, where it was poſſible that the conditions of it might be violated? Ought ſtates to live in perpetual war, becauſe there was ground to apprehend, that they might not be able to maintain a perpetual and uninterrupted peace; If the Spaniards ſhall hereafter revive their claim of ſovereignty over the provinces, will this claim derive any validity from the preſent treaty, in which they have ſo explicitly renounced it? Will they not then juſtly expoſe themſelves to the reproach of having acted with duplicity; and is it not the natural tendency of ſuch a conduct, to increaſe the number of their enemies, while we ſhall then, as well as now, be poſſeſſed of arms to maintain our liberty, and have the ſame or more numerous friends to aſſiſt us in counteracting their tyrannical deſigns?

Great diſorders, it was true, prevailed at the preſent period in the Spaniſh monarchy: the royal navy had ſuffered a conſiderable diminution, and the archdukes army was extremely ill paid and mutinous. But although this conſideration might juſtify the ſtates in demanding the moſt advantageous terms of peace, it would not juſtify them for reſolving to perſiſt, at all adventures, in the proſecution of the war. From negligence and inattention, but chiefly from the folly of engaging at once in too many difficult and expenſive enterpriſes, Spain was weakened; but it would be madneſs to proceed on the ſuppoſition, that her ſtrength was ſpent, for ſhe was ſtill poſſeſſed of inexhauſtible reſources; and nothing but greater prudence and moderation were requiſite to render her formidable to all her enemies. During the laſt campaign, ſhe had exerted herſelf more vigorouſly than ſeveral years preceding, and if the rivers that year had not been ſwelled to an unuſual height, her troops might have penetrated into the heart of the provinces. She might ſtill continue, and perhaps redouble her exertions; and if ſhe was incenſed, as ſhe would juſtly be, in caſe the ſtates ſhould obſtinately refuſe to treat with her, ſhe might be determined to direct her whole attention againſt the dominions of the ſtates, and put forth a degree of ſtrength which they would be unable to withſtand.

Their arms had hitherto been attended with greater ſucceſs, than could juſtly have been expected againſt ſo potent an enemy; but of all

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human events they ſhould remember thoſe of war were the moſt fortuitous. The republic had in former periods been brought ſo low, that the ſtates would gladly have ſubmitted to the ſovereignty of a foreign prince: and one unfortunate campaign, or the loſs of a fleet, which depended for its preſervation on the mercy of the winds and waves, might again reduce them to the like deſperate condition.

They had been enabled to attain their preſent proſperity, by the friendly aſſiſtance of the queen of England, and the king of France; but the former of theſe princes, who had long been their principal ſupport, was dead, and her ſucceſſor either not ſo able, or not ſo willing to aſſiſt them; while the latter was far advanced in years; was deſirous, for reaſons which could not be eaſily penetrated, to have the war brought to a concluſion; and although during his life, they might truſt that he would not ſuffer them to be oppreſſed, yet he might ere long leave his kingdom to an infant ſon, during whoſe minority, the Spaniards were likely to have greater influence over the French counſels, than the United States.

The great object, as well as the end of war was peace; and advantageous terms of peace could never be ſo eaſily obtained, as when the enemy found it neceſſary to apply for it, in order to retrieve the ruined ſtate of his affairs. The object of the preſent war had, from the beginning, been to ſhake off the yoke of the Spaniſh government, and to aſſert their liberty. This object was now

ſecured, and the king of Spain himſelf was ready to treat with them as with a free people, over whom he pretended to no authority. Could they be juſtified in their own eyes, or could they be juſtified in the opinion of the world, if they ſhould refuſe to treat with him? Would the pretext that he was inſincere in the acknowledgment which he had made of their independence, and that poſſibly he will hereafter revive his claim, and refuſe to fulfil his engagement, afford a vindication of a conduct ſo ſingular, ſo haughty, and contemptuous? Was the war to be proſecuted till they had accompliſhed the diſſolution of the Spaniſh monarchy? Was this an event either to be expected or deſired? Were the people of the United Provinces to be the only people on earth, who were never to enjoy the bleſſings of tranquillity?

The war indeed had been the occaſion of proſperity to ſome, who ought to reſt ſatisfied with the advantages which they had already derived from it: but to great numbers, it had often been a copious ſource of diſtreſs and miſery. Many groaned under the burdens which the war had made it neceſſary to impoſe; and many lamented the loſs of their friends, and the ruin of their fortunes, which are the inſeparable concomitants even of the moſt ſucceſsful war. It was ſurely deſirable to put a period to theſe calamities; and if they did not embrace the preſent opportunity of doing it, provided it could be done conſiſtently with their honor, and their future ſecurity, they would be anſwerable for all the blood that ſhould

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be ſpilt, and could not be juſtified in the ſight either of God or man."

This diſcourſe, which was delivered in an extraordinary aſſembly, where deputies from all the provinces and almoſt all the towns were preſent, deriving weight from the character of the ſpeaker, as well as from the ſolidity of the reaſoning which it contained, was liſtened to with great attention; and, while it produced conviction in the minds of the greater part, it impoſed ſilence upon the reſt, and extorted their conſent to the meaſure which it was intended to recommend. Prince Maurice, ſupported by the deputies from the province and towns of Zealand, propoſed that the form of an explicit and unconditional acknowledgment of their independence ſhould be tranſmitted to the archdukes, to be ſubſcribed by them as a preliminary article; but this motion being rejected as harſh and offenſive by a great majority, it was at length reſolved to appoint ambaſſadors for the purpoſe of negociating peace; and notice of this reſolution was immediately ſent to the court of Bruſſels [18].

Dec. 24th.

It was at the ſame time propoſed to the archdukes that the conferences ſhould be held at the Hague, which for ſome time paſt had been the ſeat of government in the United Provinces; and, in order to induce them to comply with this

[18] Grotius, lib. xvi. Bent. part. iii. lib. viii. The time fixed for the ſuſpenſion of arms being expired, it was prorogued on the preſent occaſion, and afterwards, from time to time, on different occaſions, till the treaty was concluded.

propoſal, it was ſuggeſted, that, as the ambaſſadors of the ſtates could not be inveſted with very ample powers, they might often have occaſion to conſult their conſtituents; and if any other place of meeting, or any town within the territories of the archdukes were made choice of, much time would be loſt, and the negociation be unneceſſarily prolonged.

Commiſſioners for peace on the part of Spain.

The archdukes, ſolicitous to avoid every cauſe of delay, readily agreed to this propoſal, and immediately appointed for their commiſſioners the marquis of Spinola, Mancicidor, a Spaniard, their ſecretary at war, Richardot, the preſident of their privy council, Verreikens, their private ſecretary of ſtate, and Ney, the Franciſcan, to whoſe activity and addreſs they thought themſelves much indebted for having brought the negociation thus far.

And on that of the United States.

The commiſſioners appointed by the ſtates were nine in number, ſeven of whom were nominated by the ſeven provinces, and the remaining two by the ancient body of the nobles. Theſe two were count William of Naſſau, a near relation of prince Maurice, and Walraeve, lord of Brederode; and thoſe appointed by the ſeveral provinces were among the moſt reſpectable perſons in the commonwealth: but the confidence of the people of all ranks, at this important criſis, was chiefly placed in Barnevelt, who was nominated commiſſioner by the province of Holland.

This virtuous and able ſtateſman was indefatigable in his attention to every ſtep of the preſent negociation; and, before the conferences were

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Suſpicion of Spain the predominant paſſion of the Dutch.

begun, he deviſed an expedient admirably calculated to promote the end in view. The predominant paſſion in the minds of his countrymen was ſtill, as it had been for many years, ſuſpicion of the intentions of the court of Spain. It had been chiefly from this quarter that he encountered ſo much difficulty in perſuading them to agree to the archdukes propoſals of a conference; and he ſtill dreaded that the ſame cauſe might prevent this conference from being attended with the deſired effect. This diſtruſt of the Spaniards he apprehended would ſhow itſelf on every occaſion, and on the ſlighteſt grounds; and it would be carefully fomented by prince Maurice and others, who wiſhed for a continuance of the war. In order, therefore, to quiet the apprehenſions of the people, to deprive the prince and his partiſans of a pretext, of which he knew they would readily lay hold, and at the ſame time to intimidate or overawe the Spaniards, he propoſed to the French and Britiſh miniſters that, before the conferences were opened, their maſters ſhould enter into a new alliance with the ſtates; that they ſhould engage to employ their endeavours to procure for them an equitable peace; and, in caſe of their procuring it, ſhould farther engage to afford them ſuch aſſiſtance as ſhould be neceſſary for maintaining it inviolate.

This propoſal did not meet with the ſame favorable reception from the Britiſh as from the French monarch. Though James was determined by the motives above explained to concur

with Henry in promoting the eſtabliſhment of peace; yet, having ground for doubt whether the intereſt of his own dominions did not rather require that the war ſhould be continued, he was never ſo deeply intereſted, as he deſired that the ſtates ſhould believe, in the ſucceſs of their preſent negociation [19]. Beſides that, he knew how much it was in the power of the Spaniards to diſturb his tranquillity by their intrigues with the Iriſh Catholics, and was therefore unwilling to incur their reſentment. Influenced by theſe conſiderations, he declined at this time to enter into the propoſed alliance. But Henry more decided in his conduct, and leſs afraid of the conſequences of giving offence to the court of Spain, readily yielded his conſent, and ſent orders to the preſident Jeannin, to finiſh the treaty without delay.

Againſt this meaſure, which no pains were taken to conceal, the Spaniſh miniſters having

[19] This appears from ſeveral paſſages in Winwood's Memorials, and particularly from the letters writ by the earl of Salisbury to Sir R. Winwood, Sir Richard Spencer, and Sir Charles Cornwallis. "You added (ſays Salisbury, in a letter dated March 20th 1607, to the two former) that this comfort you have that both parties deſire the peace with more than an ordinary affection. Which words I rather judge to proceed out of a contemplation of the tedioufneſs which this buſineſs is to bring with it, than out of any affectionate deſire or good judgment of the effects which this buſineſs is to bring with it; conſidering that the beſt in that kind that can be hoped for, is like to add but trouble and care to us in theſe parts; and yet I would not have you now gather that I would have you break it." Vol. ii. p. 378.

BOOK III. 1607. warmly remonſtrated at the court of France, and having received no other anſwer, but that if rightly underſtood, it muſt contribute to haſten the eſtabliſhment of peace, they from thence perceived that it was become neceſſary for them, and therefore reſolved, if poſſible, to procure the French king's aſſiſtance in their negociation with the ſtates. For this purpoſe, but under a different pretext, the marquis of Villa Franca was ſent to Paris, in the character of ambaſſador, and from that time Henry acted as mediator between the contracting powers, although it was well underſtood how much more he favored the pretenſions of the Dutch than thoſe either of the archdukes or the king of Spain [30].

1608. Febr. 6th. In the mean time the archdukes commiſſioners arrived at the Hague, and a few days after the conferences were begun [31]. The two or three firſt ſeſſions having been employed by the commiſſioners in examining their powers, and in diſcuſſing certain objections againſt them, which, after ſome altercation, it was agreed were not ſufficient to ſtop their procedure; the Dutch commiſſioners

[30] Bentivoglio, Grotius, &c. & Jeannin, tom. ii. p. 69.

[31] A great number of people from the other towns had come to the Hague at this time, chiefly moved by their curioſity to ſee Spinola, who for ſome years had been an object of their higheſt admiration, which was on ſome occaſions mixed with terror. Prince Maurice having gone out to meet him, received him into his own coach, and conducted him to the Hague. And both theſe great men, it is ſaid, were well pleaſed to find the high opinion which they had formed of each other's abilities, from their actions, juſtified by their diſcourſe which they held together in the preſent interview.

required

required, as a preliminary article, a ſolemn acknowledgment, in the name of the king of Spain and the archdukes, of the independence of the United Provinces, including an explicit renunciation of all right to authority over them; together with an obligation, binding on their ſucceſſors as well as on themſelves, that they ſhould not henceforth uſe the arms or titles of the provinces, or any other marks of their ancient ſovereignty. BOOK III. 1608.

The commiſſioners of the archdukes were much offended at the latter part of this requiſition; and, beſides remonſtrating againſt it to the Dutch commiſſioners themſelves, they bitterly complained to the Britiſh and French ambaſſadors, of the arrogance diſcovered in making ſo unuſual a demand. It had been the ordinary practice, they obſerved, of princes to retain the titles of the ſtates or kingdoms which they had loſt. The Catholic king was ſtyled king of Jeruſalem, and duke of Burgundy; the king of France called himſelf king of Navarre; and the king of England ſtill aſſumed the title of king of France. In requiring his Catholic majeſty therefore to renounce his titles as well as his ſovereignty, the ſtates were not only guilty of arrogating to themſelves the privilege of introducing a new practice, but of impeaching the conduct of the greateſt ſovereigns in Europe, and particularly of the kings of France and Britain, who had no leſs reaſon to be offended at the demand of the Dutch commiſſioners than the king of Spain.

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The French and Engliſh ambaſſadors, however, declined on this occaſion to interpoſe, and the archdukes commiſſioners, after having obtained the conſent of the archdukes, acquainted thoſe of the ſtates at the next meeting, that they were ready to grant the renunciation required in its full extent. The Dutch were agreeably ſurpriſed at the facility with which the Spaniards thus yielded to their requeſt; but when Richardot, who was the ſpeaker on this occaſion, added that, in return for ſo liberal a conceſſion, it was expected that the ſtates would agree to abſtain for the future from all commerce in the Indies, and reſt ſatisfied, as they had done till about ten years before, with the trade which they had carried on with Spain, and other countries in Europe, they were inflamed with indignation, and exclaimed, that one moment the king and archdukes acknowledged them to be a free and independent people, and the next ſhowed they were determined to treat them as ſlaves, and, if poſſible, to deprive them of the moſt valuable branches of their liberty: that theſe princes, in renouncing their claim to the ſovereignty of the provinces, had given nothing to the ſtates which they did not poſſeſs before; while, in requiring them to relinquiſh their trade to India, they, in effect, required them to abandon what was known to be a principal ſource of their wealth and power: but they declared that no conſideration would ever induce them to comply with a demand which was equally exorbitant and unjuſt; for, under what pretext could the Spaniards claim

The Dutch refuſe to give up their trade to India.

the excluſive privilege of trading to the Indies? Thoſe countries were not the property of the Spaniards, but belonged to a great number of independent princes, many of whom choſe rather that their ſubjects ſhould engage in trade with the Dutch than with the Spaniards or Portugueſe. Thoſe countries were likewiſe of an immenſe extent; they could furniſh materials for trade to all the commercial nations in Europe; and it was a violation of the law of nature, and contrary to the general good of mankind, for any one nation to endeavour to engroſs the whole. The ſtates would not refuſe to agree to any arrangement with regard to the Indian trade, which was calculated to promote the mutual intereſt of both nations. But, having been reduced by the Spaniards themſelves to the neceſſity of having recourſe to this new branch of commerce, having begun it in the face of difficulties, which it had required an enormous expenſe, and the moſt vigorous exertions to ſurmount, having eſtabliſhed a company for carrying it on, and already taſted of the profits ariſing from it, they were determined, whatever ſhould be the conſequences, to perſevere. The Spaniſh commiſſioners had no other reply to make to this anſwer of the ſtates, but that the Spaniards and Portugueſe had long been in the ſole poſſeſſion of the trade to India, and that the king of Spain had not only refuſed to grant a participation in that trade to the French and Engliſh, but likewiſe to his well affected ſubjects in the Netherlands: but no regard was paid to theſe conſiderations by

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the commiſſioners of the ſtates; and they were confirmed in their purpoſe by the unanimous voice of their countrymen, joined to a repreſentation which was made on this occaſion to the ſtates by the India company.

The trade, they repreſented, with Spain and Portugal, had never been, and could never be productive of any advantage to individuals or to the public, equal to that which aroſe from the trade to India. In this, and the other branches of foreign trade, of which the Spaniards wanted to deprive them, upwards of a hundred and fifty ſhips and eight thouſand ſailors were employed. Theſe ſhips were all of a conſiderable ſize, and might at any time be converted, at a ſmall expenſe, into ſhips of war, when the public exigencies ſhould require. The Indian trade was not only infinitely more profitable than the Spaniſh, as it conſiſted in going to the fountain-head for thoſe commodities, which they had formerly purchaſed at ſecond hand from the Spaniards and Portugueſe, but was likewiſe much more ſafe and certain, becauſe it did not, like the other, depend on the caprice of the king or of the miniſters of Spain. They had formerly experienced how little they had to rely on the trade with Spain and Portugal. Their ſailors had been ſeized and impriſoned, or ſent to the gallies to work as ſlaves, and their ſhips and goods had been confiſcated. It would be always in the power of the Spaniards to exerciſe the ſame oppreſſions. They would renew them under various pretexts, on the

ſlighteſt grounds of offence; and after having perſuaded the ſtates to abandon their Indian commerce, they would next exclude them from that of Spain and Portugal, in the hopes that by thus reducing their naval power, they might again compel them to ſubmit to their authority. The ſtates might judge of how much importance the trade of India was to the Spaniards, from the eagerneſs which they diſcovered to prevent any other nation from partaking in it; but it was of ſtill greater importance to the people of the United Provinces, who depended almoſt entirely upon that trade for their ſubſiſtence, and, without the reſources which they derived from it, would be utterly unable to maintain their liberty and independence. Nor was it intereſt only which the ſtates would ſacrifice, by granting the requeſt of the Spaniſh commiſſioners, but likewiſe their integrity and honor; ſince alliances had been formed with the Indian princes, and ſome of theſe princes, truſting to the protection of the company, acting by the authority of the ſtates, had ſhaken off the yoke of the Spaniards, and thereby expoſed themſelves to their ſevereſt vengeance, if, by any article in the preſent treaty, the company were to be prevented from fulfilling their engagements.

The ſtates were more than ever determined, by theſe conſiderations, to reject the requeſt of the Spaniſh commiſſioners; but, that they might afford ſome proof of the ſincerity of their deſire of peace, they gave them their choice of the three following propoſals. The firſt, that, conformably

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to the ordinary tenor of treaties of peace, both parties ſhould equally enjoy the liberty of commerce by ſea and land. The ſecond, that the united Provinces ſhould abſtain from all commerce with countries under the government of Spain, on this ſide of the northern tropic, while, on the other ſide, all matters ſhould remain on their preſent footing; the ſtates being ſatisfied that peace ſhould take place on this ſide, while hoſtilities, if unavoidable, might continue on the other. And the third, that Spain ſhould give no moleſtation to the Dutch in India for ſeven years, before the expiration of which a new treaty ſhould be ſet on foot, in order to deviſe ſome proper means of accommodation. The Spaniſh commiſſioners replied, that they were not poſſeſſed of power to agree to any of theſe propoſals. They knew that the king of Spain had renounced his ſovereignty over the provinces, in the hopes of their conſenting entirely to deſiſt from the Indian trade; but they ſhould appoint one of their number to go to Madrid for new inſtructions. The Franciſcan was accordingly diſpatched for that purpoſe; and, in the mean time, the commiſſioners proceeded to take ſome of the other points in queſtion under their conſideration.

The Dutch having, from the beginning, ſuſpected, on account of the mention of religion in the king's ſecond ratification, that it was intended to propoſe ſome change in their eſtabliſhed religion, required of the Spaniſh commiſſioners to declare whether they had received any inſtructions

on that head, and what their inſtructions were. The commiſſioners acknowledged that they were indeed inſtructed to make a propoſal to the ſtates with regard to religion: but added, that they could not enter on the diſcuſſion of this article till ſeveral others had been diſcuſſed. Of all the articles they knew, there was none in which the king and the duke of Lerma were ſo deeply intereſted; but ſince their arrival in Holland, they had come to be perſuaded, from private information, that no propoſal which they were empowered to make on this ſubject would be liſtened to by the ſtates. They were likewiſe afraid that the diſcuſſion of a point of ſo delicate a nature, on which the paſſions of the Dutch would be ſo eaſily inflamed, might occaſion a ſudden diſſolution of the conferences; and from the ſequel, it is probable that they had ſent the Franciſcan to Madrid as much for the purpoſe of ſounding the inclinations of the court, and knowing their ultimate reſolution on this head, as on that of the Indian commerce. Although they were repeatedly urged, therefore, by the Dutch to declare what they were inſtructed to propoſe with regard to religion, they as often declined complying with their requeſt, and inſiſted that it was better previouſly to examine the other queſtions in diſpute.

One of theſe related to the duties which, during the war, had been laid by the Dutch on all goods imported by the Scheld to Antwerp. The archdukes commiſſioners inſiſted that all thoſe duties ſhould be taken off: nor were thoſe of the

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ſtates unwilling to aboliſh ſuch of them as had been impoſed in conſideration of the war; but they required that the ſame duties ſhould ſtill be paid by the ſubjects of the archdukes and the king of Spain as were exacted from the ſubjects of the ſtates, to enable them to defray the expenſe of the fortifications on the banks of the Scheld, and of the ſhips of war that were neceſſary for the protection of their commerce. This was the pretext which they employed, although it is probable they were chiefly actuated by their dread leſt the trade of Antwerp ſhould be revived to the prejudice of that of their own commercial towns in the maritime provinces.

Another point which engaged the attention of the commiſſioners, regarded the mutual exchange of thoſe towns and diſtricts which the contending powers had acquired by conqueſt from one another. The ſtates were at this time in poſſeſſion of Sluys, and the iſle of Cadſant in Flanders, and of Breda, Bergen op Zoom, and Gertrudenburgh, in Brabant; all of which places were of the firſt importance, on account of their ſituation and ſtrength. The Spaniſh commiſſioners, however, propoſed and urged that theſe places ſhould be given to the archdukes, who were ſovereigns of the provinces in which they lay, and that the ſtates, in compenſation for them, ſhould accept of Oldenzeel, Groll, and Lingen. But the Dutch commiſſioners rejected this propoſal with great diſdain, alledging that the towns poſſeſſed by the ſtates were of infinitely greater value than thoſe which

were offered in exchange for them; and declaring, that as no conceſſions which the archdukes would make were a ſufficient equivalent, both parties, agreeably to what the archduke had propoſed in the beginning of this negociation, ſhould retain what was at preſent in their poſſeſſion.

The property of individuals reſtored by the treaty for peace.

A third queſtion related to the boundaries between the dominions of the ſtates and thoſe of the archdukes; a fourth, to the reſtitution of the effects belonging to individuals which had been confiſcated; and, beſides theſe, there were ſeveral other matters treated of, concerning which the oppoſite parties contended with great warmth, and diſcovered a wide diverſity of ſentiment.

Many weeks paſt in fruitleſs altercation. The parties ſeemed to be more than ever exaſperated againſt each other; and the difficulties which prevented them from coming to an agreement ſeemed daily to increaſe.

Obſtinacy of the Dutch.

The Dutch were extremely tenacious of their claims, and the archdukes commiſſioners often complained of this obſtinacy to the Engliſh and French ambaſſadors; but their conduct was, at the ſame time, explicit and undiſguiſed; and, from the commencement of the negociation, they had openly declared, that, whatever conceſſions they might be induced to make in other matters, there were two points, religion and the trade to India, on which no ſuch conceſſion was to be expected as the Spaniards were likely to require.

To procure ſome new inſtructions with regard to theſe important articles, had, as already mentioned,

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been the purpoſe for which the Franciſcan had been ſent to Madrid. The time fixed for his return was expired, and no ſatisfactory account of his delay was given by the archdukes commiſſioners, who ſtudiouſly avoided all diſcourſe concerning him, and maintained an obſtinate ſilence with regard to his ſucceſs.

The Dutch were exceedingly diſguſted at this behaviour: they knew not to what cauſe it could be aſcribed: they were not without ſuſpicion of ſome inſidious deſign: and they at length reſolved, that either the archdukes ambaſſadors ſhould give them ſatisfaction concerning the cauſe of Ney's delay, or that the treaty ſhould inſtantly be broken off.

Having, accordingly, in the moſt peremptory terms, required to know what was the ultimate determination of the king of Spain with regard to the Indian trade, the ambaſſadors, thinking it unneceſſary any longer to conceal what they knew, replied [22], that Ney had not been able to obtain a more favorable anſwer to his application than this, that the king, from his ardent deſire of reſtoring peace to his dominions, was ſtill ready to renounce his claim of ſovereignty over the provinces in the form propoſed; but, in return for ſo great a ſacrifice, required that the ſtates ſhould abſtain from all commerce to the Indies, and permit the exerciſe of the Catholic religion throughout the whole extent of their dominions.

Auguſt 10.

Diſputes concerning the Catholic religion and the Indian trade.

[22] Bentivoglio, Grotius, &c. Meteren, liv. xxx. folio 652, &c.

Of this declaration the deputies of the ſtates gave immediate information to the ſtates general, and the Engliſh and French ambaſſadors. James having lately entered into that defenſive alliance with the ſtates which he had formerly declined, and Henry, beſides concluding ſuch an alliance, having empowered [21] Jeannin to acquaint them, that, in caſe the preſent treaty were not broken off without his conſent, he had reſolved to aſſiſt them in the proſecution of the war; both theſe princes were well entitled to be conſulted on the preſent occaſion. Henry could not decently have neglected the opportunity, which was preſented to him, of interpoſing in behalf of the religion which he profeſſed, and therefore he had inſtructed Jeannin to adviſe the ſtates, if poſſible, to grant to their Catholic ſubjects the indulgence which Philip had demanded for them; but he did not inſiſt on their compliance with his advice: he was ſenſible that this indulgence might endanger their internal peace, eſpecially if it was granted at the requeſt of the king of Spain; and therefore left them at liberty to determine, both with regard to religion and their Indian trade, whether any conceſſion could be made conſiſtently with their intereſt and ſecurity.

The ſtates themſelves unanimouſly thought that there was no room for heſitation on the ſubject. With the conſent of Jeannin, as well as of the Engliſh ambaſſadors, they rejected the conditions

[21] Negociations de Jeannin, tom. i. p. 44. Seconde Inſtruction à Monſieur Jeannin.

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that were propoſed; and, at the next meeting with the archdukes commiſſioners, it was declared by thoſe of the ſtates, that they conſidered the inſiſting upon theſe conditions as a violation of the promiſe which had been made of treating with them as with a free people; that they could not conſider the conduct of Spain as conſiſtent, fair, or candid, and were therefore determined to break off the preſent treaty; and, without ſuffering themſelves to be any longer deceived, to reſume the proſecution of the war [24].

The ſtates ſeem to have received ſufficient provocation on this occaſion for the reſentment with which they were inflamed; but, from a letter of the preſident Jeannin's to the king of France, it appears that it was not the court of Spain ſo much as the archdukes commiſſioners, of whom they had reaſon to complain. For Philip, it appears from this letter, had, from the beginning of the negociation, declared that he would never conſent to renounce his ſovereignty, but on the condition that the free exerciſe of the Catholic religion ſhould be eſtabliſhed in all the provinces; and he had charged the commiſſioners to open the conferences by acquainting them that this was his unalterable reſolution. But the commiſſioners had thought it expedient to change the order of their inſtructions, and to begin with an acknowledgement of the freedom of the ſtates, hoping thereby to render them more obſequious in other articles;

[24] Meteren, liv. xxx. folio 650, &c.

and afterwards, when both parties were in better humor with each other, to obtain from Philip ſome relaxation in his demand with regard to the Catholic religion [25].

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This information was communicated to the deputies of the ſtates, and afterwards to the ſtates general, with an intention to ſooth their reſentment; but it ſerved rather to turn it into another channel, by directing it againſt the archdukes commiſſioners inſtead of the court of Spain. And it likewiſe ſerved to rivet their conviction, that no ſolid peace could ever be obtained from that court, whoſe bigotry was the ſame in the preſent as it had been in the former reign, without a conceſſion on their part, which they deemed to be no leſs contrary to good policy than it was inconſiſtent with ſincerity in their profeſſion of the Proteſtant faith. They were confirmed, therefore, in this reſolution of declining to proceed any farther in the treaty, and ſeem to have ſatisfied the Engliſh and French ambaſſadors, that they had ſufficient motives to juſtify their conduct.

Theſe ambaſſadors, however, ſtill believed it to be practicable to reſtore tranquillity to the United Provinces, although not by a perpetual peace, yet by a long truce between the contending powers. The obſtacles to the eſtabliſhment of peace had chiefly ariſen from the pride and bigotry of the court of Spain; but theſe obſtacles, they thought, might be more eaſily ſurmounted in attempting to conclude a truce than a peace,

[25] Negociations de Jeannin, tom. ii. p. 403, 404, &c.

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becauſe, if only a truce were concluded, that court might flatter themſelves with the hopes, that, at the expiration of it, they might recover their conceſſions, and accompliſh the ſeveral objects in which they were ſo deeply intereſted; beſides that, there was ground to ſuſpect, that, from the beginning of the negociation, it was a truce, and not a perpetual peace, that was intended by the Spaniſh miniſters.

The preſident Jeannin admitted to an audience of the ſtates.

The preſident Jeannin having previouſly concerted with the Engliſh ambaſſadors certain preliminary articles, without which he knew that all farther treaty muſt prove abortive, requeſted an audience of the ſtates, and, being admitted into their aſſembly, after expreſſing the concern of the French and Engliſh monarchs on account of the unſucceſsful iſſue of the late conferences, he added, that theſe princes, being deeply impreſſed with a conviction of the neceſſity of putting a period to the war, had, in caſe it ſhould be found impracticable to eſtabliſh a laſting peace, commanded their ambaſſadors to recommend to the ſtates a truce of ſeveral years, provided that ſuch a truce could be obtained on advantageous and honorable terms. For, in recommending this meaſure, he ſubjoined, it is by a regard for the true intereſt and honor of the provinces, that the French and Britiſh kings are prompted, and therefore they exhort you to adopt it only on the following conditions: firſt, that the king of Spain and the archdukes ſhall treat with you as with a free people, over whom they pretended to

no authority; ſecondly, that, during the truce, you ſhall enjoy a free commerce both in Europe and in the Indies; and, thirdly, that you ſhall retain all the towns and territories which are at preſent in your poſſeſſion.

During this truce you will have leiſure to rectify the diſorders which have ſprung up during the continuance of the war, to pay your debts, to reform your government, to extend your trade, and, if you ſtudy to maintain internal union and tranquillity, this truce, it is probable, will terminate in a laſting peace, by which the advantages you have obtained will be perpetuated and ſecured: whereas, if at this time the war were to be renewed, we foreſee innumerable difficulties to which you will be expoſed; and perceive, that, in order to inſure ſucceſs, your friends muſt be much more liberal in their aſſiſtance, than is convenient for them in the preſent ſituation of their affairs.

You are diſſatisfied with the conduct of your adverſaries; but let not your reſentment prevent you from liſtening to the counſel of your friends. It is our intention to offer them the ſame counſel; and, if they refuſe to follow it, to acquaint them that the kings of France and Britain are determined to give you every proof of faithful friendſhip in their power. But in return for this, theſe princes expect that you will not, by your obſtinacy, engage them in a war to which they are utterly averſe, and for which, if this truce can be accompliſhed, there is no neceſſity.

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It will be difficult, we know, to obtain the conſent of the Catholic king to the preliminary articles; but, if that prince ſhall be found equally uncomplying and intractable, as you have hitherto experienced, and the treaty for a truce, like that for peace, ſhall, through his fault, prove abortive, you will be juſtified for again having recourſe to arms; and the princes too, whom we repreſent, will be juſtified for reſolving to exert themſelves with greater vigor in your behalf [26].

To this propoſal the ſtates general made no immediate reply, but that they would ſubmit it to the conſideration of the ſtates of the particular provinces.

It was ſoon after communicated to the marquis of Spinola, and the reſt of the archdukes commiſſioners, by whom it was received with all the ſatisfaction which might be expected from their well known averſion to the continuance of the war. But although they acknowledged how much pleaſure it would give them, if any means of an accommodation could be deviſed, they dreaded that the archdukes would be unable to perſuade the court of Spain to agree to the preliminary articles; and, for this reaſon, they labored to perſuade Jeannin to omit the two firſt articles altogether, and to attempt to conclude a truce without any other condition but that both parties ſhould retain what they poſſeſſed. It had been with the utmoſt reluctance, they repreſented, that the king of Spain had formerly conſented to

[26] Jean. ii. 412.

acknowledge

acknowledge the independence of the ſtates, even when he expected thereby to gain ſome conceſſion from them in favor of the Catholic religion; and to exclude them from the Indian trade, had been his principal motive for deſiring to put a period to the war. To procure his conſent, therefore, either to the firſt or to the ſecond of the preliminary articles, would be attended with difficulties, which, there was ground to apprehend, would be found inſuperable; and no other agreement was like to be obtained than a ceſſation of hoſtilities, or a truce in the common form, during which both parties ſhould retain what was at preſent in their poſſeſſion.

Jeannin was ſenſible of the truth of this repreſentation, and foreſaw the difficulties which the archdukes muſt encounter, if they liſtened to his propoſal; but, beſides that theſe princes were, above all things, ſolicitous to be delivered from a ruinous war, which filled their minds with perpetual diſquietude, and would employ all their influence to overcome the pride and obſtinacy of the court of Spain, he knew that the Spaniards were at preſent extremely ill prepared for the recommencement of hoſtilities, and hoped that on this account they might be induced to agree to terms, which, on another occaſion, they would have rejected with diſdain.

He would not, therefore, have been inclined to withdraw the preliminary articles, even although he had found himſelf at liberty; but they were a part (he ſaid) of the archdukes

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commiſſioners propoſal to the ſtates, and the honor both of the French and Engliſh monarchs, in whoſe name this propoſal had been made, was now pledged either to procure the acceptance of them by the archdukes and king of Spain, or to furniſh the ſtates with ſuch aſſiſtance as might be neceſſary for the proſecution of the war. This declaration he made to the archdukes commiſſioners in the moſt explicit terms; and added, that while it might be difficult to obtain the king of Spain's aſſent to the propoſed conditions, it was extremely doubtful whether theſe conditions were ſuch as would ſatisfy the people of the United Provinces; but the commiſſioners might firmly believe that nothing leſs than was contained in the preliminary articles would give ſatisfaction either to them, or to their friends.

Of the truth of this aſſertion, as far as it regarded the confederates, there was immediate proof in the difficulty which Jeannin encountered in perſuading them to agree to his propoſal. The greater part of the deputies of the particular provinces, being ſincerely ſolicitous for the eſtabliſhment of peace, were ſatisfied with the preliminary articles, and gave their opinion that the truce, with the conditions contained in theſe articles, ought not to be refuſed. But there were many, who, whether from motives of private intereſt, or a regard to the public ſafety, being deſirous of a continuance of the war, maintained that no agreement whatever ſhould be made, but on condition that the archdukes, and the king of

Spain, ſhould grant the ſame ſolemn acknowledgment of the liberty and independence of the ſtates, to which they had formerly conſented in treating for a perpetual peace, including an explicit renunciation for ever of all their claims of authority over the United Provinces.

The former of theſe parties was headed by Barnevelt, ſupported by the French and Engliſh ambaſſadors; and the latter by prince Maurice, whoſe opinion was eſpouſed not only by the whole province of Zealand, over which his authority was almoſt without control, but by the deputies of Amſterdam, and thoſe of ſeveral other cities in the province of Holland.

Parties for and againſt the peace.

The former endeavoured to perſuade the latter, that it was unreaſonable to expect the ſame liberal conceſſions from the enemy, in the caſe of a truce, as where a perpetual peace was to be eſtabliſhed; and that, while the ſtates were conſcious of being free and able to maintain their liberty, it was of no importance whether the Spaniards ſhould acknowledge, or refuſe to acknowledge, their independence; for it was ſufficient for every valuable purpoſe which they could have in view, if the Spaniards would treat with them as with a free people, and conclude an agreement upon equitable terms.

But theſe conſiderations had no weight with prince Maurice, or his partiſans. They were averſe to the truce on other accounts, beſides their objection to the declaratory clauſe, and labored to convince their countrymen that a truce,

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on whatever terms, at the preſent period, though it might be neceſſary for Spain, muſt prove pernicious and dangerous to the Dutch republic. They omitted no opportunity of inculcating their opinion, whether in public aſſemblies or in private ſocieties, and publiſhed innumerable letters and pamphlets, which being univerſally peruſed, became the ſubject of diſcourſe in every company. Of theſe writings ſome were of the moſt inflammatory kind, intended to inſtil ſuſpicions into the minds of the people, that Barnevelt and his friends, unable to reſiſt the allurement of Peruvian gold, had ſold their country to the Spaniards; and even the French and Britiſh monarchs, it was inſinuated, by ſo earneſtly recommending the truce, intended rather to ſerve the court of Spain than the United Provinces. Their ſuſpicions on this head were heightened by the arrival at Paris and London of two ambaſſadors, who had been ſent on their preſent embaſſy by the Spaniſh miniſters, though under a different pretext, yet, probably, with no other view but to procure the good offices of James and Henry in the preſent negociation in the Netherlands.

No pains were ſpared by the French and Engliſh ambaſſadors at the Hague, to convince the Dutch that their apprehenſions were without foundation. Above all the reſt, Jeannin labored aſſiduouſly for this end; and by giving the deputies of the ſtates the ſtrongeſt aſſurances that his maſter's friendſhip was inviolable, and that nothing could be more remote from his intention

than to enter into an alliance with Spain to the prejudice of their republic, he ſeems, with regard to this matter, in which they were ſo deeply intereſted, to have ſet their minds at eaſe. BOOK III. 1608.

The averſion, however, of a great number of them to the truce, and their animoſity againſt ſuch of their countrymen as promoted it, were as ſtrong as ever. Their reſentment was principally directed againſt Barnevelt, who, by his eloquence and addreſs, his great abilities, and long experience, had acquired an entire aſcendant over moſt of the deputies: he appears, however, to have been too ſenſibly affected on this occaſion by the odium to which he found himſelf expoſed. Having one day bitterly complained, in an aſſembly of the ſtates, of the cruel treatment which he received in the libels daily publiſhed on the ſubject, of the preſent controverſy, he appealed to the deputies, whether he had given juſt ground for ſuch injurious imputations as had been caſt upon him; and then left the aſſembly with a reſolution to retire from public life. But he ſoon recovered his tranquillity; and, at the earneſt deſire of the ſtates, he returned to the aſſembly, and afterwards continued to apply himſelf to the conduct of public affairs with the ſame indefatigable attention as before [27].

It would be injurious to the character of prince Maurice to ſuppoſe that he would demean himſelf ſo far as to be concerned in thoſe anonymous pamphlets and incendiary letters, replete with

[27] Grotius, &c. lib. xvi.

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threats againſt Barnevelt and his adherents, which were publiſhed on this occaſion. He took no pains to conceal his reſentment, and openly inveighed againſt their conduct, as being calculated to involve the provinces in ruin. Having viſited ſeveral of the towns in Holland, he labored to bring over the deputies to his opinion, and with the ſame intention he wrote a circular letter to all the other towns in the province.

What he ſaid and wrote on this occaſion was principally intended to inſpire the deputies with miſtruſt of the archdukes and the court of Spain, whoſe conduct, in the preſent negociation, he ſaid, had been inconſiſtent with their profeſſions in the beginning, and who could not have any reaſon for declining to grant the moſt explicit renunciation of their right of ſovereignty over the provinces, but that they ſecretly deſigned to aſſert that right when a more convenient ſeaſon ſhould arrive.

They would obſerve the truce only ſo long as they found it neceſſary for retrieving the ruinous condition of their affairs; and, mean while, the people of the United Provinces, deceived by a falſe appearance of tranquillity, would not only quit their arms, but would loſe their military ſpirit, and be induced to agree to whatever terms ſhould be preſcribed to them, rather, than again expoſe themſelves to the dangers or inconveniencies of war.

The Spaniards, it was evident, being utterly averſe to a perpetual peace, hoped to be able,

during the truce, to apply ſome effectual remedies to the diſorders which prevailed in their finances; whereas the ſtates having ſo great a number of frontier-towns, where numerous garriſons muſt be maintained, would have nearly the ſame expenſes to defray as during the continuance of the war. It would, however, be infinitely more difficult, after their apprehenſions of immediate danger were removed, to perſuade the people to pay the taxes which it would be neceſſary to impoſe; and the enemy would, at the ſame time, practiſe on their fidelity, and ſow the ſeeds of diſcord among the different towns and provinces, of which they would not fail to avail themſelves, without thinking it incumbent on them to delay hoſtilities till the expiration of the truce.

As this reaſoning of prince Maurice coincided with the prejudices which the Dutch had, for many years, entertained againſt the Spaniards, it made a ſtrong impreſſion on the minds of many of the deputies; nor was it conſidered either by Barnevelt or Jeannin, as frivolous. On the contrary, they treated it with the reſpect which was due to the perſon by whom it was employed, although they, at the ſame time, labored aſſiduouſly to ſhow that the arguments on their ſide had greater weight; and Jeannin, in his own name and that of the other ambaſſadors, preſented a memorial to the ſtates, of the following purport, intended to remove the objections that were urged by Maurice and his adherents.

Memorial of Jeannin preſented to the United States.

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"The princes whom we repreſent, being deeply intereſted in your proſperity, and believing the truce propoſed, to be neceſſary, in the preſent ſituation of your affairs, are therefore much concerned to obſerve the oppoſition which it meets with from ſo many reſpectable members of your ſtate.

"You ought not, they alledge, to be ſatisfied that the archdukes and the king of Spain are willing to treat with you as with a free people, over whom they pretend to no authority, but you ought to require a declaration that they will conſider you in this light for ever afterwards, as well as during the continuance of the truce.

"But in the opinion of the princes, our ſovereigns, your liberty is equally well ſecured by the former of theſe declarations as by the latter; becauſe the former, not being limited to any particular time, but expreſſed in terms that are general and indefinite, it muſt be underſtood by all the world in the ſame ſenſe, as if the words "for ever" were ſubjoined. Beſides this conſideration, it is not of the king of Spain and the archdukes, that you are to hold your liberty. You have long maintained that you are already free, having aſſerted your liberty by a public ſolemn deed, founded upon reaſon and neceſſity, and bravely defended it for many years againſt your oppreſſors, by the force of arms. You ought, therefore, to reſt ſatisfied with that ſimple acknowledgment of it, which is implied in the declaration of being ready to treat with you as with a free people. You would be ſatisfied with ſuch an

acknowledgment from any neutral or friendly power. You have equal reaſon to be ſatisfied when it is made by the archdukes, and the king of Spain. And you ought not, with ſo much ſolicitude, to require theſe princes to be more explicit, in declaring you to be free, leſt you be conſidered as thereby tacitly confeſſing that ſtill they have a right to your obedience.

"But, even allowing, that the king of Spain ſhould not think himſelf excluded by the form of words made choice of from his claim of ſovereignty, will he call you before a court of juſtice, do you ſuppoſe, in order to have his rights examined by the rules of law? It is not in this manner that ſovereigns aſſert their claims; it is only to the ſword that they appeal: and if you be able when the truce expires, to maintain your liberty as you have hitherto done againſt the force of arms, you will then, as well as now, with juſtice deſpiſe your enemy's pretenſions to dominion over you. It will be ſufficient then, as it is at preſent, to find yourſelves in actual poſſeſſion of your liberty. And, in whatever ſenſe the words of the truce may be underſtood by the king of Spain, you ought to be ſatisfied with the aſſurance which has been given you, and which we now repeat, that, by the princes whom we repreſent, whoſe friendſhip you have ſo long experienced, and on whoſe aſſiſtance you may with confidence rely, theſe words are conſidered as a clear and unambiguous declaration, that you are a free people over whom authority cannot ever be juſtly pretended by the king of Spain.

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"It is farther objected by thoſe who oppoſe the truce, that it will afford leiſure to the catholic king to retrieve the ruinous condition of his finances, and to proſecute the war, after the recommencement of hoſtilities, with greater vigor. Nor can it be denied, that if he was to liſten to the advice of wiſe and faithful counſellors, it might be, in ſome meaſure, attended with this effect. But is it to be preſumed that a young king, at the head of a nation noted for reſtleſs and inordinate ambition, with miniſters inattentive to economy, when the exigencies of his affairs required it, will be more attentive when his ſituation renders it unneceſſary? Is it not rather to be preſumed, that his treaſure will, more than ever, become a prey to the avarice or profuſion of his miniſters? that it will be more than ever laviſhed on idle pomp and ſhow; or that, by quarrelling with his neighbours, he ſhall ere long be engaged in ſome ambitious and expenſive enterpriſe?

"It is from your republic, and not from the king of Spain, that thoſe prudent meaſures may be expected, which are neceſſary to repair the miſchiefs that have been occaſioned by the war: you are equally diſtinguiſhed for your private and your public economy; and you are not leſs diſtinguiſhed for your induſtry, your activity, and enterpriſe. With theſe qualities, which you poſſeſs in ſo eminent a degree, your trade muſt every year be more extended; and, being carried on with ſmaller riſks, and at leſs expenſe, the profits ariſing from it will be greater than ever. You

will thereby be enabled to discharge your public debts, to relieve your people from the load of taxes under which they groan, and, when the truce expires, to prosecute the war with less dependence on your allies, and a greater probability of success. BOOK III. 1608.

It will still, indeed, be necessary for you to maintain garrisons in the frontier-towns, and to retain a considerable proportion of your troops in pay, that, whether the truce be observed or violated, you may be always found in a proper posture of defence.

"But at least the one half of your army may be disbanded. Your trade will, in the mean time, be carried on with much greater advantage than hitherto, and all those losses by sea and by land avoided, which you have so often represented to the kings, our masters, as the cause why you were unable, of yourselves, to defray the necessary expenses of the war.

"But your enemies, it is alledged by the opposers of the truce, will have access during the continuance of it, to carry on their intrigues among the people; to sow dissensions among the towns and provinces, and to persuade some of them perhaps to abandon the confederacy; while the people themselves, delivered from the apprehensions of immediate danger, will refuse to pay the taxes which the states shall find it necessary to impose.

"With regard to these objections, as we do not pretend to any certain foresight of futurity,

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we will not affirm that they are entirely deſtitute of foundation. There is no ſtate of human ſociety that is not ſubject to inconveniencies and dangers; and there are dangers attending peace as well as war: but the dangers mentioned are ſuch as, with prudent precautions, it is in your power to avoid. The objections founded on the apprehenſions of them are equally applicable to a peace, as to a truce; and if they are ſufficient to deter you from liſtening to our propoſal of a truce, they ought to determine you to perſiſt in the proſecution of the war, till you have accompliſhed the utter ruin of your enemy. But you are too wiſe to propoſe to yourſelves an object inadequate to your ſtrength. And, therefore, unleſs you chuſe to live in perpetual war, which muſt much ſooner prove the ruin of your republic than of the Spaniſh monarchy, you muſt, ſooner or later, agree to bring the war to a concluſion, either by a peace, or by a truce. A peace on the terms which you require, is at preſent unattainable; and even although it were in your power to procure it, yet, in the opinion of many of your friends, a truce is more deſirable. For it is a ſort of medium between peace and war, and it might prove dangerous for you, before your political inſtitutions have acquired that ſtability which time alone can beſtow, to paſs at once from the one extreme to the other. It might occaſion too great a relaxation of the vigor which you have been ſo long accuſtomed to exert, and expoſe you an eaſy prey to the reſentment of your enemy.

"But during the continuance of the truce, you will look forward to the expiration of it. By keeping your fortifications in repair, and your troops under proper diſcipline, joined to a prudent adminiſtration of your finances, you will provide for that event; and thus, when the Spaniards ſhall perceive that you are well prepared for your defence, they will more eaſily agree to thoſe equitable terms of peace, which at this time their pride and their ſenſe of ſhame have determined them to reject.

"The example of the Swiſs cantons, whoſe fortune ſo nearly reſembles yours, ought to engage you to liſten to the counſel which we offer. Like you, they had thrown off the yoke of their oppreſſors, and their arms had generally been attended with ſucceſs; yet they agreed to a truce, when propoſed to them, on much leſs advantageous terms than thoſe which you are exhorted to accept; and, during the leiſure which it afforded them, they put their civil government and their military eſtabliſhments on ſo reſpectable a footing, as effectually determined their ancient maſters to lay aſide the thoughts of a farther proſecution of the war. From the ſame conduct it is likely that you will derive the ſame advantages. The king of Spain will more eaſily conſent on equitable terms, to a truce than to a perpetual peace, becauſe he may think that his dignity will ſuffer leſs from making temporary than perpetual conceſſions: but many circumſtances, it may be preſumed, will concur to deter him from a renewal

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of hoſtilities. His animoſity and reſentment will be abated; his ancient ſovereignty over you will be, in ſome meaſure, obſolete and forgotten: having taſted the ſweets of tranquillity, he will deſire to preſerve it undiſturbed: he will have experienced that it is the intereſt of his ſubjects at home, and ſtill more of thoſe in the Indies and America, to live at peace with you. And, as it will be impoſſible, unleſs you be greatly wanting to yourſelves, but that, ſome years hence, you muſt be poſſeſſed of greater reſources than at preſent, he muſt perceive the danger of engaging in war with you, after your power is eſtabliſhed and confirmed; when he conſiders, that in the very infancy of your ſtate, his moſt vigorous efforts to reduce you to obedience were of no avail.

"What has been ſaid will be ſufficient, it is hoped, to evince that the objections againſt the truce, which have been urged by its oppoſers, ought not to deter you from agreeing to it, in caſe the conſent of the king of Spain can be procured to the terms propoſed. Theſe objections indeed are urged by ſome of the moſt reſpectable members of the ſtate, whoſe zeal for the proſperity of the republic is unqueſtionable. But the wiſeſt men are ſubject to error. It may be true, that ſome inconveniencies may ariſe from the truce, but it ſhould ſeem that much greater are to be dreaded from a continuance of the war. And, it is a firſt principle of prudence, of two evils to make choice of the leaſt.

"Before we conclude this memorial, it is neceſſary to remind you of two things, which deſerve your attention. Firſt, that it is not only the counſel; but the earneſt requeſt of thoſe princes, to whom you have been chiefly indebted for aſſiſtance, that you ſhould adopt the meaſure we have recommended: and, ſecondly, that ſo favorable a concurrence of circumſtances as the preſent, for obtaining equitable terms of accommodation, may never again occur. The archdukes are princes on whoſe fidelity you can with ſafety rely for the punctual performance of their engagements: they are fond of peace; at their earneſt entreaty, the king of Spain hath already made, and is ſtill likely to make more ample conceſſions than could otherwiſe have juſtly been expected; and in conducting the treaty propoſed, you will have all the aſſiſtance that can be given you by two powerful monarchs, who conſider your intereſt as their own [28]."

This memorial did not immediately produce the deſired effect upon all the deputies. Several of the towns in Holland, and the whole province of Zealand, with prince Maurice at their head, ſtill remained as averſe to the truce as ever; and Maurice ſtill continued to employ his influence to confirm them in their reſolution of oppoſing it. By his emiſſaries, and his letters, he attempted

[28] Negociations de Jeannin, tom. iii. p. 9. Eſcrit fait par Monſieur Jeannin, au nom de tous les ambaſſadeurs, jour treizieme Octobre, & mis és mains de Meſſieurs Les Eſtats.

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to gain over the other towns and provinces to his opinion. He ſometimes talked as if both the French and Britiſh monarchs were purſuing their private intereſt, at the expenſe of the republic. He inſinuated that, unleſs they ſhould drop the propoſal of a truce, and immediately agree to aſſiſt the ſtates more liberally than hitherto in proſecuting the war, the more diſtant parts of the provinces ought to be abandoned, and the territories of the republic contracted within ſuch narrow limits, as might be defended by the forces which the Dutch themſelves, without foreign aſſiſtance; were able to ſupport. He alledged, that no matter of ſo great importance as was at preſent under deliberation, could be adopted without the unanimous conſent of all the towns and provinces: and threatened, that the province of Zealand, if forſaken by the other provinces, would alone maintain the war againſt the Spaniards, till more ample conceſſions were obtained [25].

The French monarch could not avoid feeling ſome reſentment at his conduct, which he conſidered as equally violent and injurious. But Henry's candor would not ſuffer him to diveſt himſelf of that eſteem which he had long entertained for the prince's character; nor to believe the ſuggeſtions of his enemies, that he was actuated by ſome ſiniſter deſign. He ſtill wrote to him as to a friend whom he highly reſpected, ſparing no pains, and employing every argument to engage him to adopt his views.

Henry's

[25] Jeannin, tom. iii.

Henry's endeavours were well ſeconded by Jeannin, who acted with the moſt conſummate prudence, and carefully avoided giving any perſonal offence to prince Maurice, while he exerted himſelf with great activity in counteracting his deſigns. By the eloquence and addreſs of Barnevelt, joined to the influence which he derived from his great experience, and the high opinion which was juſtly entertained of his public ſpirit and integrity, Amſterdam and all the other towns in Holland were reconciled to the truce, on the terms propoſed; and not long after, prince Maurice and the province of Zealand, with whom Jeannin and the Engliſh ambaſſadors, aſſiſted by deputies ſent thither by the other provinces, aſſiduouſly employed all their influence, were perſuaded to relinquiſh their oppoſition.

Reluctance of Philip, to acknowledge the independence of the United States.

The archdukes were employing in the mean time their intereſt at Madrid to obtain the conſent of Philip; who, from the beginning, had diſcovered no leſs reluctance to Jeannin's propoſal than prince Maurice or the province of Zealand. Far from being averſe to a truce, this prince was exceedingly deſirous that it ſhould take place, provided it could be concluded on the ordinary condition of both parties retaining what was at preſent in their poſſeſſion. But to acknowledge the independence of his rebellious ſubjects, and formally to grant them his permiſſion to carry on their trade in India, were conditions with which he himſelf and many of his ſubjects thought it ignominious to comply.

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The archdukes endeavoured to convince him, that in making these concessions, they would do nothing more than had been already done in consenting to the suspension of arms, and that no more important consequences could arise from it. They engaged to have the article relative to the Indian trade expressed in such a manner, that it should not materially affect the interest or the trade of Spain.

They represented, that the declaration so earnestly required by the United States, could not do any prejudice to the king's right of sovereignty, that it could not remain in force but while the truce subsisted, and that the Hollanders would find it of no avail, after the renewal of hostilities, if his majesty's arms were crowned with victory. They added that this was the opinion of the ambassadors of the mediating powers, and likewise of many members of the states of the revolted provinces, who opposed the truce on account of the insignificancy of the clause which contained the declaration of their liberty.

These considerations, urged by such powerful solicitors, had great weight with Philip, who would have yielded his consent, provided that some concession could have been obtained in favor of the Catholic inhabitants of the United Provinces. And he had some ground, he thought, to entertain the hope of being able, in some measure, to accomplish this object, in which he was more deeply interested than in any other, when he considered that the prince who was the chief mediator

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Religious ſcruples of Philip.

in the preſent negociation, was himſelf a Catholic. But the archdukes having informed him, that Jeannin, whoſe zeal for the Popiſh faith was unqueſtionable, had declared that it would be in vain to attempt to introduce any propoſal concerning religion among the preliminary articles, Philip doubted whether he could enter with a good conſcience into any treaty with ſuch determined heretics; and therefore heſitated, for ſome time, whether he ſhould not utterly reject the truce, whatever conſequences might follow.

In order to diſpel his ſcruples, the archduke ſent to Madrid his confeſſor, Ignatio Brizuela, a Spaniard of noble birth, eminently diſtinguiſhed for his piety and virtue, and of great experience in the affairs of the Netherlands.

Brizuela knew well how to make impreſſion on the timid, ſuperſtitious mind of Philip; and judiciouſly employed religion itſelf as a motive, which ſhould induce him to comply with the archdukes requeſt. If in the courſe of the treaty, ſaid he, any indulgence can be procured for the Catholic inhabitants, the French ambaſſador will exert his moſt ſtrenuous endeavours in their behalf; but it is neceſſary, he added, even for the intereſt of religion, that the truce ſhould be concluded, leſt, conſidering the difficulties under which the archdukes muſt labor in reſuming the war, inſtead of re-eſtabliſhing the Catholic faith in the rebellious provinces, it ſhall be expoſed to danger in thoſe which have been brought back to their allegiance.

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To this reaſoning, Philip liſtened with great attention, and ſeemed to be in a great meaſure ſatisfied, that he ought not any longer to withhold his conſent; but choſe, as uſual, before he gave an explicit anſwer, to hear the opinion of his favorite the duke of Lerma. The duke had not, it ſhould ſeem, as yet formed a deciſive reſolution with regard to the part which it would be moſt prudent for him to act on the preſent occaſion. He had long experienced the moſt inſurmountable difficulties in furniſhing the neceſſary expenſes of the war; and he dreaded, if it were not ſpeedily brought to a concluſion, ſome great diſaſter might happen in the Netherlands, which would not be aſcribed to the marquis of Spinola, who had ſo often given the moſt unqueſtionable proofs of military prudence and capacity, but to him, by whom that general had been diſappointed in the ſupplies and reinforcements which had been promiſed him. For this reaſon, and perhaps too as was ſuſpected by his cotemporaries, from his jealouſy of Spinola, who had rendered himſelf of ſo great importance as to rival him, or at leaſt to enjoy too large a ſhare in the royal favor, he had from the beginning been extremely intent on the eſtabliſhing of peace. Obſerving, however, that both the pride of the Spaniſh nation, and Philip's ſuperſtition, were alarmed by the conceſſions demanded by the ſtates, he had not ventured to adviſe a compliance with their requeſts. But it would be much eaſier, he was perſuaded to reconcile the Spaniards to the truce, than to a peace,

as the conceſſions to be made in the former were not to be perpetual; and Philip's religious ſcruples being in a great meaſure removed, by what the confeſſor had repreſented to him, he laid aſide that heſitation and reſerve with which he had hitherto acted; and uniting his influence to that of Brizuela, and of ſeveral other Spaniſh eccleſiaſtics, who were devoted to his intereſt, he ſoon perſuaded Philip to grant his ratification of the preliminary articles. It was immediately tranſmitted to the archdukes, accompanied with a recommendation, to avoid, if poſſible, the conſenting to an expreſs permiſſion of the Indian trade; and, if poſſible, likewiſe to procure ſome indulgence for the Popiſh inhabitants in the United Provinces [30].

Philip ratifies the preliminary articles.

During the confeſſor's ſtay at Madrid, the French and Engliſh ambaſſadors were employed in preparing at the Hague the ſeveral articles of the treaty. And as the archdukes commiſſioners had ſome months before, at the deſire of the ſtates, who dreaded their ſecret practices among the deputies, returned to Bruſſels, the negociations between the mediators and them had hitherto been carried on by letters.

But as this method of conducting it was attended with the moſt tedious delays, Jeannin in his own name, and that of the other ambaſſadors, propoſed to the archdukes that they ſhould ſend their

[30] Bentivoglio paſſim. Négociations de Jeannin. tom. iii. p. 223, 224. & 329, 330. Grotius. Winwood, vol. ii. p. 318. 400, &c. Jeannin, tom. iii. p. 10. & tom. ii. p. 335.

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commiſſioners to meet with them at Antwerp. This propoſal was readily complied with, and both parties arrived in that place in the beginning of February 1609.

The ambaſſadors had brought with them a copy of the articles of the truce, of which they had obtained the approbation of the ſtates; and they had engaged, that unleſs the archdukes commiſſioners ſhould adopt it without any material alteration, within eight days after their arrival in Antwerp, they ſhould break off the conferences, and decline all further negociation on the ſubject. Both the archdukes and Spaniards, they knew, were at preſent utterly unprepared for the renewal of the war, and nothing, they believed, would contribute ſo much to quicken their reſolutions, as the dread of its being inſtantly renewed.

But when the reſolution of the ſtates was communicated to the Spaniſh or archdukes commiſſioners, they complained that their maſters were rather uſed unhandſomely, and repreſented that the time allowed was too ſhort for the diſpatch of buſineſs of ſo great importance. The ambaſſadors were ſenſible of the truth of what they ſaid, and obtained the conſent of the ſtates, to prolong the time; after which both parties began ſeriouſly to apply themſelves to the diſcuſſion of the ſeveral articles of the treaty.

Againſt the fundamental article, which regarded the liberty and independence of the revolted provinces, the commiſſioners offered no objection, except to the title aſſumed in it by the ſtates,

of High and Mighty Lords, which they ſo obſtinately oppoſed; that inſtead of the terms high and mighty, the ambaſſadors were obliged to ſubſtitute the word illuſtrious. An article relating to contributions, amounting yearly to 300,000 crowns, which had been paid to the Dutch, by the inhabitants of the open country in Brabant, in order to procure an exemption from being plundered, was the occaſion of much altercation. The ſtates very unreaſonably required that theſe contributions ſhould be continued during the truce. But the mediators, having repreſented to them the injuſtice of this requeſt, and that the levying of contributions was equivalent to a continuance of hoſtilities, they at length conſented that the article ſhould be expunged, and in return for this conceſſion, the archdukes agreed to yield to them ſome extenſive diſtricts adjoining to Bergen-op-Zoom, Breda, and other places, in the poſſeſſion of the ſtates, upon condition that ſuch of the inhabitants of theſe diſtricts as were Catholics ſhould be indulged in the free exerciſe of their religion. BOOK III. 1609.

A propoſal was made for a mutual exchange of towns, which the contending parties had lately conquered from each other; but as the conqueſts of the Dutch had been much more important than thoſe of the archdukes, no expedient could be deviſed, to which the former thought it their intereſt to agree: and for this reaſon, it was at length determined that both parties ſhould retain the towns at preſent in their poſſeſſion. The

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Dutch were equally averſe to another propoſal, which was urged with much earneſtneſs by the Spaniſh commiſſioners, that all thoſe duties ſhould be aboliſhed, which were exacted in Zealand from ſhips entering the Scheld, in their way to Antwerp. They gave ſome ground however to expect that this matter might afterwards be amicably adjuſted: and the archdukes were the more eaſily perſuaded to drop their requeſt, as they hoped to be able in the time of peace to improve their poſts on the coaſt of Flanders, and thereby to rival the Dutch in thoſe branches of commerce which they had engroſſed during the ſubſiſtence of the war.

Conteſts about the Indian trade.

But of all the articles of the preſent treaty, the moſt difficult to be adjuſted to the mutual ſatisfaction of the parties, was that which regarded the Indian trade. The archdukes were aware that unleſs the Dutch were gratified in this point, no accommodation whatever could take place; nor were they or their ſubjects perſonally intereſted in refuſing to comply with their requeſt. But being well acquainted with the obſtinate and abſurd reluctance of the Spaniards againſt making any conceſſion on this ſubject, they ſtill ſuſpected, notwithſtanding their ſanguine hopes of the ſucceſs of Brizuela's application, that the king would never conſent to ratify the truce, if this conceſſion were explicitly expreſſed. They were, for this reaſon, extremely ſolicitous to perſuade the French and Engliſh ambaſſadors to agree to ſuch an indirect form of expreſſion, as might not alarm the

pride or prejudice of the Spaniards, while it would admit of being interpreted in favor of the Dutch. The ambaſſadors were not averſe to this expedient; and they afterwards prevailed upon the ſtates to conſent to it, by giving them a declaration in writing, that notwithſtanding the generality and obſcurity of the terms in which the article was couched, they underſtood it as containing a full permiſſion to the Dutch to carry on their trade in every part of India, that was not under the dominion of the crown of Spain; and by engaging likewiſe in the name of the kings whom they repreſented, to guarantee this article relative to the Indian trade, as well as all the other articles of the preſent treaty [31].

Such were the principal points diſcuſſed between the archdukes commiſſioners, and the French and Engliſh ambaſſadors, in the conferences that were held at Antwerp. Soon after the confeſſor arrived at Bruſſels with Philip's ratification of the preliminary articles; and nothing now remained, but to ſettle ſome matters of ſmaller conſequence, and to give the treaty its juſt form, in order to its being ſigned by the contending powers

In conſequence of permiſſion from the archdukes, the Dutch commiſſioners formerly mentioned, who had hitherto remained at the Hague, repaired to Antwerp: and that no ſolemnity might be wanting to a deed of ſo great importance, an extraordinary aſſembly of deputies from all the

[31] Bentivoglio. Grotius, lib. ult. &c.

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provinces and towns of the union, was ſummoned to meet at Bergen op-Zoom, where they might be at hand to ratify the ſeveral articles of the treaty, as ſoon as they ſhould be digeſted by the commiſſioners into proper form. As the confederates had not for many years been engaged in any matter in which they were ſo deeply intereſted, there were more than eight hundred deputies preſent in this aſſembly.

The commiſſioners, together with the French and Engliſh ambaſſadors, had meetings every day in the Hotel de Ville of Antwerp; and there was ſtill conſiderable diverſity of ſentiments among them with regard to certain articles of the treaty, and particularly with reſpect to the time during which the truce ſhould ſubſiſt. It was at length agreed, that it ſhould be concluded for twelve years from the preſent period; and as ſoon as this and the other points in diſpute were ſettled, and the treaty drawn up in the uſual form, it was tranſmitted to Bruſſels and Bergen-op-Zoom, to receive the ſanction of the archdukes and of the ſtates; and was finally concluded on the 9th of April 1609.

Treaty for a peace concluded.

It conſiſted of eight-and-thirty articles, the moſt important of which were thoſe which have been already mentioned. The reſt had been prepared by Barnevelt, and were equally calculated to promote the ſecurity and intereſt of individuals and of the ſtate [12]. No individuals had merited

[12] Among other articles it was ſtipulated that, during the continuance of the truce, all hoſtilities ſhould ceaſe by ſeas, rivers, and land, between the ſubjects, inhabitants, and

ſo highly from the republic as thoſe of the family of Naſſau; and all parties readily concurred in

perſons reſident in the territories of the king of Spain and the archdukes, on the one hand, and the United States, on the other, without any exception of places or perſons whatever.

That either party ſhould retain ſafe and entire poſſeſſion of whatever provinces, cities, places, lands and principalities it then enjoyed; and that the ſame conditions ſhould be obſerved with regard to diſtricts, villages, and lands and territories thereon depending.

That the ſubjects, and perſons reſiding in the dominions of Spain and the archdukes, of the one part, and of the United States, of the other, ſhould mutually cultivate good-will and friendſhip.

That all reproach, reſentment, and revenge on account of paſt hoſtilities and injuries ſhould ceaſe; and that there ſhould be a free and equal trade between the ſubjects of the contracting parties by rivers, ſeas, and land.

That it ſhould not be lawful to ſtop or lay hands on merchants, proprietors of ſhips, ſhipmaſters, or their crews, or the ſhips, or merchandize, or goods of any kind, on any pretence: but that juſtice ſhould have its uſual courſe for the recovery of debts, and in criminal proſecutions.

If any judgments or ſentences had been paſſed againſt the adherents of either party, on the footing of contumacy, and that ſuch perſons had been condemned without being defended, either in civil or criminal cauſes, ſuch judgments or ſentences were not to be carried into execution during the truce, either againſt the perſons or goods of individuals ſo condemned.

Such perſons, or their heirs and executors, as had ſuffered the loſs of their property through the rage of party, or the violence of war; by the rapine and injuſtice of individuals, and without the authority of the magiſtrates, and the countenance and protection of the laws; ſuch perſons were to be reinſtated, in virtue of the preſent treaty, in the full poſſeſſion and enjoyment of their effects and eſtates, even although

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giving them proof on this occaſion of their reſpect and gratitude. By one article of the truce it was

they ſhould have actually paſſed into the condition, and aſſumed the appearance and nature of goods confiſcated: whether they might have been depoſited as pledges, given away as donations, or alienated and transferred by any ſpecies of bargain, tranſaction, or renunciation.

If the goods or eſtates ſhall have paſſed out of the exchequer, and been diſpoſed of to Private poſſeſſors, then it was ſtipulated, that intereſt ſhould be paid to the right owners of the goods, or eſtates, at the rate of 6¼ per cent. per annum. And if this payment ſhould be delayed, it was agreed, that the proprietors ſhould be paid out of the ſtock or capital. But if the diſpoſal or transference of ſuch goods and eſtates, by the exchequer, had been accompanied with ſuch ſolemnities as conſtitute legal deeds, and the names of the right owners been eraſed and ſuperſeded, by ſuch legal formalities as conſtitute legal rights and claims, yet even in that caſe, it was provided, that their eſtates, rights, and properties ſhould be reſtored to the right owners, they refunding to any perſons that might be at that time in poſſeſſion, the bona fide price (where any had been given) which ſuch perſons might have paid on purchaſing any of the ſaid lands or properties ſince the confiſcation, within the ſpace of a year from the date of the preſent treaty.

That no length of time, not even the whole ſpace from the very beginning of the commotions in 1567, ſhould be conſidered as having conferred a preſcriptive right to property.

Perſons who, during the courſe of the preſent war, had retired into the dominions of neutral powers, were to be comprehended, and have the full benefit and advantage of the treaty: they were to return, if they were ſo inclined, to the places of their former abodes, or to ſettle in whatever place they ſhould chuſe, provided always, that they ſhould comply with eſtabliſhed manners, laws, and cuſtoms.

It was declared, in general terms, that all confiſcations, and diſinheriſons, and transferences of property that had ori-

provided that none of the deſcendants of William, the firſt prince of Orange, ſhould be liable for the debts which that prince had contracted from the year 1567 till his death. And by another, that ſuch of his eſtates, within the territory of the archdukes, as had been confiſcated, ſhould be reſtored, and his heirs permitted to enjoy them unmoleſted during the continuance of the truce [33].

The archdukes engaged that theſe and all the other articles ſhould, within the ſpace of three months, be ratified by the king of Spain; and the king's deed of ratification was accordingly delivered to the ſtates a few days before the expiration of that term, to transfer to his brother and his children the ſeveral high employments which he held at whatever period he ſhould think fit. Theſe reſolutions of the ſtates ſeem to have originated from the French monarch, and were

ginated in the violence of civil war, and the bitterneſs of party-zeal, ſhould be broken, cancelled, and to all intents and purpoſes, null and void.

[33] Beſides theſe proofs of attachment to the family of the prince of Orange, the ſtates had, ſome time before the concluſion of the truce, reſolved that prince Maurice's appointments, as admiral and captain-general, ſhould not ſuffer any diminution from the reduction of the forces. They even gave him an additional revenue, as a compenſation for his ſhare of the prizes and contributions; and they likewiſe augmented the appointments of prince Henry Frederic, and count William Lewis of Naſſau. Such was the concluſion of that negociation, which, for more than two years, had employed the attention, not only of the contracting parties, but likewiſe of moſt of the other princes and ſtates in Europe.

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formed at the inſtance of Barnevelt, whom Jeannin had engaged to enter into his maſter's views. No perſon queſtioned that prince Maurice's family were well entitled to every mark of favor which the ſtates could beſtow; it was rather unfortunate however for the prince's character that, after ſo violent an oppoſition to the truce, his acquieſcence in it was ſo quickly followed by pecuniary rewards. But although his enemies were diſpoſed to inſinuate that theſe rewards were rather to be conſidered as the price of his ſilence, than as rewards for his former ſervices, there is nothing to juſtify theſe inſinuations in the numerous letters extant in Jeannin's negociations, either of the king or the miniſters of France.

The Dutch were henceforward conſidered as a free and independent people. Having gained immortal honor by the magnanimity which they had diſplayed during the continuance of the war, they were now conſidered as having obtained the reward which their virtue merited, and were every where reſpected and admired. Their miniſters at foreign courts were now received with the ſame diſtinction as thoſe of other ſovereign powers; and their alliance was courted by nations who had formerly regarded them as rebels, that muſt ſpeedily ſubmit to the yoke which they had ſhaken off.

On the other hand, the reputation of the Spaniſh nation received a mortal wound; and their

power ceaſed to be regarded with the ſame dread as formerly. They had been foiled by a handful of their own ſubjects, and would not, it was ſuppoſed, any longer pretend to give law to other nations. The high ſpirited nobility, and the people in general, were ſecretly mortified by the conceſſions which the Dutch had been able to extort; and were ready to aſcribe the humiliation which the nation had ſuffered, not ſo much to any inſurmountable difficulty in the conteſt in which it had been ſo long engaged, as to miſconduct and want of vigor on the part of government.

THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF PHILIP THE THIRD, KING OF SPAIN.

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THE Spaniſh nation was now at peace with all the world, except the piratic ſtates of Barbary; and it might juſtly have been expected that the king and his miniſters would have inſtantly applied themſelves to the healing of thoſe wounds which the monarchy had received during the continuance of the war. But their incapacity for government, joined to their bigoted zeal for the Catholic ſuperſtition, prevented them from availing themſelves of the tranquillity which they enjoyed, and determined them to engage in a new enterpriſe, which, although their endeavours were attended with greater ſucceſs, than had accompanied their attempt to ſubdue the United Provinces, proved no leſs pernicious to the national proſperity. The Spaniſh arms had been unſucceſsfully employed againſt foreign nations, for more than half a century; and all ranks of men had felt the neceſſity of putting a period to the war; yet

no

no ſooner was peace eſtabliſhed, than it was reſolved to expel from the boſom of the kingdom ſeveral hundred thouſands of its moſt induſtrious inhabitants.

Account of the Moreſcoes.

The Moreſcoes had lived in Spain for more than eight hundred years; and ſtill, after ſo long a period, remained a ſeparate people, diſtinguiſhed from the Spaniards by their language, their religion, their character, and their manners.

The preſent race were the deſcendants of thoſe fanatic warriors, who, iſſuing forth from the deſarts of Arabia, actuated with the wild ambition of compelling mankind to embrace the Mahometan ſuperſtition, had, with the moſt aſtoniſhing rapidity, reduced under ſubjection to their caliphs Perſia, Syria, Paleſtine, and Egypt, and had afterwards extended their conqueſts as far as the Straits of Gibraltar along the coaſt of Africa. From Africa they tranſported an army into Spain, where in leſs than two years they expelled the Chriſtian inhabitants from all the open and more fertile parts of the kingdom, and obliged them to take ſhelter in the mountainous regions of Aſturia, and the other northern provinces.

Spain had, about three centuries before, been conquered by the Goths, who had not only embraced the religion, but had likewiſe, as far as could be expected from ignorant Barbarians, adopted the language of the former inhabitants, and the diſtinction between the conquerors and the conquered had long been loſt. Their language was that corrupt dialect of the Roman tongue,

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with a mixture of the Gothic, which is ſtill the language of Caſtile; and their religion was the Chriſtian mingled with the ſuperſtitions of the church of Rome. They held the religion of their invaders in great abhorrence, and being at the ſame time zealouſly attached to their own, great numbers of them choſe, rather than be guilty of apoſtacy, to abandon the fertile provinces which they had ſo long inhabited, and to fly, with their wives and children, to thoſe uncultivated parts of the kingdom, where, amidſt caves and rocks, they might maintain their religion and their liberty.

The Moors, in the mean time, eſtabliſhed their dominion in Portugal, in the greater part of Caſtile, Murcia, Andaluſia, Valencia, and Granada. Their kings made choice of Cordova for their place of reſidence; and, as numerous ſupplies of people every year arrived from Africa, they ſoon attained ſuch a degree of ſtrength as convinced the Chriſtians, that no attempt to recover their poſſeſſions could prove effectual.

A predatory war however was begun, within half a century after the conqueſt, and the Chriſtians, excited and conducted by Pelagio, and other deſcendants of their ancient kings, gave many ſignal proofs of heroic bravery; but their ſucceſs did not fully correſpond to their exertions, till a conſiderable time afterwards, when various cauſes concurred to render the conteſt leſs unequal.

Their character.

The Moors, naturally prone to eaſe and pleaſure, had loſt much of that warlike ſpirit, which

they had derived from the ſanguinary genius of their religion. Their kings were weak men, diſſolved in luxury, had been from the beginning extremely ill obeyed by their viceroys, and at length theſe viceroys, on whom their kings, agreeably to the oriental manners of government, devolved too great a ſhare of their authority, ſhook off their allegiance, aſſumed the titles of kings themſelves, and erected their governments into ſeparate independent ſtates. They were often engaged in war againſt each other, or the king of Cordova, from whom they had revolted. Their ſtrength was thereby much impaired; and they could ſeldom act in concert againſt their common enemy. BOOK IV. 1609.

It was long before the Chriſtians could rightly improve the opportunities which were thus afforded them. For they too were divided into ſeveral unconnected ſovereignties; and, for many years, through miſunderſtandings, joined to the diſtance at which they lay from one another, they found it no leſs difficult to act in concert than the Moors. But, at length, ſeveral of theſe little ſovereignties being united under one head [1], the war was carried on with greater vigor than ever on the part of the Chriſtians. The Mahometans were, in numberleſs rencounters, overpowered. They were expelled from many parts of the open country, of which they had long held poſſeſſion, and had much reaſon to apprehend that, if they did not correct the errors in their government, or

[1] Under Sancho, an. 1035. Mariana, lib. viii.

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conduct, which had occaſioned their misfortunes, they muſt ere long ſink under the growing power and ſuperior bravery of the enemy.

Their downfal was long retarded by the folly of the Chriſtians, who, on numberleſs occaſions, ſuffered equally with the Moors, from the want of concord. Far from taking warning from the misfortunes of the Moors, they were almoſt continually at war with each other, and often ſeemed to be no leſs intent on one another's deſtruction, than on that of their common enemy. It often happened that, by the conqueſts which they obtained over each other, ſtates of a conſiderable magnitude were formed, the ſovereigns of which, if they had acted wiſely, muſt have proved an overmatch for the Moors. But theſe ſtates were no ſooner formed than they were again diſſolved, through the pernicious practice adopted by the kings, of dividing their dominions among their children. This practice, of which there are many inſtances in the hiſtory of Spain, was, at different periods, a copious ſource of animoſity and diſcord. It proved equally pernicious to the people, and to the families of the kings, and long rendered it impoſſible for them to make any conſiderable effort againſt the infidels.

Their exertions, however, were generally much more vigorous and ſucceſsful than thoſe of their opponents; and before the end of the thirteenth century, they had acquired the kingdoms of Caſtile, Navarre, Arragon, Murcia, and Valencia. Their inteſtine diviſions ſtill aroſe, at times, to the

ſame height as formerly; and the Chriſtian, as well as the Mahometan parts of Spain, exhibited, almoſt every year, ſome new ſcenes of bloodſhed and devaſtation; till towards the end of the fifteenth century, when, by the marriage of Ferdinand with Iſabella, the crown of Caſtile was united to that of Arragon: an event which, while it in a great meaſure ſecured internal tranquillity to the Chriſtians, gave them a decided ſuperiority over their ancient enemies.

At this period, the only Mooriſh kingdom which remained unconquered was that of Granada, which contained a great extent of fertile country, and ſeveral of the ſtrongeſt towns in Spain. From the ſituation of ſome of the chief of theſe towns on the ſea-coaſt, the Moors could eaſily receive aſſiſtance from their friends in Africa; and Ferdinand was, on this account, the more ſolicitous to deprive them of ſo important a poſſeſſion.

This artful prince was ſeldom at a loſs to find pretexts to color his ambitious enterpriſes; and the preſent juncture was the moſt favorable to his deſign which could juſtly be expected. There were two competitors, at this time, for the crown of Granada, Albohardill, and his nephew Boabdilla; and the whole kingdom was torn in pieces by the contending parties, who often ſatiated their vengeance in each other's blood.

Ferdinand could not ſuffer ſo favorable an opportunity to eſcape: he firſt entered into an alliance with the nephew againſt the uncle, under the cover of which he made war upon the latter,

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and expelled him from his territories; and ſoon afterwards, he turned his arms againſt his ally, made himſelf maſter of the city of Granada [2], and all his other fortified places; and, although he ſtill affected to treat him with reſpect, he ſoon rendered it neceſſary for him to abandon his dominions, and retire to Africa.

In the proſecution of the war, Ferdinand gave proof of great abilities, as well as of the moſt conſummate artifice. Notwithſtanding which it was protracted to the unuſual length of ten years; and, from the difficulty which he encountered in his operations againſt a people ſo much weakened by inteſtine diviſions, it is probable that he would not have been able to complete their ſubjection, if their whole force united had been employed in repelling his attacks. Their kings had, in a great meaſure, loſt their affection by their folly and miſconduct; and, for this reaſon, they were not ſo reluctant, as they would otherwiſe have been, againſt transferring their allegiance: but they required, and Ferdinand judged it expedient, to grant them ſuch conditions as they thought would put them nearly on the ſame footing with his other ſubjects.

Of theſe conditions it was one that they ſhould be permitted the free exerciſe of their religion; and for the firſt ſeven years after the conqueſt, no violence was offered them on that account. Ferdinand expected, that after the abolition of their government, they might eaſily be converted

[2] An 1492.

to the Chriſtian faith. But, finding that the inſtructions of the eccleſiaſtics on this head were not attended with the deſired effect, he reſolved, notwithſtanding his engagement confirmed by an oath, rather to employ compulſion, than any longer to indulge ſo great a proportion of his ſubjects in the exerciſe of a falſe religion.

He made choice of the celebrated Ximenes, achbiſhop of Toledo, to carry his deſign into execution; and, for this purpoſe, ordered him to repair to Granada, with full power to employ whatever meaſures he ſhould judge to be moſt expedient. Ximenes began with careſſing, and making preſents to ſome of the leading men among the Moreſcoes, and thus perſuaded ſome of them to ſubmit to be baptized. But, making little progreſs in this way, and his natural impatience and ſeverity quickly prompting him to have recourſe to other methods, more agreeable to his diſpoſition, he threw all ſuch of their leaders as refuſed to comply with his requeſt, into priſons and dungeons, where they were treated as if they had been guilty of the moſt atrocious crimes.

The Moreſcoes perſecuted by the Spaniards.

The people, highly incenſed againſt him, on account of this violent procedure, took up arms, and having ſurrounded his palace, demanded that their leaders might be releaſed. But having no perſon among them inveſted with authority to conduct their operations, they were quickly diſperſed by the count de Tendilla, the governor of the citadel: immediately after which Ferdinand, by the advice of Ximenes, ſent judges to Granada,

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and by these judges the people were found guilty of rebellion against his government. It was declared by these judges that the whole Moriscoes in Granada, though only a small part of them had been concerned in the insurrection, were yet, on that account, liable to be capitally punished; and the king was well prepared with his army to carry the sentence into execution. But having offered them a pardon, on condition of their embracing the Christian religion; upwards of fifty thousand of them, all citizens of the town of Granada, submitted to be baptized.

The inhabitants of the country were treated with equal violence; for they too, upon receiving intelligence of what had passed in Granada, had begun to put themselves into a posture of defence. The count de Tendilla was ordered to march against them with an army of veteran troops; and this general, in order to intimidate them, put all the inhabitants of one of their towns, men, women, and children, to the sword. Still, however, they refused to lay down their arms, till Ferdinand himself, at the head of a numerous army, having reduced all their fortified places, the greater part of them consented to purchase their lives at the expense of their religion; and the rest, upon paying ten dollars each of them, as a ransom, were permitted to transport themselves to Barbary.

From this time, the Granada Moriscoes were considered by the Spaniards as Christians, although it can hardly be supposed that any of them were

ſincerely converted to the Chriſtian faith. They were ſtyled the New Chriſtians, in contradiſtinction from the Spaniards, who were called the Old. They were not admitted to the enjoyment of any office, either in the church or ſtate. But when they diſcovered, on any occaſion, an attachment to Mahometaniſm, they were treated by the inquiſition as apoſtates; and great numbers of them were, every year, condemned by that tribunal, and committed to the flames.

By this treatment, which was equally impolitical and unchriſtian, their prejudices againſt the catholic religion, and the Spaniſh government, were ſtrengthened and confirmed. Their ill-humor, however, ſhowed itſelf only in murmurs and complaints: and the Moreſcoes in Granada are ſcarcely mentioned in the Spaniſh hiſtory, till the reign of Philip II. when, in conſequence of freſh oppreſſion, having made an unſucceſsful attempt to vindicate their liberty, moſt of them, as formerly related, were tranſplanted into Caſtile, and other inland provinces.

It is not to be doubted that Philip would have treated the Moreſcoes of Valencia, in the ſame manner as thoſe of Granada, had he not been deterred by his experience of the expenſe and danger with which the reduction of the latter had been accompanied. The Mooriſh kingdom of Valencia had been conquered by James I. king of Arragon, before the middle of the thirteenth century; and this prince had been extremely ſolicitous to have the people converted to the Chriſtian faith.

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At the inſtigation of theſe eccleſiaſtics, Pope Clement, the fourth of that name, having adviſed the king to expel the Moreſcoes from his dominions if they ſhould ſtill refuſe to be converted, James would readily have embraced this council, if he could have perſuaded his cortes to conſent. But, by the free conſtitution of the government of Arragon, to which Valencia was now annexed, the conſent of the cortes was requiſite; and, although the clergy and commons were willing to gratify the king, yet the barons, who foreſaw the ruin of their eſtates if the Moreſcoes, their vaſſals, were expelled, oppoſed the meaſure with ſuch inflexible obſtinacy, that James found it neceſſary to relinquiſh his deſign.

The tyranny of king Ferdinand reſtrained by the cortes.

From this period, to the conqueſt of Granada by Ferdinand, almoſt two hundred years had elapſed; and during all that time, the Valencia Moors had been indulged in the free exerciſe of their religion. But when the barons heard of the violence with which Ferdinand had treated the Moors of Granada, they dreaded an extenſion of his tyranny to their vaſſals in Valencia; and, in order to prevent it, they required, and, though with ſome difficulty, obtained his aſſent to a law paſſed in the cortes, in the year 1510, where it was enacted that no Moreſco, within the kingdom of Valencia, ſhould either be expelled from the kingdom, or compelled to embrace the Chriſtian faith.

Nor were the barons ſatisfied with taking this precaution; but, in order to prevent the court or the eccleſiaſtics from reviving their deſign, in any future reign, they reſolved to make it henceforth a part of their king's coronation-oath, that, on no pretence whatever, he ſhould attempt to expel the Moreſcoes from Valencia, or employ force to engage them to embrace the Chriſtian religion; that he ſhould never attempt, directly or indirectly, to procure a diſpenſation from this oath, nor even accept of a diſpenſation, in caſe it ſhould be offered him.

This oath was ſworn, a few years after, by Charles V. at his acceſſion; and the barons ſeemed then to poſſeſs the utmoſt ſecurity which they could deſire againſt any future oppreſſion of their vaſſals. But they ſoon experienced, how ineffectual

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the wiſeſt precautions ſometimes prove againſt the events of fortune. A bloody war having broken out between the commons, and nobles of Valencia, in the year 1520; the former, actuated partly perhaps by religious bigotry, but principally by revenge againſt the latter, publiſhed a manifeſto, requiring all the Moreſcoes, under the penalty of death, immediately to embrace the catholic religion. The nobles were, at that time, unable to afford them protection againſt their enemies; and as the Moreſcoes were themſelves ſufficiently acquainted with the violent character of the commons, they knew that it would be in vain to offer any remonſtrance on the ſubject. Without delay, therefore, almoſt the whole of them conſented to be baptized, in the hopes that, when tranquillity ſhould be reſtored, no advantage would be taken by the court of this deed of theirs, which was known to be the effect of lawleſs force and violence.

But no ſooner were the civil commotions of the kingdom compoſed, than Charles, having convened an aſſembly of the clergy, to conſider of the validity of that baptiſm, to which the Moreſcoes had been obliged to ſubmit; it was determined by this aſſembly, that although they ought not to have been compelled to ſubmit to be baptized, yet the character thereby impreſſed upon them was indelible, they were henceforth to be conſidered as Chriſtians, and in the caſe of a defection from the catholic religion, to be treated as apoſtates; that the name of God, as is ſubjoined

in the decree, may not be blaſphemed, nor contempt brought upon the Chriſtian profeſſion.

The Moreſcoes, conſcious of a ſincere attachment to the Mahometan faith, and being at no loſs to underſtand, that by this decree it was intended they ſhould henceforth be ſubject to the juriſdiction of the inquiſition, they had no other expedient left to ſave themſelves from the cruelty of that barbarous tribunal, but to aſſert (which great numbers of them did) that they had not been baptized; and as, amidſt the confuſion of civil diſcord, no regiſter of their baptiſms had been kept, it was impoſſible in moſt caſes to diſprove their aſſertion.

Of this difficulty the eccleſiaſtics gave information to the emperor; and about the ſame time, a diſpenſation from his coronation oath was ſent him by the pope [3]. Charles had acquired a great acceſſion of power by his ſuppreſſion of the late rebellion; and the power of the nobles had ſuffered a proportional diminution. Being no longer afraid, therefore, of any oppoſition which he might receive from the Valencia barons, and being delivered from his religious ſcruples by the pope's diſpenſation from his oath, he firſt [4] gave orders to the clergy to apply themſelves to the inſtruction of the Moreſcoes in the Chriſtian faith, commanding the barons to require a punctual attendance from their vaſſals, on the inſtructions that ſhould be given them; and in the following

[3] Clement VII. Vide Geddes.

[4] An. 1525.

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year, he ordered all the Moreſcoes, who denied their having been formerly baptized, either immediately to ſubmit to that initiatory rite, or to quit the Spaniſh dominions, under the penalty of perpetual ſervitude.

The Moreſcoes of Pianaguazil refuſed to accept of this alternative, and had recourſe to arms in their defence; but theſe men having been eaſily reduced to obedience, it was believed that, after the year 1526, there was hardly a ſingle Moreſco in Spain who had not ſubmitted to the rite of baptiſm.

There was no reaſon however to ſuppoſe that any conſiderable number of them were ſincerely converted to the Chriſtian faith; and, as it is impoſſible for men who act a fictitious part, uniformly to conceal their real ſentiments, the hiſtory of Spain, during the reign of Charles and that of his ſucceſſor, is filled with complaints againſt them [1], on account of their infidelity. Frequent councils were held at Madrid, to conſider of the proper means of effectuating their converſion. Orders were repeatedly ſent from thence, requiring the clergy to exert themſelves with greater activity in inſtructing them; and the inquiſition every year exerciſed againſt great numbers of them its wonted rigor and ſeverity.

Still, however, it ſhould ſeem that their attachment to the Mahometan ſuperſtition, as well as to their ancient manners and cuſtoms, remained as ſtrong as ever.

[1] The reader will remember that the Moreſcoes here ſpoken of, are thoſe of Valencia.

Nor will this appear ſurpriſing, if it is true that men are commonly attached to a falſe religion in proportion to its abſurdity; becauſe, not being accuſtomed to employ their reaſon on the ſubject of religion, they are incapable of being convinced by reaſon. But, beſides this conſideration, there were other cauſes which concurred in producing that inconquerable obſtinacy which the Moreſcoes diſcovered in their adherence to Mahometaniſm. They were proud of profeſſing a religion, which was the religion of all thoſe mighty empires that had been founded by their anceſtors.

The attachment of the Moreſcoes to the Mahometan religion accounted for.

They had often entertained the hopes of being reſcued by means of the Turks, and other Mahometans, from the Spaniſh yoke, and could not reſolve entirely to abandon a religion which they expected, ſooner or later, to be at liberty to profeſs. Their hereditary hatred of the Spaniards, which had been nouriſhed by an uninterrupted courſe of hoſtilities during ſeveral centuries, had been riveted, ſince the conqueſt, by the ſeverity with which they had been uſed; while their averſion, to the catholic worſhip was heightened by the appearance which the uſe of images in that worſhip gave it of idolatry, againſt every ſpecies of which all Mahometans are actuated with the moſt irreconcileable averſion. When to theſe conſiderations we add how little qualified the Spaniſh eccleſiaſtics were to inſtruct them in the principles of Chriſtianity, and that moſt of the Moreſcoes lived detached from the Spaniards in towns and villages, and diſtricts by themſelves, ſeldom aſſociating

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with any but thoſe of their own perſuaſion, and ſpeaking a language of which the eccleſiaſtics, as well as the people, were extremely ignorant; when all theſe circumſtances are conſidered, it will not be ſo ſurpriſing, as at firſt ſight it might appear, that ſo ſmall a number of them ſhould have been converted to the Chriſtian faith.

It muſt, at the ſame time, be acknowledged that their infidelity afforded juſt ground for uneaſineſs to the Spaniſh monarchs, who could hardly expect to gain the affections of a people, differing ſo widely from themſelves, and from their Spaniſh ſubjects, in matters regarded as the moſt important and eſſential. The moſt inveterate enemies of Spain had for many years been the Turks, and the Moors of Barbary; and it could ſcarcely be ſuppoſed, that, in the caſe of an invaſion by theſe powers, the Moreſcoes would be averſe to exchange their preſent maſters for others, whoſe religion, cuſtoms, and manners, were ſo nearly ſimilar to their own.

Good policy, therefore, required that no pains ſhould be ſpared, on the part of the kings of Spain, to accompliſh the converſion of their Moreſco ſubjects. Nor does it appear that theſe princes were at any time neglectful of an object which they juſtly deemed ſo highly deſerving of their attention. They had inſtituted ſchools, as already mentioned, for teaching the Arabic tongue. They had often inculcated upon the clergy, to whom the inſtruction of the Moreſcoes was intruſted, the neceſſity of greater diligence in their endeavours

to

to reclaim them. The royal commands on this head had, on different occaſions, been enforced by the Roman pontiffs; and, in order to engage men, properly qualified, to apply themſelves to this important work, they had augmented the church-livings in many of thoſe parts of the kingdom where the Moors reſided. BOOK IV. 1609.

Theſe were perhaps the only means which the religious prejudices of the people, and the maxims or genius of the Spaniſh government, would permit to be employed; and if the Moreſcoes had, at the ſame time, been uſed with greater kindneſs, or even with greater lenity and forbearance, it is probable that, ſooner or later, theſe means would have been attended with the deſired ſucceſs. But, beſides that, the faith which the Spaniſh princes had pledged to them when they ſubmitted to their authority had been often violated; they had been from the beginning treated with every mark of jealouſy and ſuſpicion; they had been excluded from all the honors, and from every important office in the ſtate; encouragement had been given to the moſt minute and malignant inveſtigation of their private conduct; and after the power of the barons, who had long acted as their protectors, was reduced, they were expoſed a defenceleſs prey to the avarice and cruelty of the Inquiſition [*].

The kings of Spain were too deeply tinctured with the bigotry of the Romiſh church, and their maxims of government too deſpotic, to allow

[*] Carta de Don Pedro de Valencia, MS. No. 1.

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them to perceive the abſurdity of theſe meaſures, ſo extremely ill calculated to promote the purpoſe for which they were deſigned. Charles the Fifth, however, and Philip the Second, two princes noted for their political diſcernment, being aware of the prejudice which the kingdom would ſuſtain, if the Moreſcoes, who formed ſo great a proportion of their ſubjects were expelled, had given no ground to ſuſpect that they would ever conſent to their expulſion; nor does it appear that the clergy, who earneſtly wiſhed that this meaſure might be embraced, ever attempted to recommend it either to Charles or his ſon. But, ſoon after the acceſſion of the preſent king, they conceived the hopes of being able to accompliſh their deſire; becauſe both Philip and his miniſter, they thought, would be influenced more by religious than political conſiderations; and, in caſe they could be perſuaded that the intereſt of religion was concerned in the expulſion, would be eaſily reconciled to the political inconveniencies that might attend it.

The motives which determined the eccleſiaſtics in their conduct on this occaſion were not merely ſuch as were ſuggeſted by religious zeal or bigottry. The obſtinacy of the Moreſcoes in adhering to Mahometaniſm had been generally aſcribed to the remiſſneſs or negligence of thoſe who had been employed to inſtruct them [7]; and the clergy were ſenſible that much greater pains were requiſite for this end than they were willing to beſtow.

[7] By a brief from the pope, Gregory XIII. an. 1576.

Beſides which, their revenues had been taxed for augmenting the Moreſcoe vicarages, and for building and endowing an additional number of churches for their inſtruction. They were, on both theſe accounts, inflamed againſt the Moreſcoes with a peculiar hatred; and, in order that they might at once avoid the labor neceſſary for converting them, and the cenſure which they muſt incur in caſe of their declining it, they earneſtly deſired their expulſion; and, in order to effectuate it, were perpetually inveighing againſt them as an incurable race of infidels, of whoſe converſion, without a miraculous interpoſition of Divine Power, no hopes could juſtly be entertained.

Of all the eccleſiaſtics, the perſon who diſcovered the moſt unrelenting hatred againſt this unhappy people was Don John de Ribera, patriarch of Antioch, and archbiſhop of Valencia, an aged prelate, who was held in high veneration by his countrymen for his piety and learning; and, in different hiſtories of his life, publiſhed in Spain and Italy, is celebrated as one of the brighteſt ornaments that ever adorned the Chriſtian church.

But there is nothing for which the hiſtorians have been ſo liberal in his praiſe as the flaming zeal which he diſplayed in his unwearied exertions for the expulſion of the Moreſcoes, in which they ſuppoſe him to have been equally animated by a patriotic concern for the ſafety of Spain, and a pious ſolicitude for the preſervation of the Catholic faith.

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It has been queſtioned, however, whether his motives were in reality ſo pure as his admirers would have us to believe; for there is ground to ſuſpect, that, after the Pope, at the requeſt of Philip II. impoſed a new tax of between three and four thouſand dollars yearly on the revenues of his archbiſhopric, for augmenting the ſalaries of the curates employed in inſtructing the Moreſcoes, his zeal for their expulſion became more violent than ever. This tax, it is ſaid, neither he, nor any of the clergy in his dioceſe, ever paid; and although the king, in order more eaſily to reconcile the Moreſcoes to Chriſtianity, had obtained from the Pope an edict of grace in their favor, containing a plenary pardon for all their paſt offences, on condition that, within the ſpace of four years, they ſhould make confeſſion to certain commiſſioners, to be appointed by Ribera and the other biſhops, yet this edict was not publiſhed, nor any commiſſioners appointed, till after two years and a half, when Philip III. interpoſed his authority for that effect.

In defence of the archbiſhop's conduct in theſe inſtances, it may be alledged, that, from long experience, and many fruitleſs trials, he believed the infidelity of the Moreſcoes to be incurable, and that he would not have thus ventured repeatedly to diſobey the orders of his ſpiritual ſuperior, had he not known that the ſovereign pontiff, having the ſame opinion as himſelf of the vanity of all farther attempts for their converſion, did not ſeriouſly deſire to have his orders carried into

execution. But whatever were the motives of this prelate's conduct, and though it juſtly expoſed him to the imputation of wiſhing rather to have the Moreſcoes expelled than converted, no perſon had greater influence on this occaſion with the king and his miniſters in recommending the meaſure that was afterwards embraced.

Memorials to the king of Spain againſt the Moreſcoes.

From the arguments which he employed in two memorials on the ſubject, preſented to the king, the reader will be better able to judge of the motives by which both he and the court of Spain were determined. In his firſt memorial, dated in the year 1602, his principal deſign was to ſound their inclination, and to awaken in them a ſenſe of the danger to which the kingdom was expoſed.

"After all the pains, he ſaid, which had been beſtowed in attempting to convert the Moreſcoes to Chriſtianity, they were ſtill as ſtrongly as ever attached to the Mahometan ſuperſtition. In the kingdom of Valencia, the biſhops, the rectors, and preachers, had in vain uſed their moſt ſtrenuous endeavours to perſuade them to avail themſelves of the Pope's edict of grace, which had been lately publiſhed. In reaſoning with their leading men, it had been obſerved, that, as often as they were put to ſilence by the arguments employed to convince them, they changed color, and were ſo inflamed with indignation, as evidently ſhowed how much they deſired to be able to employ force in defence of their opinions. They correſponded with thoſe of their own ſect in the

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moſt diſtant parts of the country, and ſent their emiſſaries every where, to encourage the people to perſevere in their infidelity. They all ſpoke with one mouth, and had the ſame anſwer to return to their inſtructors, that they were already Chriſtians; that they had already confeſſed all the ſins, of which they were conſcious, to their reſpective prieſts; and that, being occupied with their proper buſineſs, they had not leiſure to attend to the conduct of others, and therefore knew not of any perſons who practiſed the rites of the Mahometan religion. They had often been convicted of falſhood; but on theſe occaſions they were either ſilent, or they repeated the ſame reply to the queſtions that were put to them. Since the publication of the edict of grace, they had celebrated the feſtivals of their religion with greater ſolemnity than before; and, with much effrontery, had caroufed together, on receiving intelligence of the unſucceſsful iſſue of the expedition of his majeſty's forces againſt Algiers.

"From this conduct of the Moreſcoes, continued Ribera, which I have repreſented with my wonted impartial regard to truth, two important conſequences follow, which require your majeſty's moſt ſerious attention.

"The firſt is, that the biſhops, and other paſtors of the church, are laid under the painful neceſſity of doing what many learned doctors of the church think unlawful, the adminiſtering of the ſacrament of baptiſm to thoſe who they know will, ſooner or later, become apoſtates from the faith;

for there is a moral certainty that every Moreſco child, whom we baptize, will, through the example and inſtruction of his Mahometan parents, become himſelf a Mahometan. And this we are taught to expect, not only by reaſon and experience, but by the ſpirit of God, who, in ſpeaking of the infidelity of Rehoboam, makes twice mention, in one chapter, that he was the ſon of Naama, a Gentile; which is equivalent to declaring that to be the child of a mother who is an infidel, and to be educated by her, is a certain means of making the child an infidel.

"In baptizing the Moreſco children, therefore, our conſciences are greatly diſturbed with the apprehenſion that we are guilty of violating the commandment of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, who has prohibited the giving of holy things to dogs, and the caſting of pearls before ſwine.

"Nor is this the only unhappy conſequence ariſing from the incurable infidelity of the Moreſcoes. But the kingdom of Spain is, therefore, expoſed to the greateſt riſk of becoming an eaſy prey to the hoſtile deſigns of our enemies. This kingdom was ruined in former times by the intrigues of a ſingle perſon, count Julian, at whoſe inſtigation it was invaded and ſubdued by the Saracens, when they had no friends within the kingdom to ſecond their attempt. And from thence may be perceived how great occaſion there is for the moſt diſquieting apprehenſions at this time, when there are eſtabliſhed in the kingdom ninety thouſand men fit to carry arms, and all of them

BOOK IV. 1699. actuated with the moſt irreconcileable averſion to the preſent government. The Turks and Moors are the inveterate enemies of Spain, becauſe ſhe is the principal bulwark of Chriſtendom; the French, from jealouſy, or envy of her greatneſs; and the Engliſh, on account of her zeal for maintaining the purity of the Catholic faith; is there not juſt ground to dread that theſe our foreign enemies, allured by the hopes of aſſiſtance from thoſe whom we nouriſh in our boſom, ſhall unite their forces, and undertake the ſubverſion of the monarchy? Eſpecially when it is conſidered that, with the powerful aſſiſtance they would receive from the Moreſcoes, a ſmall number of troops would be ſufficient, and no extraordinary preparations or expenſe required.

"The Moreſcoes, in Granada alone, had withſtood the whole force which the late king could muſter againſt them, although, beſides his Spaniſh troops, he had ſent for into Spain a numerous reinforcement of Germans and Italians. But, if all the Moreſcoes in the different parts of the kingdom were to take arms, which it is unqueſtionable they would do, if either the Turks, or French, or Engliſh, were to attempt an invaſion, our condition would then be the moſt deplorable and deſperate, and, like our anceſtors, we muſt reſolve either to yield our necks to the yoke of conquerors, or to take ſhelter, as they did, among the rocks or mountains of Aſturia.

"As often as I have reflected on the imminent danger to which this mighty monarchy ſtands

expoſed, I have thought it unaccountable, that, during the long reigns of two ſuch wiſe and powerful monarchs, as the emperor, and the late king, no ſufficient ſecurity againſt it was provided. Nor can I account for their negligence in this reſpect, but on the ſuppoſition that God, who rules the hearts of kings, thought fit to reſerve this important work, ſo worthy of your royal breaſt, on purpoſe to adorn the annals of your pious reign; as he reſerved the deliverance of his choſen people for Moſes, their entrance into the promiſed land for Joſhua, the conqueſt of the Philiſtines for David, and the inflicting of vengeance on the Amalekites for Saul.

"Either this has been his intention, or he hath ſo long prevented the Spaniſh monarchs from perceiving the neceſſity of delivering Spain from ſo great a danger, that, by means of the Moreſcoes, he may puniſh us for our ſins. But, in my opinion, one of the greateſt of theſe is the permitting of ſo great a number of inveterate enemies of the church and ſtate for ſo many years to retain their power of doing miſchief; nor is it reaſonable to expect ſucceſs in foreign enterpriſes, till the kingdom ſhall be purged of its domeſtic foes.

"In the year 1588, when the great Armada was deſtroyed, I was emboldened by my zeal for the intereſt of religion and my country, to repreſent to your royal father, that, after having long and carefully inquired why it had pleaſed God to permit ſo great a calamity to befal us, I was perſuaded that he intended thereby to inſtruct the

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king, that, till he had extirpated hereſy from his own dominions, he ought not to have ſuffered his attention to be diverted by any thing that paſſed in foreign ſtates. And, in like manner, confiding in your majeſty's clemency for forgiveneſs of the liberty which I take, I muſt declare that, after the moſt mature conſideration, it appears to me, that no other account but this can be given of the late failure of your expedition againſt Algiers, in which there was nothing omitted which human prudence could ſuggeſt to inſure ſucceſs.

"It is the will of heaven, that your majeſty ſhould firſt provide for the ſafety and tranquillity of your own dominions; and, in order to accompliſh this end, it is neceſſary that your domeſtic enemies, thoſe apoſtates from the faith, who are equally enemies to the ſtate and to our moſt holy religion, ſhould be deprived of the power of diſturbing your repoſe. No object, ſurely, can be more deeply intereſting; and, therefore, I truſt I ſhall be pardoned for preſuming, with due humility, to exhort your majeſty to require your miniſters, without delay, to apply themſelves to the conſideration of it, with all that ſerious attention which it ſo highly deſerves, excluding from all the councils which ſhall be held for that purpoſe, all thoſe perſons whoſe private intereſt may hinder them from perceiving what is conducive to the public good[s]."

[s] Vida de Ribera.

This memorial was moſt graciouſly received by the king and the duke of Lerma, both of whom wrote letters of thanks to the patriarch for the wholeſome counſel which it contained, and required him to give them his opinion with regard to the proper means of obviating that imminent danger, to which it appeared, from his memorial, the kingdom was expoſed. In compliance with this requeſt, and emboldenend by the confidence repoſed in him, Ribera ſoon after preſented another memorial, of which the purport was, partly to perſuade Philip that no other means could prove effectual for the utter extirpation of the Moreſcoes; and partly to take off the force of ſuch objections, as either religion or humanity might ſuggeſt, to deter him from having recourſe to this expedient.

In ſacred writ, he ſaid, there was no precept ſo often repeated to the choſen people of God as that of rooting out from among them thoſe infidel nations whom they found in poſſeſſion of the promiſed land. A ſtrict obedience to this precept was particularly inculcated on the kings and rulers of the people; and the firſt king, whom God himſelf had appointed to rule over them, incurred the divine diſpleaſure, and was deprived of his kingdom, merely on account of his diſobedience. The pernicious conſequences of permitting the Moreſcoes to remain in Caſtile and Aragon were the ſame as thoſe which the children of Iſrael experienced from their communication with the idolatrous heathens; for the faithful

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in Spain were in equal danger from the infection of their example, and the extirpation of these infidels was therefore equally incumbent on the catholic king, as that of the heathens on the kings and captains of the Jews.

In following the example of David, and other good kings of Israel, Philip would likewise imitate the conduct of some of the best and greatest of his predecessors; by whom the Jews had, at different periods, been expelled from Spain, though their provocations had never been so great as those of the Moriscoes; for the Jews were not heretics and apostates as they were, and were never accused of holding correspondence with the enemies of the state.

His illustrious grandfather, Charles V. the wisest and greatest prince of the age in which he lived, had published an edict, requiring the Moriscoes either ro submit to be baptized, or to depart from Spain; expecting that by submitting to be baptized they would become both Christians and friends. It now appeared how much he was mistaken in this expectation; but, from the tenor of his edict, it was manifest how much he thought it his duty, and how necessary he believed it for the safety and prosperity of his people, to extirpate infidels from his dominions.

The pernicious effects of tolerating apostates from the faith, had been severely felt by the French monarchs, whose kingdom had thereby been reduced to the lowest ebb, and their Catholic subjects exposed, for almost half a century, to

all the miſeries of civil war; whereas, if they had acted conformably to the meaſures of the church, and either put to death their heretical ſubjects, or expelled them from the kingdom, all theſe unhappy conſequences might have been prevented, and the purity of the faith preſerved. BOOK IV. 1609.

The temporal as well as the ſpiritual intereſt of the king's catholic and loyal ſubjects, required that the Moreſcoes ſhould be expelled; becauſe, if they were not, there was much ground to apprehend they would ere long become maſters of all the riches in the kingdom. They were not only induſtrious, but frugal and parſimonious to exceſs. They could labor for much lower wages, and were ſatisfied with much ſmaller profits in trade than were requiſite for the ſubſiſtence of the Spaniards; great numbers of whom were thus excluded from both trade and labor, and thereby reduced to indigence. The Spaniſh villages, all over Caſtile and Andaluſia, had fallen into decay; while thoſe of the Moreſcoes increaſed and flouriſhed; and the Spaniſh farmers were unable to pay their rents, though they cultivated the moſt fertile parts of the country; while the Moreſcoes, who generally lived in the moſt barren parts, after paying the third part of their crops to the proprietors of their farms, were not only able to ſupport themſelves and their families, but annually to increaſe their ſtock.

In conſequence of this their number had of late been greatly augmented; and there was ground to dread that, if ſome remedy were not ſpeedily

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applied, the natives would in a few years be outnumbered and overpowered. But no remedy whatever, he believed, would be found effectual, while the Moreſcoes were permitted to continue within the kingdom. The king's humanity, he ſuppoſed, would revolt at the thoughts of putting ſo many hundred thouſands to the ſword, and therefore the only expedient which remained, was to tranſport them into foreign parts.

He did not however think it adviſable to expel them all at once; for, as thoſe of Valencia lived in a great meaſure detached from the Chriſtians, in villages and diſtricts by themſelves, there was little danger from the infection of their example; beſides that the Moors of thoſe parts practiſed various uſeful arts, which were unknown to the Chriſtians, but were extremely neceſſary for the comfort and convenience of life. If all theſe Moors were to be at once expelled, thoſe arts would be entirely loſt, and a great part of the country would become waſte and deſolate. But although for theſe reaſons it might be judged expedient to delay their expulſion, they ought, in the mean time, to be loaded with taxes for the maintenance of an army, ſufficient to prevent any prejudice that might ariſe from permitting them to remain; their numbers ought, as quickly as poſſible, to be diminiſhed, by ſending annually ſome thouſands of their young men to the gallies and the mines, and Chriſtians, acquainted with their arts, ought gradually to be ſubſtituted in their room.

But a different courſe, he thought, ought to be purſued with regard to the Moreſcoes in the other provinces, who were, on many accounts, much more formidable than thoſe of Arragon and Valencia. They had every-where intermixed with the Chriſtians; their example was conſequently more infectious; and the churches and altars were profaned by their hypocritical and mock compliances with the holy rites of the true religion. They ſpoke the Caſtilian language; their minds were more cultivated and improved; they were better acquainted with the ſtate of Spain, and much more capable of giving dangerous intelligence to her enemies; beſides which, great numbers of them, having ſerved in the royal army, were thereby not only qualified to act as ſpies, but to afford aſſiſtance to the enemy, in the caſe of an invaſion or attack, or to any foreign enemy, by whom the kingdom ſhould be attacked.

By theſe conſiderations he was induced to believe that the preſervation of the kingdom, as well as the intereſt of religion, required that all the Moreſcoes in Spain, thoſe of Arragon and Valencia excepted, ſhould be inſtantly expelled. They were all to be conſidered as obſtinate heretics, or as apoſtates from the faith, whom the king, if he thought fit, might juſtly puniſh with death; and there could be no room therefore to doubt of the lawfulneſs of tranſporting them to foreign countries, which was the mildeſt puniſhment that, conſiſtently with the ſafety of his kingdom, he could inflict.

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Their children, under ſeven years of age, might be detained, in order to be educated in the Chriſtian faith; and the king might, without any ſcruple of conſcience, compel any number of thoſe who were grown up, to ſerve on board his gallies, or in the mines of America; while, for the benefit of his exchequer, he might ſell the reſt for ſlaves to his Chriſtian ſubjects in Spain and Italy. It could not be unjuſt to puniſh men in this manner, who by their crimes had forfeited their lives; and if it was juſt to puniſh them either with ſlavery or death, the ſimply expelling them from Spain, and tranſporting them to other countries, where their own religion was profeſſed, could not be conſidered in any other light but as an act of clemency and mercy on the part of the king.

It might be difficult, he acknowledged, to effectuate their expulſion, without endangering the internal peace of the kingdom; but God, he truſted, would enlighten the minds of the king's miniſters, and enable them to diſcern the moſt proper means of carrying ſo laudable a deſign into execution; for, as the counſel he had offered was equally dictated by his regard to the ſpiritual and to the temporal intereſt of the kingdom, he could not doubt that it was acceptable to God; and when he reflected on his great age, his natural temper and diſpoſition, and the habits which he had long indulged of a retired and ſequeſtered life, he could hardly ſuppoſe that the zeal and reſolution with which he felt himſelf inſpired in his addreſs

addreſs to the king, on the preſent occaſion, could proceed from any other cauſe but the ſecret and all powerful influence of the ſpirit of God upon his mind [1].

The effect of the reaſoning of Ribera on the mind of the king.

The reaſoning in this memorial was admirably fitted to make impreſſion on the ſuperſtitious and timid temper of the king; nor was its efficacy leſſened by the patriarch's vain pretenſion to divine illumination. But although both Philip's religious ſcruples, and his apprehenſions of impending danger, were eaſily excited, his natural diſpoſition, which was gentle and humane, rendered him extremely averſe to a meaſure ſo replete with cruelty, as that which Ribera had exhorted him to adopt. He could not therefore reſolve to comply with the counſel that was given him, and his irreſolution was increaſed by a memorial which was ſoon afterwards preſented to him by the barons of Valencia.

They had received intelligence from ſome of their friends at court of the patriarch's two memorials. They knew that he had adviſed the king to permit their vaſſals to remain for ſome time longer, which they aſcribed to his dread of their reſentment; but they believed that the expulſion of the other Moreſcoes, would be quickly followed by that of thoſe in Valencia, and for this reaſon they were equally alarmed as if he had counſelled the whole to be expelled.

Remonſtrance of the barons

In order to deter the king from liſtening to his propoſal, they unanimouſly remonſtrated againſt

[1] Vida de Ribera, p. 388. Por Eſcriva.

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the expulſion, as a meaſure that would be attended with the moſt pernicious conſequences; for the Moreſcoes were not only a frugal, temperate, and induſtrious race of men, but they were the moſt ſkilful farmers, and the moſt ingenious manufacturers in Spain. There were ſeveral manufactures, equally neceſſary for internal conſumption and foreign trade, with which they alone were acquainted; and without their ſkill and labor, it was an unqueſtionable fact, that a great part of the kingdom would lie waſte, and innumerable families of the higheſt rank, who entirely depended on the rents of their lands, be reduced to indigence.

It had been affirmed that they were all Mahometans, but no ſufficient evidence had been produced to prove the truth of this aſſertion. They had all been regularly initiated, by baptiſm, into the Chriſtian church; they all profeſſed themſelves to be Chriſtians; and although many of them, perhaps, were not able to give a ſatisfactory account of the doctrines of the Chriſtian faith, yet the ſame thing might be ſaid of innumerable other Chriſtians of the lower rank, beſides the Moreſcoes.

But if many of them were in reality ignorant or unbelieving, this could not juſtly be imputed to them, ſo much as to thoſe to whom their inſtruction had been committed. Sufficient pains to inſtruct them, and proper methods of dealing with them, had ſeldom been employed. They had, at firſt, been dragged into the church by

force and violence, and had afterwards been treated with inhumanity; as if bitter invectives, corporeal puniſhments, and the confiſcation of their effects, were the proper means of enlightening their underſtandings with the knowledge of the truth. In order to engage them to liſten to inſtruction, it was neceſſary that their inſtructors ſhould ſtudy to conciliate their affections. This end could be obtained only by gentleneſs and forbearance: and if the king would be pleaſed to take effectual care to prevent them from being treated more like brutes than men, and ſtill more, if, as a reward for their relinquiſhing the Mahometan ſuperſtition, he would grant them acceſs to the ſame immunities and privileges that were enjoyed by his other ſubjects, there would be no ground to deſpair of their converſion.

They had been accuſed of holding a treaſonable correſpondence with the enemies of the ſtate; but ought a vague and general aſſertion to be held as a ſufficient evidence of their guilt? was not this crime of ſuch a nature, that it muſt neceſſarily be confined to a few? ought the guilt of a few to be imputed to ſo great a number? ought even the few who had been guilty, to be condemned without a hearing, without a trial, and without the ſmalleſt evidence?

This imputation had been often caſt upon the Moreſcoes, by ſpeculative and ſequeſtered men, who had no acceſs to know the truth of their aſſertion, but were prompted by their zeal and prejudices to believe it. It had always been diſre-

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garded by the wiſeſt of the king's predeceſſors; and juſtice, they hoped, would determine the king to imitate ſo laudable an example, till ſome proof or evidence was adduced. This remonſtrance, which the barons preſented in a cortes or parliament held in the year 1604, was not altogether without effect. In compliance with the intention of it, Philip reſolved to delay the expulſion of the Moreſcoes for ſome years longer, and, in the mean time, make a further trial, whether it was poſſible to effectuate their converſion to the faith; and for this purpoſe, he procured a brief from the pope, impoſing a tax on the eccleſiaſtical revenues, a part of which he was authorized to employ in building and endowing a Moreſco college; and in order to induce men of abilities to accept of curacies among the Moreſcoes, he was empowered, from the ſame fund, to augment the ſalaries of the curates.

Its effects.

Paul V.

But no greater regard it would ſeem was paid to this than to the other brief above mentioned. The college was not endowed, and the church-livings remained the ſame as before, from whence there was but too much ground for the ſuſpicion which was entertained, that the king had neither been able to intereſt the pope nor the Spaniſh eccleſiaſtics in the execution of his plan.

The latter labored aſſiduouſly to convince both the pope and the king, that every thing had been already done for the converſion of the Moreſcoes, that was in the power of man to perform. The archbiſhop of Valencia preſented a third memorial

to the king, containing, as he pretended, a full reply to what had been aſſerted by the barons, but conſiſting principally, either of invectives againſt the Moreſcoes, or of denunciations of divine judgements, which muſt ere long overtake the kingdom, if they were not ſpeedily expelled [16].

Ribera was powerfully ſeconded by ſeveral other eccleſiaſtics, and particularly by Bleda, a Dominican friar, diſtinguiſhed for his acquaintance with the learning of his time, and equally noted for his activity, his zeal, and bigotry; who compoſed ſeveral bitter invectives againſt the Moreſcoes, and, dividing his time between Rome and Madrid, employed all his eloquence to perſuade the pontiff and the king of the neceſſity of their expulſion.

But the archbiſhop's moſt powerful aſſociate, was Don Bernardo de Roias y Sandoval, brother to the duke of Lerma, who was the cardinal-archbiſhop of Toledo, inquiſitor-general and chancellor of Spain. This prelate approved and ſeconded every part of Ribera's memorials, except where he adviſed the king to retain ſuch of the Moreſco children as were under ſeven years of age, and to ſuffer the Moreſcoes in Valencia, to remain till their place could be ſupplied by Chriſtians; for it

[16] Some prodigies are recorded by Ribera in his memorial, and by other writers, as clear and certain indications of the will of heaven on the preſent occaſion. Such as that the church-bell of Villila rung of itſelf for ſeveral days, &c. But it does not appear, whether arguments of this kind, were deſpiſed or regarded by the king.

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was more adviſable, this cardinal maintained, to put them all, men, women, and children to the ſword, than to have the Spaniſh blood contaminated, as it would be, if either of theſe exceptions were admitted by a mixture of the polluted blood of infidels.

The duke of Lerma, who, from the beginning of his adminiſtration, had ſtudied, with great aſſiduity and ſolicitude, to ingratiate himſelf with the court of Rome and the Spaniſh eccleſiaſtics, readily eſpouſed his brother's ſentiments; and, as the duke was at this time in the unrivalled and full poſſeſſion of the royal favor, nothing now was wanting to fix the reſolution of the king [11].

Expulſion of the Moreſcoes.

It was accordingly reſolved, that all the Moreſcoes in Spain, thoſe in Valencia as well as thoſe in the other provinces, ſhould be expelled. The cardinal-archbiſhop went himſelf to Rome, with the deſign, it is believed, to perſuade the ſovereign pontiff to grant his ſanction to the expulſion by ſome public deed: but, if this was the intention of his journey, it did not produce the deſired effect. The pontiff, probably, choſe that the odium which muſt attend a meaſure ſo barbarous and ſo unprecedented, ſhould rather fall on the court of Spain than on the holy ſee; and, therefore, we do not read of any other papal bull or brief publiſhed on the preſent occaſion, but one addreſſed to the biſhops of Valencia, commanding them to aſſemble together, in order to conſider whether any method of converting the Moreſcoes could

[11] Fonſeca Traicion de los Moreſcoes, p. 196.

be deviſed. This bull was dated in the year 1606, a few months before the cardinal-primate ſet out for Rome, but was not publiſhed till after his return, in 1608. It was publiſhed in the month of April of that year; and, in compliance with it, the biſhops ſoon after met together, and ſpent ſeveral months in deliberating on the ſubject. But, as if the deſign of their meeting had been to condemn the Moreſcoes, and not to conſider of the means of converting them, they at length pronounced the following ſentence: "That the Moreſcoes of the kingdom of Valencia were all apoſtates from the Chriſtian faith, and were, beſides, ſo obſtinate and inflexible in their infidelity, that, whatever means ſhould be employed, no hopes could juſtly be entertained of their converſion. 1607.

This ſentence, having been tranſmitted to the court, contributed to confirm the king in the reſolution which he had formed. It was agreed, however, that the expulſion ſhould be deferred till a more convenient ſeaſon; and that, in the mean time, the ſtricteſt ſecrecy ſhould be obſerved. It was judged neceſſary to keep the deſign ſecret, leſt the Moreſcoes ſhould, either of themſelves, or inſtigated by the barons, have recourſe to arms; and, as no court was ever more diſtinguiſhed for maintaining the moſt inviolable ſecrecy in its councils than that of Spain, it ſhould ſeem that no ſuſpicion was entertained, either by the Moreſcoes or barons, of the king's determination in a matter wherein they were ſo deeply intereſted, till every neceſſary preparation was made for carrying it into execution. Bleda, p. 503.

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The court having determined to begin with the expulsion of the Valencian Moresco's, orders were secretly given to the naval commanders in Spain, Portugal, and Italy, to receive a certain number of troops on board their ships, and to rendezvous, in August, 1609, at Alicant, Denia, and other sea-ports in the Mediterranean, on the coast of Valencia. About the same time, Don Augustin Mexia, an old experienced officer, governor of Antwerp, was sent to the city of Valencia to concert with the viceroy, the marquis of Cararena, and others, concerning the measures necessary to be taken within the kingdom to prevent a tumult or insurrection. The pretext employed for assembling the fleet was an expedition against the Moors in Barbary. But the barons, observing that frequent conferences were held, by night and by day, at the viceroy's, with regard to the subject of which they were kept entirely in the dark, and being informed that the archbishop (who assisted at these conferences), as if he expected to be besieged, had conveyed into his palace an extraordinary quantity of provisions, besides some troops and arms, they soon came to suspect what was the real purpose of the naval armament; and having, conformably to a privilege which belonged to them by the constitution of Valencia, summoned one of those assemblies of their own number, termed the Military Arms, they sent deputies to the viceroy, requesting him to acquaint them with the design of the present preparations. To this inquiry, the viceroy, without pretending ignorance

of the king's intention, replied, that, whatever it was, the barons might reſt aſſured that no reſolution could be formed, either by the king, who had ever regarded them as his moſt faithful vaſſals, or by the duke of Lerma, their countryman, whoſe eſtates were intermingled with theirs, which in the iſſue would not be found conducive to the true intereſt of Valencia.

By this anſwer the barons were confirmed in their ſuſpicions; and, as they could not but ſuppoſe that the viceroy would have choſen, had it been in his power, to diſpel their apprehenſions, they could no longer doubt that the object of all the preparations which had been made was the expulſion of their vaſſals. They inſtantly convened again, and drew up a remonſtrance to be preſented to the king; of which the purport was, that Valencia would be entirely ruined if the Moreſcoes, by whom moſt of the work in that kingdom was carried on, were expelled.

At the deſire of the viceroy, who dreaded that this ſtep might give an alarm to the Moreſcoes, the juſtiza, or chief juſtice in criminal matters, having attempted in vain to divert them from their purpoſe, was ſo violently agitated with grief and rage, that he dropt down dead in the aſſembly. This accident prevented them from coming to an immediate deciſion; but next morning they had another meeting, in which they appointed deputies to carry their remonſtrance to the king.

It was expreſſed in the ſtrongeſt terms, dictated by a deep conviction of the melancholy truth

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which it contained; but the deputies, though received by the king and his miniſter with much diſtinction and reſpect, were told, that the king's reſolution, having been formed after the moſt mature deliberation, was unalterable; that the Barons had been too late in preſenting their petition; and that the edict of expulſion was already publiſhed.

A ſtrong body of Caſtilian troops had actually entered Valencia, about the time of the arrival of the deputies at Madrid; and the Moreſcoes were now acquainted with their fate.

In the edict of expulſion, which was publiſhed with the uſual formalities, by the viceroy, in the beginning of September, 1609, they were all commanded, men, women, and children, under the penalty of death, to be ready within three days to repair to the ſea-ports appointed for their embarkation, and there to go on board of ſhips prepared for carrying them into foreign parts.

It was ordained, under the ſame penalty, that they ſhould all remain in the places where they were at the time of publiſhing the edict, till the commiſſaries appointed to conduct them to the ſea-coaſt, ſhould arrive; that if any of them ſhould, before the arrival of the commiſſaries, preſume to change the place of their abode, they might be carried by any perſon before a judge; and, in caſe they ſhould make reſiſtance, might inſtantly be put to death.

It was enacted, that all their effects ſhould belong to the lords whoſe vaſſals they were, except ſuch as they could carry along with them; and,

that in caſe they ſhould conceal or deſtroy any part of their effects, they ſhould be puniſhed with death.

For the preſervation of the ſugar-works, granaries of rice, drains or aqueducts, and, in order that the Chriſtian inhabitants might be inſtructed in the works and manufactures which had hitherto been carried on by the Moreſcoes, it was declared that ſix families, to be named by the barons, out of every hundred, might remain.

It was ordained, that all children under four years of age might remain, provided their parents or guardians ſhould conſent; that children under ſix or ſeven, one of whoſe parents was an old Chriſtian, might remain, and the mothers with them, though they were Moreſcoes; but if the fathers were Moreſcoes, and the mothers Chriſtians, that the fathers ſhould be expelled, while the children might remain with their mothers; that all ſuch of the Moreſcoes might remain, who, for any conſiderable time, had demeaned themſelves as Chriſtians, who could produce certificates from the pariſh-prieſts of their having received the ſacrament, by permiſſion of their reſpective biſhops, or who had not for two years attended any of the Moreſco religious meetings.

They were all permitted to depart into any country, not ſubject to the crown of Spain, provided they ſhould leave the kingdom within the time ſpecified; and an aſſurance was given them, that no violence or injury ſhould be offered them, by thoſe who ſhould be employed in tranſporting

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them to Barbary, or any other country they ſhould make choice of [12].

The ſeveral conceſſions contained in this edict were conſidered by the eccleſiaſtics and the court of Spain as proofs of extraordinary clemency on the part of the king; but they could not be regarded in the ſame light by the Moreſcoes. They were equally overwhelmed with aſtoniſhment, and with anguiſh and diſtreſs. They were ſurrounded with enemies on every hand. The king, they perceived, though they had been taught to believe his diſtinguiſhing character to be gentleneſs and mercy, was their irreconcileable and mortal enemy; and their hearts ſunk within them, when they reflected on the miſery which they were doomed to undergo. They were not only diſquieted with ſo near a proſpect of the loſs of their moſt valuable poſſeſſions, joined to that of perpetual baniſhment from their native country; but they violently dreaded that they were all to be butchered as ſoon as they were put on board the ſhips appointed for tranſporting them to foreign parts [13]. They had never had any friends to whom they could look for aſſiſtance, except their patrons the barons, whoſe intereſt was inſeperably linked with theirs; but the barons, they knew, were unable to afford them protection on the preſent occaſion, and all the good offices which they had interpoſed in their behalf had been without avail. They had little reaſon, therefore,

[12] Fonſeca, lib. iv. cap. 3.
[13] Fonſeca, lib. iv. cap. 8.

to expect that any thing which they themſelves could do to avert the impending ſtorm would prove effectual. That nothing, however, in their power might be omitted, their leading men, having met together privately in the city of Valencia, drew up a petition, and ſent a deputation of their number to preſent it to the viceroy; in which, after ſolemnly aſſerting their innocence of the crimes imputed to them in the edict, they offered, in caſe the king would be perſuaded to recal it, to maintain a certain number of gallies for the protection of the coaſt againſt the corſairs, to build ſeveral new forts, and to ſupport the garriſons not only of theſe, but of ſuch as were already built; to redeem all the Chriſtians of Valencia who ſhould ever be taken captives by the Moors, and, beſides, to furniſh the king with a conſiderable ſum of money [14]. But the viceroy though he was himſelf extremely averſe to the expulſion, without taking time to deliberate on their propoſals, immediately replied, that there was now no room left for any petition or remonſtrance; that the king was unalterably determined to put his edict into execution, and they muſt inſtantly prepare themſelves, however reluctant, to ſubmit [15].

When this anſwer was reported by the delegates to the aſſembly in Valencia, their minds

[14] MSS. of Cottington's letters in lord Hardwick's poſſeſſion. Mad. 8th Oct. 1609.

[15] Fonſeca, lib. iv. cap. 7.

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were variouſly agitated with grief, deſpair, and indignation. It was propoſed by ſome of them that they ſhould inſtantly have recourſe to arms; for it was better, they maintained, to die fighting like men for their property and lives, than tamely to ſuffer themſelves to be ſtript of their poſſeſſions, and afterwards, perhaps, to be butchered like ſheep, by an implacable and cruel enemy, to whom they had never given any juſt occaſion of offence; beſides, that it might not be impoſſible for them to defend themſelves in the mountainous parts of the country, till ſome foreign power, friendly to them, and hoſtile to the Spaniards, ſhould come to their relief. But this propoſal was rejected as deſperate and impracticable by a great majority of the aſſembly, who repreſented that, as they were not provided either with arms or military ſtores, had no practice in war, and had been utterly unaccuſtomed to military diſcipline, it was impoſſible they could hold out for many weeks againſt ſo potent an enemy. The Spaniſh regular forces, under the moſt experienced officers, were already diſtributed all over the country, and were every where prepared to attack them on the firſt appearance of oppoſition or reſiſtance. No time would be allowed them to put themſelves into a poſture of defence. They would inſtantly be either cut to pieces, or reduced to ſlavery, and an opportunity would be thus afforded to the Spaniards of gratifying at once, ſtill more than by their expulſion, their avarice and their cruelty. It could not be ſuppoſed that the king would have incurred the

expenſe, which his preparations for exporting them muſt have coſt him, had he intended to deſtroy them on their paſſage, ſince he could have done it more eaſily without incurring ſo great an expenſe, beſides, that ſo uſeleſs and ſo wanton a piece of treachery would cover his name with indelible diſgrace. They might with confidence therefore expect to be ſafely conveyed to Barbary, and this was ſurely preferable either to death or to ſlavery in Spain. But while, for theſe reaſons, all thoughts of reſiſtance ought to be laid aſide, they ought not to accept of either of the two offers that were made to them in the edict of expulſion. Neither their children under age, nor the ſix families out of every hundred who were permitted to remain, ought to be left behind. The Spaniards intended, by theſe conceſſions, to ſerve themſelves, and not the Moreſcoes, and the latter ſhould, for that reaſon, unanimouſly reſolve to reject them with diſdain.

The Moreſcoes reſolve to defend themſelves.

This reſolution was warmly embraced by the whole aſſembly; and not by them only, but by all the other Moreſcoes in the kingdom of Valencia, except thoſe, who, inhabiting certain mountainous parts of the country which they deemed impregnable, formed the deſperate reſolution of maintaining their poſſeſſions by force of arms. Before the meeting of Valencia, great numbers of thoſe who lived in towns, and in the more fertile parts of the country, had earneſtly ſolicited the barons to procure them to be named among the families who were to be permitted to remain;

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but no ſooner were they made acquainted with the determination of their leaders, than, with one heart, and one voice, they declared that no conſideration ſhould now induce them to ſtay behind their kinſmen and companions.

This declaration was a matter of deep concern to the barons, who had, in ſome meaſure, been reconciled to the expulſion by the promiſe which had been given for ſix families out of every hundred to remain, and now dreaded the utter ruin of their eſtates, if the Moreſcoes ſhould perſevere in their preſent reſolution. Of all the barons the duke of Gandia was likely to prove the greateſt ſufferer, as his eſtate chiefly conſiſted of thoſe manufactures with which the Moreſcoes alone were acquainted. By employing all his influence with them, and making them the moſt advantageous offers, he at length obtained their conſent, on condition that they ſhould be allowed the free exerciſe of their religion. The duke ſolicited the viceroy to grant them this indulgence, till the Chriſtians ſhould be inſtructed in the manufactures, which would not require more than two or three years at moſt; but was told by the viceroy, that, agreeably to his orders from the king, it could not be granted for a ſingle day [16]. This anſwer being communicated to the Moreſcoes, there was

[16] The viceroy received a letter of thanks from Philip on this occaſion, beginning thus: Yo os aggradeſco mucho lo que reſpondiſtes, y el parecer que days, que no por una hora ſi conſienta, que es muy conforme a lo que de vueſtra mucha Chriſtianidad, ſi podia eſperar, etc. Fonſeca, lib. iv. cap. 8.

not

not one perſon of more than a hundred and fifty thouſand who could be perſuaded to remain.

Nor were they leſs inflexible in refuſing to leave their children behind them that were under ſix years of age. They were well aware, as they ſaid to the eccleſiaſtics who applied to them on this head, of the great inconveniencies and dangers to which ſo many thouſand children, with their mothers and nurſes, none of whom had ever been at ſea, muſt be expoſed from being crowded together on board the ſhips and gallies; but they were unalterably determined to carry them along with them to whatever part of the world they themſelves ſhould go, and choſe rather to ſee them periſh before their eyes than to leave them in the hands of a people by whom their parents had been treated with ſo much cruelty [16].

The army having been diſtributed into the ſeveral ſtations, where they might moſt effectually prevent any diſturbance or inſurrection, and the ſhips of war and tranſports, fully equipped for their intended voyage, the viceroy, without any farther delay, began to carry the royal edict into execution, by ſending commiſſioners, with a

[16] The eccleſiaſtics, however, and ſome religious women of rank, detained a conſiderable number of the children, partly by ſtealth, and partly by compulſion; believing that, in doing ſo, they performed a meritorious ſervice in the ſight of God, and ſaved the ſouls of the children from perdition. Fonſeca, p. 233. Dio principio a eſte ſanto latrocinio, Donna Iſabel de Velaſco Virreina de aquel Reino, la qual dio orden que le traxeſſen a caſa algunas Moriſquillas, aunque fueſſe hurtandolas a ſus curadores, como ſe hizo, &c.

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ſufficient body of troops, to collect the Moreſcoes in different quarters together, and to conduct them to the coaſt. The vaſſals of the duke of Gandia, amounting to more than twenty thouſand men, were the firſt who embarked, and, after a proſperous voyage, they were ſafely landed at Oran a Spaniſh fortreſs on the coaſt of Barbary.

At Oran they were well received by the count of Aguilar, the governor of the fort, and, on his application to the viceroy of Tremezen, which ſtands at the diſtance of two days journey from Oran, leave was granted them to come to take up their reſidence in the former of theſe places. In their journey thither they were deeply affected, and few of them could reſtrain their tears, when they compared the deſert barren plains, through which they paſſed, with the fertile and delightful regions of Valencia. It afforded them, however, no ſmall conſolation in their diſtreſs to reflect that, as the dread which they had entertained of being murdered by the way had proved groundleſs, they had now found a prince of their own religion, diſpoſed to grant them his protection. Upon their arrival at Tremezen, they were ſuffered to retain all their wealth which they had brought along with them, and admitted to all the ſame liberties and privileges as the natives of the place.

An account of the treatment which they received having been carried to Spain, by ten perſons who were ſuffered to return for that purpoſe, it contributed, in ſome meaſure, to reconcile the

other Moreſcoes in Valencia to their fate; and, as the winter-ſeaſon was faſt approaching, when they muſt encounter greater difficulties in their paſſage, they even diſcovered a degree of impatience to be permitted to embark [17].

No time was unneceſſarily loſt on the part of the viceroy. The Moreſcoes, conducted by his commiſſaries and the royal troops, and many of them accompanied, from compaſſion and humanity, by the barons whoſe vaſſals they had been, were every where in motion, and haſtening in crowds, with their wives and children, to the coaſt. The ſhips which had been provided for tranſporting them, having been found extremely inadequate to the purpoſe, many more were collected from the ſea-ports in Spain, Majorca, and Italy. Of theſe many were hired by the Moreſcoes themſelves, who deſired, as ſoon as poſſible, to emancipate themſelves from the power of the Spaniards; while the greater number went on board the ſhips provided by the king. And in a few weeks about a hundred and twenty thouſand men, women, and children had embarked.

Many of theſe were perſons of ſubſtance and condition; ſome of them, on account of their early profeſſion of Chriſtianity, had been raiſed to the rank of nobility, by the emperor Charles V. And the elegance and beauty of the young Moreſco women is highly celebrated by a cotemporary Spaniſh hiſtorian, whoſe bigotry often prompts him to exult in their diſtreſs.

[17] Fonſeca.

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Humanity of the barons of Valencia.

Widely different from the ſentiments of this bigoted eccleſiaſtic were thoſe of the Valencia barons; who gave their vaſſals, on this melancholy occaſion, every proof of generous compaſſion and humanity. By the royal edict they were entitled to all property belonging to their vaſſals, except what they were able to carry about their perſons: but the barons, deſpiſing this right which the edict beſtowed on them, allowed the Moreſcoes to diſpoſe of whatever part of their effects could be ſold for money, and likewiſe permitted them to convey their moſt valuable furniture and manufactures on mules and in carriages to the ſhips. Many of them accompanied their vaſſals in perſon to the ſhore, and ſome of them, having embarked along with them, ſaw them ſafely land on the coaſt of Africa [18].

But this kind attention of the barons ſerved only for a little time to mitigate their diſtreſs. Their exile from their native country, which juſtly

[18] Of the barons who thus diſtinguiſhed themſelves by their tenderneſs and humanity on this occaſion, and who remained at the ſea-ports during the whole time of the embarkation, employing all their intereſt to protect the Moreſcoes from injury, and to procure them the beſt accommodation poſſible on board the ſhips, Fonſeca has recorded the names of the following, adding that there were many others whom he has not named; the duke of Gandia, whoſe great eſtate was almoſt entirely ruined; the marquis of Albada, the count of Alaguas, the count of Bunol, the count of Anna, the count of Sinarcas, the count of Concentayna, and the duke of Maqueda who went over in the firſt embarkation to the port of Oran.

excited in them the moſt bitter regret, and gave them ſo much ground for anxiety with regard to their future fortune, was ſoon ſucceeded by ſtill greater calamities. Great numbers were ſhipwrecked on their paſſage, and never reached the African coaſt; while many others were barbarouſly murdered at ſea, by the crews of the ſhips which they had freighted; this latter calamity befel only thoſe who had choſen to tranſport themſelves in private ſhips, and inſtances are recorded of ſuch inhuman cruelty exerciſed againſt this harmleſs, perſecuted, and defenceleſs people, by the owners and crews of theſe ſhips, as equals any thing of the ſame kind of which we read in hiſtory. The men butchered in the preſence of their wives and children: the women and children afterwards thrown alive into the ſea; of the women, ſome, on account of their beauty, preſerved alive for a few days to ſatiate the luſt of the inhuman murderers of their huſbands and brothers, and then either ſlaughtered or committed to the waves; ſuch were ſome of the horrid deeds of which theſe barbarians were convicted upon their trial to which they were brought, in conſequence of quarrelling with each other about the diviſion of their prey; and ſuch, if we may credit a cotemporary hiſtorian, was the unhappy fate of a great number of the Moreſcoes [19].

Hard fate of the Moreſcoes.

Nor was the fate of the greater part of thoſe who reached the coaſt of Barbary leſs deplorable. They had no ſooner landed on this barren inhoſpitable

[19] Fonſeca.

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ſhore, than they were attacked by the Bedouin Arabs, a wild banditti who live in tents, and ſupport themſelves by hunting and by plunder. The Moreſcoes, unarmed, and incumbered with their wives and children, were often robbed by thoſe barbarians, who came upon them in numerous bodies, amounting ſometimes to five or ſix thouſand men; and, as often as the Moreſcoes attempted, with ſtones and ſlings, their only arms, to make reſiſtance, put great numbers of them to the ſword. Still greater numbers periſhed of fatigue and hunger, joined to the inclemencies of the weather, from which they had no means of ſhelter, during their tedious journey through the African deſerts, to Moſtagan, Algiers, and other places, where they hoped to be permitted to take up their reſidence. Few of them ever arrived at theſe places. Of ſix thouſand, who ſet out together from Conaſtal, a town in the neighbourhood of Oran, with an intention of going to Algiers, a ſingle perſon only, of the name of Pedralvi, ſurvived the diſaſters to which they were expoſed; and of the whole hundred and forty thouſand, who were at this time tranſported to Africa, there is ground to believe, from the concurring teſtimony of perſons who had acceſs to know the truth, that more than a hundred thouſand men, women, and children, ſuffered death in its moſt hideous forms, within a few months after their expulſion from Valencia [20].

[20] Fonſeca, Gonzalez Davila, p. 146.

Compared to the dreadful fate to which this unhappy people were doomed by the Spaniards, it would have been an act of mercy on the part of the king, had he either commanded them to be put to the ſword, or committed to the flames; as their miſery would, in this caſe, have been of ſhort continuance. The knowledge of what had befallen them ought, at leaſt, to have deterred him from expoſing the reſt of his Moreſco ſubjects to the like calamities.

But the ſentiments of humanity in the eccleſiaſtics and court of Spain were overpowered by thoſe of the moſt illiberal ſuperſtition. They conſidered that inexpreſſible miſery, which they themſelves had brought on the Moreſcoes, as a ſignal of divine judgment againſt that unhappy people, which ſerved to juſtify the cruelty which they had exerciſed, and to prove that what they had done was acceptable in the ſight of God. Far from feeling remorſe or ſorrow for what had happened, they rather triumphed and exulted in it, and were confirmed in their reſolution of expelling all the Moreſcoes in Spain without exception, and without thinking it incumbent on them to make proviſion for their reception in any of thoſe countries to which they were about to be conveyed.

But before they proceeded to the expulſion of the Moreſcoes in Caſtile and other provinces, it was judged neceſſary to reduce to obedience all ſuch of the Moreſcoes in Valencia, above mentioned, as had retired to the mountainous parts of that kingdom, with the reſolution of ſtanding on

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their defence. Their number, including men, women, and children, amounted nearly to thirty thouſand. Having collected together a conſiderable quantity of proviſions of all kinds, they had begun, while the viceroy was employed in tranſporting their countrymen, to fortify themſelves as well as they were able, and to block up the narrow paſſes by which the Spaniards muſt approach. But, beſides being utterly deſtitute of military ſkill, they were extremely ill furniſhed both with arms and ammunition; and the folly of their attempt quickly appeared in the feebleneſs of every effort which they made to repel the attacks of the enemy. The viceroy having ſent againſt them the flower of the regular forces, under the command of Don Auguſtin Meſica, who had acquired conſiderable military experience and renown in the wars of Flanders, a great part of them were compelled to ſurrender, through the want of water, from which Meſica had found means to cut them off; and ſoon after the reſt were beaten from their intrenchments, and put to flight.

In the purſuit no mercy was ſhown, either to the aged or to the women and children, though rolling in the duſt, and imploring mercy, by the ſavage conquerors. Upwards of three thouſand periſhed [21]. The number of thoſe who had

[21] Fonſeca, p. 310. — From the ſtyle of this author in this and many other paſſages, there is little ground for doubt, that with pleaſure he would have acted the ſame bloody part which he deſcribes.

ſurrendered was two-and-twenty thouſand, who were all ſoon after tranſported to Africa, except the children under ſeven years of age, whom the ſoldiers were permitted to ſell for ſlaves. The king decreed, that, after a certain number of years, they ſhould be ſet at liberty; but, as many of them were ſent to foreign countries, there is ground to ſuſpect that the decree was not attended with the deſired effect [22].

Another order of the king, which he publiſhed at this time, proved more effectual. Beſides the Moreſcoes who were killed or taken priſoners, a conſiderable number, diſtruſtful of the Spaniſh faith,

Fueron Siguiendo la victoria, los nueſtros, matando ſin excecion, quantos alcançavan, viejos op moços, grandes, pequennos, hombres, y mugeres, por mas que arrodillados ellos, y ellas con los braços abiertos les pedian miſericordia, no mereciendola los que ſiempre uſaron mal della.—Fonſeca, 310.

[22] The viceroy and the archbiſhop of Valencia differed widely in their opinion with regard to the proper method of diſpoſing of the children. The former repreſented to the king, that all of them, who were under fifteen years of age, might be ſafely permitted to remain in the hands of the Chriſtians, to whom they had been ſold by the ſoldiers, as there would be no Mahometans in the kingdom by whom they could be perverted from embracing the principles of the Chriſtian faith. Beſides, that as moſt of their parents and other relations had periſhed in the late inſurrection, it would be leſs cruel to put them all to the ſword, than to land ſo great a number of helpleſs young creatures on the coaſt of Barbary. The archbiſhop, on the other hand, declared that, after a certain age, no Moreſco could poſſibly be converted; and that, if the Moreſco children, at fifteen, at twelve, at ten, or even ſeven years of age, were ſuffered to remain,

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or prompted by an unconquerable attachment to their native country, had diſperſed themſelves among the woods and rocks, where they hoped to elude the notice of the Spaniards. Philip put a price upon the heads of theſe unhappy men, and the ſoldiers were ſent out to hunt for them, as for beaſts of prey. Hardly any of them were able to eſcape. Some of them choſe rather to die of cold and hunger than ſurrender themſelves to the Spaniards; and at length their leader, who with his wife and children had concealed themſelves in the moſt inacceſſible parts of the mountains, was taken and carried alive to Valencia, where, after ſuffering much mockery and inſult for having allowed himſelf to be elected king of the inſurgents, he was, by a ſolemn ſentence, condemned and put to death [21].

the whole kingdom of Valencia would again be peopled with Mahometans before the end of the ſecond, or at moſt, of the third generation. The king, deſirous to gratify both the viceroy and the archbiſhop, but leaning more to the ſide of the latter, gave his permiſſion, as above mentioned, for retaining only ſuch of the children as were under ſeven years of age.

[21] In the Appendix (B) the reader will find other intereſting circumſtances relative to the condition of the Moreſcoes in Spain, their expulſion and ſubſequent fate, collected from Sir Francis Cottington's Letters from Spain, 1609 and 1610.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

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